Review of Philosophy and Psychology最新文献_第5页

Life Satisfaction and Affect: Why Do these SWB Measures Correlate Differently with Material Goods and Freedom? 生活满意度和影响:为什么这些幸福感测量与物质财富和自由有不同的相关性?

Review of Philosophy and Psychology Pub Date : 2023-10-31 DOI: 10.1007/s13164-023-00713-w

Jelle de Boer

引用次数: 0

A Puzzle About Mental Lexicons and Semantic Relatedness 关于心理词汇与语义关联的困惑

Review of Philosophy and Psychology Pub Date : 2023-10-23 DOI: 10.1007/s13164-023-00710-z

Alice Damirjian

{"title":"A Puzzle About Mental Lexicons and Semantic Relatedness","authors":"Alice Damirjian","doi":"10.1007/s13164-023-00710-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-023-00710-z","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to the received view in the literature on homonymy and polysemy representation, there is a difference between how polysemes and homonyms are represented in our mental lexicons. More concretely, the received view holds that whereas the meanings associated with a homonymous expression are (mentally) represented in separate lexical entries, the meanings associated with a polysemous expression are represented together in a single lexical entry. It is usually argued that this is the picture that is supported by the growing body of empirical evidence coming from psycholinguistics. Empirical studies of ambiguity processing and resolution consistently show that polysemous expressions enjoy various processing advantages compared to homonyms, and the received view is generally taken to be required in order to explain these results. The aim of this paper is not only to show that this is not the case but also, and more fundamentally, that the received view falls far short of explaining the available data to a sufficient degree. As a result, the received view is caught up in an explanatory dilemma that I dub the Continuum Puzzle. I then claim that the best way to escape this puzzle is to give up the received view’s core thesis in favor of an alternative view consistent with the empirical evidence. Reaching such an alternative will require rejecting the following pervasive but ill-motivated assumption: Differences in ambiguity processing and resolution can only be explained by there being some corresponding differences in the architecture of our mental lexicons.","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135405824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Partial First-Person Authority: How We Know Our Own Emotions 部分第一人称权威:我们如何知道自己的情绪

Review of Philosophy and Psychology Pub Date : 2023-10-19 DOI: 10.1007/s13164-023-00698-6

Adam J. Andreotta

{"title":"Partial First-Person Authority: How We Know Our Own Emotions","authors":"Adam J. Andreotta","doi":"10.1007/s13164-023-00698-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-023-00698-6","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper focuses on the self-knowledge of emotions. I first argue that several of the leading theories of self-knowledge, including the transparency method (see, e.g., Byrne 2018) and neo-expressivism (see, e.g., Bar-On 2004), have difficulties explaining how we authoritatively know our own emotions (even though they may plausibly account for sensation, belief, intention, and desire). I next consider Barrett’s (2017a) empirically informed theory of constructed emotion . While I agree with her that we ‘give meaning to [our] present sensations’ (2017a, p.26), I disagree with her that we construct our emotions, as this has some unwelcome implications. I then draw upon recent data from the science of emotions literature to advance a view I call partial first-person authority. According to this view, first-person authority with respect to our emotions is only partial: we can introspect and authoritatively know our own sensations, and beliefs, in ways others cannot; but we still need to interpret those sensations and beliefs, to know our emotions. Finally, I consider self-interpretational accounts of self-knowledge by Carruthers (2011) and Cassam (2014). I argue that while these accounts are implausible when applied to beliefs, desires, and intentions, they are more plausible when applied to our emotions.","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135778860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Clearing our Minds for Hedonic Phenomenalism 为享乐现象主义清理思绪

Review of Philosophy and Psychology Pub Date : 2023-10-18 DOI: 10.1007/s13164-023-00705-w

Lorenzo Buscicchi, Willem van der Deijl

引用次数: 0

From Altered States to Metaphysics: The Epistemic Status of Psychedelic-induced Metaphysical Beliefs 从改变状态到形而上学:迷幻诱导的形而上学信仰的认识论地位

Review of Philosophy and Psychology Pub Date : 2023-10-10 DOI: 10.1007/s13164-023-00709-6

Paweł Gładziejewski

引用次数: 0

Representationalism and Olfactory Valence 表征主义与嗅觉效价

Review of Philosophy and Psychology Pub Date : 2023-10-02 DOI: 10.1007/s13164-023-00707-8

Błażej Skrzypulec

引用次数: 0

Beyond the Implicit/Explicit Dichotomy: The Pragmatics of Plausible Deniability 超越内隐/外显二分法:似是而非的语用学

Review of Philosophy and Psychology Pub Date : 2023-09-29 DOI: 10.1007/s13164-023-00699-5

Francesca Bonalumi, Johannes B. Mahr, Pauline Marie, Nausicaa Pouscoulous

{"title":"Beyond the Implicit/Explicit Dichotomy: The Pragmatics of Plausible Deniability","authors":"Francesca Bonalumi, Johannes B. Mahr, Pauline Marie, Nausicaa Pouscoulous","doi":"10.1007/s13164-023-00699-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-023-00699-5","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In everyday conversation, messages are often communicated indirectly, implicitly. Why do we seem to communicate so inefficiently? How speakers choose to express a message (modulating confidence, using less explicit formulations) has been proposed to impact how committed they will appear to be to its content. This commitment can be assessed in terms of accountability – is the speaker held accountable for what they communicated? – and deniability – can the speaker plausibly deny they intended to communicate it? We investigated two factors that may influence commitment to implicitly conveyed messages. In a preregistered online study, we tested the hypothesis that the degree of meaning strength (strongly or weakly communicated) and the level of meaning used by the speaker (an enrichment or a conversational implicature) modulate accountability and plausible deniability. Our results show that both meaning strength and level of meaning influence speaker accountability and plausible deniability. Participants perceived enrichments to be harder to deny than conversational implicatures, and strongly implied content as more difficult to deny than weakly implied content. Furthermore, participants held the speaker more accountable to content conveyed via an enrichment than to content conveyed via an implicature. These results corroborate previously found differences between levels of meaning (enrichment vs. implicature). They also highlight the largely understudied role of meaning strength as a cue to speaker commitment in communication.","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135133103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Body Checking in Anorexia Nervosa: from Inquiry to Habit 神经性厌食症的身体检查:从询问到习惯

Review of Philosophy and Psychology Pub Date : 2023-09-25 DOI: 10.1007/s13164-023-00691-z

Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Somogy Varga

引用次数: 1

Teasing Apart the Roles of Interoception, Emotion, and Self-Control in Anorexia Nervosa 内感受、情绪和自我控制在神经性厌食症中的作用

Review of Philosophy and Psychology Pub Date : 2023-09-21 DOI: 10.1007/s13164-023-00706-9

Sarah Arnaud, Jacqueline Sullivan, Amy MacKinnon, Lindsay P. Bodell

引用次数: 0

Enhanced but Indeterminate? How Attention Colors our World 增强但不确定?注意力如何影响我们的世界

Review of Philosophy and Psychology Pub Date : 2023-09-18 DOI: 10.1007/s13164-023-00697-7

Azenet L. Lopez, Eliska Simsova

引用次数: 0