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Timing of preference submissions under the Boston mechanism 波士顿机制下提交优惠的时间
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12639
Li Chen
{"title":"Timing of preference submissions under the Boston mechanism","authors":"Li Chen","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12639","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12639","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper considers a model of centralized college admission under the Boston mechanism where students may have uncertainty about their priorities. Students have homogeneous ordinal preferences over colleges, but their preference intensities vary, and the exam scores determine their priorities. In equilibrium, student application strategies take a cutoff form. The strategies depend on their exam scores under post-score submissions, on preference intensities under pre-exam submissions, and on both preference intensities and signals about their exam scores under pre-score submissions. Given these equilibrium strategies, students are better off under pre-exam and pre-score submissions than post-score submissions. When students with the same preference intensities and exam scores receive signals of different qualities, those with bad signals could be hurt by those with good signals.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 4","pages":"803-820"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12639","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50116868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Growth and optimal policies in an R&D-growth model with imperfect international capital mobility 国际资本流动性不完全的研发增长模型中的增长与最优政策
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-12-22 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12635
Mei-ying Hu, Ping-ho Chen, Hsun Chu, Ching-chong Lai
{"title":"Growth and optimal policies in an R&D-growth model with imperfect international capital mobility","authors":"Mei-ying Hu,&nbsp;Ping-ho Chen,&nbsp;Hsun Chu,&nbsp;Ching-chong Lai","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12635","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12635","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we examine the effects of international capital mobility on innovation, growth, and optimal growth policies in a small open economy with R&amp;D-driven growth. Households can borrow funds from an imperfect international capital market to finance their investment in R&amp;D firms. We show that the economy can reach a higher growth rate if international capital is more mobile. This result is consistent with recent empirical findings. Moreover, we show that the common growth-enhancing policies, such as patent protection and the R&amp;D subsidies, have an additional negative welfare effect when households can access the international capital market. Accordingly, the optimal patent protection and R&amp;D subsidy should be smaller when the degree of international capital mobility is higher.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 4","pages":"840-866"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49651820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Optimal patent licensing—Two or three-part tariff 最佳专利许可-两部分或三部分关税
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-12-13 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12630
Swapnendu Banerjee, Arijit Mukherjee, Sougata Poddar
{"title":"Optimal patent licensing—Two or three-part tariff","authors":"Swapnendu Banerjee,&nbsp;Arijit Mukherjee,&nbsp;Sougata Poddar","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12630","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12630","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We look into technology transfer by an insider patentee in a spatial duopoly model under three types of licensing contracts—(i) two-part tariff with fixed fee and per-unit royalty, (ii) two-part tariff with fixed fee and ad-valorem royalty and (iii) general three-part tariff with fixed fee, per-unit and ad-valorem royalties. Under two-part tariff contracts, the licenser is better off with the per-unit royalty contract but the general contract does better than the other contracts. In contrast to the existing literature, all three licensing contracts may make the consumers worse-off compared to no licensing, with the lowest consumer surplus achieved under the general licensing contract. Welfare under the general licensing contract is equal to the welfare under two-part tariff with ad-valorem royalty and it is higher than the welfare under no licensing but lower than the welfare under two-part tariff with per-unit royalty. Hence, the general three-part licensing contract is privately optimal but not socially optimal. Similar conclusions hold also under a nonspatial linear demand model with differentiated products.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 3","pages":"624-648"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12630","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49035601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Endogenous timing in tax competition: The effect of asymmetric information 税收竞争中的内生时机:信息不对称的影响
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-12-02 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12631
Takaaki Hamada
{"title":"Endogenous timing in tax competition: The effect of asymmetric information","authors":"Takaaki Hamada","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12631","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12631","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study explores the effects of asymmetric information on endogenous leadership in a simple tax competition environment. The study models a two-country economy where one country is informed about its own and opponent's productivity of private goods, while the other country only knows its productivity. The results show that each type of informed country has an incentive to pretend to be the other type, which leads to a Stackelberg outcome endogenously, while the simultaneous move is the unique outcome under complete information. Under the Stackelberg outcome, the uninformed country moves first and the informed country moves second. Moreover, ex-post social welfare under asymmetric information can become larger than that under complete information, because the uninformed country chooses a less aggressive tax rate under asymmetric information. These results depend on the type of uncertainty, and capital ownership and share.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 3","pages":"570-614"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46948172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Scale-dependent and risky returns to savings: Consequences for optimal capital taxation 储蓄的规模依赖性和风险回报：最优资本税的后果
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-11-18 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12633
Eddy Zanoutene
{"title":"Scale-dependent and risky returns to savings: Consequences for optimal capital taxation","authors":"Eddy Zanoutene","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12633","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12633","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I present a model of optimal capital taxation where agents with heterogeneous labor productivity randomly draw their rate of return to savings. Because of scale dependence, the distribution of rates of returns can depend on the amount saved. Uncertainty in returns to savings yields an insurance rationale for taxing capital on top of labor income. I first show that, because of scale dependence, agents making the same saving decision should access the same rate of return at the optimum. I then constrain the information set of the government and show that, as soon as return are uncertain, positive capital income taxation is needed at the optimum. The optimal linear tax on capital income trades off insurance with distortions to both savings and to the rate of return in a context of scale dependence. Eventually, I argue that scale dependence in and of itself is not sufficient to justify capital taxation on top of labor income taxes. These results are still valid when agents can optimize between a risk-free and a risky-asset that can both exhibit scale dependence.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 3","pages":"532-569"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48062384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Tax competition, public input, and market power 税收竞争、公共投入和市场力量
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-11-15 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12632
Steve Billon
{"title":"Tax competition, public input, and market power","authors":"Steve Billon","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12632","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12632","url":null,"abstract":"<p>An increase in the number of local jurisdictions providing industrial public goods may lead to a rise in the equilibrium tax rate, in contrast to the case of residential public goods. When local jurisdictions are Leviathans, an increase in competition may expand tax revenues and thus fail to tame the Leviathan, contrary to the conventional wisdom.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 3","pages":"615-623"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12632","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50133960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Social welfare and the unrepresentative representative consumer 社会福利与不具代表性的消费者
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-11-10 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12629
Michael Jerison
{"title":"Social welfare and the unrepresentative representative consumer","authors":"Michael Jerison","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12629","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12629","url":null,"abstract":"<p>If, for all prices, income distribution is optimal for a planner with a social welfare function, then aggregate demand is the same as that of a single “representative consumer” whose preferences over aggregate consumption are the same as the planner's. This paper shows that the converse is false. Aggregate demand may be the demand function of a representative consumer although the income distribution is not optimal for any social welfare function. The representative consumer may be Pareto inconsistent, preferring situation A to B when all the actual consumers prefer B to A. We give conditions under which existence of a representative consumer implies that the income distribution satisfies first order conditions for optimality. Satisfying the first order optimality conditions for an additively separable social welfare function is essentially equivalent to aggregate demand for every pair of consumers having a symmetric Slutsky matrix.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 1","pages":"5-28"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43463919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Can corruption encourage clean technology transfer? 腐败能鼓励清洁技术转让吗？
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-11-07 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12627
Chiu Yu Ko, Bo Shen, Xuyao Zhang
{"title":"Can corruption encourage clean technology transfer?","authors":"Chiu Yu Ko,&nbsp;Bo Shen,&nbsp;Xuyao Zhang","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12627","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12627","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the impact of environmental regulation on the transfer of a clean technology where bureaucrats are needed for government intervention. In the absence of corruption, when environmental taxes are low, a technology transfer always takes place and it increases total outputs, but may lead to higher pollution levels. However, when corruption is possible, a firm with a dirty technology may choose to bribe a corruptible bureaucrat who will underreport the actual level of emissions, thereby hindering the transfer of clean technology. We show that a less strict anticorruption policy may lead to more bribing, but encourage technology transfers. Moreover, an environment-oriented government would set a deterrent environmental tax to reduce pollution, while an output-oriented government would set a minimum tax rate to eliminate corruption and induce technology transfers. However, a balanced government would tolerate corruption when the cost of bribing is low and the clean technology is sufficiently efficient.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 3","pages":"459-492"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44314722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The purity of impure public goods 不纯的公共产品的纯洁性
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-10-19 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12626
Anja Brumme, Wolfgang Buchholz, Dirk Rübbelke
{"title":"The purity of impure public goods","authors":"Anja Brumme,&nbsp;Wolfgang Buchholz,&nbsp;Dirk Rübbelke","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12626","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we provide a new perspective on the links between the analysis of the voluntary provision of pure and impure public goods. In particular, it is shown that the impure public good model can be transformed into a pure public good one. This innovative method not only leads to new comparative statics results, but also provides new insights on the impure public good model, for example, on causes of the nonneutrality of income transfers with regard to Nash equilibria in the impure public good case.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 3","pages":"493-514"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12626","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50138282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Endogenous leadership and sustainability of enhanced cooperation in a repeated interactions model of tax competition: Endogenous leadership in tax competition 税收竞争中重复互动模式下的内生领导与合作的可持续性:税收竞争中的内生领导
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-10-12 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12624
Jun-ichi Itaya, Chikara Yamaguchi
{"title":"Endogenous leadership and sustainability of enhanced cooperation in a repeated interactions model of tax competition: Endogenous leadership in tax competition","authors":"Jun-ichi Itaya,&nbsp;Chikara Yamaguchi","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12624","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12624","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this study, the endogenous timing of moves is analyzed in an infinitely repeated game setting of capital tax competition between a subgroup (a tax union) of countries agreeing on partial tax harmonization and outside countries. It is shown that in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated tax competition game, they <i>simultaneously</i> set capital taxes in every stage game <i>when a tax union comprises similar countries with respect to productivity</i>, whereas they may set capital taxes <i>sequentially</i> in every stage game <i>when a tax union comprises dissimilar countries</i>. This finding is significantly different from Ogawa (2013), although we also assume that <i>capital is owned by the country's residents</i>, as in Ogawa's model. This is because a disadvantaged member country of the tax union would suffer from larger losses <i>when a tax union comprising dissimilar countries</i>, and thus the tax union will choose the strategy of moving <i>Late</i> for the sake of sustaining tax harmonization to avoid such losses.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 2","pages":"276-300"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42403206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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