Journal of Public Economic Theory最新文献

{"title":"Efficient Mechanisms for Multi-Asset Bilateral Trading","authors":"Nicolás Figueroa,&nbsp;Vasiliki Skreta","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70109","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study when ex-post efficient bilateral trade is possible under two-sided asymmetric information with two agents and two assets, subject to balanced budget and voluntary participation constraints. We characterize how the interaction between asset characteristics and ownership structure determines the possibility of efficiency. Our main finding reveals a fundamental misalignment principle when goods are heterogeneous: efficiency is possible precisely when complementarity and ownership structure are <i>misaligned</i>. Under concentrated ownership (one agent owns both assets), efficiency is possible when assets are substitutes but impossible when they are complements. Under dispersed ownership (each agent owns one asset), the opposite holds: efficiency is possible when assets are complements but impossible when they are substitutes. This misalignment creates asymmetric valuations that overcome the participation constraints binding efficiency. Our results shed new light on the classic Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility and Cramton–Gibbons–Klemperer possibility theorems to multi-asset environments, showing that the structure of asset bundles fundamentally alters the rents that we need to provide to ensure truthfulness and voluntary participation.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70109","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147615030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Global Warming Policy in a Federation","authors":"Robin Boadway,&nbsp;Katherine Cuff","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70111","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We explore alternate allocations of responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions policies in a small open federation. Emissions result from consumption and production of a tradeable dirty good. Emissions control policies are based on social values which depend on the allocation of policy responsibility. Policies include emissions taxes and permit trading systems and involve administrative costs that can differ by level of government. We show that federal and regional optimal emission pricing policies are variants of Pigovian taxes, and there may be a role for tariffs when regional governments are responsible for emissions policy and the federal government makes interregional transfers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70111","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147615167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dynamics of Fiscal Habits and Soft Budgets in Federations","authors":"João Ricardo Faria,&nbsp;Emilson C. D. Silva","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70110","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we are motivated by empirical evidence of persistent, implicit or explicit, bailouts in federations from high-tier (e.g., center) governments to low-tier (e.g., state) governments. We build a novel dynamic model for a federation containing <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>N</mi>\u0000 \u0000 <mo>≥</mo>\u0000 \u0000 <mn>2</mn>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $Nge 2$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> identical regional governments and a central government. We assume that regional governments care about the wellbeing of residents and bureaucrats. Residents derive utility from consumption of numeraire and regional public goods. The utility of the bureaucracy depends on habit formation. The bureaucrat derives utility from consumption of current and past regional public good levels. The central government's objective function is the sum of regional utilities. Regional and central governments play an infinite-horizon sequential game in which regional governments are policy leaders with respect to their choices of public-good levels. These choices produce regional deficits. The central government observes regional deficits and then choose deficit-relief federal transfers to reduce regional costs of fiscal insecurity faced by regional residents. There is a common-pool property associated with federal funds. The federal transfers do not eliminate regional deficits. Observing this, regional governments raise additional funds to eliminate deficits. We derive the steady-state equilibrium, examine its properties and compare it with alternative equilibria, which provide useful benchmarks. We show that the dynamic model produces equilibrium outcomes that are consistent with empirical evidence; namely, they involve persistent deficits and partial federal bailouts. Deficits increase as the federation expands in size.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70110","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147566747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Alliances and Technological Partnerships in Contests","authors":"Jérôme Dollinger","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70107","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study analyses the formation of alliances and technological partnerships in contests. Alliances enhance the probability of winning at the cost of sharing the prize if won, while technological partnerships reduce the marginal cost of the effort invested in the contest by the members. When agents exhibit extreme free-riding behaviors at equilibrium, the stabilization of the grand alliance by technological cooperation requires players to be able to block any deviation in the alliance structure involving their technological partners. Nevertheless, when the agents manifest fewer free-riding intentions, the threat of being excluded from a global technological partnership is sufficient to ensure the stability of the grand alliance in the long run. When exclusions are possible, global cooperation in technology between agents in a situation with limited free-riding behaviors between partners can completely annihilate competition in the contest. This indicates that free-riding behaviors hinder the stabilization of the grand alliances in contests. As no alliance structure is stable when the agents cannot form any technological partnership, these findings highlight that the existence of technological coalitions is a facilitating factor for the formation of alliances in contests.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147614919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Optimal Dynamic Income Taxation Under Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and Idiosyncratic Productivity Shocks","authors":"Yunmin Chen,&nbsp;Jang-Ting Guo","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70108","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In the context of a dynamic (three-period) general equilibrium model, this paper examines the optimal tax rates on capital savings and labor income under quasi-hyperbolic discounting and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. In the absence of skill-type uncertainty, we analytically show that the marginal capital tax wedges on agents' first-period savings are negative for correcting inherent preference internalities and that these tax rates will be higher when productivity disturbances are incorporated. In the stochastic two-type setting with exogenously-given factor input prices, our calibrated numerical experiments find that the marginal capital wedges for both types on their period-1 savings are positive, indicating the government's motive to relax individuals' incentive-compatibility constraints. We also quantitatively find that the optimal tax rates for both types on their first- and second-period capital savings are <i>ceteris paribus</i> decreasing in the degree of quasi-hyperbolic discounting because of a stronger need to rectify negative utility internalities.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147614947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Financial Market Globalization, Growth, and Inequality of Nations: A Multicountry Case","authors":"Wai-Hong Ho,&nbsp;Cheng Zheng","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70104","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper proposes a world economy growth model where countries are plagued with domestic credit market imperfections, and there are knowledge spillovers diffusing from technologically advanced countries to backward ones. Under some conditions, globalizing financial markets beget uphill international credit flows which amplify all countries' initial income gaps, giving rise to a ranking of countries in terms of their living standards. The analysis shows that, while disconnecting from the world financial market helps a country to raise its income level, it impedes growth. A redistribution of total wage income from the highest-income to the lowest-income country narrows the income distances between countries, and it may speed up growth. The world economic growth rate increases with the number of countries participating in the international financial market.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146680409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Do International Environmental Agreements Affect Tax and Environmental Competition Between Developed and Developing Countries?","authors":"Thierry Madiès,&nbsp;Ornella Tarola,&nbsp;Emmanuelle Taugourdeau","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70103","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The aim of this paper is to examine how the \"Common but Differentiated Responsibility\" (CBDR) principle embedded in international climate agreements influences the intensity of corporate tax competition between a developed and a developing country. In contrast to the standard (asymmetric) tax competition literature, our model shows that the interplay between corporate taxes and environmental regulations do not necessarily lead to a higher equilibrium corporate tax in the developed country compared to the developing country. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the developing country does not necessarily become a pollution haven. This finding nuances the argument put forward by developed countries to shrink their climate responsibility that developing countries are pollution havens.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147268918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Contests With Delegation","authors":"Francesco Trevisan","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70091","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper studies winner-takes-all Tullock contests between two groups, each formed by a principal and a delegate. Principals allocate the monetary prize within their group, while delegates exert effort to win it. In equilibrium, the more productive delegate receives a smaller prize share while enjoying a higher expected payoff. Nevertheless, delegates' expected payoffs do not monotonically increase with their productivity. As productivity differences get wide enough, delegates' expected payoffs decline and tend to zero. Finally, a more balanced competition raises both delegates' efforts and prize shares, ultimately benefiting delegates' utilitarian welfare.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146139306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Emission and Performance Standards in a Duopoly With Differentiated Goods","authors":"Adriana Gama,&nbsp;Mario Lechuga-Calderón","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70102","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We consider a polluting duopoly that sells differentiated goods and is subject to environmental regulation, by means of an emission or a performance standard. The firms simultaneously choose prices and investment in R&amp;D—to improve their abatement technology—and we show that the performance standard leads to lower prices and per-firm profits, but higher R&amp;D, consumer surplus and social welfare when the goods are substitutes. If the goods are complements, such rankings may be reversed, except for the welfare comparison. We also provide a full comparative statics analysis of the equilibria under both instruments with respect to the stringency of the regulation and the degree of product differentiation. Finally, we show that the entry of firms reduces social welfare and eventually reverses its comparison.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146083349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Governance, Productivity and Economic Development","authors":"Cuong Le Van,&nbsp;Ngoc-Sang Pham,&nbsp;Thi Kim Cuong Pham,&nbsp;Binh Tran-Nam","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70099","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper explores the interplay between transfer policies, R&amp;D, corruption, and economic development using a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and a government. The government collects taxes, redistributes fiscal revenues, and undertakes public investment (in R&amp;D, infrastructure, etc.). Corruption is modeled as a fraction of tax revenues that is siphoned off and removed from the economy. We first establish the existence of a political-economic equilibrium. Then, using an analytically tractable framework with two private agents, we examine the effects of corruption and evaluate the impact of various policies, including redistribution and innovation-led strategies.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146027594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}