Journal of Public Economic Theory最新文献_第6页

First-best health policy in vaccine markets with health and network externalities 具有健康和网络外部性的疫苗市场的最佳卫生政策

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-14 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12673

Rabah Amir, Filomena Garcia, Iryna Topolyan

引用次数: 1

Persuading sincere and strategic voters 说服真诚和有战略眼光的选民

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-06 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12671

Toygar T. Kerman, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Dominik Karos

引用次数: 0

Double auction for trading perfect complements 完美互补交易的双重拍卖

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-10-30 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12672

Rakesh Chaturvedi, Ashish Kumar Pandey

引用次数: 0

FDI spillovers, new industry development, and economic growth 外国直接投资溢出效应、新产业发展和经济增长

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-10-18 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12670

Thanh Tam Nguyen-Huu, Ngoc-Sang Pham

引用次数: 0

Optimal law enforcement when individuals are either moral or norm followers 当个人是道德或规范追随者时的最佳执法方式

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-10-10 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12669

Claude Fluet, Tim Friehe

引用次数: 0

Green industrial policy, information asymmetry, and repayable advance 绿色产业政策、信息不对称和可偿还预付款

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-10-10 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12668

Guy Meunier, Jean-Pierre Ponssard

{"title":"Green industrial policy, information asymmetry, and repayable advance","authors":"Guy Meunier, Jean-Pierre Ponssard","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12668","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12668","url":null,"abstract":"The energy transition requires the deployment of risky research and development programs, most of which are partially financed by public funding. Recent recovery plans, associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and the energy transition, increased the funding available to finance innovative low-carbon projects and called for an economic evaluation of their allocation. This paper analyzes the potential benefit of using repayable advance: a lump-sum payment to finance the project that is paid back in case of success. The relationship between the state and innovative firms is formalized in the principal-agent framework. Investing in an innovative project requires an initial observable capital outlay. We introduce asymmetric information on the probability of success, which is known to the firm but not to the state agency. The outcome of the project, if successful, delivers a private benefit to the firm and an external social benefit to the state. In this context a repayable advance consists in rewarding failure. We prove that it is a superior strategy in the presence of pure adverse selection. We investigate under what conditions this result could be extended in the presence of moral hazard. Implications for green industrial policy are discussed.","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12668","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136296091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Patent licensing for signaling the cost-reduction innovation: The case of the insider innovator 专利许可为降低成本的创新提供信号：内部创新者的案例

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-10-08 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12667

Cheng-Tai Wu, Tsung-Sheng Tsai

引用次数: 0

Should the police give priority to violence within criminal organizations? A personnel economics perspective 警方是否应该优先处理犯罪组织内部的暴力行为?人事经济学视角

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-09-18 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12666

C. Bravard, J. Durieu, J. Kamphorst, S. Roché, S. Sémirat

{"title":"Should the police give priority to violence within criminal organizations? A personnel economics perspective","authors":"C. Bravard, J. Durieu, J. Kamphorst, S. Roché, S. Sémirat","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12666","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12666","url":null,"abstract":"Even among themselves, criminals are not seen as trustworthy. Consequently, a criminal organization needs to incentivize its members, either by threats of violence or by rewarding good behavior. The cost of using violence depends on the resources police allocate to investigating intraorganizational violence. This means that the police may affect the choice of an incentive scheme by the criminal organization. The design of the optimal strategy for crime control has to take this into account. We develop a model of an infinitely repeated criminal labor market where (i) a criminal organization hires and incentivizes members, and (ii) peripheral crime (crime outside the criminal organization) is a stepping stone to a career in organized crime. We establish that there are two possible optimal strategies for the police. (i) There are situations in which the optimal strategy for the police is to use all of their resources to decrease the efficiency of criminals. (ii) In other situations, the optimal strategy for the police is to spend the minimum amount of resources to ensure that the criminal organization cannot punish disloyal criminals, and spend the rest of their resources to decrease the efficiency of criminals.","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 6","pages":"1361-1393"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12666","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135207495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Nonrenewable resource use sustainability and public debt 不可再生资源利用的可持续性与公共债务

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-09-15 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12665

Nicolas Clootens, Francesco Magris

{"title":"Nonrenewable resource use sustainability and public debt","authors":"Nicolas Clootens, Francesco Magris","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12665","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12665","url":null,"abstract":"The sustainability of resource use and the management of public finances are both long-run issues that are linked to each other through savings decisions. To study them conjointly, this paper introduces a public debt stabilization constraint in an overlapping generation model in which nonrenewable resources constitute a necessary input in the production function and belong to agents. It shows that stabilization of public debt at a high level (as share of capital) may prevent the existence of a sustainable development path, that is, a path on which per capita consumption is not decreasing. Public debt thus appears as a threat to sustainable development. It also shows that higher public debt-to-capital ratios (and public expenditures-to-capital ones) are associated with lower growth. Two transmission channels are identified. As usual, public debt crowds out capital accumulation. In addition, public debt tends to increase resource use which reduces the rate of growth. We also provide a numerical analysis of the dynamics that shows that the economy is characterized by saddle path stability. Finally, we show that the public debt-to-capital ratio may be calibrated to implement the social planner optimal allocation according to which the growth rate is increasing in the degree of patience.","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135397408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A generalized Hotelling–Downs model with asymmetric candidates 具有非对称候选人的广义霍特林-唐斯模型

IF 1.1 4区经济学

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-09-15 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12663

Elham Nikram, Dieter Balkenborg

引用次数: 0