Journal of Public Economic Theory最新文献_第6页

Trade and Environmental Policies With Special Interest Politics: A Case of Asymmetric Information 具有特殊利益政治的贸易与环境政策：一个信息不对称的案例

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-12-17 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70081

Gaurav Bhattacharya, Meeta Keswani Mehra

{"title":"Trade and Environmental Policies With Special Interest Politics: A Case of Asymmetric Information","authors":"Gaurav Bhattacharya, Meeta Keswani Mehra","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70081","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper presents a model on the political economy of trade and environmental policies in the presence of asymmetric information. Information asymmetries stem from the preference of the incumbent government towards welfare of the general voter and political contributions made by special interest groups. Special interest groups are owners of sector-specific factors of production used to produce traded final goods and there exist negative production externalities. The incumbent uses trade and environmental policies to regulate trade flows and environmental quality, respectively. Results show that: (i) information asymmetries work in favour of special interest groups as they guarantee laxer environmental policy in comparison to the baseline scenario of complete information; (ii) trade policy in the domestic country is invariant of the information on the incumbent's preference over aggregate social welfare and reflect terms-of-trade effects and addresses production externalities generated abroad; (iii) including intermediate goods along with final goods in the model creates an additional layer of distortion in the environmental policy through cross-sectoral effects on returns to the sector-specific factors of production. The downward distortion in environmental policy worsens environmental quality, which adversely affects the general voters.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145845825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Environmentally Conscious Fishing Communities and Fishing Quota Negotiations: The Impact of Environmental Externalities 具有环保意识的渔业社区与捕捞配额谈判：环境外部性的影响

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-12-17 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70093

Elias Asproudis, Eleftherios Filippiadis

{"title":"Environmentally Conscious Fishing Communities and Fishing Quota Negotiations: The Impact of Environmental Externalities","authors":"Elias Asproudis, Eleftherios Filippiadis","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70093","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper uses a Nash bargaining model for analyzing negotiations between a fishing community and a vessel over fishing quotas and wages, for a given Total Allowable Catch imposed by the regulator. The analysis considers the environmental awareness of the community and whether the entire quota allotment is being leased, to examine how environmental externalities, unrelated to fishery sustainability, affect wages, employment, and social welfare. It is argued that if the maximum number of quotas is leased to the vessel, a system of transferable fishing rights is a vehicle for pure transfer payments from the vessel to the community, in the form of higher wages and leased quota revenues. In this context, employment level and social welfare are not affected by the fishing communities' environmental consciousness. However, if less than the maximum number of quotas is leased to the vessel, both wages and revenues from leased quotas are higher, while employment is lower when the community is environmentally conscious compared to when it is not. In such case, social welfare is higher when the community is environmentally conscious provided that the inverse demand for fish does not decline too sharply relative to the rate at which marginal pollution damages increase. Finally, it is shown that the strictness of the <b>Total Allowable Catch</b> regulations impacts both the community's well-being and the vessel's profitability.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70093","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145845826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Ramsey's Conjecture in Dynamic Contests 拉姆齐在动态竞赛中的猜想

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-12-13 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70092

Kerim Keskin, Sıla Pehlivan, Çağrı Sağlam

引用次数: 0

Emission Markets Linkage and Strategic Environmental Policy 排放市场、联系和战略性环境政策

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-12-11 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70089

Fabio Antoniou, Panos Hatzipanayotou, Nikos Tsakiris

引用次数: 0

Monopoly in Bilateral Exchange: Some Historico-Analytical Remarks 双边交易中的垄断：一些历史分析的评论

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-12-05 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70088

Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato, Franco Donzelli, Sayantan Ghosal, Damiano Turchet

引用次数: 0

International Cross-Ownership, Tariff Simplification, and Welfare Superiority 国际交叉所有制、关税简化与福利优势

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-12-05 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70086

Qidi Zhang, Leonard F. S. Wang, Ya-Po Yang

{"title":"International Cross-Ownership, Tariff Simplification, and Welfare Superiority","authors":"Qidi Zhang, Leonard F. S. Wang, Ya-Po Yang","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70086","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study examines the welfare effects of tariff simplification—a shift from a specific to an ad valorem tariff—in an import trade model featuring a domestic and a foreign firm with international cross-ownership. We find that in the absence of cross-shareholdings, tariff simplification increases tariff revenue and domestic social welfare without affecting the domestic firm's profit. However, when cross-shareholdings are present, tariff simplification induces an output-reallocation effect, which shifts some output from the foreign firm to the domestic one, and thus may reduce both firms’ profits, tariff revenue, domestic social welfare, and global welfare. Consequently, an ad valorem tariff can be Pareto-inferior to a specific tariff under international cross-ownership. Extending the model to a reciprocal dumping framework with symmetric linear demands in both countries, we find that with symmetric cross-ownership, tariff simplification harms (benefits) the country with a more (less) efficient domestic firm. Furthermore, when firms have asymmetric production efficiencies, tariff simplification reduces global welfare.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145686372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Anti-Consumerism: Stick or Carrot? 反消费主义：大棒还是胡萝卜？

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-12-02 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70085

Iwan Bos, Giovanni Maccarrone, Marco A. Marini

引用次数: 0

Delegated Networking 委托网络

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-12-02 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70087

Jing Fu, Frank Page

{"title":"Delegated Networking","authors":"Jing Fu, Frank Page","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70087","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We construct a model of a principal-agent game of network formation (over layered networks) with asymmetric information and consider the following two questions: (1) Is it possible for the principal to design a mechanism that links the reports of agents' private information and the set of connections allowed and recommended by the principal via the mechanism in such a way that players truthfully reveal their private information to the principal and follow the recommendations specified by the mechanism. (2) An even more fundamental question we address is whether or not it is possible for the principal to achieve the same outcome (as that achieved via a mechanism and centralized reporting) by instead choosing a profile of sets of allowable ways an agent (a player) can connect to a club (here modeled as player-club pair specific sets—or catalogs—of arc types) and then delegating connection choice to the player. We call this approach to network formation with incomplete information delegated networking and we show, under relatively mild conditions on our game-theoretic model, that strategic network formation with incomplete information, implemented via a mechanism and centralized reporting, is equivalent to implementation via arc catalogs and delegated networking with monitoring. Because the principal's problem over connection catalogs can be shown to have a solution, our equivalence result allows us to show that the principal's much more difficult problem over incentive compatible network formation mechanisms has a solution.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145686158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Robust Collective Agreements: A Theory of Cooperation Under Heterogeneity and Limited Enforcement 强有力的集体协议：异质性和有限执行下的合作理论

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-11-29 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70084

Gustavo Nicolas Paez Salamanca

{"title":"Robust Collective Agreements: A Theory of Cooperation Under Heterogeneity and Limited Enforcement","authors":"Gustavo Nicolas Paez Salamanca","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70084","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper develops a unified theoretical framework to explain why informal collective agreements frequently persist even when they deviate from welfare-maximizing rules. It addresses four empirical puzzles of cooperation, commitment without enforcement, persistence of inefficient rules, the ambiguous role of inequality, and the coexistence of unequal treatment with equalizing outcomes, by introducing the concept of <i>robustness</i>: the ability of a rule to sustain cooperation under the weakest incentive conditions. Within a common stochastic repeated-game setting, two archetypal forms of collective agreements are examined: <i>club good agreements</i>, with unequal contributions and equal benefits, and <i>common pool agreements</i>, with equal contributions and unequal benefits. Robust agreements are shown to exist broadly and to differ systematically across these institutional forms, yet in both cases, they minimize incentives to deviate while compressing disparities in expected utility. The analysis reconciles diverse empirical regularities, such as partial pooling, persistent inequality, and stability of informal arrangements, by shifting the focus from efficiency to robustness as the key organizing principle of sustainable cooperation under heterogeneity.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145695514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Selective Contracting in Heath Care: Is There an Optimal Network Size? 医疗保健的选择性承包：是否存在最优网络规模？

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-11-26 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70083

Michel Mougeot, Florence Naegelen

{"title":"Selective Contracting in Heath Care: Is There an Optimal Network Size?","authors":"Michel Mougeot, Florence Naegelen","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70083","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In many countries, insurers build preferred provider networks to reduce costs. In this paper, we address the issue of the optimal size of such networks. Considering the case of medical services whose price is not regulated, we assume that the insurer sets a number <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>m</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $m$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> of in-network providers and organizes price competition to select the preferred providers among <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>n</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $n$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> suppliers. Policyholders benefit from a higher reimbursement when they choose an in-network provider. We show that both in-network and off-network prices decrease with the number of in-network providers, that the largest possible network is optimal for the representative policyholder and for a not-for-profit insurer while a network with only one provider is preferred by a for-profit insurer.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145626112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0