Credences and Trustworthiness: a Calibrationist Account

IF 1.8 Q2 PSYCHOLOGY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY

Review of Philosophy and Psychology Pub Date : 2024-02-10 DOI:10.1007/s13164-024-00724-1

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

All of us make judgments of probability, and we rely on them for our decision-making. This paper argues that such judgments are trustworthy only to the extent that one has good reasons to think that they are produced by maximally inclusive, well calibrated cognitive processes. A cognitive process is maximally inclusive when it takes into account all the evidence which one regards as relevant, and it is well calibrated when anything it would assign, say, an 80% probability to would be true 80% of the time. We further have good reasons to think these judgments are trustworthy when, inter alia, they are produced by processes that have good track records of calibration. Call this inclusive calibrationism—or just “calibrationism” for short. In arguing for calibrationism, I also appeal to various empirical results, including research into probabilistic reasoning funded by the US intelligence community. Together, these ideas and results have implications for some important philosophical problems: the problem of the priors, the problem of unique events and the use of intuition in probabilistic reasoning. These theses and results also imply that our judgments are often less trustworthy than we might hope for potentially many domains, including law, medicine and others—barring good track records, that is.

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信用与可信度：校准论的阐述

摘要我们每个人都会对概率做出判断，并依赖这些判断做出决策。本文认为，只有当人们有充分的理由认为这些判断是由包容性最大、校准良好的认知过程产生的时候，这些判断才是可信的。当一个认知过程考虑到所有被认为相关的证据时，它就具有最大的包容性；当它认为任何事情（比如说，80%的概率）在80%的时间里都是真的时，它就具有良好的校准性。我们还有充分的理由认为，这些判断是可信的，因为它们是由具有良好校准记录的过程产生的。我们称之为包容性校准主义--简称 "校准主义"。在论证校准主义时，我还引用了各种经验成果，包括由美国情报界资助的概率推理研究。这些观点和结果共同对一些重要的哲学问题产生了影响：先验问题、独特事件问题以及概率推理中直觉的使用。这些论点和结果还意味着，我们的判断在许多领域，包括法律、医学和其他领域，往往没有我们所希望的那么可信--除非有良好的记录。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Review of Philosophy and Psychology PSYCHOLOGY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY-

CiteScore

4.70

自引率

5.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Review of Philosophy and Psychology is a peer-reviewed journal focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive science. The aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on topics of mutual interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster interdisciplinary research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of the mind, including the neural, behavioural and social sciences. The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical research as well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical relevance. It includes thematic issues featuring invited contributions from leading authors together with articles answering a call for papers. The Review of Philosophy and Psychology is published quarterly and is hosted at the Jean Nicod Institute, a research centre of the French Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. It was formerly published as the "European Review of Philosophy" by CSLI Publications, Stanford.