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Journal of Public Economic Theory最新文献

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Do International Environmental Agreements Affect Tax and Environmental Competition Between Developed and Developing Countries? 国际环境协定会影响发达国家和发展中国家之间的税收和环境竞争吗？
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-02-06 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70103
Thierry Madiès, Ornella Tarola, Emmanuelle Taugourdeau
{"title":"Do International Environmental Agreements Affect Tax and Environmental Competition Between Developed and Developing Countries?","authors":"Thierry Madiès,&nbsp;Ornella Tarola,&nbsp;Emmanuelle Taugourdeau","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70103","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The aim of this paper is to examine how the \"Common but Differentiated Responsibility\" (CBDR) principle embedded in international climate agreements influences the intensity of corporate tax competition between a developed and a developing country. In contrast to the standard (asymmetric) tax competition literature, our model shows that the interplay between corporate taxes and environmental regulations do not necessarily lead to a higher equilibrium corporate tax in the developed country compared to the developing country. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the developing country does not necessarily become a pollution haven. This finding nuances the argument put forward by developed countries to shrink their climate responsibility that developing countries are pollution havens.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147268918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Contests With Delegation 与委托竞争
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-02-01 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70091
Francesco Trevisan
{"title":"Contests With Delegation","authors":"Francesco Trevisan","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70091","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper studies winner-takes-all Tullock contests between two groups, each formed by a principal and a delegate. Principals allocate the monetary prize within their group, while delegates exert effort to win it. In equilibrium, the more productive delegate receives a smaller prize share while enjoying a higher expected payoff. Nevertheless, delegates' expected payoffs do not monotonically increase with their productivity. As productivity differences get wide enough, delegates' expected payoffs decline and tend to zero. Finally, a more balanced competition raises both delegates' efforts and prize shares, ultimately benefiting delegates' utilitarian welfare.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146139306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Emission and Performance Standards in a Duopoly With Differentiated Goods 具有差异化产品的双头垄断的排放和性能标准
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-01-20 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70102
Adriana Gama, Mario Lechuga-Calderón
{"title":"Emission and Performance Standards in a Duopoly With Differentiated Goods","authors":"Adriana Gama,&nbsp;Mario Lechuga-Calderón","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70102","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We consider a polluting duopoly that sells differentiated goods and is subject to environmental regulation, by means of an emission or a performance standard. The firms simultaneously choose prices and investment in R&amp;D—to improve their abatement technology—and we show that the performance standard leads to lower prices and per-firm profits, but higher R&amp;D, consumer surplus and social welfare when the goods are substitutes. If the goods are complements, such rankings may be reversed, except for the welfare comparison. We also provide a full comparative statics analysis of the equilibria under both instruments with respect to the stringency of the regulation and the degree of product differentiation. Finally, we show that the entry of firms reduces social welfare and eventually reverses its comparison.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146083349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Governance, Productivity and Economic Development 治理、生产力和经济发展
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-01-13 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70099
Cuong Le Van, Ngoc-Sang Pham, Thi Kim Cuong Pham, Binh Tran-Nam
{"title":"Governance, Productivity and Economic Development","authors":"Cuong Le Van,&nbsp;Ngoc-Sang Pham,&nbsp;Thi Kim Cuong Pham,&nbsp;Binh Tran-Nam","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70099","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper explores the interplay between transfer policies, R&amp;D, corruption, and economic development using a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and a government. The government collects taxes, redistributes fiscal revenues, and undertakes public investment (in R&amp;D, infrastructure, etc.). Corruption is modeled as a fraction of tax revenues that is siphoned off and removed from the economy. We first establish the existence of a political-economic equilibrium. Then, using an analytically tractable framework with two private agents, we examine the effects of corruption and evaluate the impact of various policies, including redistribution and innovation-led strategies.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146027594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Motivation in All-Pay Contests 全薪酬竞赛中的动机
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-01-08 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70100
Yung-Shiang Jasmine Yang
{"title":"Motivation in All-Pay Contests","authors":"Yung-Shiang Jasmine Yang","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70100","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies how agents with monetary and non-monetary motivation interact strategically in competitions. Examining the question under an all-pay contest framework, we show that there do not exist pure-strategy equilibria when the competing agents share the same motivation. When agents with different motivation compete against each other, we determine the conditions for the existence of pure-strategy equilibria and fully characterize the mixed-strategy equilibria. The results help explain situations where prizes are ineffective in eliciting higher efforts in contests. They show that the discouragement effect is prevalent when competing agents harbor different motivation and illustrate how reputation and money can be complementary goods.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70100","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145964007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Nonemptiness of the Alpha-Core 核心的非空性
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-01-08 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70097
V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha, Nicholas C. Yannelis
{"title":"Nonemptiness of the Alpha-Core","authors":"V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha,&nbsp;Nicholas C. Yannelis","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70097","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We prove nonemptiness of the <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>α</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $alpha $</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>-core for balanced games with nonordered preferences, extending and generalizing in several aspects the results of Scarf (1971), Border (1984), Florenzano (1989), Yannelis (1991b), and Kajii (1992). In particular, we answer an open question in Kajii (1992) regarding the applicability of the nonemptiness results to models with infinite-dimensional strategy spaces. We provide two models with Knightian and voting preferences for which the results of Scarf (1971) and Kajii (1992) cannot be applied, while our nonemptiness result applies.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70097","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145986935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Managing Predator–Prey Fisheries With Prey Refuges 利用猎物保护区管理捕食者-猎物渔业
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-01-08 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70098
Guillaume Bataille
{"title":"Managing Predator–Prey Fisheries With Prey Refuges","authors":"Guillaume Bataille","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70098","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Many natural and artificial marine habitats provide refuge for prey species by reducing predation pressure. While such refuges are primarily intended to support biodiversity, their economic implications remain insufficiently understood. This paper develops a tractable two-species predator–prey model with specialized, strategic harvesting to assess how prey refuges shape the efficiency and sustainability of multispecies fisheries. Prey refuges lower effective fishing pressure on both species. Beyond increasing gains in the prey fishery by mitigating natural predation, they may also generate spillover gains for the predator industry through greater prey availability outside the refuge. The analysis characterizes conditions under which a welfare-maximizing regulator would implement an artificial refuge to manage predation intensity. Since a refuge provides benefits only through population dynamics, the discount rate is an important determinant of the model. Even when human predation is controlled through optimal harvesting quotas, artificial refuges remain an effective instrument for managing natural predation. Finally, I use data from predator–prey interactions in Lake Victoria fisheries to support the theoretical findings.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145963993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Effort Provision in Peer Groups 同伴小组中的努力提供
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-01-06 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70095
Isabel Melguizo, Sergio Tovar
{"title":"Effort Provision in Peer Groups","authors":"Isabel Melguizo,&nbsp;Sergio Tovar","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70095","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We study a model in which individuals, who are heterogeneous along a single dimension capturing productivity, choose which of two available groups to join and how much costly effort to exert within their chosen group. On the one hand, individuals like to be in groups where others' average performance is high (global quality). On the other hand, individuals are concerned with their ranking with respect to their peers' average performance (local standing). Nash equilibrium efforts are such that the higher the individual's productivity the higher her private outcome. In contrast, it is not necessarily the case that highly productive individuals exert more effort. When social welfare is measured as the sum of individual utilities, Nash equilibrium efforts are never efficient and whether they are higher or lower than efficient efforts depends on the strength of global quality versus local standing concerns. Moreover, stable partitions of society into groups may either resemble grouping by productivity or productivity mixing. In contrast, efficient partitions must always exhibit grouping by productivity.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145909177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Progressive Taxation and Long-Run Income Inequality Under Endogenous Growth 内生增长下的累进税与长期收入不平等
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-12-23 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70094
Juin-Jen Chang, Jang-Ting Guo, Wei-Neng Wang
{"title":"Progressive Taxation and Long-Run Income Inequality Under Endogenous Growth","authors":"Juin-Jen Chang,&nbsp;Jang-Ting Guo,&nbsp;Wei-Neng Wang","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70094","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70094","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In accordance with strong empirical evidence that casts doubt on the conventional Cobb-Douglas technological specification, this paper examines the long-run macroeconomic effects of progressive income taxation in a one-sector endogenous growth model with heterogeneous households and a non-unitary elasticity of substitution between productive capital and labor inputs. In a simplified two-type version of the baseline macroeconomy, we analytically show that higher fiscal progression leads to less unequal long-run gross/net income distributions, provided the general-equilibrium elasticity of aggregate labor supply surpasses a specific negative threshold. This inequality-growth relationship is found to hold for all variants of our model under consideration. Numerical simulations find that under either productivity-enhancing or utility-generating public expenditures, together with the elasticity of substitution in intertemporal-consumption/production taking on the highest/lowest possible value regarded as empirically plausible, our fully-calibrated model to OECD data with five types/quintiles is able to generate qualitatively as well as quantitatively realistic long-run disposable-income inequality effects of changing the tax progressivity <i>vis-à-vis</i> recent panel estimation results. We also numerically study how more progressive taxation affects the economy's long-run social welfare and output growth rate with useless or useful government spending.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145887257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic Considerations of Critical Mineral Depletion and Recycling Under Markovian Competition 马尔可夫竞争下矿产临界枯竭与回收的战略思考
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-12-20 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70090
Weihua Ruan, Benteng Zou
{"title":"Strategic Considerations of Critical Mineral Depletion and Recycling Under Markovian Competition","authors":"Weihua Ruan,&nbsp;Benteng Zou","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70090","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Understanding the supply and recycling of critical minerals is crucial for advancing clean technologies and mitigating resource depletion. The strategic decisions of exporting and importing countries regarding critical minerals are modeled as a differential game. The Markovian subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game is characterized by a system of nonlinear partial differential Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations. Mathematical and numerical analysis reveal existence of multiple subgame perfect Nash equilibria. The main finding of this analysis is that the market can rely on virgin resources, recyclable reserves (provided recycling technology is available), or a combination of both. However, it is also possible that a monopoly may halt supply before exhausting its reserves if exploitation costs are prohibitively high and/or if the recyclable resources are near depletion. This situation accelerates the monopoly's return to a monopoly position.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145848150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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