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Norms and Efficiency in a Multi-Group Society: An Online Experiment 多群体社会中的规范与效率：在线实验
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-12-17 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70010
Marco Catola, Simone D'Alessandro, Pietro Guarnieri, Veronica Pizziol
{"title":"Norms and Efficiency in a Multi-Group Society: An Online Experiment","authors":"Marco Catola,&nbsp;Simone D'Alessandro,&nbsp;Pietro Guarnieri,&nbsp;Veronica Pizziol","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70010","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this study, we measure personal normative beliefs, empirical expectations, and normative expectations in a multilevel public goods game, where two local public goods are nested in a global one. We use these measures as indexes of subjective personal and social norms to pursue a twofold objective. On the one hand, we aim to understand whether and to what extent contribution decisions are driven by personal or social norms. On the other hand, we aim to investigate whether changes in the relative efficiency of the two public goods affect norms and norm compliance. In our online experiment, personal norms emerge as the main driver of contribution decisions especially when the efficiency of the related public good increases. However, compliance to empirical expectations signals that social norms still play a role in both positively affecting the contribution to the relative public good and negatively the contribution to the other one.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142868695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Matching Versus Raffles as a Fund-Raising Device
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-12-10 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70009
Paul Pecorino
{"title":"Matching Versus Raffles as a Fund-Raising Device","authors":"Paul Pecorino","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70009","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Matching is a commonly used fund-raising tactic, whereby small donors have their donation to a charity matched via a fund established by large donors. I developed a model in which a single large donor decides whether to establish a matching fund or contribute to the public good via the voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM). The credibility of the matching fund is an endogenous component of the model. For a match to be credible, the organizer must have a credible promise not to top up the contributions of the small donors. If the number of small donors is sufficiently large, there always exists a matching fund that is both credible and leads to a Pareto improvement relative to the VCM. When the matching fund needs to satisfy an endogenous credibility constraint, all of the outcomes that are eliminated due to this constraint are outcomes under which small donors are worse off relative to the VCM. The matching fund is also compared with a raffle mechanism. As the number of small donors grows large, public good provision under the two mechanisms converges. However, the matching function outperforms the raffle when there is a finite number of small donors.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142868275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Notions of Rank Efficiency for the Random Assignment Problem 随机分配问题的等级效率概念
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-11-20 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70008
Mehdi Feizi
{"title":"Notions of Rank Efficiency for the Random Assignment Problem","authors":"Mehdi Feizi","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70008","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>An assignment is rank efficient if there is no other assignment where the expected number of agents who received one of their top choices is weakly higher. We introduce new notions of rank efficiency for the random assignment problem and illustrate a hierarchy between them. In a <i>rank-minimizing</i> assignment, agents receive objects with a minimum rank on average. An <i>ex-post rank efficient</i> random assignment has at least one lottery over only rank efficient deterministic assignments. Thus, it could still have another lottery with some rank-dominated deterministic assignments in its support. If each deterministic assignment in any decomposition of a random assignment is rank efficient, we call it a <i>robust ex-post rank efficient</i> assignment. We demonstrate that rank-minimizing implies rank efficiency, which indicates (robust) ex-post rank efficiency. Moreover, we introduce a mechanism that provides an ex-post rank efficient random assignment. We also prove that ex-post rank efficiency is incompatible with strategyproofness or fairness in the sense of weak envy-freeness and equal division lower bound.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142707963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Old-Age Support Policy Effects on Economic Growth and Fertility 老年支助政策对经济增长和生育率的影响
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-11-07 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70006
Akira Yakita
{"title":"Old-Age Support Policy Effects on Economic Growth and Fertility","authors":"Akira Yakita","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70006","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Salient features of major economies around the world, specifically in high-income countries, are graying population and declining fertility. Incorporating the quantity–quality tradeoff of children into an overlapping generations model, this paper presents an analysis of the effects of formal old-age support on fertility and economic growth. Because of health risks during old age, which might be too severe to be covered privately, some economically developed countries have public old-age support programs. Formal old-age support provision is regarded as involving management costs, for instance, caused by X-inefficiency in addition to labor costs. Findings demonstrate that when management costs are sufficiently small, formal old-age support raises the balanced economic growth rate, involving a smaller tax burden and freeing individual time from family old-age support, but it lowers fertility. Effects on the lifetime utility of individuals are indeterminate. By contrast, when management costs are high, the increased formal old-age support deters economic growth through a negative income effect. However, it also lowers the fertility rate. In this case, lifetime utility becomes lower. Our major finding is that, when the cost inefficiency of public support is not high, formal old-age support might increase long-term lifetime welfare of individuals, but it lowers fertility.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142641501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fiscal Space and the Supply of Pro-Government Militias 财政空间与亲政府民兵的供应
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-11-07 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70007
M. Christian Lehmann
{"title":"Fiscal Space and the Supply of Pro-Government Militias","authors":"M. Christian Lehmann","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70007","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Militias hamper state-building by undermining the government's monopoly of violence, which creates an environment of anarchy. Yet many governments collaborate with them. These pro-government militias (PGMs), such as paramilitary groups, are not only a poor-country phenomenon, that is, economic growth does not seem to eradicate these armed nonstate actors: Intriguingly, cross-country data reveals a U-shaped relationship between GDP per capita and PGM presence. This article presents an economic theory of PGM supply that can explain this puzzling relationship and provide actionable ways for international actors (e.g., UN) to discourage the emergence of PGMs. However, the theory also cautions that some common international policies (e.g., development aid) may unintentionally encourage PGM supply.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142641475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Transmissible diseases, vaccination, and inequality 传染病、疫苗接种与不平等
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-11-07 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70002
Carmen Camacho, Chrysovalantis Vasilakis
{"title":"Transmissible diseases, vaccination, and inequality","authors":"Carmen Camacho,&nbsp;Chrysovalantis Vasilakis","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70002","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We construct a Susceptible–Infected–Vaccinated Economic two-sector growth model to explore the dynamics of inequality in an economy with distinct groups of workers exposed to a transmissible disease. Our analysis reveals a spectrum of outcomes in the long term, ranging from a disease-free economic environment to a scenario where only the most susceptible group suffers from the disease. Long-term outcomes are influenced by the reproduction rates both of the overall economy and those of the two groups of workers. If one group remains infected over time, the other will surely follow, leading to a perpetual disease burden for both. Additionally, because long-term equilibria may not be unique, there is a possibility of long-term uncertainty, posing additional challenges for policymakers. Notably, our calibrated model suggests that if the vaccination rate exceeds 24%, the relationship between disease exposure and inequality in capital assets becomes nonmonotonic.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142641474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Political Accountability and the Distortion of Law Enforcement 政治问责与执法扭曲
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-11-07 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70000
Yohei Yamaguchi, Ken Yahagi
{"title":"Political Accountability and the Distortion of Law Enforcement","authors":"Yohei Yamaguchi,&nbsp;Ken Yahagi","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70000","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Citizens may derive personal benefits from new technologies while remaining uncertain about their potential social harm. Consequently, citizens may delegate the decision of legal prohibition to politicians, but conflicts can arise because politicians may have self-interested motivations. How does the interaction of uncertainty regarding social harm and politicians' incentives affect the legal prohibition of new technologies? To answer this question, we develop a two-period political agency model combined with a law enforcement model in which citizens endogenously determine whether to become law-breaking or law-abiding citizens. We then demonstrate that (i) when uncertainty regarding social harm is low, politicians tend to opt for under-enforcement, while (ii) when uncertainty is high, politicians are inclined toward over-enforcement. Additionally, we show that as politicians have greater motivation to hold office, expected welfare is enhanced when future uncertainty about harm exceeds current uncertainty although this may result in distorted law enforcement.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142641476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Carrots and Sticks: Collaboration of Taxation and Subsidies in Contests 胡萝卜与大棒：竞赛中税收与补贴的合作
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-11-06 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70005
Yizhaq Minchuk, Aner Sela
{"title":"Carrots and Sticks: Collaboration of Taxation and Subsidies in Contests","authors":"Yizhaq Minchuk,&nbsp;Aner Sela","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70005","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study all-pay auctions under incomplete information in which the designer can impose taxes or subsidies, and his expected payoff is the contestants' expected total effort minus the cost of subsidies, or, alternatively, plus the tax payment. When contestants have linear effort cost functions, we show that taxing the winner's payoff is profitable for the contest designer, and particularly more profitable than the same model with no taxation or the same model with contestants' effort taxation. When the contestants' effort cost functions are convex and the taxation rate is relatively low, we show that the designer should tax the winner's payoff while subsidizing all of the other contestants' effort costs. As a result, contest organizers should think about combining taxation and subsidies in their contests because they complement rather than substitute each other.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142595661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Mergers and Licensing With Horizontal Differentiation 横向差异化的兼并与许可
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-11-05 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70004
Ramon Fauli-Oller, Sougata Poddar, Joel Sandonis
{"title":"Mergers and Licensing With Horizontal Differentiation","authors":"Ramon Fauli-Oller,&nbsp;Sougata Poddar,&nbsp;Joel Sandonis","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70004","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider a research laboratory that owns a patented process innovation and two firms producing differentiating goods in a Bertrand setting. The laboratory considers the possibility to license the innovation as an outsider patentee or to merge with one of the firms in the industry, becoming an incumbent patentee. Licensing takes place through observable two-part tariff contracts. We show that the merger is profitable only for small innovations and increases social welfare for both small and large innovations. Even though we allow the royalty to be higher than the size of the innovation, and opposite to the result in a Cournot setting, we find a region where the merger is both profitable and welfare improving. This occurs only for small innovations and sufficiently differentiated goods. The same result arises for consumer surplus which allows us to derive the optimal merger policy: compared with Cournot competition, a Bertrand setting calls for a more lenient merger policy.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142587940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dynamic policy in the presence of social norms 存在社会规范时的动态政策
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70001
Beat Hintermann, Andreas Lange
{"title":"Dynamic policy in the presence of social norms","authors":"Beat Hintermann,&nbsp;Andreas Lange","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70001","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Individual actions can depend on prevailing social norms. We investigate how optimal policy to promote pro-social action should exploit the underlying social dynamics. We develop a dynamic model of prosocial action in which conformist consumers repeatedly choose whether to engage in some prosocial activity. Whereas individual behavior is not observed, the overall participation rate in the previous period is common knowledge. We demonstrate how conformity can lead to multiple steady states and how their selection depends on starting conditions and discount factors. We further show that the optimal subsidy path can be non-monotonic and can decrease before reaching the steady state-level. Our model thus provides a rationale for introductory subsidies to promote environmentally friendly behavior from a behavioral perspective.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142561617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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