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Scale-dependent and risky returns to savings: Consequences for optimal capital taxation 储蓄的规模依赖性和风险回报：最优资本税的后果
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-11-18 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12633
Eddy Zanoutene
{"title":"Scale-dependent and risky returns to savings: Consequences for optimal capital taxation","authors":"Eddy Zanoutene","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12633","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12633","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I present a model of optimal capital taxation where agents with heterogeneous labor productivity randomly draw their rate of return to savings. Because of scale dependence, the distribution of rates of returns can depend on the amount saved. Uncertainty in returns to savings yields an insurance rationale for taxing capital on top of labor income. I first show that, because of scale dependence, agents making the same saving decision should access the same rate of return at the optimum. I then constrain the information set of the government and show that, as soon as return are uncertain, positive capital income taxation is needed at the optimum. The optimal linear tax on capital income trades off insurance with distortions to both savings and to the rate of return in a context of scale dependence. Eventually, I argue that scale dependence in and of itself is not sufficient to justify capital taxation on top of labor income taxes. These results are still valid when agents can optimize between a risk-free and a risky-asset that can both exhibit scale dependence.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 3","pages":"532-569"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48062384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Tax competition, public input, and market power 税收竞争、公共投入和市场力量
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-11-15 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12632
Steve Billon
{"title":"Tax competition, public input, and market power","authors":"Steve Billon","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12632","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12632","url":null,"abstract":"<p>An increase in the number of local jurisdictions providing industrial public goods may lead to a rise in the equilibrium tax rate, in contrast to the case of residential public goods. When local jurisdictions are Leviathans, an increase in competition may expand tax revenues and thus fail to tame the Leviathan, contrary to the conventional wisdom.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 3","pages":"615-623"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12632","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50133960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Social welfare and the unrepresentative representative consumer 社会福利与不具代表性的消费者
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-11-10 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12629
Michael Jerison
{"title":"Social welfare and the unrepresentative representative consumer","authors":"Michael Jerison","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12629","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12629","url":null,"abstract":"<p>If, for all prices, income distribution is optimal for a planner with a social welfare function, then aggregate demand is the same as that of a single “representative consumer” whose preferences over aggregate consumption are the same as the planner's. This paper shows that the converse is false. Aggregate demand may be the demand function of a representative consumer although the income distribution is not optimal for any social welfare function. The representative consumer may be Pareto inconsistent, preferring situation A to B when all the actual consumers prefer B to A. We give conditions under which existence of a representative consumer implies that the income distribution satisfies first order conditions for optimality. Satisfying the first order optimality conditions for an additively separable social welfare function is essentially equivalent to aggregate demand for every pair of consumers having a symmetric Slutsky matrix.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 1","pages":"5-28"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43463919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Can corruption encourage clean technology transfer? 腐败能鼓励清洁技术转让吗？
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-11-07 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12627
Chiu Yu Ko, Bo Shen, Xuyao Zhang
{"title":"Can corruption encourage clean technology transfer?","authors":"Chiu Yu Ko,&nbsp;Bo Shen,&nbsp;Xuyao Zhang","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12627","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12627","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the impact of environmental regulation on the transfer of a clean technology where bureaucrats are needed for government intervention. In the absence of corruption, when environmental taxes are low, a technology transfer always takes place and it increases total outputs, but may lead to higher pollution levels. However, when corruption is possible, a firm with a dirty technology may choose to bribe a corruptible bureaucrat who will underreport the actual level of emissions, thereby hindering the transfer of clean technology. We show that a less strict anticorruption policy may lead to more bribing, but encourage technology transfers. Moreover, an environment-oriented government would set a deterrent environmental tax to reduce pollution, while an output-oriented government would set a minimum tax rate to eliminate corruption and induce technology transfers. However, a balanced government would tolerate corruption when the cost of bribing is low and the clean technology is sufficiently efficient.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 3","pages":"459-492"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44314722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Political alienation and voter mobilization in elections 选举中的政治异化和选民动员
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-11-06 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12628
Alberto Grillo
{"title":"Political alienation and voter mobilization in elections","authors":"Alberto Grillo","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12628","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12628","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The paper examines candidates' choice between policies that increase the number of supporters and policies that foster their participation. Voter turnout is decided at the group level, in response to candidates' policies. A convex utility function captures the alienation of citizens who are far from all candidates. In equilibrium, extreme policies are adopted as a mobilization strategy, if citizens are sufficiently polarized and inclined to alienation. Otherwise, a standard result of convergence to the center obtains, in line with the persuasion of the swing voters.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 3","pages":"515-531"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47967091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
The purity of impure public goods 不纯的公共产品的纯洁性
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-10-19 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12626
Anja Brumme, Wolfgang Buchholz, Dirk Rübbelke
{"title":"The purity of impure public goods","authors":"Anja Brumme,&nbsp;Wolfgang Buchholz,&nbsp;Dirk Rübbelke","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12626","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we provide a new perspective on the links between the analysis of the voluntary provision of pure and impure public goods. In particular, it is shown that the impure public good model can be transformed into a pure public good one. This innovative method not only leads to new comparative statics results, but also provides new insights on the impure public good model, for example, on causes of the nonneutrality of income transfers with regard to Nash equilibria in the impure public good case.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 3","pages":"493-514"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12626","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50138282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Endogenous leadership and sustainability of enhanced cooperation in a repeated interactions model of tax competition: Endogenous leadership in tax competition 税收竞争中重复互动模式下的内生领导与合作的可持续性:税收竞争中的内生领导
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-10-12 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12624
Jun-ichi Itaya, Chikara Yamaguchi
{"title":"Endogenous leadership and sustainability of enhanced cooperation in a repeated interactions model of tax competition: Endogenous leadership in tax competition","authors":"Jun-ichi Itaya,&nbsp;Chikara Yamaguchi","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12624","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12624","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this study, the endogenous timing of moves is analyzed in an infinitely repeated game setting of capital tax competition between a subgroup (a tax union) of countries agreeing on partial tax harmonization and outside countries. It is shown that in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated tax competition game, they <i>simultaneously</i> set capital taxes in every stage game <i>when a tax union comprises similar countries with respect to productivity</i>, whereas they may set capital taxes <i>sequentially</i> in every stage game <i>when a tax union comprises dissimilar countries</i>. This finding is significantly different from Ogawa (2013), although we also assume that <i>capital is owned by the country's residents</i>, as in Ogawa's model. This is because a disadvantaged member country of the tax union would suffer from larger losses <i>when a tax union comprising dissimilar countries</i>, and thus the tax union will choose the strategy of moving <i>Late</i> for the sake of sustaining tax harmonization to avoid such losses.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 2","pages":"276-300"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42403206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Informational roles of pre-election polls 选前民调的信息作用
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-10-12 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12625
Jinhee Jo
{"title":"Informational roles of pre-election polls","authors":"Jinhee Jo","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12625","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12625","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper introduces a pre-election polling stage to Feddersen and Pesendorfer's two-candidate election model in which some voters are uncertain about the state of the world. While Feddersen and Pesendorfer find that less informed, indifferent voters strictly prefer abstention, which they refer to as the swing voter's curse, I show that there exists an equilibrium in which everyone truthfully reveals his or her preference in the pre-election poll and participates in voting. Moreover, even in the truth-telling equilibrium, the candidate who leads in the poll may lose the election. However, polls can help elections aggregate information more successfully.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 3","pages":"441-458"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48177033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal taxation with positional considerations 考虑位置因素的最优税收
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-10-10 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12622
Ourania Karakosta, Eleftherios Zacharias
{"title":"Optimal taxation with positional considerations","authors":"Ourania Karakosta,&nbsp;Eleftherios Zacharias","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12622","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12622","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper analyzes the optimal commodity tax policy, in a generalized vertical differentiation model in which consumers have positional considerations. Consumers enjoy having a product which is better than that owned by others, and feel envy when others own a better product than them. We examine the impact of these positional considerations on the optimal tax and welfare when a monopoly produces two variants of such good. The standard result that the government should subsidize the product, can be reversed in our setting. In the presence of positional concerns, the optimal tax rate can be positive. Furthermore, the positional effects determine the level of the tax pass-through on prices. Finally, the tax levied on the high-quality variant affects the price of the low-quality variant and vice versa.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 2","pages":"342-358"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44119632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Theory of cultural capital: Productive use of an unproductive activity 文化资本理论：非生产性活动的生产性利用
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-10-06 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12623
Sam-Ho Lee
{"title":"Theory of cultural capital: Productive use of an unproductive activity","authors":"Sam-Ho Lee","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12623","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12623","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Cultural capital is the term suggested to explain the phenomena that seemingly productivity-irrelevant cultural activities may lead to better economic outcome for individuals. A simple model is proposed to explain the emergence of cultural capital. The cost of acquiring a cultural attribute plays a role in the emergence of cultural capital. The importance of cultural capital is compared between two groups distinguished by a natural attribute. The cultural capital in the economically worse-performing group is more elitist in the sense that a smaller proportion of individuals acquire it due to the higher attainment costs. Welfare implications are also investigated.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 2","pages":"359-375"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45213895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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