{"title":"环境研发锦标赛","authors":"John C. Strandholm, Eric P. Dunaway","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70029","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n \n <p>We investigate the impacts of investment in environmental (or green) research and development (R&D) in the context of a contest with endogenous rewards, known as R&D tournaments. The firm that “wins“ the tournament is the one which develops the most effective technology at reducing emissions and gains sole property rights in using that technology. This reduces the burden of the emission fee which the winning firm faces, while also lowering the fee all firms face. We find that the tournament induces firms to invest more than in a non-tournament R&D model except at high levels of green investment cost.</p>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2025-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Environmental R&D Tournaments\",\"authors\":\"John C. Strandholm, Eric P. Dunaway\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/jpet.70029\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div>\\n \\n <p>We investigate the impacts of investment in environmental (or green) research and development (R&D) in the context of a contest with endogenous rewards, known as R&D tournaments. The firm that “wins“ the tournament is the one which develops the most effective technology at reducing emissions and gains sole property rights in using that technology. This reduces the burden of the emission fee which the winning firm faces, while also lowering the fee all firms face. We find that the tournament induces firms to invest more than in a non-tournament R&D model except at high levels of green investment cost.</p>\\n </div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47024,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Public Economic Theory\",\"volume\":\"27 3\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-05-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Public Economic Theory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jpet.70029\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jpet.70029","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate the impacts of investment in environmental (or green) research and development (R&D) in the context of a contest with endogenous rewards, known as R&D tournaments. The firm that “wins“ the tournament is the one which develops the most effective technology at reducing emissions and gains sole property rights in using that technology. This reduces the burden of the emission fee which the winning firm faces, while also lowering the fee all firms face. We find that the tournament induces firms to invest more than in a non-tournament R&D model except at high levels of green investment cost.
期刊介绍:
As the official journal of the Association of Public Economic Theory, Journal of Public Economic Theory (JPET) is dedicated to stimulating research in the rapidly growing field of public economics. Submissions are judged on the basis of their creativity and rigor, and the Journal imposes neither upper nor lower boundary on the complexity of the techniques employed. This journal focuses on such topics as public goods, local public goods, club economies, externalities, taxation, growth, public choice, social and public decision making, voting, market failure, regulation, project evaluation, equity, and political systems.