{"title":"Subjectivity and Non-Objectifying Awareness.","authors":"Donnchadh O'Conaill","doi":"10.1007/s13164-022-00665-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s13164-022-00665-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We are each aware of our own experiences as they occur, but in this inner awareness our experiences do not seem to be presented to us as objects in the way that they typically are when we reflect on them. A number of philosophers, principally in the phenomenological tradition, have characterised this in terms of inner awareness being a non-objectifying mode of awareness. This claim has faced persistent objections that the notion of non-objectifying awareness is obscure or merely negatively characterised. In this paper I shall outline a positive conception of a non-objectifying mode of awareness, feature-encountering awareness. I shall apply this conception to our awareness of our experiences, characterising it as an awareness of instantiations of phenomenal properties in a temporal dimension. Inner awareness thus characterised clearly differs from standard modes of objectifying awareness.</p>","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10937791/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42161472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How to Think about Zeugmatic Oddness","authors":"Michelle Liu","doi":"10.1007/s13164-023-00718-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-023-00718-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138947377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Pattern Theory of Scaffolding","authors":"Albert Newen, R. Fabry","doi":"10.1007/s13164-023-00720-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-023-00720-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138950298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Lina Bendifallah, Julie Abbou, Igor Douven, Heather Burnett
{"title":"Conceptual Spaces for Conceptual Engineering? Feminism as a Case Study","authors":"Lina Bendifallah, Julie Abbou, Igor Douven, Heather Burnett","doi":"10.1007/s13164-023-00708-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-023-00708-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recently, there has been much research into conceptual engineering in connection with feminist inquiry and activism, most notably involving gender issues, but also sexism and misogyny. Our paper contributes to this research by explicating, in a principled manner, a series of other concepts important for feminist research and activism, to wit, feminist political identity terms. More specifically, we show how the popular Conceptual Spaces Framework (CSF) can be used to identify and regiment concepts that are central to feminist research, focusing especially on feminism in France. According to the CSF, concepts can be represented geometrically, as regions in similarity spaces. A particular strength of the CSF framework is its empirically-focused methodology, which allows researchers to infer the boundaries of concepts from empirical data, thus eliminating the need to strongly rely on intuitions about meanings. This is shown to be especially valuable for the explication of concepts relating to feminist political identity, given that the intuitions of feminist scholars and activists about what would appear to be core concepts in the area tend to be poorly aligned or even conflicting. We report the results from an empirical categorization study conducted among French feminists and show how they support the view that the CSF can contribute to both the conceptual engineering project and our understanding of the structure of social reality.</p>","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138743568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conspiracy Theory Belief: A Sane Response to an Insane World?","authors":"Joseph M. Pierre","doi":"10.1007/s13164-023-00716-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-023-00716-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Are conspiracy theory beliefs pathological? That depends on what is meant by \"pathological.\" This paper begins by unpacking that ill-defined and value-laden term before making the case that widespread conspiracy theory belief should not be conceptualized through the “othering’ perspective of individual psychopathology. In doing so, it adopts a phenomenological perspective to argue that conspiracy theory beliefs can be reliably distinguished from paranoid delusions based on falsity, belief conviction, idiosyncrasy, and self-referentiality. A socio-epistemic model is then presented that characterizes the broader phenomenon of conspiracy theory belief as a product of a sick society plagued by epistemic mistrust and vulnerability to misinformation that is ubiquitous in today’s post-truth world. Finally, it is proposed that for individuals, the harmfulness of conspiracy theory belief is less related to belief content as it is to belief conviction and degree of self-relevant consequentiality. Staging conspiracy theory belief in terms of ideological commitment offers a conceptual framework to estimate behavioral risks and test hypotheses about the effectiveness of interventions along a continuum of belief conviction and associated socio-epistemic dynamics. Interventions should target not only individuals, but the dysfunctional social conditions that give rise to the pervasive and enduring phenomenon of conspiracy theory belief.</p>","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138630907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Hard Problem of Content is Neither","authors":"William Max Ramsey","doi":"10.1007/s13164-023-00714-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-023-00714-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>For the past 40 years, philosophers have generally assumed that a key to understanding mental representation is to develop a naturalistic theory of representational content. This has led to an outlook where the importance of content has been heavily inflated, while the significance of the representational vehicles has been somewhat downplayed. However, the success of this enterprise has been thwarted by a number of mysterious and allegedly non-naturalizable, irreducible dimensions of representational content. The challenge of addressing these difficulties has come to be known as the “hard problem of content” (Hutto & Myin, 2012), and many think it makes an account of representation in the brain impossible. In this essay, I argue that much of this is misguided and based upon the wrong set of priorities. If we focus on the functionality of representational vehicles (as recommended by teleosemanticists) and remind ourselves of the quirks associated with many functional entities, we can see that the allegedly mysterious and intractable aspects of content are really just mundane features associated with many everyday functional kinds. We can also see they have little to do with content and more to do with representation function. Moreover, we can begin to see that our explanatory priorities are backwards: instead of expecting a theory of content to be the key to understanding how a brain state can function as a representation, we should instead expect a theory of neural representation function to serve as the key to understanding how content occurs naturally.</p>","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138560601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Anorexia Nervosa, Bodily Alienation, and Authenticity","authors":"Michelle Maiese","doi":"10.1007/s13164-023-00717-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-023-00717-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Existing phenomenological accounts of anorexia nervosa suggest that various forms of bodily alienation and distorted bodily self-consciousness are common among subjects with this condition. Subjects often experience a sense of distance or estrangement from their body and its needs and demands. What is more, first-person reports and existing qualitative research reveal struggles with authenticity and a search for identity. Is there a connection between the two? I argue that to gain a fuller understanding of anorexia nervosa, how it is experienced by subjects, and why many of them express concerns about authenticity, we need to look more closely at their experiences of bodily alienation and the ways in which they encounter a diminished sense of bodily ownership. After presenting a general overview of the various sorts of bodily alienation that appear to be characteristic of anorexia nervosa, I outline three conceptions of authenticity and introduce some empirical evidence indicating that many subjects with this condition have concerns about identity and authenticity. Then, I examine how different sorts of bodily alienation have the potential to compromise authenticity at various stages of the disorder. Throughout, I draw from several first-person accounts of anorexia nervosa to illustrate and support my claims.</p>","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138560378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Emotional Impulsivity and Sensorimotor Skills","authors":"Luis Alejandro Murillo-Lara","doi":"10.1007/s13164-023-00715-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-023-00715-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper I propose an explanation for the impulsivity displayed by some of our emotional experiences. I begin by looking for such an account in the psychological and philosophical literatures. After expressing doubts regarding some approaches’ resources to account for the phenomenon at issue, I outline an account of emotional impulsivity by focusing on (1) its independence from judgment and deliberation; (2) its felt strength; and (3) its relationship to action. Following the intuition that there is a strong connection between the possession of skills and the ability to entertain certain representational states, I propose that the impulsivity of some emotional experiences can be explained by their characteristic inseparability from sets of sensorimotor skills.</p>","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138508499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"For an Epistemology of Stereopsis","authors":"Gabriele Ferretti","doi":"10.1007/s13164-023-00711-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-023-00711-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Philosophers and cognitive scientists try to understand, from different perspectives, the nature of the experience of reality. Given this shared, interdisciplinary interest, it would be beneficial to have a coherent story about the experience of reality, in which there is reciprocal contribution from both philosophy and cognitive science. This paper wants to pave the way for this shared enterprise on the investigation of the experience of reality. I first distinguish between two <i>indicators of reality</i>. (1) The experience of <i>availability to motor interaction</i>. (2) The experience of <i>mind-independence</i>. I then show how invoking an analysis of the results from vision science, concerning the visual mechanisms of stereopsis, which is related to the visual impression of a solid, three-dimensional world available to motor interaction, successfully provides a coherent description of the <i>first indicator</i>. Furthermore, I suggest that the analysis of the evidence about the <i>first indicator</i> is very informative in preparing the ground for the investigation of the <i>second indicator</i>. This is shown by discussing experimental evidence directly related to stereopsis, as well as some perceptual phenomena that are usually described by invoking the story from vision science about stereopsis. Thus, the epistemological analysis of the results from vision science on stereopsis, offered in this paper, is beneficial in a twofold manner, for the interdisciplinary enterprise aimed at understanding the experience of reality. It is <i>explicitly</i> beneficial in the description of the <i>first indicator</i>, and <i>implicitly</i> beneficial to understand the <i>second indicator</i>. Finally, it also suggests future research about their relation.</p>","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138508500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Lying by Asserting What You Believe is True: a Case of Transparent Delusion","authors":"Vladimir Krstić","doi":"10.1007/s13164-023-00700-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-023-00700-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135043054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}