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Measuring Hierarchy With Multiple Supervisors 多重管理者的层级测量
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-08-12 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70130
Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau
{"title":"Measuring Hierarchy With Multiple Supervisors","authors":"Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70130","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper develops an axiomatic framework for measuring hierarchical structures in modern organizations, where multiple supervisors and non-traditional arrangements, such as matrix structures, are common. Representing hierarchies as directed acyclic graphs, we show that structural flattening in these organizations is path-dependent: determining hierarchical dominance generally requires explicitly tracing the sequence of subordination removals. We show that this complexity resolves in multipath-free hierarchies. When each ordered pair of individuals is connected by at most one directed path, the effects of removal order leave a static footprint, allowing hierarchical dominance to be verified by a single geometric condition rather than a step-by-step procedure. Our axiomatic framework is grounded in Anonymity, the Replication Principle, and two versions of the Subordination Removal postulate. The distinction between baseline and Strong Subordination Removal clarifies whether redundant formal reporting lines contribute to measured hierarchical weight or instead leave the effective chain of command unchanged. Using this foundation, we characterize the hierarchical pre-orders consistent with sequential subordination removal, including incomplete comparisons and complete extensions for organizations of varying sizes.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148753325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Model of Punitive Voting 惩罚性投票模式
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-08-11 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70133
Manuel Lleonart-Anguix
{"title":"A Model of Punitive Voting","authors":"Manuel Lleonart-Anguix","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70133","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I analyze a two-period model of political competition where voters care about candidates' integrity. Candidates must trade off implementing their preferred policy against maintaining their electoral promises. Voters punish candidates who deviate from electoral promises by voting for their opponent. I find that punitive voting can exert political discipline only if candidates face low levels of uncertainty about voters' preferences. In this case, candidates' electoral promises are a compromise between their preferred policy and voters' preferences, and when elected, they implement their promise. Finally, I show that when one candidate's ideal policy is closer to the median voter, an equilibrium exists where one candidate is disciplined and the other is not.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70133","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148753302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Incentives in Networked Teams 网络团队的激励机制
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-08-11 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70132
Ziyan Li, Yifan Xiong
{"title":"Incentives in Networked Teams","authors":"Ziyan Li,&nbsp;Yifan Xiong","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70132","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper studies incentive provision and optimal network design in team environments. We develop a two-stage moral hazard framework in which agents first invest effort in preparation and then decide on continuation effort after observing their peers' first-stage actions. Peer information is represented by an observability network, modeled as an undirected graph in which connected agents mutually observe each other's actions. A central insight of the paper is that the role of the network depends critically on whether agents' efforts are substitutes or complements. Under substitute technology, incentives depend only on the number of active agents, and network structure is irrelevant. Under complementary technology, by contrast, agents condition continuation effort on observed behavior, so that network topology directly shapes incentive provision. We then study the optimal design of the observability network. We show that a key determinant is how total compensation—comprising incentive rewards and fixed salaries—varies with agents' network position. A horizontal team structure is optimal when total compensation increases with degree at the margin, whereas a hierarchical structure is optimal when it decreases with degree.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148753301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Climate Inequality: Carbon Capture for Redistribution 气候不平等：碳捕获与再分配
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-08-09 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70134
Elisa Belfiori, Manuel Macera
{"title":"Climate Inequality: Carbon Capture for Redistribution","authors":"Elisa Belfiori,&nbsp;Manuel Macera","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70134","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We study optimal climate policy in a global economy where regions differ in wealth and climate vulnerability. Carbon emissions from production lead to output losses, and there is a technology for carbon capture. We provide an aggregation result: the model with heterogeneity can be cast into a representative region economy with a different discount factor and damage function. This result offers a simple rule to account for inequality in the design of climate policy. We show that wealthier regions should bear more responsibility for carbon capture to reduce atmospheric carbon and that inequality <i>per se</i> does not entail a compromise on the global emissions target. It is only if regions must contribute uniformly to carbon capture that the optimal climate policy dictates higher global net emissions relative to the first best. Carbon capture serves as a natural redistribution mechanism precisely because lump-sum transfers are unavailable.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148753250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Resource Allocation Under Exogenous Information Regimes in Multi-Battle Team Contests 外生信息条件下多战斗团队竞争中的资源配置
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-08-04 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70131
Lixue Zhou, Mengling Sun
{"title":"Resource Allocation Under Exogenous Information Regimes in Multi-Battle Team Contests","authors":"Lixue Zhou,&nbsp;Mengling Sun","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70131","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>A central leader allocates a budget across multiple fronts before agents choose effort. We study a <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>T</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $T$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>-front team contest with heterogeneous players under three exogenous information regimes: full, partial, and no disclosure. Under full disclosure, every interior allocation-game Nash equilibrium features battle-by-battle spending parity: with equal budgets, leaders match each other's spending within each battle, although the common spending level may vary with the realized type pair. Under partial and no disclosure, we characterize neutral-opponent benchmark best responses. Partial disclosure yields a prior-only tilt direction: toward strong-player battles when strong types are in the majority and toward weak-player battles otherwise. Under no disclosure, Bayesian effort pooling can make weak-player battles have higher marginal product than strong-player battles; the benchmark first-order driver then points toward weak-link protection over a wide region and becomes the neutral-opponent benchmark best response under the stated concavity and interior-effort conditions. We call this mechanism Bayesian productivity reversal. Three-battle strategic-response checks suggest that these directions are robust away from the relevant benchmark thresholds.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148752640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Decentralization for the Core of Non-Convex Economies With Externalities 具有外部性的非凸经济核心的分散化
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-08-03 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70129
Maria Gabriella Graziano, Marialaura Pesce, Vincenzo Platino
{"title":"Decentralization for the Core of Non-Convex Economies With Externalities","authors":"Maria Gabriella Graziano,&nbsp;Marialaura Pesce,&nbsp;Vincenzo Platino","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70129","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study pure exchange economies with consumption externalities, where agents' preferences depend on others' consumption and may be non-convex. Adopting a cooperative approach, we allow agents to form coalitions and introduce a notion of generalized fuzzy core. We show that core allocations can be decentralized via suitable price systems. We establish a core equivalence theorem for <i>A-equilibria</i>, which generalizes Walras-Nash and Berge equilibria with externalities. We also prove a corresponding equivalence result for economies with Arrowian markets, where generalized fuzzy core allocations can be supported as <i>Information equilibria</i> with personalized and market prices.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70129","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148752712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Knowledge Spillover Network and Optimal R&D Policy in Oligopoly 寡头垄断下的知识溢出网络与最优研发政策
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-07-26 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70128
Jun-Hyung Lee
{"title":"Knowledge Spillover Network and Optimal R&D Policy in Oligopoly","authors":"Jun-Hyung Lee","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70128","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies optimal R&amp;D policy in a Cournot oligopoly with network-based knowledge spillovers. Generalizing the standard two-stage model of Kamien et al. (1992), we characterize the socially optimal policy by decomposing the net externality of private innovation into three channels: the market expansion effect, direct knowledge spillovers, and the market rivalry effect. Contrary to the standard duopoly results that subsidies achieve the second-best allocation, we show that in oligopolies with more than two firms, the optimal policy becomes taxation when knowledge spillover rate is sufficiently low or the spillover network is sufficiently sparse. We further show that the tax-optimal region survives in non-regular networks including complete bipartite, core-periphery, scale-free, and spatial networks.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70128","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148616078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Welfare-Improving Tax Disputes 改善福利的税收纠纷
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-07-13 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70124
Nigar Hashimzade
{"title":"Welfare-Improving Tax Disputes","authors":"Nigar Hashimzade","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70124","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Tax law is often uncertain. Taxpayers and tax authorities can disagree over the tax position, eligibility for tax incentives, or sufficiency of evidence. Taxpayers can face uncertainty over sanctions when tax position is not sustained. In many jurisdictions uncertain tax position can be disputed in court. In this paper, I present an analysis of tax dispute over uncertain tax treatment of investment in the framework of rent-seeking contest with endogenous prize. I show that in the presence of tax uncertainty, a tax dispute can lead to a net welfare gain despite the litigation costs. These results provide economic efficiency rationale for tax disputes.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70124","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148467032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the Role of the Congestion Technology in Tax Competition With Unemployment 论拥堵技术在税收与失业竞争中的作用
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-07-13 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70125
Johannes Pauser
{"title":"On the Role of the Congestion Technology in Tax Competition With Unemployment","authors":"Johannes Pauser","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70125","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The present study examines the role of the congestion technology in a tax competition framework with productive government spending and unemployment. Considering two well-known specifications of congestion, the congestion technology can be shown to be crucial for the analysis of efficiency in both public provision and private utilization levels of a congestible public input in the decentralized equilibrium: Under the common specification of decreasing marginal congestion, efficiency in the non-cooperative equilibrium with capital and lump-sum taxation depends solely on the magnitude of the production and congestion elasticities. By contrast, factor prices, such as the level of wage rigidity and corresponding employment levels are, in addition, important in determining whether both provision and utilization levels of the public input are efficient in the case of increasing marginal congestion. Numerical analysis is employed to supplement the results of the theoretical and graphical analysis and to further compare the social optimum to the decentralized equilibria.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70125","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148467033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
FDI Versus R&D in an Endogenous Growth Model FDI与R&D的内生增长模型
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-07-09 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70126
Thanh Tam Nguyen-Huu, Ngoc-Sang Pham
{"title":"FDI Versus R&D in an Endogenous Growth Model","authors":"Thanh Tam Nguyen-Huu,&nbsp;Ngoc-Sang Pham","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70126","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We investigate the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) and research and development (R&amp;D) in the transitional dynamics of host countries using an optimal growth model. FDI may benefit the host country's GNP by enabling multinational enterprises to hire local workers. However, if the host country focuses solely on FDI, it may fall into a middle-income trap. Most importantly, we show that if the host country invests in R&amp;D, its economy can reach sustained growth. In this case, FDI benefits the host country, but only in the early stages of its development process.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148466751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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