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“Shop Until You Drop”: The Effects of Antihedonism and Environmentalism “购物直到你倒下”：反享乐主义和环保主义的影响
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-10-11 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70067
Giovanni Maccarrone, Marco A. Marini, Ornella Tarola
{"title":"“Shop Until You Drop”: The Effects of Antihedonism and Environmentalism","authors":"Giovanni Maccarrone,&nbsp;Marco A. Marini,&nbsp;Ornella Tarola","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70067","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a vertically differentiated duopoly where consumers have heterogeneous preferences over the hedonic and environmental attributes of goods, we explore the effects of antihedonism and environmentalism, intended here as cultural paradigms altering consumers' preferences. We find that in a market where consumers prioritize hedonic concerns, antihedonism can reduce consumer surplus (CS), whereas an increase in environmentalism can raise CS. However, advocating for environmentalism over hedonism so that consumers prioritize environmental concerns can result in a significantly lower environmental surplus.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70067","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145273029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rising Skill Premium, Education Funding, and Education Decision 不断上升的技能溢价、教育资金和教育决策
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-10-08 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70070
Joël Hellier
{"title":"Rising Skill Premium, Education Funding, and Education Decision","authors":"Joël Hellier","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70070","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper analyzes the effects of an increase in earnings inequality between skilled and unskilled workers (rising skill premium) on education decisions, intraskilled inequality, and intergenerational mobility, depending on the way higher education is funded. The rise in the skill premium encourages higher education enrollment. When higher education is costly for individuals or their families, a rising skill premium (i) improves the relative position of children from skilled families, (ii) reduces interskill intergenerational mobility, and (iii) fosters inequality across skilled workers (“intraskilled inequality”). The impact depends on education funding, and the only situation in which skilled families are not favored is when higher education is freely provided. In this case, the increase in university enrollment must come with an increase in public expenditure on higher education to prevent the deletion of the highest skills. These results are in line with the developments observed in the last four decades in advanced economies, where the constant increase in the skill premium has come with a general increase in the educational level of the population, which has been higher at the top of the skill ladder.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70070","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145272004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Merger Review Under Asymmetric Information 信息不对称条件下的并购审查
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-10-08 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70069
Corinne Langinier, Amrita RayChaudhuri
{"title":"Merger Review Under Asymmetric Information","authors":"Corinne Langinier,&nbsp;Amrita RayChaudhuri","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70069","url":null,"abstract":"<p>When the antitrust authority has imperfect information about firms' costs, we show that all firms (including firms not participating in a merger) can influence the antitrust authority's merger decision by manipulating Pre-merger quantities. We find that there exists a clear relationship between the level of synergy generated by a given merger and the type of error in the merger decision that is more likely to occur. The larger the level of merger-induced synergy, the greater the likelihood of a Type II error whereby a consumer surplus-decreasing merger is allowed. The smaller the level of synergy, the greater the likelihood of a Type I error whereby a consumer surplus-increasing merger is rejected.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70069","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145272005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Lobbying as a Signal 游说是一个信号
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-10-08 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70071
Artyom Jelnov, Doron Klunover
{"title":"Lobbying as a Signal","authors":"Artyom Jelnov,&nbsp;Doron Klunover","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70071","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A model of political competition is considered, in which a candidate who will provide favors to a lobbyist in exchange for a campaign donation, may be perceived as more competent than a rival candidate who has not received a donation and therefore will work solely on behalf of the public. We characterize the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game and show that: (i) the lobbyist is able to exploit the political system to serve his own interests, although lobbying may benefit voters as well; and (ii) donating to both candidates—which is frequently observed in political campaigns—is possible only under competition among lobbyists or under asymmetric information regarding voters' preferences.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70071","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145272006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Skill-Biased Technological Changes, Nonseparable Utility, and Dynamic Optimal Capital Tax 技能偏向的技术变革、不可分效用与动态最优资本税
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-10-05 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70065
Qiongqiong Li, Wenjian Li
{"title":"Skill-Biased Technological Changes, Nonseparable Utility, and Dynamic Optimal Capital Tax","authors":"Qiongqiong Li,&nbsp;Wenjian Li","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70065","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper examines the optimal dynamic taxation of capital in the context of skill-biased technological change. The study reveals that the widening wage gap, coupled with the complementarity between consumption and leisure, provides a novel rationale for capital taxation. We demonstrate that taxing capital is beneficial in economies experiencing persistent skill-biased technological advancements, even if the capital is skill-neutral and the complementarity between consumption and leisure is time invariant. Converse results appear when leisure substitutes for consumption. Statistics-based optimal tax formulas are provided to show how the government can dynamically mitigate the impacts of various technological changes through the utilization of labor and capital income taxes.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145271810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Banking on Bias: Media Coverage and Financial Bailouts 偏见的银行：媒体报道和金融救助
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-10-02 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70064
Saltuk Ozerturk
{"title":"Banking on Bias: Media Coverage and Financial Bailouts","authors":"Saltuk Ozerturk","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70064","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper studies the optimal bailout coverage of a media firm. Driven by the incentive to lower its expected borrowing costs, the media firm's coverage tends to favor the banking sector. However, this pro-bank bias results in the same ex ante expected borrowing cost as truthful coverage. While bias reduces borrowing costs when a bailout provides no public benefit, it also leads to higher borrowing costs when a bailout serves the public interest. Ultimately, pro-bank media bias always harms the taxpayer's expected welfare. Moreover, greater financial fragility in the media sector increases the likelihood of bank failures that taxpayers would ideally seek to prevent.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145223780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Disclosing Effort in Dynamic Team Contests With Effort Complementarity 努力互补性下动态团队竞争中的努力披露
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-30 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70063
Maria Arbatskaya, Hideo Konishi
{"title":"Disclosing Effort in Dynamic Team Contests With Effort Complementarity","authors":"Maria Arbatskaya,&nbsp;Hideo Konishi","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70063","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper studies strategic effort disclosure in dynamic team contests. Two teams of two players compete in a Tullock contest with teammates' sequential efforts aggregated across two periods using a Cobb–Douglas production function. We examine how equilibrium efforts and winning probabilities are affected by the teams' communication policies: no communication, private communication (efforts shared internally with stage-2 teammates), and public communication (efforts disclosed to stage-2 rivals as well). To describe asymmetric information generated by privately observable efforts for each communication policy profile, we use a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with an appropriate belief refinement for multistage complete information games. In the unique positive-effort equilibrium, the optimal choice of a communication strategy differs for the favorite (the strong team) and the underdog (the weak team). Private communication only benefits the underdog team, fostering effort complementarity and improving their chances of winning and payoffs. In contrast, the favorite team prefers either public or no communication to deter rival efforts or avoid intrateam free-riding. Importantly, endogenous communication policies reshape competitive dynamics, with private disclosure of efforts serving as a strategic equalizer for weaker teams.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145224456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Controlling Extortion and Collusion: Morality, Peer-Effect, and the Strategies Beyond Punishment 控制勒索与合谋：道德、同伴效应和惩罚之外的策略
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-28 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70061
Dyuti S. Banerjee, Panchali Banerjee, Vivekananda Mukherjee
{"title":"Controlling Extortion and Collusion: Morality, Peer-Effect, and the Strategies Beyond Punishment","authors":"Dyuti S. Banerjee,&nbsp;Panchali Banerjee,&nbsp;Vivekananda Mukherjee","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70061","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We explore the interaction between enforcement and individual-specific sensitivity to moral standards in determining the scope of extortion and collusion in a bureaucracy consisting of corruptible officers. The moral standard is determined by the number of corrupt officers in the bureaucracy, which is a function of both the penalty and the probability of conviction of collusion. Both a higher penalty and a more active independent auditor, like the media, keep the number of corrupt officers in check in a “low” and “medium” penalty situation and incentivize compliance. Extortion occurs only under a “low penalty, low compliance cost” situation. Increases in penalty or judicial accuracy in judging extortion cases or active independent auditing keep extortion in check. Controlling the rent of the firms induces compliance and reduces both extortion and collusion incidents in an economy, having a greater impact on collusion than extortion.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145224387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal Interventions When Illicit Trafficking Responds 应对非法贩运时的最佳干预措施
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-28 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70062
Mehmet Bac
{"title":"Optimal Interventions When Illicit Trafficking Responds","authors":"Mehmet Bac","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70062","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The capabilities of illicit trafficking organizations to expand or contract their periphery and source segments by modifying their link structures pose challenges to law enforcement. This paper scrutinizes the structural response of illicit trafficking organizations to intervention strategies. It also studies how the law enforcement authority should allocate its resources between the source and the periphery segments, given the structural response of trafficking, to minimize the expected harms. The analysis shows that traffickers integrate the supply, possibly build redundant sources and expand in peripheral markets if the source segment is targeted (decapitation), maintain near-maximal expansion by splintering into supply cells or thin subnetworks if the periphery is targeted (amputation). This response subverts law enforcement primarily by suppressing the possibility of trace-back detection of trafficking units through their detected connections. In the transnational trafficking context, it can also stifle intelligence sharing between nations. The optimal intervention, then, is amputation under intermediate budgets and large source fragmentation costs, decapitation under low detection contiguity. Actual policies that prioritize border protection and port-of-entry units can be optimal from national, but not global, perspective.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145224386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal Incentives With Other-Regarding Principal and Agents 与他人无关的委托人和代理人的最优激励
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-28 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70066
Swapnendu Banerjee, Somenath Chakraborty, Arijit Mukherjee, Sougata Poddar
{"title":"Optimal Incentives With Other-Regarding Principal and Agents","authors":"Swapnendu Banerjee,&nbsp;Somenath Chakraborty,&nbsp;Arijit Mukherjee,&nbsp;Sougata Poddar","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70066","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Analyzing interactions between an other-regarding principal and two other-regarding agents, we show with continuous efforts and outcomes that “team contracts” are optimal if the principal is inequity averse or not “too status seeking.” However, if the principal is sufficiently status seeking and the agents' wages are far apart, relative performance contracts or independent contracts could be the optimal choice of the principal. However, a status-seeking principal will certainly offer relative performance contracts to self-regarding agents. The above results hold when the ‘direct wage incentive’ effect is not too high. With discrete efforts and outcomes, both team contracts and relative performance contracts can be optimal if the principal is “status seeking” or “not too inequity averse.” But an extreme independent contract can also be optimal when the principal is sufficiently inequity averse. Similar results hold when the projects of the agents are correlated. With a “fair” principal, ceteris paribus, team contracts are more likely over relative performance contracts, however, relative performance contracts can also be optimal with other-regarding agents.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70066","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145224384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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