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Journal of Public Economic Theory最新文献

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Political alienation and voter mobilization in elections 选举中的政治异化和选民动员
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-11-06 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12628
Alberto Grillo
{"title":"Political alienation and voter mobilization in elections","authors":"Alberto Grillo","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12628","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12628","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The paper examines candidates' choice between policies that increase the number of supporters and policies that foster their participation. Voter turnout is decided at the group level, in response to candidates' policies. A convex utility function captures the alienation of citizens who are far from all candidates. In equilibrium, extreme policies are adopted as a mobilization strategy, if citizens are sufficiently polarized and inclined to alienation. Otherwise, a standard result of convergence to the center obtains, in line with the persuasion of the swing voters.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 3","pages":"515-531"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47967091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
The purity of impure public goods 不纯的公共产品的纯洁性
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-10-19 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12626
Anja Brumme, Wolfgang Buchholz, Dirk Rübbelke
{"title":"The purity of impure public goods","authors":"Anja Brumme,&nbsp;Wolfgang Buchholz,&nbsp;Dirk Rübbelke","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12626","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we provide a new perspective on the links between the analysis of the voluntary provision of pure and impure public goods. In particular, it is shown that the impure public good model can be transformed into a pure public good one. This innovative method not only leads to new comparative statics results, but also provides new insights on the impure public good model, for example, on causes of the nonneutrality of income transfers with regard to Nash equilibria in the impure public good case.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 3","pages":"493-514"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12626","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50138282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Endogenous leadership and sustainability of enhanced cooperation in a repeated interactions model of tax competition: Endogenous leadership in tax competition 税收竞争中重复互动模式下的内生领导与合作的可持续性:税收竞争中的内生领导
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-10-12 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12624
Jun-ichi Itaya, Chikara Yamaguchi
{"title":"Endogenous leadership and sustainability of enhanced cooperation in a repeated interactions model of tax competition: Endogenous leadership in tax competition","authors":"Jun-ichi Itaya,&nbsp;Chikara Yamaguchi","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12624","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12624","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this study, the endogenous timing of moves is analyzed in an infinitely repeated game setting of capital tax competition between a subgroup (a tax union) of countries agreeing on partial tax harmonization and outside countries. It is shown that in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated tax competition game, they <i>simultaneously</i> set capital taxes in every stage game <i>when a tax union comprises similar countries with respect to productivity</i>, whereas they may set capital taxes <i>sequentially</i> in every stage game <i>when a tax union comprises dissimilar countries</i>. This finding is significantly different from Ogawa (2013), although we also assume that <i>capital is owned by the country's residents</i>, as in Ogawa's model. This is because a disadvantaged member country of the tax union would suffer from larger losses <i>when a tax union comprising dissimilar countries</i>, and thus the tax union will choose the strategy of moving <i>Late</i> for the sake of sustaining tax harmonization to avoid such losses.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 2","pages":"276-300"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42403206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Informational roles of pre-election polls 选前民调的信息作用
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-10-12 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12625
Jinhee Jo
{"title":"Informational roles of pre-election polls","authors":"Jinhee Jo","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12625","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12625","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper introduces a pre-election polling stage to Feddersen and Pesendorfer's two-candidate election model in which some voters are uncertain about the state of the world. While Feddersen and Pesendorfer find that less informed, indifferent voters strictly prefer abstention, which they refer to as the swing voter's curse, I show that there exists an equilibrium in which everyone truthfully reveals his or her preference in the pre-election poll and participates in voting. Moreover, even in the truth-telling equilibrium, the candidate who leads in the poll may lose the election. However, polls can help elections aggregate information more successfully.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 3","pages":"441-458"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48177033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal taxation with positional considerations 考虑位置因素的最优税收
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-10-10 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12622
Ourania Karakosta, Eleftherios Zacharias
{"title":"Optimal taxation with positional considerations","authors":"Ourania Karakosta,&nbsp;Eleftherios Zacharias","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12622","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12622","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper analyzes the optimal commodity tax policy, in a generalized vertical differentiation model in which consumers have positional considerations. Consumers enjoy having a product which is better than that owned by others, and feel envy when others own a better product than them. We examine the impact of these positional considerations on the optimal tax and welfare when a monopoly produces two variants of such good. The standard result that the government should subsidize the product, can be reversed in our setting. In the presence of positional concerns, the optimal tax rate can be positive. Furthermore, the positional effects determine the level of the tax pass-through on prices. Finally, the tax levied on the high-quality variant affects the price of the low-quality variant and vice versa.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 2","pages":"342-358"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44119632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Theory of cultural capital: Productive use of an unproductive activity 文化资本理论：非生产性活动的生产性利用
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-10-06 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12623
Sam-Ho Lee
{"title":"Theory of cultural capital: Productive use of an unproductive activity","authors":"Sam-Ho Lee","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12623","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12623","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Cultural capital is the term suggested to explain the phenomena that seemingly productivity-irrelevant cultural activities may lead to better economic outcome for individuals. A simple model is proposed to explain the emergence of cultural capital. The cost of acquiring a cultural attribute plays a role in the emergence of cultural capital. The importance of cultural capital is compared between two groups distinguished by a natural attribute. The cultural capital in the economically worse-performing group is more elitist in the sense that a smaller proportion of individuals acquire it due to the higher attainment costs. Welfare implications are also investigated.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 2","pages":"359-375"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45213895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pension, possible phaseout, and endogenous fertility in general equilibrium 养老金、可能的逐步淘汰和一般均衡中的内生生育率
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-09-30 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12621
Amol Amol, Monisankar Bishnu, Tridip Ray
{"title":"Pension, possible phaseout, and endogenous fertility in general equilibrium","authors":"Amol Amol,&nbsp;Monisankar Bishnu,&nbsp;Tridip Ray","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12621","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12621","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The rich literature on Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG)-type pensions provides a notion that when pension return is dominated by the market return, generally it is impossible to phase pension out without hurting any generation. We show that PAYG pensions can indeed be phased out in a much richer framework where fertility is endogenous and general equilibrium effects are present. Interestingly, the factor that helps us to phase the pension out in a Pareto way is hidden in the structure of PAYG pension itself. Individualistic agents fail to recognize the benefits of their fertility decision on these programs and, therefore, end up in an allocation that is strictly dominated by the allocations that internalize this externality. Exploiting this positive externality, competitive economy can improve its allocations and can reach the planner's steady-state in finite time where each generation secures as much utility as in the competitive equilibrium. Clearly, it is possible to transition in a Pareto way to an economy either with no pension or with pensions whose return is not dominated by market return.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 2","pages":"376-406"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41972174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic climate policy with endogenous plant location: The role of border carbon adjustments 具有内生植物区位的战略性气候政策:边界碳调整的作用
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-09-23 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12615
Noha Elboghdadly, Michael Finus
{"title":"Strategic climate policy with endogenous plant location: The role of border carbon adjustments","authors":"Noha Elboghdadly,&nbsp;Michael Finus","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12615","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12615","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Carbon leakage and the relocation of firms is one of the main concerns of governments when choosing their climate policy. In a strategic trade model with endogenous plant location, we study the effect of border carbon adjustments (BCAs) on global welfare and emissions in an emission tax competition game between two asymmetric countries for two games: a simultaneous and a sequential game. Without BCAs, a ruinous “race to the bottom” with no relocation of firms is the only Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous game. In a sequential game, additionally, a “wise chicken” equilibrium may emerge where the Stackelberg leader gives in, letting all his/her plants relocate to avoid being stuck at the bottom. With BCAs, equilibrium emission taxes in both countries are higher, implying lower global emissions and usually higher global welfare in both games. With BCAs, the environmental more concerned country accepts that its firm partially relocates abroad, as it is rewarded with better control of global emissions, tariff revenues and higher net profits (profits minus taxes). This avoids high environmental damages and that either net profits are zero because of high subsidy levels in a “race to the bottom” or because all production plants have moved abroad.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"24 6","pages":"1266-1309"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12615","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43212825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Vaccination under pessimistic expectations in clinical trials and immunization campaigns 在临床试验和免疫运动中对疫苗接种的悲观预期
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-09-18 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12617
Hippolyte d'Albis, Johanna Etner, Josselin Thuilliez
{"title":"Vaccination under pessimistic expectations in clinical trials and immunization campaigns","authors":"Hippolyte d'Albis,&nbsp;Johanna Etner,&nbsp;Josselin Thuilliez","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12617","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12617","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We provide one of the first formalizations of a vaccination campaign in a decision-theoretic framework. We analyze a model where an ambiguity-averse individual must decide how much effort to invest into prevention in the context of a rampant disease. We study how ambiguity aversion affects the effort and the estimation of the vaccine efficacy in clinical trials and immunization campaigns. We find that the behaviors of individuals participating in a clinical trial differ from individuals not participating. Individuals who are more optimistic toward vaccination participate more in trials. Their behaviors and efforts are also affected. As a result, because vaccine efficacy depends on unobserved behaviors and efforts, the biological effect of the vaccine becomes difficult to evaluate. During the scale-up phase of a vaccination campaign, provided that vaccine efficacy is established, we show that vaccine hesitancy may still be rational.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 6","pages":"1188-1211"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9538933/pdf/JPET-9999-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"33514373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Assurance payments on the coordination of threshold public goods provision: An experimental investigation 保障性支付对门槛公共物品供给协调的影响:一项实验研究
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-09-18 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12616
Zhi Li, Dongsheng Chen, Pengfei Liu
{"title":"Assurance payments on the coordination of threshold public goods provision: An experimental investigation","authors":"Zhi Li,&nbsp;Dongsheng Chen,&nbsp;Pengfei Liu","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12616","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12616","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate the assurance payment mechanism (APM) in a single-unit threshold public good game. APM offers an assurance payment (<math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>A</mi>\u0000 \u0000 <mi>P</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $AP$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>) as compensation to would-be contributors if the group fails to provide the good and individual contributions reach a pre-determined price. We characterize the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for APM under complete information and show that assurance payments substantially reduce the multiplicity of equilibria and eliminate the set of non-provision equilibria in a general setup. We find strong evidence that APM improves upon the baseline provision point mechanism without assurance in lab experiments. Assurance payments act as a coordination device and induce more contributions concentrated on <math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>A</mi>\u0000 \u0000 <mi>P</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $AP$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>, especially for agents with values above <math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>A</mi>\u0000 \u0000 <mi>P</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $AP$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>, leading to more frequent successful provision, higher group contributions, and an overall welfare improvement. Our experimental findings highlight the non-equilibrium mis-coordination as the main reason for the non-provision of threshold public goods and indicate that the format of assurance payments plays a key role in successful coordination even when provision is the unique equilibrium outcome.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 2","pages":"407-436"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48240375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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