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Journal of Public Economic Theory最新文献

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Redistribution with needs 按需分配
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-02-22 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12683
Ricardo Martínez, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero
{"title":"Redistribution with needs","authors":"Ricardo Martínez,&nbsp;Juan D. Moreno-Ternero","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12683","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12683","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We take an axiomatic approach to study redistribution problems when agents report income and needs. We formalize axioms reflecting ethical and operational principles such as additivity, impartiality and individual rationality. Different combinations of those axioms characterize three focal rules (<i>laissez faire</i>, <i>full redistribution</i>, and <i>need-adjusted full redistribution</i>) as well as compromises among them. We also uncover the structure of those compromises exploring the Lorenz dominance criterion as well as majority voting. Our analysis provides an axiomatic justification for a linear income tax system. We conclude our analysis resorting to Eurostat's Household Budget Survey from where we illustrate the different redistribution patterns accounting for needs across European countries.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12683","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139937297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Licensing option to reduce rent extraction by the input supplier 减少投入品供应商收取租金的许可方案
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-02-11 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12682
Kuo-Feng Kao, Arijit Mukherjee
{"title":"Licensing option to reduce rent extraction by the input supplier","authors":"Kuo-Feng Kao,&nbsp;Arijit Mukherjee","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12682","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12682","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It is well known that if the final goods producers adopt new technologies, the input suppliers with market power can extract more rent from the final goods producers by increasing the input prices. Higher rent extraction by the input supplier neither allows the licenser of the new technology to earn large profit nor helps welfare to increase much. In a model with an outside innovator (the licenser), a final good producer (the licensee) and an input supplier, we offer a new perspective to the literature by considering a licensing option, which is often observed in the business world, but ignored in the literature. We show that the licensing option offered by the outside innovator can prevent rent extraction by the input supplier. The innovator's profit and social welfare are higher under licensing option compared to a standard licensing contract with no option.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139720060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic interaction in the market for charitable donations: The role of public funding 慈善捐赠市场中的战略互动：公共资金的作用
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-01-09 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12681
Rune Jansen Hagen, Jørn Rattsø
{"title":"Strategic interaction in the market for charitable donations: The role of public funding","authors":"Rune Jansen Hagen,&nbsp;Jørn Rattsø","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12681","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12681","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Government financing of charities influences their fundraising and private donations. To analyze competition between charities, we modify the model of fundraising introduced by Andreoni and Payne, where there are two groups of donors and two charities. We concentrate on warm-glow motivation for giving and highlight strategic interaction in the market for donations. The charities are output-maximizing, producing services with a purchased input and in-house managerial supervision. In the absence of public funding, fundraising by charities are strategic complement given fixed costs. We show that block grants can change the nature of the competition, making fundraising strategic substitutes if grants exceed fixed costs. A charity receiving a grant will optimally reduce its fundraising, but the level of service provision will also be affected by the fact that the competing charity will solicit more intensively. The competitor will deliver more services because it benefits from the reduction in solicitation by the grant recipient. In this setting, matching grants work much like block grants as charities in both cases will compete less intensively for donations. That is, incentives for fundraising are weaker with matching grants. However, if both instruments are used the impact of a matching grant depends on whether the block grant over- or undercompensates for fixed costs. An optimal funding policy must account for this interaction effect as well as the fungibility of support working through charity competition in the market for donations.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12681","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139406806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Prospect equality: A force of redistribution 前景平等：重新分配的力量
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-01-07 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12680
Xiangyu Qu
{"title":"Prospect equality: A force of redistribution","authors":"Xiangyu Qu","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12680","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12680","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recent evidence demonstrates that the perceived, not the actual, level of income inequality influences the redistribution policy. The perception of inequality, as conceptualized in this paper, is closely related to both objective inequality and prospect equality. An axiomatic system of individual preferences is suggested and demonstrated to characterize an index of perceived inequality. Prospect equality reflects the individual ideal level of equality, and it serves as a reference point for perception. I adopt the proposed notion to study voting on redistribution. I theoretically identify the conditions under which a more equal society will demand redistribution while a less equal society blocks redistribution. These insights help explain the <i>redistribution puzzle</i> observed across nations.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139399976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fertility, heterogeneity, and the Golden Rule 生育力、异质性和黄金法则
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-30 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12679
Gregory Ponthiere
{"title":"Fertility, heterogeneity, and the Golden Rule","authors":"Gregory Ponthiere","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12679","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12679","url":null,"abstract":"<p>According to Phelps' Golden Rule, a rise in fertility decreases the optimal capital intensity, because a higher fertility increases the investment required to sustain a given capital intensity (the capital dilution effect). Using a matrix population model embedded in a two-period overlapping generation setting, we examine the robustness of that relationship to the partitioning of the population into two subpopulations having distinct fertility behaviors and entering the production process as distinct inputs. We show that, unlike what prevails under a homogeneous population, a rise in fertility (caused by a change in type-specific fertility) does not necessarily reduce the Golden Rule capital intensity. The intuition is that changes in type-specific fertility modify the composition of the labor force, which affects the marginal productivity of capital and the capital dilution effect. When the composition effect induced by the fertility change outweighs the standard capital dilution effect prevailing under a fixed partition of the population, a rise in fertility increases the optimal capital intensity. These results are robust to a finer description of heterogeneity, that is, a partitioning of the population into a larger number of subpopulations.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138519670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Risk, trust, and altruism in genetic data sharing 基因数据共享中的风险、信任和利他主义
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-23 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12678
Zeeshan Samad, Myrna Wooders, Bradley Malin, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
{"title":"Risk, trust, and altruism in genetic data sharing","authors":"Zeeshan Samad,&nbsp;Myrna Wooders,&nbsp;Bradley Malin,&nbsp;Yevgeniy Vorobeychik","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12678","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12678","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How does concern about genetic data privacy compare with other concerns? We conduct behavioral experiments to compare risk attitudes towards sharing genetic data with a healthcare provider with risk attitudes towards sharing financial data with a money manager. Both scenarios involve identical decisions and monetary stakes, permitting us to focus on how the framing of data sharing influences attitudes. To delve deeper into individual motivations to share data, we provide treatments that study how data sharers' altruism and trust affect their decisions. Our findings (with 162 subjects) indicate that individuals are more willing to risk a loss to privacy of genetic data (for an anticipated return framed as health benefits) than they are to risk loss of financial data (for an anticipated return in financial benefits). We also find that 50%–60% of data recipients choose to protect another person's data, with no significant differences between frames.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 6","pages":"1251-1269"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138432501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Economies with rights: Efficiency and inequality 权利经济:效率与不平等
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-23 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12676
Carlos Hervés-Beloso, Francisco Martínez-Concha, Emma Moreno-García
{"title":"Economies with rights: Efficiency and inequality","authors":"Carlos Hervés-Beloso,&nbsp;Francisco Martínez-Concha,&nbsp;Emma Moreno-García","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12676","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12676","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider a scenario where inequality levels originate harmful effects on society. To alleviate this negative externality, we introduce tradable consumption licenses within a general equilibrium framework to obtain efficient outcomes, reduce inequality, and improve social welfare. This mechanism would be easily implementable with the necessary support of the law.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12676","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138519667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Epidemics, vaccines, and health policy 流行病、疫苗和卫生政策
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-23 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12677
Rabah Amir, Raouf Boucekkine
{"title":"Epidemics, vaccines, and health policy","authors":"Rabah Amir,&nbsp;Raouf Boucekkine","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12677","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12677","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 6","pages":"1143-1148"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138432317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Temptation and self-control for the impure benevolent planner: The case of heterogeneous discounting 不纯粹的善意计划者的诱惑和自我控制:异质折扣的例子
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-20 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12674
Takashi Hayashi, Noriaki Kiguchi, Norio Takeoka
{"title":"Temptation and self-control for the impure benevolent planner: The case of heterogeneous discounting","authors":"Takashi Hayashi,&nbsp;Noriaki Kiguchi,&nbsp;Norio Takeoka","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12674","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12674","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper presents a “behavioral” model of a normative benevolent social planner, who faces a self-control problem when he/she is in charge of aggregating diverse and conflicting preferences of individuals. The model is presented in the context of aggregating preferences over intertemporal streams of social outcomes, in which Zuber and Jackson and Yariv have shown the impossibility of a time-consistent and Paretian social objective function. Unlike previous studies, our investigation focuses on the compatibility of the Pareto condition with the impure social planner who has a dynamically consistent self-control utility function characterized by Gul and Pesendorfer. Assuming that the social planner is tempted to adopt the majority's opinion when there is a conflict of opinions among individuals, the paper characterizes an aggregation form in which the planner is allowed to depart from dictatorship in ex-post choice under noncommitment.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12674","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138519653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Price and variety in the Salop model Salop模型的价格和品种
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-20 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12675
Changying Li, Jianhu Zhang
{"title":"Price and variety in the Salop model","authors":"Changying Li,&nbsp;Jianhu Zhang","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12675","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12675","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using a Salop circle model, this research analyzes the welfare implications of firm/product entry with information provision by consumers. While firms use consumer information to target sales efforts, consumers face privacy trade-offs when providing their personal information. We show that (i) price and profit first increase, then decrease with more varieties; (ii) consumer welfare, affected by price, sales effort, privacy loss, and matching effects, first decreases, then increases with firm entry; (iii) equilibrium information is socially optimal given the number of varieties; and (iv) if the variable cost of providing sales assistance is low (high), free entry leads to too much (few) varieties and too little (more) information, from a social welfare standpoint.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138519671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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