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Journal of Public Economic Theory最新文献

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Expectational Equilibria and Drèze Equilibria in Many-to-One Matching Models 多对一匹配模型中的期望均衡和期望均衡
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-05-25 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70038
P. Jean-Jacques Herings
{"title":"Expectational Equilibria and Drèze Equilibria in Many-to-One Matching Models","authors":"P. Jean-Jacques Herings","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70038","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study coalition formation in many-to-one matching models from a competitive equilibrium perspective. We cover both models with and models without monetary transfers. A first notion to do so is the one of Drèze equilibrium, which we extend to the many-to-one setup. A second concept is expectational equilibrium. It turns out that under very weak assumptions, we obtain an equivalence between these concepts, so both lead to exactly the same predictions. Since the equivalence might be between empty sets, we also present sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium. The existence proof is based on an adjustment process.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70038","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144135636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the Public and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods 论公共物品的公共性与自愿性提供
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-05-05 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70031
Emma Moreno-García, Ramόn J. Torregrosa
{"title":"On the Public and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods","authors":"Emma Moreno-García,&nbsp;Ramόn J. Torregrosa","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70031","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We extend Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian's (1986) model to a non-cooperative approach where voluntary contributions and taxes coexist to finance public goods. After obtaining the uniqueness of equilibrium, we present different properties of the outcomes, showing the role that the taxes play and the impact on voluntary contributions. We also identify conditions ensuring neutrality. Finally, we present some remarks on welfare and efficiency, pointing out the second-best solution and identifying conditions for efficiency.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143905036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Environmental R&D Tournaments 环境研发锦标赛
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-05-05 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70029
John C. Strandholm, Eric P. Dunaway
{"title":"Environmental R&D Tournaments","authors":"John C. Strandholm,&nbsp;Eric P. Dunaway","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70029","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We investigate the impacts of investment in environmental (or green) research and development (R&amp;D) in the context of a contest with endogenous rewards, known as R&amp;D tournaments. The firm that “wins“ the tournament is the one which develops the most effective technology at reducing emissions and gains sole property rights in using that technology. This reduces the burden of the emission fee which the winning firm faces, while also lowering the fee all firms face. We find that the tournament induces firms to invest more than in a non-tournament R&amp;D model except at high levels of green investment cost.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143905038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why the Statutory Retirement Age Is Too Low in a Democracy 民主国家法定退休年龄为何过低
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-05-02 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70034
Berthold U. Wigger
{"title":"Why the Statutory Retirement Age Is Too Low in a Democracy","authors":"Berthold U. Wigger","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70034","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines the normative criteria for setting the statutory retirement age (SRA) under majority voting. It finds that when the working population forms the democratic majority, the SRA tends to be set inefficiently low. This inefficiency stems from a positive fiscal externality in pay-as-you-go pension systems: workers determining the SRA do not consider the benefits that a higher retirement age provides to current pensioners. Using a continuous-time overlapping generations model, the paper demonstrates that a Pareto improvement can be achieved by raising the SRA–provided it is accompanied by compensatory transfers from pensioners to workers at the time of the increase.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70034","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143896958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Vaccine-Preventable Diseases and Individual Behavior: Deterministic vs Stochastic Outcomes 疫苗可预防疾病与个体行为：确定性与随机结果
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-05-02 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70033
Simone Marsiglio, Marco Tolotti
{"title":"Vaccine-Preventable Diseases and Individual Behavior: Deterministic vs Stochastic Outcomes","authors":"Simone Marsiglio,&nbsp;Marco Tolotti","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70033","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We analyze the determinants of individual vaccination decisions and their implications on the aggregate immunization coverage and disease prevalence. We show that the relation between key socio-health-economic and epidemiological parameters determines which of the several alternative outcomes may arise (unique and multiple stable equilibria, monotonic and fluctuating trajectories, chaotic dynamics, and path dependency). By comparing the deterministic dynamics with their stochastic counterpart, we also show that the deterministic approximation typically employed in economic epidemiology may lead to misleading conclusions about the true stochastic outcome because of the metastable properties of the stochastic system. Public policy, by affecting socio-health-economic parameters, may play a fundamental role in ruling out some undesired outcomes and promoting eradication.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143896959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Climate Policy Under National Commitments and Global Economic Shocks 国家承诺和全球经济冲击下的气候政策
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-04-30 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70032
Anwesha Banerjee, Stefano Barbieri
{"title":"Climate Policy Under National Commitments and Global Economic Shocks","authors":"Anwesha Banerjee,&nbsp;Stefano Barbieri","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70032","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Global economic shocks may affect countries' Nash equilibrium contributions to emissions reduction efforts. We study the effect of income uncertainty on emissions reduction under different scenarios of national commitment targets. Our results show that in the presence of uncertainty, the framing of emissions reduction targets has implications for total emissions reduction and ex-ante welfare. Under the plausible assumption of “prudence,” higher global uncertainty tends to reduce equilibrium climate contributions if countries commit to a fixed cap for damage reductions before the income uncertainty is resolved. In contrast, if countries are committed to allocating a <i>proportion</i> of income to climate protection, ex-ante welfare may be higher than in the baseline case of no commitments.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70032","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143888959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Just Lindahl Taxation—A Welfarist Solution 只是林达尔的税收——福利主义的解决方案
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-04-24 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70035
Ivan Anich, Matt Van Essen
{"title":"Just Lindahl Taxation—A Welfarist Solution","authors":"Ivan Anich,&nbsp;Matt Van Essen","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70035","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The classic Lindahl allocation in a public good economy is both Pareto efficient and individually rational. However, it is easy to generate examples where the Lindahl outcome violates our intuition about economic justice. We explore how a suitable generalization of Lindahl taxation can lead to fair outcomes. We alter Lindahl's equilibrium approach so that consumers are given personalized price <i>schedules</i> for the public good (as opposed to simply personalized prices). The result is a special case of Mas-Colell and Silvestre's cost share equilibrium. We show that any outcome on the individually rational Pareto frontier can be achieved by some generalized Lindahl equilibrium. We next set up an optimization problem to search for a “just” Lindahl equilibrium. A social welfare function is first used to select an outcome on the individually rational Pareto frontier. We then provide an algorithm to construct the price functions that induce the precise generalized Lindahl equilibrium that obtains this outcome. Finally, we present a mechanism that Nash implements the set of generalized Lindahl equilibria for our environment.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143871502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
CvdN Equilibrium and Share Equilibrium in Local Public Good Economies 地方公共物品经济中的CvdN均衡与份额均衡
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-04-21 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70030
Nathan W. Chan, Anne van den Nouweland
{"title":"CvdN Equilibrium and Share Equilibrium in Local Public Good Economies","authors":"Nathan W. Chan,&nbsp;Anne van den Nouweland","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70030","url":null,"abstract":"<p>CvdN equilibrium and share equilibrium are both extensions of the cost-shares-based ratio equilibrium for global public good economies to local public good economies. CvdN equilibrium and share equilibrium differ in terms of the stability requirements for equilibrium jurisdictions. While share equilibrium keeps agents' relative cost shares fixed across jurisdictions and allows each agent to consider unilateral moves to alternative jurisdictions, CvdN equilibrium employs the use of share functions that allow for equilibrium adjustments of relative shares in each jurisdiction and requires the agreement of all agents in alternative jurisdictions. Despite these differences, we demonstrate that CvdN equilibrium extends share equilibrium: every arrangement of an economy that is supported in share equilibrium is also a CvdN equilibrium. However, the reverse is not true and CvdN equilibrium may exist when share equilibrium does not. Thus, CvdN equilibrium provides predictions in more economies and does not contradict share equilibrium when it exists.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70030","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143852702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Leadership in Public Good Games and Private Information on Own Social Value Orientation 公共利益博弈中的领导力与个人社会价值取向的私人信息
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-04-14 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70026
Edward Cartwright, Yidan Chai, Lian Xue
{"title":"Leadership in Public Good Games and Private Information on Own Social Value Orientation","authors":"Edward Cartwright,&nbsp;Yidan Chai,&nbsp;Lian Xue","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70026","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We explore whether information on one's own social value orientation (SVO) impacts contributions in a public good game with leadership by example. In doing so, we compare the predictions of a model of belief-based preferences, where payoffs depend on first- and second-order beliefs on the contributions of others, and a model of internalized descriptive norms, where payoffs depend on deviation from an empirical norm. We argue that if pro-social behavior is driven by belief-based preferences, then private information on SVO should not impact contributions, but if the behavior is driven by internalized descriptive norms, then information on its own SVO should impact contributions. We report an experiment with three treatments: no information on SVO, binary information whether pro-self or pro-social, and SVO indicated on a scale from very pro-social to very pro-self. We observe no effect of information on contributions. This finding is inconsistent with internalized descriptive norms. We find that contributions are highest with a pro-social leader.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143831156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Delegation as a Signal: Implicit Communication With Full Cooperation 授权是一种信号充分合作下的隐性沟通
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-04-14 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70028
Joanna Franaszek
{"title":"Delegation as a Signal: Implicit Communication With Full Cooperation","authors":"Joanna Franaszek","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70028","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>I examine the issue of implicit signaling of inexpressible types through delegation in a communication game with perfectly aligned preferences, two-sided private information, and communication frictions. A principal consults an agent to choose one of two actions. The principal has some tacit knowledge, which he cannot communicate, and may acquire some imperfect, costly signal about the state of the world. After observing the signal, the principal may choose to act or delegate to the agent, who observes the state of the world perfectly. Even if the principal's information acquisition and the signal are unobservable, the delegation, combined with private information, allows the agent to extract some information about the principal's tacit knowledge. I show that for a large class of parameters there exists an equilibrium, in which the agent (upon delegation) can correctly understand “cues” and tailor the action to the principal's needs. In particular, the agent's decision may be non-monotone in the state of the world.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143831155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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