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Journal of Public Economic Theory最新文献

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Control and spread of contagion in networks with global effects 在具有全球影响的网络中控制和传播传染病
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-03-29 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12643
John Higgins, Tarun Sabarwal
{"title":"Control and spread of contagion in networks with global effects","authors":"John Higgins,&nbsp;Tarun Sabarwal","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12643","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12643","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study proliferation of an action in binary action network coordination games that are generalized to include global effects. This captures important aspects of proliferation of a particular action or narrative in online social networks, providing a basis to understand their impact on societal outcomes. Our model naturally captures complementarities among starting sets, network resilience, and global effects, and highlights interdependence in channels through which contagion spreads. We present new, natural, computationally tractable, and efficient algorithms to define and compute equilibrium objects that facilitate the general study of contagion in networks and prove their theoretical properties. Our algorithms are easy to implement and help to quantify relationships previously inaccessible due to computational intractability. Using these algorithms, we study the spread of contagion in scale-free networks with 1000 players using millions of Monte Carlo simulations. Our analysis provides quantitative and qualitative insight into the design of policies to control or spread contagion in networks. The scope of application is enlarged given the many other situations across different fields that may be modeled using this framework.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 6","pages":"1149-1187"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134952132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information design, externalities, and government interventions 信息设计、外部性和政府干预
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-03-05 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12640
Cheng Li, Yancheng Xiao
{"title":"Information design, externalities, and government interventions","authors":"Cheng Li,&nbsp;Yancheng Xiao","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12640","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12640","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion with spillovers. A sender provides information to persuade a receiver to take an action with external effects. We consider how government interventions, including corrective subsidy and tax, affect social welfare. In addition to internalizing externalities, government interventions affect social welfare through an informational channel. Subsidies to the sender's preferred action incentivize the sender to reveal less information, but taxes on the sender's preferred action incentivize the sender to reveal more information. Because of such an informational effect, the optimal subsidy and tax may be different from the size of the externalities. In some cases, social welfare is maximized with no government intervention.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 4","pages":"821-839"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49014883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Kantian equilibria of a class of Nash bargaining games 一类Nash讨价还价对策的Kantian均衡
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12638
Atakan Dizarlar, Emin Karagözoğlu
{"title":"Kantian equilibria of a class of Nash bargaining games","authors":"Atakan Dizarlar,&nbsp;Emin Karagözoğlu","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12638","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12638","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study Kantian equilibria of an <math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>n</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $n$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>-player bargaining game, which is a modified version of the well-known divide-the-dollar game. We first show that the Kantian equilibrium exists under fairly minimal assumptions. Second, if the bankruptcy rule used satisfies equal treatment of equals, and is almost nowhere proportional, then only equal division can prevail in any Kantian equilibrium. On the other hand, we show that an “anything goes” type result emerges only under the proportional rule. Finally, using hybrid bankruptcy rules that we construct in a novel fashion, we can characterize the whole equilibrium set. Our results highlight the interactions between institutions (axiomatic properties of division rules) and agents' equilibrium behavior.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 4","pages":"867-891"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47801286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Timing of preference submissions under the Boston mechanism 波士顿机制下提交优惠的时间
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12639
Li Chen
{"title":"Timing of preference submissions under the Boston mechanism","authors":"Li Chen","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12639","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12639","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper considers a model of centralized college admission under the Boston mechanism where students may have uncertainty about their priorities. Students have homogeneous ordinal preferences over colleges, but their preference intensities vary, and the exam scores determine their priorities. In equilibrium, student application strategies take a cutoff form. The strategies depend on their exam scores under post-score submissions, on preference intensities under pre-exam submissions, and on both preference intensities and signals about their exam scores under pre-score submissions. Given these equilibrium strategies, students are better off under pre-exam and pre-score submissions than post-score submissions. When students with the same preference intensities and exam scores receive signals of different qualities, those with bad signals could be hurt by those with good signals.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 4","pages":"803-820"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12639","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50116868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal climate and fiscal policy in an OLG economy OLG经济中的最优气候与财政政策
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-02-03 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12637
Richard Jaimes
{"title":"Optimal climate and fiscal policy in an OLG economy","authors":"Richard Jaimes","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12637","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12637","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper develops a climate–economy model to study the joint design of optimal climate and fiscal policies in economies with overlapping generations (OLGs). I demonstrate how capital taxation, if optimal, drives a wedge between the market costs of carbon (the net present value of marginal damages using the market interest rate) and the Pigouvian tax (the net present value of marginal damages using the consumption discount rate of successive OLGs). In contrast to deterministic infinitely lived representative agent models, at the optimum, the capital income tax is positive, the carbon price equals the market costs of carbon but it falls short of the Pigouvian tax when (i) preferences are not separable over consumption and leisure; and (ii) labor income taxes cannot be age-dependent. I also show that restrictions on climate change policy provide a novel rationale for positive capital income taxes.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 4","pages":"727-752"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42480501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Minimum wage spillover effects and social welfare in a model of stochastic job matching 随机工作匹配模型下的最低工资溢出效应与社会福利
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-02-02 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12636
Panagiotis Nanos
{"title":"Minimum wage spillover effects and social welfare in a model of stochastic job matching","authors":"Panagiotis Nanos","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12636","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12636","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, I carry out a welfare analysis of the minimum wage in the framework of a Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides model with stochastic job matching. I explore the role of the minimum wage in a labor market with trading externalities and present the necessary and sufficient condition for a minimum wage hike to be efficiency enhancing. In this context, I characterize minimum wage spillover effects and demonstrate that there is a direct link between the welfare effects and spillover effects of a minimum wage. This theoretical finding suggests that the welfare impact of minimum wage changes can be inferred from the empirical observation of spillover effects on the wage distribution.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 4","pages":"753-802"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12636","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47754979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Growth and optimal policies in an R&D-growth model with imperfect international capital mobility 国际资本流动性不完全的研发增长模型中的增长与最优政策
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-12-22 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12635
Mei-ying Hu, Ping-ho Chen, Hsun Chu, Ching-chong Lai
{"title":"Growth and optimal policies in an R&D-growth model with imperfect international capital mobility","authors":"Mei-ying Hu,&nbsp;Ping-ho Chen,&nbsp;Hsun Chu,&nbsp;Ching-chong Lai","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12635","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12635","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we examine the effects of international capital mobility on innovation, growth, and optimal growth policies in a small open economy with R&amp;D-driven growth. Households can borrow funds from an imperfect international capital market to finance their investment in R&amp;D firms. We show that the economy can reach a higher growth rate if international capital is more mobile. This result is consistent with recent empirical findings. Moreover, we show that the common growth-enhancing policies, such as patent protection and the R&amp;D subsidies, have an additional negative welfare effect when households can access the international capital market. Accordingly, the optimal patent protection and R&amp;D subsidy should be smaller when the degree of international capital mobility is higher.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 4","pages":"840-866"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49651820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Optimal patent licensing—Two or three-part tariff 最佳专利许可-两部分或三部分关税
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-12-13 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12630
Swapnendu Banerjee, Arijit Mukherjee, Sougata Poddar
{"title":"Optimal patent licensing—Two or three-part tariff","authors":"Swapnendu Banerjee,&nbsp;Arijit Mukherjee,&nbsp;Sougata Poddar","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12630","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12630","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We look into technology transfer by an insider patentee in a spatial duopoly model under three types of licensing contracts—(i) two-part tariff with fixed fee and per-unit royalty, (ii) two-part tariff with fixed fee and ad-valorem royalty and (iii) general three-part tariff with fixed fee, per-unit and ad-valorem royalties. Under two-part tariff contracts, the licenser is better off with the per-unit royalty contract but the general contract does better than the other contracts. In contrast to the existing literature, all three licensing contracts may make the consumers worse-off compared to no licensing, with the lowest consumer surplus achieved under the general licensing contract. Welfare under the general licensing contract is equal to the welfare under two-part tariff with ad-valorem royalty and it is higher than the welfare under no licensing but lower than the welfare under two-part tariff with per-unit royalty. Hence, the general three-part licensing contract is privately optimal but not socially optimal. Similar conclusions hold also under a nonspatial linear demand model with differentiated products.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 3","pages":"624-648"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12630","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49035601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Endogenous timing in tax competition: The effect of asymmetric information 税收竞争中的内生时机:信息不对称的影响
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-12-02 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12631
Takaaki Hamada
{"title":"Endogenous timing in tax competition: The effect of asymmetric information","authors":"Takaaki Hamada","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12631","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12631","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study explores the effects of asymmetric information on endogenous leadership in a simple tax competition environment. The study models a two-country economy where one country is informed about its own and opponent's productivity of private goods, while the other country only knows its productivity. The results show that each type of informed country has an incentive to pretend to be the other type, which leads to a Stackelberg outcome endogenously, while the simultaneous move is the unique outcome under complete information. Under the Stackelberg outcome, the uninformed country moves first and the informed country moves second. Moreover, ex-post social welfare under asymmetric information can become larger than that under complete information, because the uninformed country chooses a less aggressive tax rate under asymmetric information. These results depend on the type of uncertainty, and capital ownership and share.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 3","pages":"570-614"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46948172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Nonlinear taxation of income and education in the presence of income-misreporting 存在收入误报情况下的收入和教育非线性税收
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-12-02 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12634
Spencer Bastani, Firouz Gahvari, Luca Micheletto
{"title":"Nonlinear taxation of income and education in the presence of income-misreporting","authors":"Spencer Bastani,&nbsp;Firouz Gahvari,&nbsp;Luca Micheletto","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12634","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12634","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the joint design of nonlinear income and education taxes when the government pursues redistributive objectives. A key feature of our setup is that the ability type of an agent can affect both the costs and benefits of acquiring education. Market remuneration of agents depends on both their innate ability type and their educational choices. Our focus is on the properties of constrained efficient allocations when educational choices are publicly observable at the individual level, but earned income is subject to misreporting. We find that income-misreporting (IM) affects the optimal distortions on income and education and shed light on the reasons for it and mechanisms through which it is done. We show how and why IM strengthens the case for downward distorting the educational choices of low-ability agents. Finally, we find that IM provides another mechanism that makes commodity taxation useful.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 4","pages":"679-726"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12634","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50117957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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