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Social Choice and Welfare最新文献

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The “invisible hand” of vote markets 投票市场的“看不见的手”
4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-09-19 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01485-z
Dimitrios Xefteris, Nicholas Ziros
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引用次数: 0
Centralized assignment of prizes and contestants 集中分配奖品和选手
4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-09-13 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01483-1
Stefano Barbieri, Marco Serena
{"title":"Centralized assignment of prizes and contestants","authors":"Stefano Barbieri, Marco Serena","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01483-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01483-1","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study a contest design problem in which a designer chooses how many Tullock contests to have, how much to award to each contest, and which contestants (of high or low type) should be assigned to which contest. Our main result is that a single grand contest maximizes total effort. We consider three extensions. First, when the designers’ objective changes to maximizing the effort submitted by the winning contestant, we find that the optimal design involves the high-type contestants being assigned to a set of pairwise contests. Second, under multiple participations (a player’s effort is valid in multiple contests, as in several applications), running a contest open to all, along with a parallel contest open only to low types, increases total effort over a single grand contest. Third, tilting the playing field (a player’s effort is multiplied by a tilting factor) in favor of low types increases total effort in a single grand contest, even more than what is possible with multiple participations; thus, in applications, a quota reserved for traditionally disadvantaged categories results in lower total effort than a grand contest that optimally handicaps advantaged categories.","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135689708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values 具有相互依赖值的单对象分配的最坏情况高效和预算平衡机制
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-08-30 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01479-x
A. Vikram
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引用次数: 0
Assignment games with population monotonic allocation schemes 具有人口单调分配方案的分配对策
4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-08-21 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01477-z
Tamás Solymosi
{"title":"Assignment games with population monotonic allocation schemes","authors":"Tamás Solymosi","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01477-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01477-z","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We characterize the assignment games which admit a population monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS) in terms of efficiently verifiable structural properties of the nonnegative matrix that induces the game. We prove that an assignment game is PMAS-admissible if and only if the positive elements of the underlying nonnegative matrix form orthogonal submatrices of three special types. In game theoretic terms it means that an assignment game is PMAS-admissible if and only if it contains either a veto player or a dominant veto mixed pair, or the game is a composition of these two types of special assignment games. We also show that in PMAS-admissible assignment games all core allocations can be extended to a PMAS, and the nucleolus coincides with the tau-value.","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135817868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Approval-based shortlisting 不允许名单
4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-08-11 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01482-2
Martin Lackner, Jan Maly
{"title":"Approval-based shortlisting","authors":"Martin Lackner, Jan Maly","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01482-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01482-2","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Shortlisting is the task of reducing a long list of alternatives to a (smaller) set of best or most suitable alternatives. Shortlisting is often used in the nomination process of awards or in recommender systems to display featured objects. In this paper, we analyze shortlisting methods that are based on approval data, a common type of preferences. Furthermore, we assume that the size of the shortlist, i.e., the number of best or most suitable alternatives, is not fixed but determined by the shortlisting method. We axiomatically analyze established and new shortlisting methods and complement this analysis with an experimental evaluation based on synthetic and real-world data. Our results lead to recommendations which shortlisting methods to use, depending on the desired properties.","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135396949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Escape poverty trap with trust? An experimental study 用信任摆脱贫困陷阱?实验研究
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-08-06 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01480-4
Kenneth S. Chan, V. Lei, Filip Veselý
{"title":"Escape poverty trap with trust? An experimental study","authors":"Kenneth S. Chan, V. Lei, Filip Veselý","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01480-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01480-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46862409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ties 关系
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-08-04 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01476-0
Federico Revelli, Tsung-Sheng Tsai, Cheng-Tai Wu
{"title":"Ties","authors":"Federico Revelli, Tsung-Sheng Tsai, Cheng-Tai Wu","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01476-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01476-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49246133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Two impossibility results for social choice under individual indifference intransitivity 个体冷漠不及物性下社会选择的两个不可能结果
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-07-28 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01478-y
Gustav Alexandrie
{"title":"Two impossibility results for social choice under individual indifference intransitivity","authors":"Gustav Alexandrie","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01478-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01478-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"61 1","pages":"919 - 936"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46735883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Tailored recommendations on a matching platform 在匹配平台上量身定制的推荐
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-07-25 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01475-1
Gunhaeng Lee
{"title":"Tailored recommendations on a matching platform","authors":"Gunhaeng Lee","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01475-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01475-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"61 1","pages":"883 - 917"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46623355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On measuring axiom violations due to each tax instrument applied in a real-world personal income tax 在衡量公理违反由于每个税收工具应用于现实世界的个人所得税
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-07-19 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01473-3
S. Pellegrino, A. Vernizzi
{"title":"On measuring axiom violations due to each tax instrument applied in a real-world personal income tax","authors":"S. Pellegrino, A. Vernizzi","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01473-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01473-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"61 1","pages":"853 - 882"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43492649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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