非哆嗦态度报告、信息结构和语义-语用接口

IF 1.8 Q2 PSYCHOLOGY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY
Wojciech Rostworowski, Katarzyna Kuś, Bartosz Maćkiewicz
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引用次数: 0

摘要

赋予非恶性命题态度的句子的真实条件似乎取决于嵌入句的信息结构。在本文中,我们认为这种敏感性是一种语义现象,而不是语用现象。我们报告了四项问卷调查研究,从不同角度探讨了信息结构对非哆嗦态度描述的真实性条件的影响。前两项研究的结果表明,这些描述的可接受性会受到嵌入式分句的某些结构修改的影响,特别是当我们用一个等效的复杂连接形式('p 和 q')来替换一个简单形式时。然而,对这类描述的不同评价也可能有语用方面的原因,即带有嵌入连词的描述意味着行为主体的态度会转移到两个连词上。在第二对研究中,我们进一步调查了这种暗示的性质,这种暗示可以归类为态度动词范围内的 "连词消除"(CE)。研究结果表明,在非事实性非佯谬态度描述的语境中,CE-蕴涵不容易被取消,因此属于语义而非语用性质。就事实性非佯谬态度而言,结果并不确定。最后,我们对非事实性态度动词和事实性态度动词之间观察到的差异的潜在来源以及我们的一般研究结果对非恶性态度描述语义理论的意义进行了一些思考。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Non-doxastic Attitude Reports, Information Structure, and Semantic-Pragmatic Interface

Non-doxastic Attitude Reports, Information Structure, and Semantic-Pragmatic Interface

Truth conditions of sentences ascribing non-doxastic propositional attitudes seem to depend on the information structure of the embedded clause. In this paper, we argue that this kind of sensitivity is a semantic phenomenon rather than a pragmatic one. We report four questionnaire studies which explore the impact of the information structure on the truth conditions of non-doxastic attitude ascriptions from different perspectives. The results of the first two studies show that the acceptability of those ascriptions can be affected by some structural modifications of the embedded clause, in particular, when we replace a simple form by an equivalent complex conjunctional form (‘p and q’). However, it is possible that different evaluations of such ascriptions have a pragmatic source, namely, the ascriptions with embedded conjunction imply that the agent’s attitude transfers to both conjuncts. In the second pair of studies, we further investigate the nature of this implication which can be classified as ‘Conjunction Elimination’ (CE) in the scope of an attitude verb. The results show that CE-inferences in the context of non-factive non-doxastic attitude ascriptions are not easily cancellable and hence of a semantic rather than pragmatic nature. The results are not conclusive when it comes to the factive non-doxastic attitudes. We conclude our findings by some considerations about a potential source of the observed difference between non-factive and factive attitude verbs and the significance of our general findings to the semantic theory of non-doxastic attitude ascriptions.

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来源期刊
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Review of Philosophy and Psychology PSYCHOLOGY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY-
CiteScore
4.70
自引率
5.00%
发文量
60
期刊介绍: The Review of Philosophy and Psychology is a peer-reviewed journal focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive science. The aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on topics of mutual interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster interdisciplinary research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of the mind, including the neural, behavioural and social sciences. The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical research as well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical relevance. It includes thematic issues featuring invited contributions from leading authors together with articles answering a call for papers. The Review of Philosophy and Psychology is published quarterly and is hosted at the Jean Nicod Institute, a research centre of the French Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. It was formerly published as the "European Review of Philosophy" by CSLI Publications, Stanford.
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