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Stable and efficient networks with neighborhood-influenced externalities 受邻里外部因素影响的稳定高效网络
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-05-26 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12699
Ping Sun, Elena Parilina
{"title":"Stable and efficient networks with neighborhood-influenced externalities","authors":"Ping Sun,&nbsp;Elena Parilina","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12699","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12699","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper analyzes the incentives of individuals to add or sever links that imply the formation of stable and efficient networks when a society is partitioned into groups. In terms of group partitioning, we determine cost topology by arranging a model in which a pair of players pays equally for the link connecting them and in which such a cost depends on the neighborhood composition of the pair when they belong to different groups. To be more precise, the cost of a link between players can be reduced if at least one of these players has neighbors from the group the other player belongs to. We examine specific network structures (i.e., minimal networks, minimally connected networks, complete networks, majority complete networks, and complete bipartite networks) when they are stable and efficient. Our analysis demonstrates how players' distribution among groups modifies the conditions of stability and efficiency. More significantly, we identify some fascinating phenomena which sharply contrast with most literature dealing with stable and efficient networks: (i) the nonminimal network can be stable in the absence of a benefit decay through the path; (ii) a player may prefer to link with players in other groups with a higher average link cost abandoning connection with the partners from her own group; (iii) it is impossible to ensure that the complete network will be efficient for partition with certain characteristics irrespective of the decay factor and the value of costs. The numerical examples are provided to illustrate our theoretical findings.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141156521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Social security, bequests, and social comparisons 社会保障、遗赠和社会比较
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-05-26 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12698
Kirill Borissov, Andrei Kalk
{"title":"Social security, bequests, and social comparisons","authors":"Kirill Borissov,&nbsp;Andrei Kalk","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12698","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12698","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the long-run impact of unfunded social security on capital stock and wealth inequality in an overlapping generations (OLG) model where newborn individuals differ in their inheritance. In our model, individuals' decisions are subject to social comparisons, which can lead to overspending on personal consumption and result in zero bequests left within poor families. In this scenario, unfunded social security increases long-run wealth inequality by redistributing wealth from poor to rich families, who always leave bequests. However, it increases long-run capital stock, too. We also show that when none or all of the families leave bequests in the long run, our model predicts negative and neutral effects of social security on capital accumulation, in line with the standard OLG models of Diamond and Barro. Thus, our results emphasize the need to account for heterogeneity in bequest behavior in the analysis of social security.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141156501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Second-best socially optimal R&D under output spillovers 产出溢出效应下的次优社会最优研发
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-05-21 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12691
Yassine Badra, Damien Gaumont, Christine Halmenschlager
{"title":"Second-best socially optimal R&D under output spillovers","authors":"Yassine Badra,&nbsp;Damien Gaumont,&nbsp;Christine Halmenschlager","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12691","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12691","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using the standard two-stage game of process R&amp;D and Cournot competition with R&amp;D output spillovers, this paper provides a thorough second-best welfare analysis. The planner's solution is compared with the standard noncooperative scenario, the R&amp;D cartel, the cartelized research joint venture, and the social research joint venture solution in terms of propensities for R&amp;D as well as welfare levels. The main result is that, when spillovers are not too high, a cartelized joint venture unexpectedly outperforms the planner's solution in terms of propensities for R&amp;D and resulting welfare level, though it is the only market scenario to do so. We also assess the performance of a social joint venture, relative to all the well-known scenarios for the organization of R&amp;D. Finally, we observe that the gap between market outcomes and planner's solutions, in terms of welfare levels, increases as R&amp;D becomes less appropriable.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141073744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Comparing ad valorem and specific taxes with corporate social responsibility 从价税和从量税与企业社会责任的比较
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-05-08 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12690
Po-Yuan Hsiao, K. L. Glen Ueng, Cheng-Hau Peng, Horn-In Kuo
{"title":"Comparing ad valorem and specific taxes with corporate social responsibility","authors":"Po-Yuan Hsiao,&nbsp;K. L. Glen Ueng,&nbsp;Cheng-Hau Peng,&nbsp;Horn-In Kuo","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12690","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12690","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines the welfare ranking of indirect tax systems with corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a duopoly. Findings show that the two firms' cost and CSR asymmetries both play important roles. If the cost-efficient firm has a higher CSR level, the standard result in traditional tax theory is sustainable. Namely, ad valorem tax (specific subsidy) policies are considered superior to specific tax (ad valorem subsidy) policies. However, if the cost-inefficient firm has a significantly higher CSR level, the standard result is reversed. This result remains robust in an oligopoly model or under a tax revenue constraint.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140895314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Public infrastructure provision in the presence of terms-of-trade effects and tax competition 在存在贸易条件效应和税收竞争的情况下提供公共基础设施
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-05-07 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12689
Karl J. Zimmermann
{"title":"Public infrastructure provision in the presence of terms-of-trade effects and tax competition","authors":"Karl J. Zimmermann","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12689","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12689","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper analyses and compares the performance of resource taxes and capital taxes in financing public goods while considering the positive effects of public expenditure on firm productivity. It is motivated by Franks et al. (2017), who argue that the advantage of the resource tax consists in its potential to reap foreign resource rents. I employ an analytical general equilibrium framework of <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>n</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $n$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> identical resource-poor countries, where local firms use internationally mobile capital and a net imported resource in production as well as local public infrastructure. The latter is financed solely by either taxing the input of the resource or capital. The choice of the policy instrument is exogenous to policy makers and symmetric across countries. I find that expenditure on infrastructure renders the impact of fiscal policy on the terms of trade ambiguous under resource taxation and negative under capital taxation. Moreover, public expenditure weakens the outflow of factors moderating the deficit of public spending caused by tax competition. This holds for both policy scenarios. Considering both effects simultaneously, resource taxation cannot generally be identified as the policy to provide higher provision or efficiency. A numerical exercise shows cases for higher provision of either policy.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140881147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Endogenous subsidies for cleaner products: The role of ecofriendly consumers 清洁产品的内生补贴：生态友好型消费者的作用
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-04-24 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12688
Ornella Tarola, Cecilia Vergari
{"title":"Endogenous subsidies for cleaner products: The role of ecofriendly consumers","authors":"Ornella Tarola,&nbsp;Cecilia Vergari","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12688","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12688","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a vertically differentiated duopoly, we assume that environmental subsidies are endogenously determined by the demand for dirtier goods and the relative greenness of cleaner alternatives. By contemplating the possibility that a subsidy targets either consumers or firms, we study how the impact of a subsidy changes with its recipients, consumers versus firms. A consumer-based subsidy is environmentally enhancing and increases firms' profits at equilibrium, while it hurts consumers. Overall, however, it is welfare improving. A firm-based subsidy makes firms better off but may be environmentally harmful and has the paradoxical effect of hurting consumers buying the cleaner variant. Moreover, it is welfare detrimental on the whole.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140641987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Should product-specific advertisement be regulated in pharmaceutical markets? 应否对药品市场的特定产品广告进行监管？
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12687
Junichiro Ishida, Tsuyoshi Takahara
{"title":"Should product-specific advertisement be regulated in pharmaceutical markets?","authors":"Junichiro Ishida,&nbsp;Tsuyoshi Takahara","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12687","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12687","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines the optimal content regulation of direct-to-consumer advertisement (DTCA) by comparing two forms of DTCA—product-specific and category-specific—and identifies a key tradeoff which underlies this policy debate. Our analysis suggests that the optimal form of DTCA depends crucially on the cost effectiveness of DTCA and the market-size distortion induced by DTCA. When the cost of advertisement is high, there often exists a Pareto-improving policy choice: category-specific DTCA is preferred when the market-size distortion is more severe while produce DTCA is preferred when it is less so. As the cost decreases, however, a conflict emerges between pharmaceutical firms and patients: firms are worse off under product-specific DTCA while patients are better off. We also find that the physician's reluctance to persuade misinformed patients can actually alleviate the market-size distortion and hence be welfare-enhancing.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140333097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Positional and conformist effects in voluntary public good provision 志愿公益服务中的立场效应和顺应效应
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-03-17 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12685
Francisco Cabo, Alain Jean-Marie, Mabel Tidball
{"title":"Positional and conformist effects in voluntary public good provision","authors":"Francisco Cabo,&nbsp;Alain Jean-Marie,&nbsp;Mabel Tidball","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12685","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12685","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The literature featuring game–theoretical models aimed at explaining the effect of the status concerns on the voluntary provision of a public good is generally focused on snob agents, driven by a desire for exclusiveness. However, the social context literature highlights that status concerns can give rise to a desire, in some individuals to be different from the “common herd,” and in some others to conform with other people. We analyze a two-player public good game under two different settings: The standard case with two positional players (PP<span>s</span>), versus the case in which the positional player faces a conformist player (PC). Giving entrance to conformism has two main implications. Strong status concerns by both players can lead to a virtuous cycle in which the conformist player wishes to imitate the contributing behavior of the positional player, and the latter wishes to increase contribution to distinguish herself from the former. Then, the contribution to the public good can be higher than in the case with only snob agents. This higher contribution can increase social welfare, but only if endowments are not too large and the status concern of the positional player is not excessively high.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12685","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140145518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Endogenous property rights, credit market, and economic development 内生产权、信贷市场和经济发展
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-03-17 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12686
Niloy Bose, Richard Cothren, Nazanin Sedaghatkish
{"title":"Endogenous property rights, credit market, and economic development","authors":"Niloy Bose,&nbsp;Richard Cothren,&nbsp;Nazanin Sedaghatkish","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12686","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12686","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Empirical evidence suggests that credit markets can catalyze property rights reforms. We illustrate this in a theoretical framework where a borrower must expend costly effort to protect output from predation. We consider two possible equilibrium loan contracts. In the first, lenders leave the decision to protect output to borrowers. In the second, lenders set the standard of property protection as a precondition for lending. The second contracting regime results in a higher level of property rights enforcement. Significantly, the level of economic development determines the equilibrium contracting form and vice versa. Based on this analysis, we jointly determine the evolution of property rights and economic development. The analysis also sheds light on the environments that lead an economy to a low development trap with a poor quality of property rights institutions.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140145517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition with unemployment 有失业的财政竞争模型中的纳什均衡
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-03-13 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12684
Yuya Kikuchi, Toshiki Tamai
{"title":"Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition with unemployment","authors":"Yuya Kikuchi,&nbsp;Toshiki Tamai","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12684","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12684","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines two different fiscal competition games under labor market imperfections. Given that capital moves across regions and affects regional employment, governments must choose the expenditure level and tax rate on such mobile capital by accounting for the effects of fiscal variables on both capital and labor. Therefore, governments may play these games with either the tax rates on mobile capital or with public expenditures. The presence/absence of absentee ownership of capital and employment externalities are significant factors that characterize two distinct Nash equilibria, one that occurs with tax competition and the other with expenditure competition. Contrary to the existing literature, tax rates under tax competition are likely to be lower than those under expenditure competition owing to employment externalities. In some cases, governments prefer to choose government expenditure as their strategic variable rather than the tax rate. The presence of employment externalities motivates governments to use such expenditure as the variable through which it may strengthen strategic effects.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140114352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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