‘Pragmatics First’: Animal Communication and the Evolution of Language

IF 1.8 Q2 PSYCHOLOGY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY
Dorit Bar-On
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Research on the evolution of language is often framed in terms of sharp discontinuities in syntax and semantics between animal communication systems and human language as we know them. According to the so-called “pragmatics-first” approach to the evolution of language, when trying to understand the origins of human language in animal communication, we should be focusing on potential pragmatic continuities. However, some proponents of this approach (e.g. Seyfarth and Cheney Animal Behavior 124: 339–346, 2017) find important pragmatic continuities, whereas others (e.g. Origgi and Sperber 2000) find sharp discontinuities. I begin (in Section 1) by arguing that this divergence is due to the fact that the proponents implicitly rely, respectively, on two different views of pragmatics, corresponding to different conceptions of what is involved in context-dependence – one “Carnapian”, the other “Gricean”. I argue that neither conception is fit to serve the purposes of pragmatics-first approaches to the evolution of language. In Section 2, I examine a recent formal “semantic-pragmatic” analysis of monkey calls, due to Philippe Schlenker et al. (in, e.g., Linguistics and Philosophy 37 (6): 439–501, 2014, Trends in Cognitive Science 20 (12): 894–904, 2016a, Theoretical Linguistics 42 (1–2): 1–90, 2016b), which appears to improve on the Carnapian and Gricean conceptions. However, I argue that the appearances are misleading and that the S-P analysis is no better suited than Carnapian analyses for the purposes of those seeking to establish human-nonhuman pragmatic continuities. Understanding why this is so will point the way toward my preferred, genuinely intermediate conception of pragmatics (as defended in Bar-On Biology & Philosophy 36 (6): 1–25, 2021), which – I argue in Section 3 – is better fit for these purposes. Drawing on recent discussions of chimpanzee communication, I briefly indicate which aspects of extant primate call communication – both gestural and vocal – could potentially count as pragmatic according to this conception.

Abstract Image

语法优先":动物交流与语言的进化
关于语言进化的研究通常是从动物交流系统与我们所知的人类语言之间在句法和语义上的尖锐不连续性的角度进行的。根据所谓 "语用优先 "的语言进化论,当我们试图从动物交流中了解人类语言的起源时,我们应该关注潜在的语用连续性。然而,这种方法的一些支持者(如 Seyfarth 和 Cheney Animal Behavior 124: 339-346, 2017)发现了重要的语用连续性,而另一些支持者(如 Origgi 和 Sperber 2000)则发现了尖锐的不连续性。我首先(在第 1 节中)认为,这种分歧是由于支持者分别隐含地依赖于两种不同的语用学观点,对应于对语境依赖所涉及内容的不同概念--一种是 "卡纳普 "式的,另一种是 "格赖斯 "式的。我认为,这两种概念都不适合语用学优先的语言进化方法。在第 2 节中,我研究了菲利普-施伦克(Philippe Schlenker)等人最近对猴子叫声进行的形式化 "语义-语用 "分析(见《语言学与哲学》第 37 (6) 期,2014 年,第 439-501 页):439-501, 2014, Trends in Cognitive Science 20 (12):894-904, 2016a, Theoretical Linguistics 42 (1-2):1-90, 2016b),这似乎改进了卡尔纳普和格莱斯的概念。然而,我认为这些表象具有误导性,对于那些寻求建立人类-非人类语用连续性的人来说,S-P 分析并不比卡尔纳普分析更适合。理解为什么会这样,就会为我所偏爱的、真正的语用学中间概念(在《巴-奥恩生物学与amp》、《哲学》36(6)1-25,2021)指明方向:1-25, 2021),我将在第 3 节中论证这一概念是否更适合上述目的。根据最近对黑猩猩交流的讨论,我简要地指出了现存灵长类叫声交流的哪些方面--包括手势和声音--根据这一概念有可能算作语用学。
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来源期刊
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Review of Philosophy and Psychology PSYCHOLOGY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY-
CiteScore
4.70
自引率
5.00%
发文量
60
期刊介绍: The Review of Philosophy and Psychology is a peer-reviewed journal focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive science. The aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on topics of mutual interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster interdisciplinary research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of the mind, including the neural, behavioural and social sciences. The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical research as well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical relevance. It includes thematic issues featuring invited contributions from leading authors together with articles answering a call for papers. The Review of Philosophy and Psychology is published quarterly and is hosted at the Jean Nicod Institute, a research centre of the French Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. It was formerly published as the "European Review of Philosophy" by CSLI Publications, Stanford.
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