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Pension, possible phaseout, and endogenous fertility in general equilibrium 养老金、可能的逐步淘汰和一般均衡中的内生生育率
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-09-30 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12621
Amol Amol, Monisankar Bishnu, Tridip Ray
{"title":"Pension, possible phaseout, and endogenous fertility in general equilibrium","authors":"Amol Amol,&nbsp;Monisankar Bishnu,&nbsp;Tridip Ray","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12621","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12621","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The rich literature on Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG)-type pensions provides a notion that when pension return is dominated by the market return, generally it is impossible to phase pension out without hurting any generation. We show that PAYG pensions can indeed be phased out in a much richer framework where fertility is endogenous and general equilibrium effects are present. Interestingly, the factor that helps us to phase the pension out in a Pareto way is hidden in the structure of PAYG pension itself. Individualistic agents fail to recognize the benefits of their fertility decision on these programs and, therefore, end up in an allocation that is strictly dominated by the allocations that internalize this externality. Exploiting this positive externality, competitive economy can improve its allocations and can reach the planner's steady-state in finite time where each generation secures as much utility as in the competitive equilibrium. Clearly, it is possible to transition in a Pareto way to an economy either with no pension or with pensions whose return is not dominated by market return.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 2","pages":"376-406"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41972174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic climate policy with endogenous plant location: The role of border carbon adjustments 具有内生植物区位的战略性气候政策:边界碳调整的作用
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-09-23 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12615
Noha Elboghdadly, Michael Finus
{"title":"Strategic climate policy with endogenous plant location: The role of border carbon adjustments","authors":"Noha Elboghdadly,&nbsp;Michael Finus","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12615","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12615","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Carbon leakage and the relocation of firms is one of the main concerns of governments when choosing their climate policy. In a strategic trade model with endogenous plant location, we study the effect of border carbon adjustments (BCAs) on global welfare and emissions in an emission tax competition game between two asymmetric countries for two games: a simultaneous and a sequential game. Without BCAs, a ruinous “race to the bottom” with no relocation of firms is the only Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous game. In a sequential game, additionally, a “wise chicken” equilibrium may emerge where the Stackelberg leader gives in, letting all his/her plants relocate to avoid being stuck at the bottom. With BCAs, equilibrium emission taxes in both countries are higher, implying lower global emissions and usually higher global welfare in both games. With BCAs, the environmental more concerned country accepts that its firm partially relocates abroad, as it is rewarded with better control of global emissions, tariff revenues and higher net profits (profits minus taxes). This avoids high environmental damages and that either net profits are zero because of high subsidy levels in a “race to the bottom” or because all production plants have moved abroad.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"24 6","pages":"1266-1309"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12615","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43212825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Vaccination under pessimistic expectations in clinical trials and immunization campaigns 在临床试验和免疫运动中对疫苗接种的悲观预期
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-09-18 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12617
Hippolyte d'Albis, Johanna Etner, Josselin Thuilliez
{"title":"Vaccination under pessimistic expectations in clinical trials and immunization campaigns","authors":"Hippolyte d'Albis,&nbsp;Johanna Etner,&nbsp;Josselin Thuilliez","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12617","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12617","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We provide one of the first formalizations of a vaccination campaign in a decision-theoretic framework. We analyze a model where an ambiguity-averse individual must decide how much effort to invest into prevention in the context of a rampant disease. We study how ambiguity aversion affects the effort and the estimation of the vaccine efficacy in clinical trials and immunization campaigns. We find that the behaviors of individuals participating in a clinical trial differ from individuals not participating. Individuals who are more optimistic toward vaccination participate more in trials. Their behaviors and efforts are also affected. As a result, because vaccine efficacy depends on unobserved behaviors and efforts, the biological effect of the vaccine becomes difficult to evaluate. During the scale-up phase of a vaccination campaign, provided that vaccine efficacy is established, we show that vaccine hesitancy may still be rational.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 6","pages":"1188-1211"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9538933/pdf/JPET-9999-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"33514373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Assurance payments on the coordination of threshold public goods provision: An experimental investigation 保障性支付对门槛公共物品供给协调的影响:一项实验研究
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-09-18 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12616
Zhi Li, Dongsheng Chen, Pengfei Liu
{"title":"Assurance payments on the coordination of threshold public goods provision: An experimental investigation","authors":"Zhi Li,&nbsp;Dongsheng Chen,&nbsp;Pengfei Liu","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12616","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12616","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate the assurance payment mechanism (APM) in a single-unit threshold public good game. APM offers an assurance payment (<math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>A</mi>\u0000 \u0000 <mi>P</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $AP$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>) as compensation to would-be contributors if the group fails to provide the good and individual contributions reach a pre-determined price. We characterize the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for APM under complete information and show that assurance payments substantially reduce the multiplicity of equilibria and eliminate the set of non-provision equilibria in a general setup. We find strong evidence that APM improves upon the baseline provision point mechanism without assurance in lab experiments. Assurance payments act as a coordination device and induce more contributions concentrated on <math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>A</mi>\u0000 \u0000 <mi>P</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $AP$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>, especially for agents with values above <math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>A</mi>\u0000 \u0000 <mi>P</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $AP$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>, leading to more frequent successful provision, higher group contributions, and an overall welfare improvement. Our experimental findings highlight the non-equilibrium mis-coordination as the main reason for the non-provision of threshold public goods and indicate that the format of assurance payments plays a key role in successful coordination even when provision is the unique equilibrium outcome.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 2","pages":"407-436"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48240375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Rationed price controls and “prices versus quantities” 定量价格控制和“价格vs数量”
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-09-15 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12619
John Bennett
{"title":"Rationed price controls and “prices versus quantities”","authors":"John Bennett","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12619","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12619","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We interpret Weitzman's prices-versus-quantities model as applying to a private-good market, and we formulate a “rationed price control,” with quantity determined endogenously as the minimum of supply and demand. With efficient rationing and no externalities, the optimal rationed price control exceeds the price at the expected demand–supply intersection if (the numerical value of) the demand slope curve exceeds the supply slope, and is less than this level for the reverse ordering of slopes. If uncertain demand is steeper than deterministic supply, or if uncertain supply is steeper than deterministic demand, expected welfare is greater with the optimal rationed price control than with the optimal quantity control. We obtain, for any specified price level, a partial ranking of the rationed price control and alternative simple price controls. Extending the model to incorporate externalities, we show that, for demand steeper than supply, with a negative externality on either benefit or cost, the optimal rationed price control exceeds the price at the expected intersection of marginal social benefit and marginal social cost; a converse result also obtains. For an example with inefficient rationing, we show that the optimal pure price control always exceeds the price at the expected intersection of demand and supply.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"24 6","pages":"1364-1385"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42120079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Introduction to the special issue on new insights into economic epidemiology: Theory and policy 经济流行病学新见解特刊导论:理论与政策
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-09-15 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12620
Rabah Amir, Raouf Boucekkine
{"title":"Introduction to the special issue on new insights into economic epidemiology: Theory and policy","authors":"Rabah Amir,&nbsp;Raouf Boucekkine","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12620","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12620","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"24 5","pages":"861-872"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48761818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Choosing between imperfect proxies for a corrective tax 在不完美的代理中选择纠正性税收
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-09-12 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12618
Paul Calcott, Vladimir Petkov
{"title":"Choosing between imperfect proxies for a corrective tax","authors":"Paul Calcott,&nbsp;Vladimir Petkov","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12618","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12618","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Choices are sometimes distorted by internalities or externalities. This paper considers a setting in which the distortion cannot be taxed directly, and asks how a policymaker should choose a proxy variable to tax instead. We derive a criterion for when one proxy should be preferred to another, and consider a range of factors with implications for this criterion. These factors are (i) sensitivity to the tax rate, (ii) how accurately the taxed variable approximates the distorted variable, (iii) susceptibility to offsetting behavior, and (iv) consumer heterogeneity. Our analysis is illustrated with a comparison between ad valorem and volumetric taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 2","pages":"245-275"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12618","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46656941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A continuous model of strong and weak ties 强弱关系的连续模型
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-08-24 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12611
Alan Griffith
{"title":"A continuous model of strong and weak ties","authors":"Alan Griffith","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12611","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12611","url":null,"abstract":"<p>When individuals interact in a network, links are often asymmetric and of varying intensity. I study a model whereby networks emerge from agents maximizing utility from continuous linking decisions and self-investment. The joint link surplus function allows arbitrary, bounded heterogeneity in the benefit to forming links. Under decreasing returns to scale in link surplus, the set of Nash equilibria is well-behaved. In contrast, with constant or increasing returns to scale, heterogeneity and returns to self-investment limit the set of Nash equilibria. This model rationalizes equilibrium networks in which individuals simultaneously hold ties that are asymmetric and of varying intensity.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"24 6","pages":"1519-1563"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42680923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Using the primal approach to derive the second-best rules for different public services in a general competitive growth model 使用原始方法在一般竞争增长模型中推导出不同公共服务的次优规则
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-08-24 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12614
Ge Jin
{"title":"Using the primal approach to derive the second-best rules for different public services in a general competitive growth model","authors":"Ge Jin","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12614","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12614","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper we establish a general competitive growth model which includes public consumption services and public productive services, which are financed by capital and labor income taxes. By using the <i>primal</i> approach, we derive the second-best rules for both types of public services and compare them with the conventional first-best rules. Particularly, we find that the second-best rule for public consumption generally differs from the conventional rule due to distortionary taxation. Whether the conventional rule represents an under- or over-supply of public consumption depends on the form of preference. Finally, by solving a specific example theoretically and numerically, we show that the absolute difference of the first- and second-best ratios of public-to-private consumption increases with an increase in distorting taxes as long as the two ratios differ.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"24 6","pages":"1564-1590"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43916143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Tax competition, tax coordination, and e-commerce: A corrigendum 税收竞争、税收协调与电子商务:更正
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-08-21 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12613
Wenming Wang, Hikaru Ogawa
{"title":"Tax competition, tax coordination, and e-commerce: A corrigendum","authors":"Wenming Wang,&nbsp;Hikaru Ogawa","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12613","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12613","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This note corrects Proposition 7 in Bacache Beauvallet (2018) and shows that total tax revenues are higher when the destination-based taxation is applied to e-commerce than when origin-based taxation is applied.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"24 6","pages":"1591-1592"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42844951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
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