发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Journal of Public Economic Theory最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Contractual Requirements and Bidding Behavior in Public Procurement With Entry 有条目的公共采购中的合同要求与投标行为
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-02-18 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70019
Samielle Drake, Fei Xu
{"title":"Contractual Requirements and Bidding Behavior in Public Procurement With Entry","authors":"Samielle Drake,&nbsp;Fei Xu","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70019","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We combine theoretical and empirical analyses to investigate the impacts of contractual requirements on bidding behavior and competition in procurement auctions with endogenous entry. Our analysis demonstrates that contractual requirements affect expected payoffs, influencing the equilibrium number of bidders and their bids under zero-profit conditions. Specifically, in equilibrium, increased contractual requirements enhance competition by raising bidders' expected payoffs, while higher entry costs reduce competition. Overall, a rise in entry costs results in elevated equilibrium bids. Under certain conditions, an increase in contractual requirements raises equilibrium bids. Additionally, we emphasize the significance of enforceability in shaping bidding behavior and, thus, in policy implementation. Empirical evidence from public cleaning services procurement in Sweden supports the implications of our model.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70019","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143439241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Social Norms Drivers on Public Good Contributions 社会规范对公共物品贡献的驱动因素
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-02-05 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70015
Lionel Richefort, Pauline Pedehour
{"title":"Social Norms Drivers on Public Good Contributions","authors":"Lionel Richefort,&nbsp;Pauline Pedehour","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70015","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This article develops a model of public good provision with social norms determined by network relationships. Individuals' wealth allocation preferences are guided by the benefit they obtain from a private good and a public good, and the social value they receive when following their neighbors in their contribution to the public good. We find conditions under which (i) redistributions of wealth will increase total giving if the transfer goes to the less norm-conformist agent, (ii) an increase in tastes for conformity of the weak contributors will increase total giving, and (iii) the deletion of a link between two contributors will increase total giving. Subsequently, examples in very small networks allow us to discuss how these results can help policymakers encourage the voluntary provision of public good.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143112148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Persuasion in Networks With Strategic Substitutes 战略替代网络中的说服
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-01-10 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70014
Guopeng Li, Yang Sun
{"title":"Persuasion in Networks With Strategic Substitutes","authors":"Guopeng Li,&nbsp;Yang Sun","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70014","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We study Bayesian persuasion with local strategic substitutes in networks. A designer commits to a public signal to maximize total activity. Equilibria are characterized by the network's maximum <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>k</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $k$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>-insulated sets for each realization. We solve the optimal information structure and characterize beneficial persuasion. While agents individually prefer higher states, the designer's payoff is non-monotonic in the posterior mean due to substitution effects. This provides a rationale for downwardplaying mechanisms: revealing low states truthfully and mixing signals when high. Moreover, for tree, nested split, and core-periphery networks, the designer strictly benefits if the prior mean insulated set size is less than the highest state set size.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143114069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How to Deal with Exchange Rate Risk in Infrastructure and Other Long-Lived Projects 如何应对基础设施等长期项目的汇率风险
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-01-07 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70003
Luciano de Castro, Claudio Frischtak, Arthur Rodrigues
{"title":"How to Deal with Exchange Rate Risk in Infrastructure and Other Long-Lived Projects","authors":"Luciano de Castro,&nbsp;Claudio Frischtak,&nbsp;Arthur Rodrigues","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70003","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Most developing economies rely on foreign capital to finance their infrastructure needs. These projects are usually structured as long-term (25–35 years) franchises that pay in local currency. If investors evaluate their returns in terms of foreign currency, exchange rate volatility introduces risk that may reduce the level of investment below what would be socially optimal. In this article, we propose a mechanism with very general features that hedges exchange rate fluctuation by adjusting the concession period. Such mechanism does not imply additional costs to the government and could be offered as a zero-cost option to lenders and investors exposed to currency fluctuations. We illustrate the general mechanism with three alternative specifications and use data from a 25-year highway franchise to simulate how they would play out in eight different emerging economies that exhibit diverse exchange rate trajectories. Results show relatively small length adjustments, and suggest the mechanism offers a powerful policy tool to cost-effectively attract vital foreign infrastructure investment for developing countries.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143112806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Deliberation and Voting: A Matter of Truth or Taste 审议和投票：真理或品味的问题
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-01-06 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70013
Masayuki Odora
{"title":"Deliberation and Voting: A Matter of Truth or Taste","authors":"Masayuki Odora","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70013","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study examines the strategic communication that occurs before voting under various voting rules. A group of imperfectly informed voters communicate before casting their votes in binary elections. The voters have <i>partially conflicting interests</i>: there is a correct candidate in some states of the world, while in others, voters disagree, and ideologies matter. This study demonstrates that truthful communication is never an equilibrium under any voting rule when the size of the electorate is sufficiently large.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143112548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Complainer's Dilemma 爱抱怨的人的困境
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-12-23 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70011
Greg Leo, Jennifer Pate
{"title":"Complainer's Dilemma","authors":"Greg Leo,&nbsp;Jennifer Pate","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70011","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Technological innovations have made complaining easier. Often, when it is easy to complain, only problems that meet a high threshold of complaints are addressed. We present a novel model of the strategic environment facing complainers and demonstrate that the properties of the resulting games' equilibria justify the existence of high complaint thresholds. By setting the thresholds appropriately, an administrator can prevent complaints that are not worth addressing. Policies that minimize the cost of complaining while requiring a large threshold are universally more efficient for large constituencies. Our results regarding the equilibrium for large constituencies are facilitated by the application of the Lambert-W function, demonstrating how this tool can be employed to analyze games with a large number of players. We motivate the model using a rich data set of complaints from New York City.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143118217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Corrigendum: Heterogeneity, Impatience, and Dynamic Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good 勘误：异质性、不耐烦和离散公共产品的动态私人供给
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-12-23 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70012
Jinping Zhang, Zhentao Zou
{"title":"Corrigendum: Heterogeneity, Impatience, and Dynamic Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good","authors":"Jinping Zhang,&nbsp;Zhentao Zou","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70012","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This corrigendum amends the main results in Bhattacharya et al., henceforth BTS. We show that the closed-form solution in Proposition 3 of BTS is incorrect, and the individual contributions are nonlinear (rather than linear) in the cumulative collective contribution. In addition, when the impatience differential is large enough, the patient individuals (rather than impatient individuals) reduce the contributions as the project progresses toward completion. Finally, the project is completed earlier (rather than later) as we increase the difference in impatience.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143118213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Norms and Efficiency in a Multi-Group Society: An Online Experiment 多群体社会中的规范与效率：在线实验
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-12-17 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70010
Marco Catola, Simone D'Alessandro, Pietro Guarnieri, Veronica Pizziol
{"title":"Norms and Efficiency in a Multi-Group Society: An Online Experiment","authors":"Marco Catola,&nbsp;Simone D'Alessandro,&nbsp;Pietro Guarnieri,&nbsp;Veronica Pizziol","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70010","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this study, we measure personal normative beliefs, empirical expectations, and normative expectations in a multilevel public goods game, where two local public goods are nested in a global one. We use these measures as indexes of subjective personal and social norms to pursue a twofold objective. On the one hand, we aim to understand whether and to what extent contribution decisions are driven by personal or social norms. On the other hand, we aim to investigate whether changes in the relative efficiency of the two public goods affect norms and norm compliance. In our online experiment, personal norms emerge as the main driver of contribution decisions especially when the efficiency of the related public good increases. However, compliance to empirical expectations signals that social norms still play a role in both positively affecting the contribution to the relative public good and negatively the contribution to the other one.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142868695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Matching Versus Raffles as a Fund-Raising Device 配对与莱佛士作为筹款工具
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-12-10 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70009
Paul Pecorino
{"title":"Matching Versus Raffles as a Fund-Raising Device","authors":"Paul Pecorino","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70009","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Matching is a commonly used fund-raising tactic, whereby small donors have their donation to a charity matched via a fund established by large donors. I developed a model in which a single large donor decides whether to establish a matching fund or contribute to the public good via the voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM). The credibility of the matching fund is an endogenous component of the model. For a match to be credible, the organizer must have a credible promise not to top up the contributions of the small donors. If the number of small donors is sufficiently large, there always exists a matching fund that is both credible and leads to a Pareto improvement relative to the VCM. When the matching fund needs to satisfy an endogenous credibility constraint, all of the outcomes that are eliminated due to this constraint are outcomes under which small donors are worse off relative to the VCM. The matching fund is also compared with a raffle mechanism. As the number of small donors grows large, public good provision under the two mechanisms converges. However, the matching function outperforms the raffle when there is a finite number of small donors.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142868275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Notions of Rank Efficiency for the Random Assignment Problem 随机分配问题的等级效率概念
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-11-20 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70008
Mehdi Feizi
{"title":"Notions of Rank Efficiency for the Random Assignment Problem","authors":"Mehdi Feizi","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70008","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>An assignment is rank efficient if there is no other assignment where the expected number of agents who received one of their top choices is weakly higher. We introduce new notions of rank efficiency for the random assignment problem and illustrate a hierarchy between them. In a <i>rank-minimizing</i> assignment, agents receive objects with a minimum rank on average. An <i>ex-post rank efficient</i> random assignment has at least one lottery over only rank efficient deterministic assignments. Thus, it could still have another lottery with some rank-dominated deterministic assignments in its support. If each deterministic assignment in any decomposition of a random assignment is rank efficient, we call it a <i>robust ex-post rank efficient</i> assignment. We demonstrate that rank-minimizing implies rank efficiency, which indicates (robust) ex-post rank efficiency. Moreover, we introduce a mechanism that provides an ex-post rank efficient random assignment. We also prove that ex-post rank efficiency is incompatible with strategyproofness or fairness in the sense of weak envy-freeness and equal division lower bound.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142707963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：604180095
Book学术官方微信