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Economies with rights: Efficiency and inequality 权利经济:效率与不平等
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-23 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12676
Carlos Hervés-Beloso, Francisco Martínez-Concha, Emma Moreno-García
{"title":"Economies with rights: Efficiency and inequality","authors":"Carlos Hervés-Beloso,&nbsp;Francisco Martínez-Concha,&nbsp;Emma Moreno-García","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12676","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12676","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider a scenario where inequality levels originate harmful effects on society. To alleviate this negative externality, we introduce tradable consumption licenses within a general equilibrium framework to obtain efficient outcomes, reduce inequality, and improve social welfare. This mechanism would be easily implementable with the necessary support of the law.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12676","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138519667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Epidemics, vaccines, and health policy 流行病、疫苗和卫生政策
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-23 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12677
Rabah Amir, Raouf Boucekkine
{"title":"Epidemics, vaccines, and health policy","authors":"Rabah Amir,&nbsp;Raouf Boucekkine","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12677","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12677","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 6","pages":"1143-1148"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138432317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Temptation and self-control for the impure benevolent planner: The case of heterogeneous discounting 不纯粹的善意计划者的诱惑和自我控制:异质折扣的例子
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-20 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12674
Takashi Hayashi, Noriaki Kiguchi, Norio Takeoka
{"title":"Temptation and self-control for the impure benevolent planner: The case of heterogeneous discounting","authors":"Takashi Hayashi,&nbsp;Noriaki Kiguchi,&nbsp;Norio Takeoka","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12674","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12674","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper presents a “behavioral” model of a normative benevolent social planner, who faces a self-control problem when he/she is in charge of aggregating diverse and conflicting preferences of individuals. The model is presented in the context of aggregating preferences over intertemporal streams of social outcomes, in which Zuber and Jackson and Yariv have shown the impossibility of a time-consistent and Paretian social objective function. Unlike previous studies, our investigation focuses on the compatibility of the Pareto condition with the impure social planner who has a dynamically consistent self-control utility function characterized by Gul and Pesendorfer. Assuming that the social planner is tempted to adopt the majority's opinion when there is a conflict of opinions among individuals, the paper characterizes an aggregation form in which the planner is allowed to depart from dictatorship in ex-post choice under noncommitment.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12674","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138519653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Price and variety in the Salop model Salop模型的价格和品种
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-20 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12675
Changying Li, Jianhu Zhang
{"title":"Price and variety in the Salop model","authors":"Changying Li,&nbsp;Jianhu Zhang","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12675","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12675","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using a Salop circle model, this research analyzes the welfare implications of firm/product entry with information provision by consumers. While firms use consumer information to target sales efforts, consumers face privacy trade-offs when providing their personal information. We show that (i) price and profit first increase, then decrease with more varieties; (ii) consumer welfare, affected by price, sales effort, privacy loss, and matching effects, first decreases, then increases with firm entry; (iii) equilibrium information is socially optimal given the number of varieties; and (iv) if the variable cost of providing sales assistance is low (high), free entry leads to too much (few) varieties and too little (more) information, from a social welfare standpoint.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138519671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
First-best health policy in vaccine markets with health and network externalities 具有健康和网络外部性的疫苗市场的最佳卫生政策
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-14 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12673
Rabah Amir, Filomena Garcia, Iryna Topolyan
{"title":"First-best health policy in vaccine markets with health and network externalities","authors":"Rabah Amir,&nbsp;Filomena Garcia,&nbsp;Iryna Topolyan","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12673","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12673","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper considers an oligopolistic market for a vaccine, characterized by negative network effects, which stem from the free-riding behavior of individuals engaged in a vaccination game. Vaccine markets often suffer from three imperfections: high concentration, network effects, and a health externality (contagion). The first conclusion of the paper is that the negative network externality is important as a market distortion, as it may lead to significant welfare losses. The second and main part of the paper develops a two-part per-unit subsidy scheme that a social planner could use to target both consumers and producers of vaccines. The scope of such a subsidy scheme to induce the firms to produce the first-best output without network effects (which is the most ambitious first-best target) is investigated. In many cases, while the first-best is attainable, it requires negative prices for vaccines, which amounts to rewarding consumers to induce them to vaccinate.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 6","pages":"1229-1250"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134957221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Persuading sincere and strategic voters 说服真诚和有战略眼光的选民
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-06 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12671
Toygar T. Kerman, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Dominik Karos
{"title":"Persuading sincere and strategic voters","authors":"Toygar T. Kerman,&nbsp;P. Jean-Jacques Herings,&nbsp;Dominik Karos","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12671","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12671","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A sender wants to persuade multiple homogeneous receivers to vote in favor of a proposal. Before the vote sender commits to a signal which sends private, potentially correlated, messages to receivers that are contingent on the true state of the world. The best equilibrium for sender in the resulting incomplete information game is unappealing: all receivers vote in favor of sender's preferred outcome, irrespective of their message. We therefore focus on the equilibrium where receivers vote sincerely, that is they vote in favor of the outcome that is optimal given their posterior. We characterize the optimal public and the optimal private signal, both for the case where receivers are behavioral and vote sincerely as well as the case where such behavior is a Bayes–Nash equilibrium (BNE). For the optimal public signal, sincere voting is a BNE, but the optimal private signal is subject to the swing voter's curse. Imposing the constraint that sincere voting be a BNE leads to an optimal signal where receivers are never pivotal.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12671","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135634262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Double auction for trading perfect complements 完美互补交易的双重拍卖
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-10-30 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12672
Rakesh Chaturvedi, Ashish Kumar Pandey
{"title":"Double auction for trading perfect complements","authors":"Rakesh Chaturvedi,&nbsp;Ashish Kumar Pandey","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12672","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12672","url":null,"abstract":"<p>For a trading problem where a buyer is interested in an aggregate resource with fragmented ownership, the individually owned resources are perfect complements in trade. A double auction, chosen in accordance with a value alignment principle which we formulate, is shown to be strategy proof for owners. Since it also values the aggregate resource correctly, it mitigates the holdout problem by changing the source of inefficiency from complementarity on owners' side to lack of competition on buyer side. The value alignment principle implies that this double auction has a majority trading rule. With multiple buyers, a suitable modification makes the double auction strategy proof even for the buyers, thus mitigating the holdout problem by achieving approximate ex post efficiency when the number of owners is large.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136102654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
FDI spillovers, new industry development, and economic growth 外国直接投资溢出效应、新产业发展和经济增长
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-10-18 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12670
Thanh Tam Nguyen-Huu, Ngoc-Sang Pham
{"title":"FDI spillovers, new industry development, and economic growth","authors":"Thanh Tam Nguyen-Huu,&nbsp;Ngoc-Sang Pham","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12670","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12670","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The paper investigates the optimal strategy of a small open economy receiving foreign direct investment (FDI) in an optimal growth context. We prove that no domestic firm can enter the new industry when the multinational enterprise's productivity or the fixed entry cost is high. Nevertheless, the host country's investment stock converges to a higher steady state than an economy without FDI. A domestic firm enters the new industry if its productivity is high enough. Moreover, the domestic firm can dominate or even eliminate its foreign counterpart.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135885160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal law enforcement when individuals are either moral or norm followers 当个人是道德或规范追随者时的最佳执法方式
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-10-10 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12669
Claude Fluet, Tim Friehe
{"title":"Optimal law enforcement when individuals are either moral or norm followers","authors":"Claude Fluet,&nbsp;Tim Friehe","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12669","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12669","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Moral rules and social norms influence whether individuals break the law. We characterize optimal law enforcement when some individuals obey internalized moral rules and implement social norms for other individuals who prefer to comply with them. Moral individuals and norm followers are linked via the endogenous social norm and this induces the social planner to create an expected sanction for norm setters that is higher than without the link. The optimal expected sanction for moral individuals is higher than the one for norm followers if the moral rule is weak but the reverse ranking is true when it is strong.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12669","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136295439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Green industrial policy, information asymmetry, and repayable advance 绿色产业政策、信息不对称和可偿还预付款
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-10-10 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12668
Guy Meunier, Jean-Pierre Ponssard
{"title":"Green industrial policy, information asymmetry, and repayable advance","authors":"Guy Meunier,&nbsp;Jean-Pierre Ponssard","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12668","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12668","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The energy transition requires the deployment of risky research and development programs, most of which are partially financed by public funding. Recent recovery plans, associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and the energy transition, increased the funding available to finance innovative low-carbon projects and called for an economic evaluation of their allocation. This paper analyzes the potential benefit of using repayable advance: a lump-sum payment to finance the project that is paid back in case of success. The relationship between the state and innovative firms is formalized in the principal-agent framework. Investing in an innovative project requires an initial observable capital outlay. We introduce asymmetric information on the probability of success, which is known to the firm but not to the state agency. The outcome of the project, if successful, delivers a private benefit to the firm and an external social benefit to the state. In this context a repayable advance consists in rewarding failure. We prove that it is a superior strategy in the presence of pure adverse selection. We investigate under what conditions this result could be extended in the presence of moral hazard. Implications for green industrial policy are discussed.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12668","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136296091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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