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Existence of Equilibria for Shared Goods 共享商品均衡的存在性
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-07-15 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70045
John A. Weymark
{"title":"Existence of Equilibria for Shared Goods","authors":"John A. Weymark","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70045","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A shared good is an impure public good in which personalized consumptions are produced by groups using a sharing technology. Rivalry in consumption is captured by the shape of this technology. Private goods and pure public goods are special cases in which there is complete rivalry and no rivalry, respectively. A competitive shared goods equilibrium is defined in which there are markets for all goods, there are personalized prices for the consumption of shared goods, and both firms and groups are profit maximizers. When all shared goods are private (resp. public), this equilibrium is a Walrasian (resp. Lindahl) equilibrium. Sufficient conditions for the existence of a competitive shared goods equilibrium are identified. An alternative equilibrium concept in which groups behave cooperatively towards their beneficiaries is also considered and an equilibrium existence theorem for it is established.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70045","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144624534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do the Poor Benefit From a Well Defined Tax Regime? 穷人能从明确的税收制度中受益吗？
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-07-15 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70040
Marisa Ratto, Simon Vicary
{"title":"Do the Poor Benefit From a Well Defined Tax Regime?","authors":"Marisa Ratto,&nbsp;Simon Vicary","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70040","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The uncertainty of the tax base is the central issue we consider in this paper. Top-income earners benefit from the wealth management industry's supply of sophisticated schemes, allowing them to adopt a gray-area avoidance/evasion position. This fact makes the assessment of the tax base uncertain, even for the tax authority. Our research questions are: when should sophisticated evasion be deterred? How should a utilitarian government set tax rates accordingly? Does the uncertainty of the tax base disadvantage less fortunate taxpayers? We show that risk aversion plays a role. It has to be quite low for the tax authority not to enforce compliance. When compliance is enforced, if the rich are concentrated enough at the top of the income distribution—a mild condition—we find that the tax rate applied on the lower income should be minimized, a parallel with Edgeworth's old utilitarian proposition on equal marginal sacrifice. Our analysis also suggests that government uncertainty about the tax base will actually benefit the poor, provided tax compliance is enforced.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144624535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Coalitions Improve the Coordination and Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence 联盟改善公共产品的协调与供给：理论与实验证据
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-07-13 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70037
Sheryl Ball, Sudipta Sarangi, Sakshi Upadhyay
{"title":"Coalitions Improve the Coordination and Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence","authors":"Sheryl Ball,&nbsp;Sudipta Sarangi,&nbsp;Sakshi Upadhyay","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70037","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study a public goods game with heterogeneous agents who care about their own payoff as well as that of the player who receives the lowest payoff. The weight of own payoff varies across players and is private information. We first develop a theoretical model and then test the predictions of our model in a laboratory setting under different parameter conditions. In both our model and experiments, introducing a coalition formation stage before making a contribution decision enables sorting of players according to their preferences, resulting in higher contributions to the public good. Additionally, we find that participants in our experiment take previous period outcomes into account while making current period decisions. These results help explain successful coalitions, like International Environmental Agreements, that are effective in creating real-world public goods like reductions in carbon emissions.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70037","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144611996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Merger Policy and the Timing of Killer and Continuation Acquisitions 并购政策与杀手级收购和持续性收购的时机
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-07-08 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70036
Antonio Tesoriere
{"title":"Merger Policy and the Timing of Killer and Continuation Acquisitions","authors":"Antonio Tesoriere","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70036","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>I study a dynamic game of innovation and takeover between an incumbent and a potential entrant where the entrant knows whether it has the resources to complete a project and compete, but the incumbent does not and can wait to learn about it. Under the assumption that the entrant lacks bargaining power, the equilibrium is inefficient. Killer acquisitions, by which the incumbent takes over and then drops the innovation, occur early and attract the resource-constrained entrant. Continuation acquisitions happen later and always keep the constrained entrant out, blocking socially desirable innovations. To stop killer acquisitions, merger policies require a cap on takeover bids. To encourage continuation acquisitions, they require both a cap and a possibly time-dependent floor. Policies that apply both before and after innovation achieve the optimum with complete information. Those applying only before cause delays, waste entry costs, and may even be unfeasible. The results call for stricter merger control, such as stronger notification rules and unified theories of harms that treat takeovers of nascent and established competitors in the same way.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144574100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Social Discount Rates Under Persistent Risks: A Theoretical and Numerical Analysis 持续风险下的社会贴现率：理论与数值分析
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-07-08 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70046
Hélène Schernberg
{"title":"Social Discount Rates Under Persistent Risks: A Theoretical and Numerical Analysis","authors":"Hélène Schernberg","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70046","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Economic shocks can be felt for years or even decades. Social welfare functions that exhibit aversion to persistent consumption risk address several gaps in the social discounting literature. First, they allow analyzing the impact of risk aversion and dependences on discount rates. Second, they generate results with normative appeal: Persistent risk decreases the discount rates. Moreover, in the presence of persistent risk, the discount rates decrease with the social planner's risk aversion and her planning horizon. In addition, I provide an extended Ramsey equation for the persistent risk-averse social planner as well as a numerical application.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70046","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144574101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Role of Endogenous Timing in Public Goods Provision and Its Implications for Welfare 内生时间在公共物品供给中的作用及其对福利的影响
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-07-06 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70047
Leonardo J. Basso, Pedro Jara - Moroni, Eduardo Zúñiga - Leyton
{"title":"The Role of Endogenous Timing in Public Goods Provision and Its Implications for Welfare","authors":"Leonardo J. Basso,&nbsp;Pedro Jara - Moroni,&nbsp;Eduardo Zúñiga - Leyton","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70047","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This article analyzes the provision of public goods in a two-player game setting, employing the Game with Observable Delay (GOD) framework to investigate how endogenous timing influences contribution strategies and welfare outcomes. Our analysis shows that, for both symmetric and asymmetric valuation cases, the endogenous timing outcome leads to simultaneous play. This result arises from players' strong aversion to the follower position, driven by the leader's free-riding incentives. The outcome is good for welfare, since in both the symmetric and asymmetric cases, simultaneous play leads to greater total contributions compared to the sequential equilibrium. If the framework for contributions was of the Game with Action Commitment type, the outcome would be simultaneous, leading to an inferior welfare result. These findings indicate that fostering environments with a structure akin to the GOD could strategically encourage players to maximize their contributions and improve welfare outcomes in public goods scenarios.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144573472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good: When and How Much? 对公共物品的自愿捐款：何时和多少？
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-17 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70042
Yunjie Shi, Simona Fabrizi, Steffen Lippert
{"title":"Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good: When and How Much?","authors":"Yunjie Shi,&nbsp;Simona Fabrizi,&nbsp;Steffen Lippert","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70042","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze voluntary public good contributions with incomplete information. A fundraiser chooses whether to disclose or withhold contributions as they occur, and two contributors choose the size and (eventually) the order of their contributions. Contributions made without announcement—thus simultaneous—minimize free-riding incentives of contributors with low valuations, whereas contributions with disclosure of past donations—thus sequential—minimize those of contributors with high valuations. To maximize aggregate contributions, a fundraiser permits sequential contributions when high valuations are prevalent or significantly exceed low valuations. Otherwise, simultaneous contributions are preferred.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70042","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144308884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Binary Self-Selective Voting Rules 二进制自选择投票规则
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-14 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70039
Héctor Hermida-Rivera, Toygar T. Kerman
{"title":"Binary Self-Selective Voting Rules","authors":"Héctor Hermida-Rivera,&nbsp;Toygar T. Kerman","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70039","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper introduces a novel binary stability property for voting rules—called binary self-selectivity—by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself in pairwise elections will choose not to do so. In Theorem 1, we show that a neutral voting rule is binary self-selective if and only if it is universally self-selective. We then use this equivalence to show, in Corollary 1, that under the unrestricted strict preference domain, a unanimous and neutral voting rule is binary self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. In Theorem 2 and Corollary 2, we show that whenever there is a strong Condorcet winner; a unanimous, neutral, and anonymous voting rule is binary self-selective (or universally self-selective) if and only if it is the Condorcet voting rule.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70039","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144281433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal Timing in Competition for Advantage: A Two-Stage Contest 优势竞争中的最佳时机：两阶段竞争
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-05 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70041
Konstantinos Protopappas
{"title":"Optimal Timing in Competition for Advantage: A Two-Stage Contest","authors":"Konstantinos Protopappas","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70041","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study a two-stage contest between two players who differ in ability, with a prize awarded in the second stage. In the first stage, players compete, and the winner enjoys a reduced effort cost in the second stage. The second-stage contest is simultaneous, while the first-stage contest can be simultaneous or sequential. We investigate how a sequential first stage affects the <i>catching-up</i> and <i>discouragement</i> effects between players. Additionally, we explore the optimal first-stage timing structure of contest designers with different objectives, that is, maximizing effort in the second stage, total effort across both stages, or the winner's total effort. Interestingly, a designer focused on maximizing second-stage effort prefers a simultaneous first-stage contest, contrary to the conventional intuition that the stronger player should lead.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70041","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144220406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Expectational Equilibria and Drèze Equilibria in Many-to-One Matching Models 多对一匹配模型中的期望均衡和期望均衡
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-05-25 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70038
P. Jean-Jacques Herings
{"title":"Expectational Equilibria and Drèze Equilibria in Many-to-One Matching Models","authors":"P. Jean-Jacques Herings","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70038","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study coalition formation in many-to-one matching models from a competitive equilibrium perspective. We cover both models with and models without monetary transfers. A first notion to do so is the one of Drèze equilibrium, which we extend to the many-to-one setup. A second concept is expectational equilibrium. It turns out that under very weak assumptions, we obtain an equivalence between these concepts, so both lead to exactly the same predictions. Since the equivalence might be between empty sets, we also present sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium. The existence proof is based on an adjustment process.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70038","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144135636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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