{"title":"Foundations of utilitarianism under risk and variable population.","authors":"Dean Spears, Stéphane Zuber","doi":"10.1007/s00355-022-01440-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s00355-022-01440-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Utilitarianism is the most prominent social welfare function in economics. We present three new axiomatic characterizations of utilitarian (that is, additively-separable) social welfare functions in a setting where there is risk over both population size and individuals' welfares. We first show that, given uncontroversial basic axioms, Blackorby et al.'s (1998) Expected Critical-Level Generalized Utilitarianism is equivalent to a new axiom holding that it is better to allocate higher utility-conditional-on-existence to possible people who have a higher probability of existence. The other two characterizations extend and clarify classic axiomatizations of utilitarianism from settings with either social risk or variable-population, considered alone.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"61 1","pages":"101-129"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10751882/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49475867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cesàro average utilitarianism in relativistic spacetime","authors":"M. Pivato","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01470-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01470-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"61 1","pages":"733 - 761"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46634254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the safety of group manipulation","authors":"H. Peters, Yuliya A. Veselova","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01469-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01469-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"61 1","pages":"713 - 732"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42058382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Leading by example in a public goods experiment with benefit heterogeneity","authors":"Jing Yu, Martin G. Kocher","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01459-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01459-1","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Social dilemmas such as greenhouse gas emission reduction are often characterized by heterogeneity in benefits from solving the dilemma. How should leadership of group members be organized in such a setting? We implement a laboratory public goods experiment with heterogeneous marginal per capita returns from the public good and leading by example that is either implemented exogenously or by self-selection. Our results suggest that both ways of implementing leadership only have small effects on contributions to the public good. Self-selected leaders—in particular self-selected low-benefit leaders—tend to set better examples than imposed leaders, but they are also exploited more strongly by followers. Leaders seem to need additional instruments to be more effective when benefits are heterogeneous.","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136248311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How does exposure to COVID-19 influence health and income inequality aversion?","authors":"Miqdad Asaria, Joan Costa-Font, Frank Cowell","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01460-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s00355-023-01460-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We study individual aversion to health and income inequality in three European countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy), its determinants and especially, the effects of exposure to three types of COVID-19 specific shocks affecting individuals' employment status, their income and health. Next, using evidence of representative samples of the population in the UK, we compare levels of health- and income-inequality aversion in the UK between the years 2016 and 2020. We document evidence of a significant increase in inequality aversion in both income and health domains. However, we show that inequality aversion is higher in the income domain than in the health domain. Furthermore, we find that inequality aversion in both domains increases in age and education and decreases in income and risk appetite. However, people directly exposed to major health shocks during the COVID-19 pandemic generally exhibited lower levels of aversion to both income and health inequality. Finally, we show that inequality aversion was significantly higher among those exposed to higher risk of COVID-19 mortality who experienced major health shocks during the pandemic.</p><p><strong>Supplementary information: </strong>The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s00355-023-01460-8.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":" ","pages":"1-23"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10197041/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10075340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis","authors":"Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, F. Klijn, M. Vorsatz","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01458-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01458-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"61 1","pages":"587 - 624"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47437937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Citizen preferences and the architecture of government","authors":"Jean-Marc Bourgeon, Marie-Laure Breuillé","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01465-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01465-3","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the division of a territory into administrative jurisdictions responsible for providing a set of goods to its residents. We deduce the optimal architecture of public governance (i.e. the division of government into several levels, the distribution of services among them, their number of jurisdictions and the capacity of their administrations), which depends on citizens preferences regarding the quality of public services. We compare it to a decentralized government where each jurisdiction is free to choose the capacity and scope of its administration. The resulting architecture generally involves more countries with fewer levels of administration than the optimal one. Our results allow us to estimate citizen preferences for the U.S. We find that the country is divided into two zones (“Northeast and West” and “Midwest and South”) whose estimated values are statistically different.","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"196 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135288149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Manipulation of moves in sequential contests","authors":"K. Protopappas","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01461-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01461-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"61 1","pages":"511 - 535"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42490004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mostapha Diss, Clinton Gubong Gassi, Issofa Moyouwou
{"title":"Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule","authors":"Mostapha Diss, Clinton Gubong Gassi, Issofa Moyouwou","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01464-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01464-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"61 1","pages":"489 - 510"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43264441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}