Joseph Siani, Bertrand Tchantcho, Bill Proces Tsague
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引用次数: 0
摘要
权力度量用于量化民主机构成员的影响力。我们考虑的是带弃权的投票博弈或（3,2）博弈，即投票选项包括赞成、反对和弃权的决策过程。我们研究的权力指数是基于最小赢家三方和移位最小赢家三方的概念。我们定义并描述了（3,2）博弈类中的迪根-帕克尔（Deegan-Packel）和移位迪根-帕克尔（Deegan-Packel）力量指数。此外，由于 Freixas 等人获得的参数化结果（Discret Appl Math 255:21-39, 2019），我们提供了这些指数在 I-complete（3,2）博弈类中的计算公式。通过这些公式，我们可以确定每个棋手在博弈中的实力，而无需考虑博弈中最小和/或移位最小胜局三方的数量。
Axiomatization of some power indices in voting games with abstention
Power measures are used to quantify the influence of members of a democratic institution. We consider voting games with abstention or (3,2) games, which are decision-making processes in which voting options include yes, no and abstention. The power indices that we study are based on the notions of minimal and shift minimal winning tripartitions. We define and characterize the Deegan–Packel and shift Deegan–Packel power indices in the class of (3,2) games. Furthermore, owing to the parameterization result obtained by Freixas et al. (Discret Appl Math 255:21–39, 2019), we provide computational formulae of these indices in the class of I-complete (3,2) games. These formulae allow us to determine the power of each player in a game, regardless of the number of minimal and/or shift minimal winning tripartitions of the game.
期刊介绍：
Social Choice and Welfare explores all aspects, both normative and positive, of welfare economics, collective choice, and strategic interaction. Topics include but are not limited to: preference aggregation, welfare criteria, fairness, justice and equity, rights, inequality and poverty measurement, voting and elections, political games, coalition formation, public goods, mechanism design, networks, matching, optimal taxation, cost-benefit analysis, computational social choice, judgement aggregation, market design, behavioral welfare economics, subjective well-being studies and experimental investigations related to social choice and voting. As such, the journal is inter-disciplinary and cuts across the boundaries of economics, political science, philosophy, and mathematics. Articles on choice and order theory that include results that can be applied to the above topics are also included in the journal. While it emphasizes theory, the journal also publishes empirical work in the subject area reflecting cross-fertilizing between theoretical and empirical research. Readers will find original research articles, surveys, and book reviews.Officially cited as: Soc Choice Welf
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