Review of Philosophy and Psychology最新文献

{"title":"Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and the Comprehension of Determinism","authors":"Daniel Lim, Ryan Nichols, Joseph Wagoner","doi":"10.1007/s13164-024-00726-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-024-00726-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The experimental validity of research in the experimental philosophy of free will has been called into question. Several new, important studies (Murray et al. forthcoming; Nadelhoffer et al., Cognitive Science 44 (8): 1–28, 2020; Nadelhoffer et al., 2021; Rose et al., Cognitive Science 41 (2): 482–502, 2017) are interpreted as showing that the vignette-judgment model is defective because participants only exhibit a surface-level comprehension and not the deeper comprehension the model requires. Participants, it is argued, commit <i>bypassing</i>, <i>intrusion</i>, and <i>fatalism</i> errors. We respond in two ways: (1) we critique and improve existing methods for assessing deeper comprehension and (2) we develop videos to convey deterministic principles of change that succeed in significantly reducing participants’ bypassing, intrusion, and fatalism errors. Consequently, we have the best existing instrument for gauging folk intuitions about the relationship between free will and determinism.</p>","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140116390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Aftereffects, High-Levelism and Gestalt Properties","authors":"Yavuz Recep Başoğlu","doi":"10.1007/s13164-024-00730-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-024-00730-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>According to high-levelism, one can perceptually be aware of high-level properties such as natural kind properties. Against high-levelism, the Gestalt proposal suggests that instead of high-level properties, one can have a perceptual experience as of Gestalt properties, i.e., determinables of determinate low-level properties. When one looks at a bird, the high-levelist argues that one can perceive the property of being a bird, and the proponent of the Gestalt proposal argues that one first perceives the property of having the bird Gestalt (shared by all and only birds) and only post-perceptually recognizes that it is a bird. In the present study, to resolve the dispute between high-levelism and the Gestalt proposal, I aim to test their abilities to explain the attribution of multiple perceptible properties to the same object by making use of various empirical studies on high-level aftereffects. I conclude that the Gestalt proposal fails the test and hence shall not be a viable alternative to high-levelism.</p>","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140036436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Non-doxastic Attitude Reports, Information Structure, and Semantic-Pragmatic Interface","authors":"Wojciech Rostworowski, Katarzyna Kuś, Bartosz Maćkiewicz","doi":"10.1007/s13164-024-00727-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-024-00727-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Truth conditions of sentences ascribing non-doxastic propositional attitudes seem to depend on the information structure of the embedded clause. In this paper, we argue that this kind of sensitivity is a semantic phenomenon rather than a pragmatic one. We report four questionnaire studies which explore the impact of the information structure on the truth conditions of non-doxastic attitude ascriptions from different perspectives. The results of the first two studies show that the acceptability of those ascriptions can be affected by some structural modifications of the embedded clause, in particular, when we replace a simple form by an equivalent complex <i>conjunctional</i> form (‘<i>p</i> and <i>q</i>’). However, it is possible that different evaluations of such ascriptions have a pragmatic source, namely, the ascriptions with embedded conjunction <i>imply</i> that the agent’s attitude transfers to both conjuncts. In the second pair of studies, we further investigate the nature of this implication which can be classified as ‘Conjunction Elimination’ (CE) in the scope of an attitude verb. The results show that CE-inferences in the context of non-factive non-doxastic attitude ascriptions are not easily cancellable and hence of a semantic rather than pragmatic nature. The results are not conclusive when it comes to the factive non-doxastic attitudes. We conclude our findings by some considerations about a potential source of the observed difference between non-factive and factive attitude verbs and the significance of our general findings to the semantic theory of non-doxastic attitude ascriptions.</p>","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140018967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Causal Conditionals, Tendency Causal Claims and Statistical Relevance","authors":"Michał Sikorski, Noah van Dongen, Jan Sprenger","doi":"10.1007/s13164-024-00725-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-024-00725-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Indicative conditionals and tendency causal claims are closely related (e.g., Frosch and Byrne, 2012), but despite these connections, they are usually studied separately. A unifying framework could consist in their dependence on probabilistic factors such as high conditional probability and statistical relevance (e.g., Adams, 1975; Eells, 1991; Douven, 2008, 2015). This paper presents a comparative empirical study on differences between judgments on tendency causal claims and indicative conditionals, how these judgments are driven by probabilistic factors, and how these factors differ in their predictive power for both causal and conditional claims.</p>","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140010682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Credences and Trustworthiness: a Calibrationist Account","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s13164-024-00724-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-024-00724-1","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>All of us make judgments of probability, and we rely on them for our decision-making. This paper argues that such judgments are trustworthy only to the extent that one has good reasons to think that they are produced by maximally inclusive, well calibrated cognitive processes. A cognitive process is maximally inclusive when it takes into account all the evidence which one regards as relevant, and it is well calibrated when anything it would assign, say, an 80% probability to would be true 80% of the time. We further have good reasons to think these judgments are trustworthy when, inter alia, they are produced by processes that have good track records of calibration. Call this inclusive calibrationism—or just “calibrationism” for short. In arguing for calibrationism, I also appeal to various empirical results, including research into probabilistic reasoning funded by the US intelligence community. Together, these ideas and results have implications for some important philosophical problems: the problem of the priors, the problem of unique events and the use of intuition in probabilistic reasoning. These theses and results also imply that our judgments are often less trustworthy than we might hope for potentially many domains, including law, medicine and others—barring good track records, that is.</p>","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139753822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Symbol and Substrate: A Methodological Approach to Computation in Cognitive Science","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s13164-023-00719-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-023-00719-4","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>Cognitive scientists use computational models to represent the results of their experimental work and to guide further research. Neither of these claims is particularly controversial, but the philosophical and evidentiary statuses of these models are hotly debated. To clarify the issues, I return to Newell and Simon’s 1972 exposition on the computational approach; they herald its ability to describe mental operations despite that the neuroscience of the time could not. Using work on visual imagery (cf. imagination) as a guide, I examine the extent to which this holds true today. Does contemporary neuroscience contain mechanisms capable of describing experimental results in imagery? I argue that it does not, first by exploring foundational achievements in imagery research then by showing that their neural basis cannot be specified. Newell and Simon’s methodological position accordingly stands, even 50 years later. Computational — as opposed to physiological — descriptions must be retained to characterize and study mental phenomena, even as we learn high-level details of their implementation via brain data.</p>","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139588933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"‘Pragmatics First’: Animal Communication and the Evolution of Language","authors":"Dorit Bar-On","doi":"10.1007/s13164-023-00721-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-023-00721-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Research on the evolution of language is often framed in terms of sharp discontinuities in syntax and semantics between animal communication systems and human language as we know them. According to the so-called “<i>pragmatics-first</i>” approach to the evolution of language, when trying to understand the origins of human language in animal communication, we should be focusing on potential <i>pragmatic</i> continuities. However, some proponents of this approach (e.g. Seyfarth and Cheney <i>Animal Behavior</i> 124: 339–346, 2017) find important pragmatic continuities, whereas others (e.g. Origgi and Sperber 2000) find sharp discontinuities. I begin (in Section 1) by arguing that this divergence is due to the fact that the proponents implicitly rely, respectively, on two different views of pragmatics, corresponding to different conceptions of what is involved in context-dependence – one “Carnapian”, the other “Gricean”. I argue that neither conception is fit to serve the purposes of pragmatics-first approaches to the evolution of language. In Section 2, I examine a recent formal “semantic-pragmatic” analysis of monkey calls, due to Philippe Schlenker et al. (in, e.g., <i>Linguistics and Philosophy</i> 37 (6): 439–501, 2014, <i>Trends in Cognitive Science</i> 20 (12): 894–904, 2016a, <i>Theoretical Linguistics</i> 42 (1–2): 1–90, 2016b), which appears to improve on the Carnapian and Gricean conceptions. However, I argue that the appearances are misleading and that the S-P analysis is no better suited than Carnapian analyses for the purposes of those seeking to establish human-nonhuman pragmatic continuities. Understanding why this is so will point the way toward my preferred, genuinely <i>intermediate</i> conception of pragmatics (as defended in Bar-On <i>Biology &amp; Philosophy</i> 36 (6): 1–25, 2021), which – I argue in Section 3 – is better fit for these purposes. Drawing on recent discussions of chimpanzee communication, I briefly indicate which aspects of extant primate call communication – both gestural and vocal – could potentially count as pragmatic according to this conception.</p>","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139588925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"On the Reality of the Base-Rate Fallacy: A Logical Reconstruction of the Debate","authors":"Martina Calderisi","doi":"10.1007/s13164-023-00712-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-023-00712-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Does the most common response given by participants presented with Tversky and Kahneman’s famous taxi cab problem amount to a violation of Bayes’ theorem? In other words, do they fall victim to so-called base-rate fallacy? In the present paper, following an earlier suggestion by Crupi and Girotto, we will identify the logical arguments underlying both the original diagnosis of irrationality in this reasoning task under uncertainty and a number of objections that have been raised against such a diagnosis. This will enable us to show firstly that, contrary to the dismissive arguments recently put forward by Elqayam and Evans, empirical evidence turns out to be quite useful in addressing questions of this kind. Therefore, it can make a significant contribution to moving the base-rate fallacy controversy forward. Secondly, the available empirical evidence (though limited and sometimes inconclusive) seems to support the charge of irrationality levelled against the majority of participants presented with the taxi cab problem, and hence suggests that base-rate neglect is a real fallacy − that is the conclusion of our analysis.</p>","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139463369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Against an Epistemic Argument for Mineness","authors":"Shao-Pu Kang","doi":"10.1007/s13164-024-00723-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-024-00723-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>When you have a conscious experience—such as feeling pain, watching the sunset, or thinking about your loved ones—are you aware of the experience as your own, even when you do not reflect on, think about, or attend to it? Let us say that an experience has “mineness” just in case its subject is aware of it as her own while she undergoes it. And let us call the view that all ordinary experiences have mineness “typicalism.” Recently, Guillot has offered a novel argument for typicalism by leveraging the relation between self-knowledge and self-awareness. She starts by arguing that all ordinary experiences give their subjects immediate justification to believe that their experiences are their own. She then argues that this can be explained by typicalism. In this paper, I argue that her argument fails. I start by clarifying the notion of mineness and giving more details about her argument. I then explain why her argument fails by raising doubts about whether typicalism explains the target explanandum. I close by considering some implications of our discussion for self-knowledge.</p>","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139412565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Moral Identity, Moral Integration, and Autobiographical Narrative","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s13164-023-00722-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-023-00722-9","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>Moral identity theorists argue that moral action is explained by the centrality of moral values to a person’s identity. Moral identity theorists refer to moral integration as both the process by which moral values become central to a person’s identity and the state an individual is in when a given moral value is central to their identity. While moral identity theorists appeal to autobiographical narratives to determine the state of moral integration in an individual, they have little to say about the role of autobiographical narratives in articulating the process of moral integration. The aim of this paper is to argue that appealing to autobiographical narratives supports the view that moral integration is a learning process the outcome of which is the acquisition of an understanding of moral concepts that is exercised in moral deliberation. Since moral identity theorists argue that moral integration is empirically correlated to a sustained commitment to moral action, the upshot of the argument of this paper is an account that elucidates the relationship between moral identity, moral action and moral deliberation.</p>","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139374228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}