{"title":"Fiscal Space and the Supply of Pro-Government Militias","authors":"M. Christian Lehmann","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70007","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Militias hamper state-building by undermining the government's monopoly of violence, which creates an environment of anarchy. Yet many governments collaborate with them. These pro-government militias (PGMs), such as paramilitary groups, are not only a poor-country phenomenon, that is, economic growth does not seem to eradicate these armed nonstate actors: Intriguingly, cross-country data reveals a U-shaped relationship between GDP per capita and PGM presence. This article presents an economic theory of PGM supply that can explain this puzzling relationship and provide actionable ways for international actors (e.g., UN) to discourage the emergence of PGMs. However, the theory also cautions that some common international policies (e.g., development aid) may unintentionally encourage PGM supply.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142641475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Transmissible diseases, vaccination, and inequality","authors":"Carmen Camacho, Chrysovalantis Vasilakis","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70002","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We construct a Susceptible–Infected–Vaccinated Economic two-sector growth model to explore the dynamics of inequality in an economy with distinct groups of workers exposed to a transmissible disease. Our analysis reveals a spectrum of outcomes in the long term, ranging from a disease-free economic environment to a scenario where only the most susceptible group suffers from the disease. Long-term outcomes are influenced by the reproduction rates both of the overall economy and those of the two groups of workers. If one group remains infected over time, the other will surely follow, leading to a perpetual disease burden for both. Additionally, because long-term equilibria may not be unique, there is a possibility of long-term uncertainty, posing additional challenges for policymakers. Notably, our calibrated model suggests that if the vaccination rate exceeds 24%, the relationship between disease exposure and inequality in capital assets becomes nonmonotonic.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142641474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Political Accountability and the Distortion of Law Enforcement","authors":"Yohei Yamaguchi, Ken Yahagi","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70000","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Citizens may derive personal benefits from new technologies while remaining uncertain about their potential social harm. Consequently, citizens may delegate the decision of legal prohibition to politicians, but conflicts can arise because politicians may have self-interested motivations. How does the interaction of uncertainty regarding social harm and politicians' incentives affect the legal prohibition of new technologies? To answer this question, we develop a two-period political agency model combined with a law enforcement model in which citizens endogenously determine whether to become law-breaking or law-abiding citizens. We then demonstrate that (i) when uncertainty regarding social harm is low, politicians tend to opt for under-enforcement, while (ii) when uncertainty is high, politicians are inclined toward over-enforcement. Additionally, we show that as politicians have greater motivation to hold office, expected welfare is enhanced when future uncertainty about harm exceeds current uncertainty although this may result in distorted law enforcement.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142641476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Carrots and Sticks: Collaboration of Taxation and Subsidies in Contests","authors":"Yizhaq Minchuk, Aner Sela","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70005","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study all-pay auctions under incomplete information in which the designer can impose taxes or subsidies, and his expected payoff is the contestants' expected total effort minus the cost of subsidies, or, alternatively, plus the tax payment. When contestants have linear effort cost functions, we show that taxing the winner's payoff is profitable for the contest designer, and particularly more profitable than the same model with no taxation or the same model with contestants' effort taxation. When the contestants' effort cost functions are convex and the taxation rate is relatively low, we show that the designer should tax the winner's payoff while subsidizing all of the other contestants' effort costs. As a result, contest organizers should think about combining taxation and subsidies in their contests because they complement rather than substitute each other.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142595661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mergers and Licensing With Horizontal Differentiation","authors":"Ramon Fauli-Oller, Sougata Poddar, Joel Sandonis","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70004","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider a research laboratory that owns a patented process innovation and two firms producing differentiating goods in a Bertrand setting. The laboratory considers the possibility to license the innovation as an outsider patentee or to merge with one of the firms in the industry, becoming an incumbent patentee. Licensing takes place through observable two-part tariff contracts. We show that the merger is profitable only for small innovations and increases social welfare for both small and large innovations. Even though we allow the royalty to be higher than the size of the innovation, and opposite to the result in a Cournot setting, we find a region where the merger is both profitable and welfare improving. This occurs only for small innovations and sufficiently differentiated goods. The same result arises for consumer surplus which allows us to derive the optimal merger policy: compared with Cournot competition, a Bertrand setting calls for a more lenient merger policy.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142587940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dynamic policy in the presence of social norms","authors":"Beat Hintermann, Andreas Lange","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70001","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Individual actions can depend on prevailing social norms. We investigate how optimal policy to promote pro-social action should exploit the underlying social dynamics. We develop a dynamic model of prosocial action in which conformist consumers repeatedly choose whether to engage in some prosocial activity. Whereas individual behavior is not observed, the overall participation rate in the previous period is common knowledge. We demonstrate how conformity can lead to multiple steady states and how their selection depends on starting conditions and discount factors. We further show that the optimal subsidy path can be non-monotonic and can decrease before reaching the steady state-level. Our model thus provides a rationale for introductory subsidies to promote environmentally friendly behavior from a behavioral perspective.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142561617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Counteracting “the tragedy of the commons” in an imperfect world","authors":"Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, Rajani Singh","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12713","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Our research question is whether it is possible and how to counteract “the tragedy of the commons” if facing various limitations of real-world economies. To answer it, we derive regulatory tax–subsidy systems and self-enforcing environmental agreements in a problem of extraction of common renewable resources. The first considered limitation is that the feasible class of tax–subsidy systems may have a compl icated form, for example, there are transition periods for smooth reduction of fishing. The alternative limitation is that there is no institution that can impose taxes or subsidize, so sustainability can be achieved only by self-enforcing international agreements. The next limitation is in those agreements: we assume that it takes time to detect a defection. We study these enforcement tools in a continuous-time version of a Fish War type game with <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>n</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $n$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> countries, with fish indispensable for their economies. We calculate the social optimum, a Nash equilibrium, and partial cooperation equilibria. The Nash equilibrium leads to the depletion of fish, while the social optimum typically results in sustainability. For partial cooperation, only two-country coalitions are stable. We calculate tax–subsidy systems that enforce maximization of joint payoff, also if there are additional constraints, and we propose an algorithm that looks for such a system in an arbitrary class of regulatory tax–subsidy systems. For the international agreement with imperfect monitoring, we are interested in the maximal detection delay for which the agreement remains self-enforcing. Counterintuitively, the more the players, the more stable the agreement.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12713","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142152336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Maurizio Lisciandra, Antonio Miralles Asensio, Fabio Monteforte
{"title":"Corruption dynamics and political instability","authors":"Maurizio Lisciandra, Antonio Miralles Asensio, Fabio Monteforte","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12712","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12712","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper introduces a model where a briber designs a bribing schedule targeted at the governing party within a bipartisan system to secure favorable treatment. Detected corruption increases voters' resentment, and in turn, the risk of political turnover—raising the minimum acceptable bribe. Periods without corruption mitigate such a risk. Should the briber deem bribing unprofitable for sufficiently high levels of resentment, resentment converges to a steady state in finite time. Conversely, if the briber perceives bribing as profitable regardless of the resentment level, the dynamics may result in continuous bribing and an unbounded increase in resentment (exploding dynamics). The model underscores the complexity of addressing corruption, emphasizing the need to balance reducing corruption with preventing excessive political instability. Societal forgiveness and sensitivity significantly shape corruption dynamics and public resentment. While forgiveness reduces long-run resentment, it concurrently exacerbates long-term corruption and, on balance, may have a detrimental effect on long-term welfare. Sensitivity has no long-run effect on resentment, while it reduces both corruption activity and political instability in the long term. Finally, exogenous political instability exacerbates corruption, resentment, and the risk of exploding dynamics.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12712","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142045207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Habits and externalities","authors":"Arthur J. Caplan","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12711","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12711","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We develop a conceptual model characterizing two types of individuals: one myopic and the other hyperopic. A myopic individual ignores his private contributions to both a social and private negative externality, as well as the effect that his accumulation of stuff (i.e., the stock of consumption goods) has on his habit parameter. A hyperopic individual internalizes both externalities as well as his habit-formation effect. We find that the hyperopic individual consumes a greater amount of a clean good and a lesser amount of a dirty good, with the magnitude of the latter difference being greater than the magnitude of the former. Consequently, the hyperopic individual's cumulative consumption of the two goods is lower. The hyperopic individual's lower cumulative consumption also contributes to a less-persistent consumption habit. Further, we explore the extent to which the allocation of consumption across the clean and dirty goods made by an astigmatic individual (an intermediate type of individual who internalizes the private externality, as well as the habit-formation effect) diverges from the myopic individual's allocation. We consider the implications of our findings for traditional environmental tax policy as it applies to myopic and astigmatic individuals. Conceptually, we find that Pigovian tax rates in the presence of habit formation diverge from corresponding standard rates that ignore habit formation based on the difference between the magnitudes of the cumulative marginal benefit associated with habit formation and the marginal cost associated with the accumulation of stuff. Results from a simple numerical analysis demonstrate these conceptual results and more.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142013633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Policy rules and political polarization","authors":"Carsten Hefeker, Michael Neugart","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12710","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12710","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We develop a model to analyze policymakers' incentives to install policy rules, comparing the case of no rule with a binding and a contingent policy rule that allows policymakers to suspend the rule in response to a sufficiently large shock. First, abstracting from political polarization, we show that the choice of the policy rule depends on policymakers' policy targets. Depending on the policy target, there is an unambiguous ranking going from a no-rule regime to a contingent rule to a binding rule. Next, allowing for political polarization, the incentive to install the different types of rules changes with political polarization between different policymakers and their probability of being elected into office. Increasing political polarization when there is a sufficiently high election probability for policymakers with a high policy target increases the preference for more binding policy rules. It also leads to stricter rules in a contingent rule regime.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141991595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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