发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Social Choice and Welfare最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences 单峰偏好经济中人口对再分配规则的可变操纵
4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-11-02 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01487-x
Agustín G. Bonifacio
{"title":"Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences","authors":"Agustín G. Bonifacio","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01487-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01487-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"37 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135934435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A dynamic model of endogenous development: the role of pioneers 内生发展的动态模型:先驱者的作用
4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01489-9
Alexander Usvitskiy
{"title":"A dynamic model of endogenous development: the role of pioneers","authors":"Alexander Usvitskiy","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01489-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01489-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"360 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135321149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cost intervention in delinquent networks 拖欠网络的成本干预
4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01493-z
Yifan Xiong, Youze Lang, Ziyan Li
{"title":"Cost intervention in delinquent networks","authors":"Yifan Xiong, Youze Lang, Ziyan Li","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01493-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01493-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"54 12","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135370818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ordinal utility differences 序效用差异
4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-10-27 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01488-w
Jean Baccelli
{"title":"Ordinal utility differences","authors":"Jean Baccelli","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01488-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01488-w","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is widely held that under ordinal utility, utility differences are ill-defined. Allegedly, for these to be well-defined (without turning to choice under risk or the like), one should adopt as a new kind of primitive quaternary relations, instead of the traditional binary relations underlying ordinal utility functions. Correlatively, it is also widely held that the key structural properties of quaternary relations are entirely arbitrary from an ordinal point of view. These properties would be, in a nutshell, the hallmark of cardinal utility. While much is obviously true in these two tenets, this note explains why, as stated, they should be abandoned. Any ordinal utility function induces a rich quaternary relation. There is such a thing as ordinal utility differences. Furthermore, this induced quaternary relation respects, apart from completeness, the most standard structural properties of quaternary relations. These properties are, from an ordinal point of view, anything but arbitrary; from a quaternary perspective only completeness should be considered the hallmark—if any—of cardinal utility. These facts are explained to be especially relevant to the critical appreciation of the ordinalist methodology.","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"10 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136263144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The expressive power of voting rules 投票规则的表现力
4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-10-10 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01486-y
Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde, João V. Ferreira
{"title":"The expressive power of voting rules","authors":"Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde, João V. Ferreira","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01486-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01486-y","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Different voting rules are commonly used to settle collective decisions. A promising way to assess voting rules, for which little is known, is to compare the expressive utility that voters derive from voting with each rule. In this paper, we first propose a simple ordinal model of expressive voting that allows us to compare voting rules in terms of the expressive utility that voters can derive from voting (their expressive power ). Our model provides a novel testable implication according to which expected turnout increases with expressive power. We then ran an online experiment testing this implication in a controlled environment. We find that if voters are made aware of alternative voting rules, turnout is higher in voting rules with higher expressive power. Our results also show that higher expressive power is associated with a better representation of voters’ actual preferences and, according to our model, higher expressive utility. This suggests that the expressive power of voting rules is a relevant criterion when choosing between voting rules for economic and political decisions.","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136295096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Technological advance, social fragmentation and welfare 技术进步、社会分裂和福利
4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-10-04 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01484-0
Steven J. Bosworth, Dennis J. Snower
{"title":"Technological advance, social fragmentation and welfare","authors":"Steven J. Bosworth, Dennis J. Snower","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01484-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01484-0","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper models the welfare consequences of social fragmentation arising from technological advance. We start from the premise that technological progress falls primarily on market-traded commodities rather than prosocial relationships, since the latter intrinsically require the expenditure of time and thus are less amenable to productivity increases. Since prosocial relationships require individuals to identify with others in their social group whereas marketable commodities are commonly the objects of social status comparisons, a tradeoff arises between in-group affiliation and inter-group status comparisons. People consequently narrow the bounds of their social groups, reducing their prosocial relationships and extending their status-seeking activities. As prosocial relationships generate positive externalities whereas status-seeking activities generate negative preference externalities, technological advance may lead to a particular type of “decoupling” of social welfare from material prosperity. Once the share of status goods in total production exceeds a crucial threshold, technological advance is shown to be welfare-reducing.","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"302 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135547703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The “invisible hand” of vote markets 投票市场的“看不见的手”
4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-09-19 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01485-z
Dimitrios Xefteris, Nicholas Ziros
{"title":"The “invisible hand” of vote markets","authors":"Dimitrios Xefteris, Nicholas Ziros","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01485-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01485-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135060931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Centralized assignment of prizes and contestants 集中分配奖品和选手
4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-09-13 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01483-1
Stefano Barbieri, Marco Serena
{"title":"Centralized assignment of prizes and contestants","authors":"Stefano Barbieri, Marco Serena","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01483-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01483-1","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study a contest design problem in which a designer chooses how many Tullock contests to have, how much to award to each contest, and which contestants (of high or low type) should be assigned to which contest. Our main result is that a single grand contest maximizes total effort. We consider three extensions. First, when the designers’ objective changes to maximizing the effort submitted by the winning contestant, we find that the optimal design involves the high-type contestants being assigned to a set of pairwise contests. Second, under multiple participations (a player’s effort is valid in multiple contests, as in several applications), running a contest open to all, along with a parallel contest open only to low types, increases total effort over a single grand contest. Third, tilting the playing field (a player’s effort is multiplied by a tilting factor) in favor of low types increases total effort in a single grand contest, even more than what is possible with multiple participations; thus, in applications, a quota reserved for traditionally disadvantaged categories results in lower total effort than a grand contest that optimally handicaps advantaged categories.","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135689708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values 具有相互依赖值的单对象分配的最坏情况高效和预算平衡机制
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-08-30 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01479-x
A. Vikram
{"title":"Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values","authors":"A. Vikram","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01479-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01479-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48893103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Assignment games with population monotonic allocation schemes 具有人口单调分配方案的分配对策
4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-08-21 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01477-z
Tamás Solymosi
{"title":"Assignment games with population monotonic allocation schemes","authors":"Tamás Solymosi","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01477-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01477-z","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We characterize the assignment games which admit a population monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS) in terms of efficiently verifiable structural properties of the nonnegative matrix that induces the game. We prove that an assignment game is PMAS-admissible if and only if the positive elements of the underlying nonnegative matrix form orthogonal submatrices of three special types. In game theoretic terms it means that an assignment game is PMAS-admissible if and only if it contains either a veto player or a dominant veto mixed pair, or the game is a composition of these two types of special assignment games. We also show that in PMAS-admissible assignment games all core allocations can be extended to a PMAS, and the nucleolus coincides with the tau-value.","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135817868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信