Journal of Public Economic Theory最新文献

{"title":"Competing for Priorities in School Choice","authors":"Greg Leo,&nbsp;Martin Van der Linden","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70137","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70137","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We present a model in which students can influence their priorities in a school choice mechanism through a first-stage contest. We show that efficiency improvements at the mechanism level can lead to net efficiency losses if they come at the price of increased allocative inequalities, intensifying competition in the contest. To demonstrate this potential tension, we apply these results to the deferred and immediate acceptance mechanisms (<span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>DA</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $mathrm{DA}$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> and <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>IA</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $mathrm{IA}$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>) and show that there are conditions under which <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>IA</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $mathrm{IA}$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> can yield higher net welfare than <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>DA</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $mathrm{DA}$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>, despite the allocative efficiency advantages of <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>DA</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $mathrm{DA}$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> under these conditions.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70137","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148878415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Family Bargaining and the Gender Gap in Informal Care","authors":"Chiara Canta,&nbsp;Helmuth Cremer","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70135","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We study the optimal long-term care (LTC) policy when informal care can be provided by children in exchange for monetary transfers from their elderly parents. We consider a bargaining model with single-child families, where daughters have lower labor market wages, and bargaining power within the family varies by the child's gender. In the laissez-faire scenario, daughters always provide more informal care than sons. When their bargaining weight is smaller, they also experience lower welfare; however, this may be reversed if their bargaining weight is sufficiently high. The first-best outcome involves redistribution from families with sons to families with daughters and can be implemented through a gender-specific schedule of public LTC benefits and state-contingent transfers to adult children. Gender neutrality disadvantages families with daughters and may even leave daughters worse off than under laissez faire. It also leads to a distorted allocation of care within families with daughters and affects the distribution of transfers in all families.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148784911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Measuring Hierarchy With Multiple Supervisors","authors":"Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70130","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper develops an axiomatic framework for measuring hierarchical structures in modern organizations, where multiple supervisors and non-traditional arrangements, such as matrix structures, are common. Representing hierarchies as directed acyclic graphs, we show that structural flattening in these organizations is path-dependent: determining hierarchical dominance generally requires explicitly tracing the sequence of subordination removals. We show that this complexity resolves in multipath-free hierarchies. When each ordered pair of individuals is connected by at most one directed path, the effects of removal order leave a static footprint, allowing hierarchical dominance to be verified by a single geometric condition rather than a step-by-step procedure. Our axiomatic framework is grounded in Anonymity, the Replication Principle, and two versions of the Subordination Removal postulate. The distinction between baseline and Strong Subordination Removal clarifies whether redundant formal reporting lines contribute to measured hierarchical weight or instead leave the effective chain of command unchanged. Using this foundation, we characterize the hierarchical pre-orders consistent with sequential subordination removal, including incomplete comparisons and complete extensions for organizations of varying sizes.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148753325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Model of Punitive Voting","authors":"Manuel Lleonart-Anguix","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70133","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I analyze a two-period model of political competition where voters care about candidates' integrity. Candidates must trade off implementing their preferred policy against maintaining their electoral promises. Voters punish candidates who deviate from electoral promises by voting for their opponent. I find that punitive voting can exert political discipline only if candidates face low levels of uncertainty about voters' preferences. In this case, candidates' electoral promises are a compromise between their preferred policy and voters' preferences, and when elected, they implement their promise. Finally, I show that when one candidate's ideal policy is closer to the median voter, an equilibrium exists where one candidate is disciplined and the other is not.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70133","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148753302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Incentives in Networked Teams","authors":"Ziyan Li,&nbsp;Yifan Xiong","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70132","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper studies incentive provision and optimal network design in team environments. We develop a two-stage moral hazard framework in which agents first invest effort in preparation and then decide on continuation effort after observing their peers' first-stage actions. Peer information is represented by an observability network, modeled as an undirected graph in which connected agents mutually observe each other's actions. A central insight of the paper is that the role of the network depends critically on whether agents' efforts are substitutes or complements. Under substitute technology, incentives depend only on the number of active agents, and network structure is irrelevant. Under complementary technology, by contrast, agents condition continuation effort on observed behavior, so that network topology directly shapes incentive provision. We then study the optimal design of the observability network. We show that a key determinant is how total compensation—comprising incentive rewards and fixed salaries—varies with agents' network position. A horizontal team structure is optimal when total compensation increases with degree at the margin, whereas a hierarchical structure is optimal when it decreases with degree.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148753301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Climate Inequality: Carbon Capture for Redistribution","authors":"Elisa Belfiori,&nbsp;Manuel Macera","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70134","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We study optimal climate policy in a global economy where regions differ in wealth and climate vulnerability. Carbon emissions from production lead to output losses, and there is a technology for carbon capture. We provide an aggregation result: the model with heterogeneity can be cast into a representative region economy with a different discount factor and damage function. This result offers a simple rule to account for inequality in the design of climate policy. We show that wealthier regions should bear more responsibility for carbon capture to reduce atmospheric carbon and that inequality <i>per se</i> does not entail a compromise on the global emissions target. It is only if regions must contribute uniformly to carbon capture that the optimal climate policy dictates higher global net emissions relative to the first best. Carbon capture serves as a natural redistribution mechanism precisely because lump-sum transfers are unavailable.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148753250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Resource Allocation Under Exogenous Information Regimes in Multi-Battle Team Contests","authors":"Lixue Zhou,&nbsp;Mengling Sun","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70131","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>A central leader allocates a budget across multiple fronts before agents choose effort. We study a <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>T</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $T$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>-front team contest with heterogeneous players under three exogenous information regimes: full, partial, and no disclosure. Under full disclosure, every interior allocation-game Nash equilibrium features battle-by-battle spending parity: with equal budgets, leaders match each other's spending within each battle, although the common spending level may vary with the realized type pair. Under partial and no disclosure, we characterize neutral-opponent benchmark best responses. Partial disclosure yields a prior-only tilt direction: toward strong-player battles when strong types are in the majority and toward weak-player battles otherwise. Under no disclosure, Bayesian effort pooling can make weak-player battles have higher marginal product than strong-player battles; the benchmark first-order driver then points toward weak-link protection over a wide region and becomes the neutral-opponent benchmark best response under the stated concavity and interior-effort conditions. We call this mechanism Bayesian productivity reversal. Three-battle strategic-response checks suggest that these directions are robust away from the relevant benchmark thresholds.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148752640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Decentralization for the Core of Non-Convex Economies With Externalities","authors":"Maria Gabriella Graziano,&nbsp;Marialaura Pesce,&nbsp;Vincenzo Platino","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70129","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study pure exchange economies with consumption externalities, where agents' preferences depend on others' consumption and may be non-convex. Adopting a cooperative approach, we allow agents to form coalitions and introduce a notion of generalized fuzzy core. We show that core allocations can be decentralized via suitable price systems. We establish a core equivalence theorem for <i>A-equilibria</i>, which generalizes Walras-Nash and Berge equilibria with externalities. We also prove a corresponding equivalence result for economies with Arrowian markets, where generalized fuzzy core allocations can be supported as <i>Information equilibria</i> with personalized and market prices.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70129","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148752712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Knowledge Spillover Network and Optimal R&D Policy in Oligopoly","authors":"Jun-Hyung Lee","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70128","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies optimal R&amp;D policy in a Cournot oligopoly with network-based knowledge spillovers. Generalizing the standard two-stage model of Kamien et al. (1992), we characterize the socially optimal policy by decomposing the net externality of private innovation into three channels: the market expansion effect, direct knowledge spillovers, and the market rivalry effect. Contrary to the standard duopoly results that subsidies achieve the second-best allocation, we show that in oligopolies with more than two firms, the optimal policy becomes taxation when knowledge spillover rate is sufficiently low or the spillover network is sufficiently sparse. We further show that the tax-optimal region survives in non-regular networks including complete bipartite, core-periphery, scale-free, and spatial networks.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70128","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148616078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Welfare-Improving Tax Disputes","authors":"Nigar Hashimzade","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70124","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Tax law is often uncertain. Taxpayers and tax authorities can disagree over the tax position, eligibility for tax incentives, or sufficiency of evidence. Taxpayers can face uncertainty over sanctions when tax position is not sustained. In many jurisdictions uncertain tax position can be disputed in court. In this paper, I present an analysis of tax dispute over uncertain tax treatment of investment in the framework of rent-seeking contest with endogenous prize. I show that in the presence of tax uncertainty, a tax dispute can lead to a net welfare gain despite the litigation costs. These results provide economic efficiency rationale for tax disputes.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70124","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148467032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}