Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values

IF 0.5 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-08-30 DOI:10.1007/s00355-023-01479-x

A. Vikram

引用次数: 0

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具有相互依赖值的单对象分配的最坏情况高效和预算平衡机制

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来源期刊

Social Choice and Welfare Multiple-

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

11.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： Social Choice and Welfare explores all aspects, both normative and positive, of welfare economics, collective choice, and strategic interaction. Topics include but are not limited to: preference aggregation, welfare criteria, fairness, justice and equity, rights, inequality and poverty measurement, voting and elections, political games, coalition formation, public goods, mechanism design, networks, matching, optimal taxation, cost-benefit analysis, computational social choice, judgement aggregation, market design, behavioral welfare economics, subjective well-being studies and experimental investigations related to social choice and voting. As such, the journal is inter-disciplinary and cuts across the boundaries of economics, political science, philosophy, and mathematics. Articles on choice and order theory that include results that can be applied to the above topics are also included in the journal. While it emphasizes theory, the journal also publishes empirical work in the subject area reflecting cross-fertilizing between theoretical and empirical research. Readers will find original research articles, surveys, and book reviews.Officially cited as: Soc Choice Welf