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Why the Statutory Retirement Age Is Too Low in a Democracy 民主国家法定退休年龄为何过低
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-05-02 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70034
Berthold U. Wigger
{"title":"Why the Statutory Retirement Age Is Too Low in a Democracy","authors":"Berthold U. Wigger","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70034","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines the normative criteria for setting the statutory retirement age (SRA) under majority voting. It finds that when the working population forms the democratic majority, the SRA tends to be set inefficiently low. This inefficiency stems from a positive fiscal externality in pay-as-you-go pension systems: workers determining the SRA do not consider the benefits that a higher retirement age provides to current pensioners. Using a continuous-time overlapping generations model, the paper demonstrates that a Pareto improvement can be achieved by raising the SRA–provided it is accompanied by compensatory transfers from pensioners to workers at the time of the increase.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70034","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143896958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Vaccine-Preventable Diseases and Individual Behavior: Deterministic vs Stochastic Outcomes 疫苗可预防疾病与个体行为：确定性与随机结果
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-05-02 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70033
Simone Marsiglio, Marco Tolotti
{"title":"Vaccine-Preventable Diseases and Individual Behavior: Deterministic vs Stochastic Outcomes","authors":"Simone Marsiglio,&nbsp;Marco Tolotti","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70033","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We analyze the determinants of individual vaccination decisions and their implications on the aggregate immunization coverage and disease prevalence. We show that the relation between key socio-health-economic and epidemiological parameters determines which of the several alternative outcomes may arise (unique and multiple stable equilibria, monotonic and fluctuating trajectories, chaotic dynamics, and path dependency). By comparing the deterministic dynamics with their stochastic counterpart, we also show that the deterministic approximation typically employed in economic epidemiology may lead to misleading conclusions about the true stochastic outcome because of the metastable properties of the stochastic system. Public policy, by affecting socio-health-economic parameters, may play a fundamental role in ruling out some undesired outcomes and promoting eradication.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143896959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Climate Policy Under National Commitments and Global Economic Shocks 国家承诺和全球经济冲击下的气候政策
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-04-30 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70032
Anwesha Banerjee, Stefano Barbieri
{"title":"Climate Policy Under National Commitments and Global Economic Shocks","authors":"Anwesha Banerjee,&nbsp;Stefano Barbieri","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70032","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Global economic shocks may affect countries' Nash equilibrium contributions to emissions reduction efforts. We study the effect of income uncertainty on emissions reduction under different scenarios of national commitment targets. Our results show that in the presence of uncertainty, the framing of emissions reduction targets has implications for total emissions reduction and ex-ante welfare. Under the plausible assumption of “prudence,” higher global uncertainty tends to reduce equilibrium climate contributions if countries commit to a fixed cap for damage reductions before the income uncertainty is resolved. In contrast, if countries are committed to allocating a <i>proportion</i> of income to climate protection, ex-ante welfare may be higher than in the baseline case of no commitments.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70032","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143888959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Just Lindahl Taxation—A Welfarist Solution 只是林达尔的税收——福利主义的解决方案
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-04-24 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70035
Ivan Anich, Matt Van Essen
{"title":"Just Lindahl Taxation—A Welfarist Solution","authors":"Ivan Anich,&nbsp;Matt Van Essen","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70035","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The classic Lindahl allocation in a public good economy is both Pareto efficient and individually rational. However, it is easy to generate examples where the Lindahl outcome violates our intuition about economic justice. We explore how a suitable generalization of Lindahl taxation can lead to fair outcomes. We alter Lindahl's equilibrium approach so that consumers are given personalized price <i>schedules</i> for the public good (as opposed to simply personalized prices). The result is a special case of Mas-Colell and Silvestre's cost share equilibrium. We show that any outcome on the individually rational Pareto frontier can be achieved by some generalized Lindahl equilibrium. We next set up an optimization problem to search for a “just” Lindahl equilibrium. A social welfare function is first used to select an outcome on the individually rational Pareto frontier. We then provide an algorithm to construct the price functions that induce the precise generalized Lindahl equilibrium that obtains this outcome. Finally, we present a mechanism that Nash implements the set of generalized Lindahl equilibria for our environment.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143871502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
CvdN Equilibrium and Share Equilibrium in Local Public Good Economies 地方公共物品经济中的CvdN均衡与份额均衡
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-04-21 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70030
Nathan W. Chan, Anne van den Nouweland
{"title":"CvdN Equilibrium and Share Equilibrium in Local Public Good Economies","authors":"Nathan W. Chan,&nbsp;Anne van den Nouweland","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70030","url":null,"abstract":"<p>CvdN equilibrium and share equilibrium are both extensions of the cost-shares-based ratio equilibrium for global public good economies to local public good economies. CvdN equilibrium and share equilibrium differ in terms of the stability requirements for equilibrium jurisdictions. While share equilibrium keeps agents' relative cost shares fixed across jurisdictions and allows each agent to consider unilateral moves to alternative jurisdictions, CvdN equilibrium employs the use of share functions that allow for equilibrium adjustments of relative shares in each jurisdiction and requires the agreement of all agents in alternative jurisdictions. Despite these differences, we demonstrate that CvdN equilibrium extends share equilibrium: every arrangement of an economy that is supported in share equilibrium is also a CvdN equilibrium. However, the reverse is not true and CvdN equilibrium may exist when share equilibrium does not. Thus, CvdN equilibrium provides predictions in more economies and does not contradict share equilibrium when it exists.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70030","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143852702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Leadership in Public Good Games and Private Information on Own Social Value Orientation 公共利益博弈中的领导力与个人社会价值取向的私人信息
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-04-14 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70026
Edward Cartwright, Yidan Chai, Lian Xue
{"title":"Leadership in Public Good Games and Private Information on Own Social Value Orientation","authors":"Edward Cartwright,&nbsp;Yidan Chai,&nbsp;Lian Xue","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70026","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We explore whether information on one's own social value orientation (SVO) impacts contributions in a public good game with leadership by example. In doing so, we compare the predictions of a model of belief-based preferences, where payoffs depend on first- and second-order beliefs on the contributions of others, and a model of internalized descriptive norms, where payoffs depend on deviation from an empirical norm. We argue that if pro-social behavior is driven by belief-based preferences, then private information on SVO should not impact contributions, but if the behavior is driven by internalized descriptive norms, then information on its own SVO should impact contributions. We report an experiment with three treatments: no information on SVO, binary information whether pro-self or pro-social, and SVO indicated on a scale from very pro-social to very pro-self. We observe no effect of information on contributions. This finding is inconsistent with internalized descriptive norms. We find that contributions are highest with a pro-social leader.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143831156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Delegation as a Signal: Implicit Communication With Full Cooperation 授权是一种信号充分合作下的隐性沟通
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-04-14 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70028
Joanna Franaszek
{"title":"Delegation as a Signal: Implicit Communication With Full Cooperation","authors":"Joanna Franaszek","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70028","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>I examine the issue of implicit signaling of inexpressible types through delegation in a communication game with perfectly aligned preferences, two-sided private information, and communication frictions. A principal consults an agent to choose one of two actions. The principal has some tacit knowledge, which he cannot communicate, and may acquire some imperfect, costly signal about the state of the world. After observing the signal, the principal may choose to act or delegate to the agent, who observes the state of the world perfectly. Even if the principal's information acquisition and the signal are unobservable, the delegation, combined with private information, allows the agent to extract some information about the principal's tacit knowledge. I show that for a large class of parameters there exists an equilibrium, in which the agent (upon delegation) can correctly understand “cues” and tailor the action to the principal's needs. In particular, the agent's decision may be non-monotone in the state of the world.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143831155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dynamic Volunteer's Dilemma With Procrastinators 动态志愿者与拖延者的困境
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-04-09 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70027
Yixuan Shi
{"title":"Dynamic Volunteer's Dilemma With Procrastinators","authors":"Yixuan Shi","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70027","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Only one trip planner is needed for a group of friends to enjoy a pleasant trip and only one country is needed to coordinate on international talks that can be beneficial for all participating countries. We study a dynamic volunteering dilemma game in which two players choose to volunteer or wait given there have not been any volunteering actions in the past. The players can be procrastinators and the benefits of volunteering arrive later than the costs. We fully characterize the stationary Markov Strotz-Pollak equilibria. When the cost of volunteering is sufficiently small or agents' present-bias parameters are sufficiently close, there always exists an equilibrium in which both players randomize. This equilibrium features stochastic delay, and the delay is exacerbated if one or both agents become more present-biased. However, if the agents differ significantly in their present-bias parameters, this difference may act as a 'natural coordination device' and the unique stationary equilibrium predicts that only the less severe procrastinator volunteers, and this may result in an even quicker provision compared with the case of two exponential discounters.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70027","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143809457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Finding Out Who You Are: A Self-Exploration View of Education 发现你是谁：教育的自我探索观
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-04-04 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70023
Sungmin Park
{"title":"Finding Out Who You Are: A Self-Exploration View of Education","authors":"Sungmin Park","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70023","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I study the optimal design of information in education. Students in my model have different priors about their talents and update their beliefs after receiving noisy signals about themselves. I show that the socially optimal signal structure depends only on the average priors of the participating students. In particular, an optimal structure encourages a career in which the average participant has a comparative advantage. In an extended model with human capital accumulation, optimal education targets the participants who respond most sensitively to information.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70023","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143770441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Games of Social Interactions With Externalities 具有外部性的社交互动游戏
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-03-28 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70021
Subir K. Chakrabarti, Alexander Shapoval, Shlomo Weber
{"title":"Games of Social Interactions With Externalities","authors":"Subir K. Chakrabarti,&nbsp;Alexander Shapoval,&nbsp;Shlomo Weber","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70021","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper studies a class of games in which players' payoffs explicitly depend on their intrinsic preferences over the set of available alternatives, level of social interaction and the global influence of the aggregate societal choices. Using the potential functions approach, we examine the conditions under which the games admit a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies with a special emphasis on the role of social interactions. The existence results are then applied to examine the welfare consequences of the introduction of common goods and the adoption of new technologies.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143717295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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