Journal of Public Economic Theory最新文献_第7页

Catch Laffer If You Can: Tax Take in an Evasion-Detection Game 如果你能抓住后来者：逃税侦查游戏中的税收

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-11-23 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70082

Rosaria Distefano, Francesco Reito

引用次数: 0

Persuading Through Media Bias With News Diffusion 通过新闻传播的媒体偏见说服

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-11-19 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70073

Bartosz Redlicki

引用次数: 0

Economic Stimulus Effects of Product Innovation Under Demand Stagnation 需求停滞下产品创新的经济刺激效应

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-11-18 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70078

Daisuke Matsuzaki, Yoshiyasu Ono

{"title":"Economic Stimulus Effects of Product Innovation Under Demand Stagnation","authors":"Daisuke Matsuzaki, Yoshiyasu Ono","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70078","url":null,"abstract":"When confronting economic stagnation, innovation (product innovation in particular) is often cited as an effective stimulus because it is assumed to encourage household consumption and lead to higher demand. Using a secular stagnation model with wealth preference, we examine the effects of product innovation on employment and consumption. This study examines three types of product innovation, including quantity-augmenting-like innovation, variety expansion, and addictive innovation. The first works as if a larger quantity were consumed although the actual quantity remains the same, the second increases the variety of consumption commodities, and the third reduces the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. We find that the first and second always reduce both consumption and employment, whereas the third can expand them. It suggests that policy makers should carefully choose the type of product innovation to promote as an economic stimulus: addictive innovation can stimulate business activity whereas quantity-augmenting-like innovation and variety expansion always worsen stagnation.","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70078","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145572220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Tax and Subsidy Policies in a Two-Sided Market: An Application to the Digital Healthcare Industry 双边市场中的税收和补贴政策：在数字医疗行业中的应用

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-11-17 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70077

Doriani Lingga, Simona Fabrizi, Steffen Lippert

引用次数: 0

The Realizing Potential Rule and Other Axiomatic Rankings of Ordinal Performance Improvements 有序性能改进的实现潜在规则和其他公理排序

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-11-17 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70080

Guy Barokas

{"title":"The Realizing Potential Rule and Other Axiomatic Rankings of Ordinal Performance Improvements","authors":"Guy Barokas","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70080","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 Evaluating performance is essential for designing effective incentive structures that enhance productivity across various domains. This paper introduces and axiomatically characterizes the realizing potential rule, which assesses an agent's potential for improvement (or deterioration) based on past performance. Current performance is then evaluated based on the ratio of improvements (or deterioration) relative to this potential. Our main axiom introduces a novel consistency condition, ensuring that evaluations remain stable when the performance scale is reversed. Alternative rules are also discussed and characterized, and the seemingly natural relative improvements rule is shown to violate our consistency condition. Additionally, we show that building a reward system based on the realizing potential rule is more effective in increasing total productivity compared to reward systems based on more common rules. Finally, extending the framework to a social-rule setting, our main result provides an extension of realizing potential to cases where the level of maximal performance is not well-defined. Our results lay a foundation for designing incentive systems that equitably reward improvement while enhancing productivity, with applications in labor markets, education, and healthcare programs.\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145580745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Emissions Taxes Versus Tradeable Permits With Many Countries 许多国家的排放税与可交易许可

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-11-11 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70079

Helmuts Azacis, David R. Collie

引用次数: 0

Polarization as Pluralistic Ignorance 两极分化是多元无知

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-11-09 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70076

Kenjiro Asami, Daiki Kishishita

{"title":"Polarization as Pluralistic Ignorance","authors":"Kenjiro Asami, Daiki Kishishita","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70076","url":null,"abstract":"Polarization is considered one of the most serious challenges in democratic countries. While substantial evidence points to exaggerated perceptions of polarization—called false polarization—whether it can persist in the long run remains understudied. This paper develops a social learning model in which each citizen belongs to either of two political groups and holds either of two attitudes on a controversial issue. In each period, two citizens—one from each group—publicly express their opinions on the issue. Citizens havePolitical polarization is considered one of the conformity motives, but their distribution could be misperceived. We show that false polarization may arise as pluralistic ignorance even when the majority shares the same attitude across the two groups. Specifically, when citizens underestimate others' conformity motives, perceived polarization can trigger a self-reinforcing spiral, leading both groups to appear polarized. Consequently, both groups may continue to publicly express different opinions. Finally, we discuss conditions under which the formation of echo chambers either mitigates or exacerbates false polarization.","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70076","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145530048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Sabotage and Free Riding in Contests With a Group-Specific Public Good/Bad Prize 在有特定群体公共好/坏奖的竞赛中蓄意破坏和搭便车

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-11-04 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70075

Kyung Hwan Baik, Dongwoo Lee

引用次数: 0

Useful Public Spending, Taylor Principle, and Macroeconomic Instability 有用的公共支出、泰勒原则和宏观经济不稳定

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-10-23 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70054

Antoine Le Riche

{"title":"Useful Public Spending, Taylor Principle, and Macroeconomic Instability","authors":"Antoine Le Riche","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70054","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the stationary welfare and local stability implication of useful public spending in a discrete-time one-sector monetary economy with Taylor rule. Public spending, financed through a flat income tax, is useful and exerts externalities on production. In our economy, money is needed for transaction purposes. We show that the introduction of a public spending exerting externality in the production may lead to multiplicity and indeterminacy. When the externality in production is low enough, under a passive interest rate feedback rule, two steady states emerge and could be either locally determinate or indeterminate, depending on the interplay between the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption and the elasticity of the interest rate, while under an active interest rate feedback rule, two interior locally determinate steady states and two liquidity trap locally determinate steady states exist. When externality in production is high enough, a unique local determinate interior steady state occurs, while under an active interest feedback rule, a unique liquidity trap steady state and a unique interior steady state occur, and both are locally determinate. When both two interior steady states and two liquidity trap steady states exist, when the capital stock is low, the interior steady state has a higher level of capital than the one of the liquidity trap, while, when the capital stock is high, it is the liquidity trap steady having a higher level of capital. Finally, liquidity trap equilbria Pareto-dominate the interior equilibria in view of the zero cost of money.","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70054","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145367028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

In-Group Versus Out-Group Preferences in Intergroup Conflict: An Experiment 群体冲突中的群体内偏好与群体外偏好：一项实验

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-10-23 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70074

Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Anwesha Mukherjee, Roman M. Sheremeta

{"title":"In-Group Versus Out-Group Preferences in Intergroup Conflict: An Experiment","authors":"Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Anwesha Mukherjee, Roman M. Sheremeta","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70074","url":null,"abstract":"In group conflicts, individuals often have diverse preferences, such as maximizing personal payoff, maximizing the group's payoff, or defeating rivals. When these preferences coexist, isolating their impact on conflict outcomes becomes challenging. To disentangle in-group and out-group preferences, we conduct a group contest experiment in which human in-group or out-group players are replaced with historical subjects to maintain strategic similarity. Our study aims to explore (i) the variation in effort in group conflicts due to in-group and out-group preferences and group cohesion, and (ii) how the impact of these preferences changes when the two groups have explicitly different categorical identities. Surprisingly, our results indicate an absence of overall treatment effects on effort levels. However, the presence of in-groups has heightened concerns about individual payoffs. When out-groups are introduced, these concerns are moderated by an additional focus on the group's payoffs. The negative effect of the in-group preferences and the positive effect of the out-group preferences are weaker when group members have a common categorical identity.","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70074","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145366801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0