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Opacity in bargaining over public good provision 公共产品供应谈判不透明
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-04-19 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12646
Julian Lamprecht, Marcel Thum
{"title":"Opacity in bargaining over public good provision","authors":"Julian Lamprecht,&nbsp;Marcel Thum","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12646","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12646","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider ultimatum bargaining over the provision of a public good. Offer-maker and responder can delegate their decisions to agents whose actual decision rules are opaque. We show that the responder will benefit from strategic opacity, even with bilateral delegation. The incomplete information created by strategic opacity choices does not lead to inefficient negotiation failure in equilibrium. Inefficiencies arise from an inefficient provision level. While an agreement will always be reached, the public good provision will fall short of the socially desirable level. Compared with unilateral delegation, bilateral delegation is never worse from a welfare perspective.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 5","pages":"1069-1095"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12646","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50152242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The role of vaccine effectiveness on individual vaccination decisions and welfare 疫苗有效性对个人疫苗接种决策和福利的作用
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-04-10 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12644
Andrea Sorensen
{"title":"The role of vaccine effectiveness on individual vaccination decisions and welfare","authors":"Andrea Sorensen","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12644","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12644","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines a theoretical model designed to characterize a static, individual vaccination decision environment. I identify and characterize both equilibrium and socially optimal vaccination behavior and determine how this behavior changes as the effectiveness of the vaccine changes. I also evaluate the individual and social welfare implications of a change in vaccine effectiveness. I find that under certain conditions, an increase in vaccine effectiveness can decrease the number of agents vaccinating in equilibrium due to the positive external effects of vaccination. Notably, it is also possible for individual and total welfare to decrease. This is an undesirable, and perhaps unexpected, consequence of better vaccines. Fortunately, welfare at the social optimum always increases as vaccine effectiveness increases. However, equilibrium behavior often falls short of the social optimum due to the positive externalities created by vaccinating.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 6","pages":"1212-1228"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42878905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
More competition to alleviate poverty? A general equilibrium model and an empirical study 增加竞争以减轻贫困?一般均衡模型及实证研究
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-04-07 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12642
Hend Ghazzai, Wided Hemissi, Rim Lahmandi-Ayed, Sana Mami Kefi
{"title":"More competition to alleviate poverty? A general equilibrium model and an empirical study","authors":"Hend Ghazzai,&nbsp;Wided Hemissi,&nbsp;Rim Lahmandi-Ayed,&nbsp;Sana Mami Kefi","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12642","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12642","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we theoretically and empirically analyze the impact of competition on poverty. We consider a general equilibrium framework with vertical preferences and compare poverty in a Monopoly setting versus a Duopoly setting considering explicitly the ownership structure. Poverty is measured by the size of the population living below an absolute poverty line. Theoretical results show that the impact of competition on poverty is contingent to the ownership structure, the poverty line and the relative dispersion of the individuals with respect to their intensity of preference for quality and sensitivity to effort: competition can improve or worsen poverty depending on the model's parameters. Empirical findings for the three existing poverty lines ($1.9, $3.2, and $5.5) are consistent to a large extent with our theoretical results.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 5","pages":"985-1011"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44612952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A spatial theory of urban segregation 城市隔离的空间理论
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-04-02 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12641
Gian Luca Carniglia, Juan F. Escobar
{"title":"A spatial theory of urban segregation","authors":"Gian Luca Carniglia,&nbsp;Juan F. Escobar","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12641","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12641","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We provide a competitive equilibrium theory of urban segregation in a linear city. Households demand consumption and housing along the city and are exposed to neighborhood externalities. We show that equilibria that are robust to small coalitional deviations are segregated. Our results explain urban segregation in a standard neoclassical framework and shed new light on the difficulties faced by authorities to integrate cities.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 4","pages":"653-678"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43835294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Control and spread of contagion in networks with global effects 在具有全球影响的网络中控制和传播传染病
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-03-29 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12643
John Higgins, Tarun Sabarwal
{"title":"Control and spread of contagion in networks with global effects","authors":"John Higgins,&nbsp;Tarun Sabarwal","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12643","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12643","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study proliferation of an action in binary action network coordination games that are generalized to include global effects. This captures important aspects of proliferation of a particular action or narrative in online social networks, providing a basis to understand their impact on societal outcomes. Our model naturally captures complementarities among starting sets, network resilience, and global effects, and highlights interdependence in channels through which contagion spreads. We present new, natural, computationally tractable, and efficient algorithms to define and compute equilibrium objects that facilitate the general study of contagion in networks and prove their theoretical properties. Our algorithms are easy to implement and help to quantify relationships previously inaccessible due to computational intractability. Using these algorithms, we study the spread of contagion in scale-free networks with 1000 players using millions of Monte Carlo simulations. Our analysis provides quantitative and qualitative insight into the design of policies to control or spread contagion in networks. The scope of application is enlarged given the many other situations across different fields that may be modeled using this framework.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 6","pages":"1149-1187"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134952132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information design, externalities, and government interventions 信息设计、外部性和政府干预
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-03-05 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12640
Cheng Li, Yancheng Xiao
{"title":"Information design, externalities, and government interventions","authors":"Cheng Li,&nbsp;Yancheng Xiao","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12640","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12640","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion with spillovers. A sender provides information to persuade a receiver to take an action with external effects. We consider how government interventions, including corrective subsidy and tax, affect social welfare. In addition to internalizing externalities, government interventions affect social welfare through an informational channel. Subsidies to the sender's preferred action incentivize the sender to reveal less information, but taxes on the sender's preferred action incentivize the sender to reveal more information. Because of such an informational effect, the optimal subsidy and tax may be different from the size of the externalities. In some cases, social welfare is maximized with no government intervention.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 4","pages":"821-839"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49014883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Kantian equilibria of a class of Nash bargaining games 一类Nash讨价还价对策的Kantian均衡
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12638
Atakan Dizarlar, Emin Karagözoğlu
{"title":"Kantian equilibria of a class of Nash bargaining games","authors":"Atakan Dizarlar,&nbsp;Emin Karagözoğlu","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12638","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12638","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study Kantian equilibria of an <math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>n</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $n$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>-player bargaining game, which is a modified version of the well-known divide-the-dollar game. We first show that the Kantian equilibrium exists under fairly minimal assumptions. Second, if the bankruptcy rule used satisfies equal treatment of equals, and is almost nowhere proportional, then only equal division can prevail in any Kantian equilibrium. On the other hand, we show that an “anything goes” type result emerges only under the proportional rule. Finally, using hybrid bankruptcy rules that we construct in a novel fashion, we can characterize the whole equilibrium set. Our results highlight the interactions between institutions (axiomatic properties of division rules) and agents' equilibrium behavior.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 4","pages":"867-891"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47801286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Timing of preference submissions under the Boston mechanism 波士顿机制下提交优惠的时间
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12639
Li Chen
{"title":"Timing of preference submissions under the Boston mechanism","authors":"Li Chen","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12639","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12639","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper considers a model of centralized college admission under the Boston mechanism where students may have uncertainty about their priorities. Students have homogeneous ordinal preferences over colleges, but their preference intensities vary, and the exam scores determine their priorities. In equilibrium, student application strategies take a cutoff form. The strategies depend on their exam scores under post-score submissions, on preference intensities under pre-exam submissions, and on both preference intensities and signals about their exam scores under pre-score submissions. Given these equilibrium strategies, students are better off under pre-exam and pre-score submissions than post-score submissions. When students with the same preference intensities and exam scores receive signals of different qualities, those with bad signals could be hurt by those with good signals.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 4","pages":"803-820"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12639","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50116868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal climate and fiscal policy in an OLG economy OLG经济中的最优气候与财政政策
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-02-03 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12637
Richard Jaimes
{"title":"Optimal climate and fiscal policy in an OLG economy","authors":"Richard Jaimes","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12637","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12637","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper develops a climate–economy model to study the joint design of optimal climate and fiscal policies in economies with overlapping generations (OLGs). I demonstrate how capital taxation, if optimal, drives a wedge between the market costs of carbon (the net present value of marginal damages using the market interest rate) and the Pigouvian tax (the net present value of marginal damages using the consumption discount rate of successive OLGs). In contrast to deterministic infinitely lived representative agent models, at the optimum, the capital income tax is positive, the carbon price equals the market costs of carbon but it falls short of the Pigouvian tax when (i) preferences are not separable over consumption and leisure; and (ii) labor income taxes cannot be age-dependent. I also show that restrictions on climate change policy provide a novel rationale for positive capital income taxes.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 4","pages":"727-752"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42480501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Minimum wage spillover effects and social welfare in a model of stochastic job matching 随机工作匹配模型下的最低工资溢出效应与社会福利
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-02-02 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12636
Panagiotis Nanos
{"title":"Minimum wage spillover effects and social welfare in a model of stochastic job matching","authors":"Panagiotis Nanos","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12636","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12636","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, I carry out a welfare analysis of the minimum wage in the framework of a Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides model with stochastic job matching. I explore the role of the minimum wage in a labor market with trading externalities and present the necessary and sufficient condition for a minimum wage hike to be efficiency enhancing. In this context, I characterize minimum wage spillover effects and demonstrate that there is a direct link between the welfare effects and spillover effects of a minimum wage. This theoretical finding suggests that the welfare impact of minimum wage changes can be inferred from the empirical observation of spillover effects on the wage distribution.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 4","pages":"753-802"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12636","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47754979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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