{"title":"Stable licensing schemes in technology transfer","authors":"Shin Kishimoto","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12664","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12664","url":null,"abstract":"<p>By considering combinations of a lump-sum fee and a per-unit royalty as licensing schemes in the transfer of new technology through licensing from a technology holder to oligopolistic firms, we investigate stable licensing schemes that are realized as bargaining outcomes. The licensing schemes agreeable to both the technology holder and licensees are necessarily rejection-proof; that is, no subgroup of licensees has an incentive to reject the licensing schemes. We newly define the rejection-proof core for each group of licensees as the set of rejection-proof licensing schemes for its group that are not dominated by any other rejection-proof licensing schemes for any licensees' group. Our principal findings are as follows: For the group of licensees that maximizes the sum of the technology holder's (gross) profit and licensees' total surplus, the rejection-proof core is always nonempty. Furthermore, from the perspective of profit maximization, the nonempty rejection-proof cores suggest that the technology holder should license the new technology to such a group.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135885107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Monopolistic competition, rising markups, and optimal taxation of participation","authors":"Eren Gürer","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12661","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12661","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study explores the optimal taxation of participation within a monopolistically competitive product market that exhibits increasing markups. Individual labor supply responds along both intensive and extensive margins. The government simultaneously optimizes a nonlinear Mirrleesian income tax scheme, a flat profit tax rate, and a flat unemployment benefit. It is shown analytically that the monetized welfare cost of an increase in unemployment benefit is higher under monopolistic competition compared to under perfect competition. Nevertheless, numerical simulations suggest that the optimal unemployment benefit increases in response to greater markups when the government simultaneously optimizes all of its tools. The reason is that, along with a higher profit tax, rising markups require a decline in marginal income taxes. Lower marginal income taxes relieve the extensive margin distortions and accommodate an increase in the unemployment benefit. Accordingly, optimal nominal participation taxes remain approximately unchanged for the lower half of the ability distribution. For the upper half, the decline in income taxes outweighs the increase in the unemployment benefit, leading to lower optimal nominal participation taxes.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45640504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Should credit card rewards be taxed?","authors":"Oz Shy","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12660","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12660","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Rewards that consumers receive on credit card payments influence their payment choice. They are not taxed but merchants deduct card fees from their taxes. This article analyzes the tax effects in a model where card companies set interchange fees, merchants decide whether to accept card payments, and consumers choose their preferred payment method. I find that card companies raise interchange fees when merchants are allowed to deduct these fees from their taxes. Taxing consumers' card rewards reduces interchange fees. The optimal distribution of cash and card payments cannot be supported without a policy combination of taxes and regulated interchange fees.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135017088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cultural and economic integration of immigrant minorities: Analytical framework and policy implications","authors":"Mark Gradstein, Moshe Justman","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12662","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12662","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The cultural diversity that new immigrants bring to the host economy is potentially beneficial for the productivity of both immigrants and natives, but immigrants must assimilate to some extent for these benefits to be realized. In general, immigrants assimilate more slowly than natives would like, as they ignore the external material benefits of assimilation for natives and their resistance to foreign cultural influences. We develop a formal framework that highlights the complementarity between immigrants' cultural assimilation, economic integration, and investment in human capital, indicating the scope for mutually beneficial policies, offering immigrants material incentives to assimilate more rapidly.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 6","pages":"1337-1360"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43493407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
John C. Strandholm, Ana Espinola-Arredondo, Felix Munoz-Garcia
{"title":"Asymmetric regulators in polluting mixed oligopolies: Agency problems and second-mover advantage","authors":"John C. Strandholm, Ana Espinola-Arredondo, Felix Munoz-Garcia","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12659","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12659","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate privatization decisions in a mixed oligopoly market, with and without environmental regulation. We consider three agents: the manager of the public firm, the environmental agency, and the regulator choosing privatization levels; allowing them to assign different weights to pollution. When environmental policy is absent, we find that privatization decisions in equilibrium suffer from agency problems, yielding potentially inefficient privatizations. When environmental regulation is present and privatization decisions precede this regulation, privatizations have no impact on equilibrium output; while the opposite holds when environmental policy is chosen first. Our results, then, identify the presence of a second-mover advantage when asymmetric government agencies act sequentially.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12659","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43222376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Comparative analyses of fiscal sustainability of the budgetary policy rules","authors":"Koichi Futagami, Kunihiko Konishi","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12658","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12658","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We construct a continuous-time overlapping generations model with an endogenous growth structure and consider fiscal sustainability under two fiscal rules: (i) the government fixes the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio and (ii) the government fixes the primary balance-to-GDP ratio. Under the constant budget deficit-to-GDP rule, fiscal sustainability is ensured when the initial public debt-to-GDP and budget deficit-to-GDP ratios are sufficiently small. Under the constant primary balance-to-GDP rule, it is difficult to ensure fiscal sustainability when the primary balance is in deficit or zero. However, fiscal sustainability is ensured when the primary balance is in surplus and the initial government debt-to-GDP ratio is sufficiently small.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 5","pages":"944-984"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45917299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sovereign debt assistance and democratic decision-making","authors":"Ruth Ben-Yashar, Miriam Krausz, Shmuel Nitzan","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12656","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12656","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Organizational reforms stimulating democratic decision-making play a role in the economic effectiveness of concessional debt and debt relief. Effectiveness is defined as the increase in project approval produced by debt assistance. This claim is supported by a theoretic model illustrating the role of democratic decision-making in increasing lending as well as in determining the effectiveness of debt assistance. Using the framework of group decision-making in a fixed-size committee, we suggest a novel explanation to the advantage of conditioning debt assistance on organizational reforms that target the decision-making structure in organizations. The results imply that if the aid organization can affect the level of democratization in organizations, it can exploit its advantage and set the debt assistance that induces the maximal increase in project approval. We derive conditions under which organizational reforms that impose various forms of democratic norms in decision-making are important for increasing the effectiveness of debt assistance. We also point to the case where replacing an autocratic decision maker can cause debt assistance effectiveness to decline.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 5","pages":"930-943"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42596905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Equity-settled share-based payments and their (strategic) use under asymmetric information","authors":"Stefano Bolatto, Giuseppe Pignataro","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12657","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12657","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Share-based payments are of widespread use in today's economy. Consulting firms are increasingly accepting equity compensation for their services (particularly from startups) and many governments provide fiscal incentives to support this choice. Likewise, profit-sharing licensing is an on-trend business practice by innovative firms and patent holders when transferring their technology to interested adopters. This paper unveils strategic considerations according to which an agent/seller designs its optimal policy in regard to the equity share to request in exchange for its service, technology, or trademark. The model assumes a fringe of interested users/customers differentiated by both the support they need from the seller and the value of the underlying relationship; and also holding an informational disadvantage on their own type. Given the seller's cost configuration, equilibrium outcomes entail entering a profit-sharing relationship either with the high-type customers only or with all customers. Yet, in this case, equity-based payment claims are —for rent extraction purposes— common (i.e., <i>not</i> differentiated) across types.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 5","pages":"1012-1042"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46020680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Claude Crampes, Norbert Ladoux, Jean-Marie Lozachmeur
{"title":"Pricing energy consumption and residential energy-efficiency investment: An optimal tax approach","authors":"Claude Crampes, Norbert Ladoux, Jean-Marie Lozachmeur","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12655","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12655","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze a Pareto optimal income tax problem à la Mirrlees in which households consume three types of goods: energy goods, energy-efficient investments, and nonenergy goods. The two main ingredients of our normative analysis are: (i) an indirect relationship between energy and the satisfaction of energy needs, as energy-efficient investments transform energy into services, such as light, heating, and air conditioning; and (ii) imperfect information of the policy designer as regards the level of energy efficiency of households' housing and their labor market productivity. Each household differs with respect to these two latter characteristics, and the government designs a nonlinear income tax combined with energy and energy-efficient investment nonlinear pricing that maximizes a weighted sum of households' utilities. We show that a benevolent social planner should distort energy prices in a way that depends on the difference between the saturation of energy needs and the complementarity between energy and the level of energy efficiency in the provision of energy services. A sufficient condition for energy consumption to be subsidized is that the rebound effect is small. Second, when individuals can invest in energy efficiency on top of energy consumption, these investments should always be subsidized and the marginal subsidy should always be higher than the one on energy consumption.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42611825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Twin peaks: Expressive externality in group participation","authors":"David K. Levine, Salvatore Modica, Junze Sun","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12654","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12654","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We introduce a model of group behavior that combines expressive participation with strategic participation. Building on the idea that expressive voting in elections is much like rooting for a sports team, we give applications to both sporting events and elections. In our model there is an expressive externality: an individual enjoys an event more when more of her peers come out to support her preferred party or team. We show that this results in the possibility of “tipping”—that participation may jump up discontinuously when the externality becomes strong enough. We examine the implications for pricing by sports teams and for voter turnout.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 5","pages":"897-929"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12654","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47717687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}