Journal of Public Economic Theory最新文献_第2页

CvdN Equilibrium and Share Equilibrium in Local Public Good Economies 地方公共物品经济中的CvdN均衡与份额均衡

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-04-21 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70030

Nathan W. Chan, Anne van den Nouweland

引用次数: 0

Leadership in Public Good Games and Private Information on Own Social Value Orientation 公共利益博弈中的领导力与个人社会价值取向的私人信息

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-04-14 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70026

Edward Cartwright, Yidan Chai, Lian Xue

引用次数: 0

Delegation as a Signal: Implicit Communication With Full Cooperation 授权是一种信号充分合作下的隐性沟通

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-04-14 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70028

Joanna Franaszek

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Dynamic Volunteer's Dilemma With Procrastinators 动态志愿者与拖延者的困境

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-04-09 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70027

Yixuan Shi

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引用次数: 0

Finding Out Who You Are: A Self-Exploration View of Education 发现你是谁：教育的自我探索观

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-04-04 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70023

Sungmin Park

引用次数: 0

Games of Social Interactions With Externalities 具有外部性的社交互动游戏

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-03-28 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70021

Subir K. Chakrabarti, Alexander Shapoval, Shlomo Weber

引用次数: 0

Intermediate Condorcet Winners and Losers 中级孔多塞赢家和输家

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-03-28 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70024

Salvador Barberà, Walter Bossert

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引用次数: 0

School Segregation and Outside Options 学校隔离和校外选择

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-03-25 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70025

Sumeyra Akin

引用次数: 0

Does Equal Income Maximize Social Welfare When Multiple Pure Public Goods Are Privately Provided? 当多种纯公共物品由私人提供时，收入相等是否使社会福利最大化？

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-03-25 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70016

Jun-ichi Itaya, Atsue Mizushima, Gareth Myles

{"title":"Does Equal Income Maximize Social Welfare When Multiple Pure Public Goods Are Privately Provided?","authors":"Jun-ichi Itaya, Atsue Mizushima, Gareth Myles","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70016","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper analyzes the relationship between income distribution and social welfare when multiple pure public goods are privately provided. With a single public good and identical preferences, an increase in income inequality raises social welfare when it reduces the set of contributors so equality cannot be social optimal. We explore how this result is modified when there are multiple privately-provided public goods. It is shown that regions of neutrality alternate with regions of non-neutrality as income distribution is varied. In particular, in the setting of multiple privately-supplied public goods with non-idential preferences a region of non-neutrality emerges when individuals contribute to different public goods or when only one individual contributes. Moreover, social welfare will always be maximized by an income distribution located in a region of non-neutrality. This result implies that social welfare has local maxima at income distributions with inequality as well as around the equal income distribution. We also explore how the optimal extent of inequality is dependent on preference parameters.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143689911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Condorcet Was Wrong, Pareto Was Right: Families, Inheritance and Inequality 孔多塞错了，帕累托是对的：家庭、继承和不平等

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-03-25 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70022

Frank Cowell, Dirk Van de gaer

引用次数: 0