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Comparing ad valorem and specific taxes with corporate social responsibility 从价税和从量税与企业社会责任的比较
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-05-08 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12690
Po-Yuan Hsiao, K. L. Glen Ueng, Cheng-Hau Peng, Horn-In Kuo
{"title":"Comparing ad valorem and specific taxes with corporate social responsibility","authors":"Po-Yuan Hsiao,&nbsp;K. L. Glen Ueng,&nbsp;Cheng-Hau Peng,&nbsp;Horn-In Kuo","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12690","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12690","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines the welfare ranking of indirect tax systems with corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a duopoly. Findings show that the two firms' cost and CSR asymmetries both play important roles. If the cost-efficient firm has a higher CSR level, the standard result in traditional tax theory is sustainable. Namely, ad valorem tax (specific subsidy) policies are considered superior to specific tax (ad valorem subsidy) policies. However, if the cost-inefficient firm has a significantly higher CSR level, the standard result is reversed. This result remains robust in an oligopoly model or under a tax revenue constraint.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140895314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Public infrastructure provision in the presence of terms-of-trade effects and tax competition 在存在贸易条件效应和税收竞争的情况下提供公共基础设施
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-05-07 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12689
Karl J. Zimmermann
{"title":"Public infrastructure provision in the presence of terms-of-trade effects and tax competition","authors":"Karl J. Zimmermann","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12689","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12689","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper analyses and compares the performance of resource taxes and capital taxes in financing public goods while considering the positive effects of public expenditure on firm productivity. It is motivated by Franks et al. (2017), who argue that the advantage of the resource tax consists in its potential to reap foreign resource rents. I employ an analytical general equilibrium framework of <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>n</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $n$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> identical resource-poor countries, where local firms use internationally mobile capital and a net imported resource in production as well as local public infrastructure. The latter is financed solely by either taxing the input of the resource or capital. The choice of the policy instrument is exogenous to policy makers and symmetric across countries. I find that expenditure on infrastructure renders the impact of fiscal policy on the terms of trade ambiguous under resource taxation and negative under capital taxation. Moreover, public expenditure weakens the outflow of factors moderating the deficit of public spending caused by tax competition. This holds for both policy scenarios. Considering both effects simultaneously, resource taxation cannot generally be identified as the policy to provide higher provision or efficiency. A numerical exercise shows cases for higher provision of either policy.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140881147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Endogenous subsidies for cleaner products: The role of ecofriendly consumers 清洁产品的内生补贴：生态友好型消费者的作用
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-04-24 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12688
Ornella Tarola, Cecilia Vergari
{"title":"Endogenous subsidies for cleaner products: The role of ecofriendly consumers","authors":"Ornella Tarola,&nbsp;Cecilia Vergari","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12688","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12688","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a vertically differentiated duopoly, we assume that environmental subsidies are endogenously determined by the demand for dirtier goods and the relative greenness of cleaner alternatives. By contemplating the possibility that a subsidy targets either consumers or firms, we study how the impact of a subsidy changes with its recipients, consumers versus firms. A consumer-based subsidy is environmentally enhancing and increases firms' profits at equilibrium, while it hurts consumers. Overall, however, it is welfare improving. A firm-based subsidy makes firms better off but may be environmentally harmful and has the paradoxical effect of hurting consumers buying the cleaner variant. Moreover, it is welfare detrimental on the whole.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140641987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Should product-specific advertisement be regulated in pharmaceutical markets? 应否对药品市场的特定产品广告进行监管？
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12687
Junichiro Ishida, Tsuyoshi Takahara
{"title":"Should product-specific advertisement be regulated in pharmaceutical markets?","authors":"Junichiro Ishida,&nbsp;Tsuyoshi Takahara","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12687","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12687","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines the optimal content regulation of direct-to-consumer advertisement (DTCA) by comparing two forms of DTCA—product-specific and category-specific—and identifies a key tradeoff which underlies this policy debate. Our analysis suggests that the optimal form of DTCA depends crucially on the cost effectiveness of DTCA and the market-size distortion induced by DTCA. When the cost of advertisement is high, there often exists a Pareto-improving policy choice: category-specific DTCA is preferred when the market-size distortion is more severe while produce DTCA is preferred when it is less so. As the cost decreases, however, a conflict emerges between pharmaceutical firms and patients: firms are worse off under product-specific DTCA while patients are better off. We also find that the physician's reluctance to persuade misinformed patients can actually alleviate the market-size distortion and hence be welfare-enhancing.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140333097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Positional and conformist effects in voluntary public good provision 志愿公益服务中的立场效应和顺应效应
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-03-17 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12685
Francisco Cabo, Alain Jean-Marie, Mabel Tidball
{"title":"Positional and conformist effects in voluntary public good provision","authors":"Francisco Cabo,&nbsp;Alain Jean-Marie,&nbsp;Mabel Tidball","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12685","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12685","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The literature featuring game–theoretical models aimed at explaining the effect of the status concerns on the voluntary provision of a public good is generally focused on snob agents, driven by a desire for exclusiveness. However, the social context literature highlights that status concerns can give rise to a desire, in some individuals to be different from the “common herd,” and in some others to conform with other people. We analyze a two-player public good game under two different settings: The standard case with two positional players (PP<span>s</span>), versus the case in which the positional player faces a conformist player (PC). Giving entrance to conformism has two main implications. Strong status concerns by both players can lead to a virtuous cycle in which the conformist player wishes to imitate the contributing behavior of the positional player, and the latter wishes to increase contribution to distinguish herself from the former. Then, the contribution to the public good can be higher than in the case with only snob agents. This higher contribution can increase social welfare, but only if endowments are not too large and the status concern of the positional player is not excessively high.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12685","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140145518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Endogenous property rights, credit market, and economic development 内生产权、信贷市场和经济发展
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-03-17 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12686
Niloy Bose, Richard Cothren, Nazanin Sedaghatkish
{"title":"Endogenous property rights, credit market, and economic development","authors":"Niloy Bose,&nbsp;Richard Cothren,&nbsp;Nazanin Sedaghatkish","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12686","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12686","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Empirical evidence suggests that credit markets can catalyze property rights reforms. We illustrate this in a theoretical framework where a borrower must expend costly effort to protect output from predation. We consider two possible equilibrium loan contracts. In the first, lenders leave the decision to protect output to borrowers. In the second, lenders set the standard of property protection as a precondition for lending. The second contracting regime results in a higher level of property rights enforcement. Significantly, the level of economic development determines the equilibrium contracting form and vice versa. Based on this analysis, we jointly determine the evolution of property rights and economic development. The analysis also sheds light on the environments that lead an economy to a low development trap with a poor quality of property rights institutions.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140145517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition with unemployment 有失业的财政竞争模型中的纳什均衡
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-03-13 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12684
Yuya Kikuchi, Toshiki Tamai
{"title":"Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition with unemployment","authors":"Yuya Kikuchi,&nbsp;Toshiki Tamai","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12684","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12684","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines two different fiscal competition games under labor market imperfections. Given that capital moves across regions and affects regional employment, governments must choose the expenditure level and tax rate on such mobile capital by accounting for the effects of fiscal variables on both capital and labor. Therefore, governments may play these games with either the tax rates on mobile capital or with public expenditures. The presence/absence of absentee ownership of capital and employment externalities are significant factors that characterize two distinct Nash equilibria, one that occurs with tax competition and the other with expenditure competition. Contrary to the existing literature, tax rates under tax competition are likely to be lower than those under expenditure competition owing to employment externalities. In some cases, governments prefer to choose government expenditure as their strategic variable rather than the tax rate. The presence of employment externalities motivates governments to use such expenditure as the variable through which it may strengthen strategic effects.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140114352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Redistribution with needs 按需分配
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-02-22 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12683
Ricardo Martínez, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero
{"title":"Redistribution with needs","authors":"Ricardo Martínez,&nbsp;Juan D. Moreno-Ternero","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12683","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12683","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We take an axiomatic approach to study redistribution problems when agents report income and needs. We formalize axioms reflecting ethical and operational principles such as additivity, impartiality and individual rationality. Different combinations of those axioms characterize three focal rules (<i>laissez faire</i>, <i>full redistribution</i>, and <i>need-adjusted full redistribution</i>) as well as compromises among them. We also uncover the structure of those compromises exploring the Lorenz dominance criterion as well as majority voting. Our analysis provides an axiomatic justification for a linear income tax system. We conclude our analysis resorting to Eurostat's Household Budget Survey from where we illustrate the different redistribution patterns accounting for needs across European countries.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12683","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139937297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Licensing option to reduce rent extraction by the input supplier 减少投入品供应商收取租金的许可方案
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-02-11 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12682
Kuo-Feng Kao, Arijit Mukherjee
{"title":"Licensing option to reduce rent extraction by the input supplier","authors":"Kuo-Feng Kao,&nbsp;Arijit Mukherjee","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12682","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12682","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It is well known that if the final goods producers adopt new technologies, the input suppliers with market power can extract more rent from the final goods producers by increasing the input prices. Higher rent extraction by the input supplier neither allows the licenser of the new technology to earn large profit nor helps welfare to increase much. In a model with an outside innovator (the licenser), a final good producer (the licensee) and an input supplier, we offer a new perspective to the literature by considering a licensing option, which is often observed in the business world, but ignored in the literature. We show that the licensing option offered by the outside innovator can prevent rent extraction by the input supplier. The innovator's profit and social welfare are higher under licensing option compared to a standard licensing contract with no option.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139720060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic interaction in the market for charitable donations: The role of public funding 慈善捐赠市场中的战略互动：公共资金的作用
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-01-09 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12681
Rune Jansen Hagen, Jørn Rattsø
{"title":"Strategic interaction in the market for charitable donations: The role of public funding","authors":"Rune Jansen Hagen,&nbsp;Jørn Rattsø","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12681","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12681","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Government financing of charities influences their fundraising and private donations. To analyze competition between charities, we modify the model of fundraising introduced by Andreoni and Payne, where there are two groups of donors and two charities. We concentrate on warm-glow motivation for giving and highlight strategic interaction in the market for donations. The charities are output-maximizing, producing services with a purchased input and in-house managerial supervision. In the absence of public funding, fundraising by charities are strategic complement given fixed costs. We show that block grants can change the nature of the competition, making fundraising strategic substitutes if grants exceed fixed costs. A charity receiving a grant will optimally reduce its fundraising, but the level of service provision will also be affected by the fact that the competing charity will solicit more intensively. The competitor will deliver more services because it benefits from the reduction in solicitation by the grant recipient. In this setting, matching grants work much like block grants as charities in both cases will compete less intensively for donations. That is, incentives for fundraising are weaker with matching grants. However, if both instruments are used the impact of a matching grant depends on whether the block grant over- or undercompensates for fixed costs. An optimal funding policy must account for this interaction effect as well as the fungibility of support working through charity competition in the market for donations.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12681","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139406806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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