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Criminal network, leniency, and market externalities 犯罪网络、宽大处理和市场外部性
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-08-08 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12709
Giovanni Immordino, Salvatore Piccolo, Paolo Roberti
{"title":"Criminal network, leniency, and market externalities","authors":"Giovanni Immordino,&nbsp;Salvatore Piccolo,&nbsp;Paolo Roberti","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12709","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12709","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze the self-reporting incentives fostered by a leniency program within a criminal network formed by a supplier of an illegal good and his dealers who compete against each other in the product market. We show that when it is viable, a first-informant rule always performs better than an all-informant rule—that is, it induces a lower level of crime. Nevertheless, the viability of a first-informant rule may be compromised if the baseline probability of conviction is sufficiently low, thereby placing disproportionate reliance on leniency over other investigative efforts for securing convictions.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141936006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The complementary role of distributive and criminal equity 分配公平与刑事公平的互补作用
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-07-25 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12708
Massimo D'Antoni, Avraham D. Tabbach
{"title":"The complementary role of distributive and criminal equity","authors":"Massimo D'Antoni,&nbsp;Avraham D. Tabbach","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12708","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12708","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We conduct a theoretical analysis to explore how the distribution of wealth in society impacts the social costs of crime and law enforcement. We show that a reduction in inequality reduces these costs when enforcement and nonmonetary punishment are equitable, that is, they do not discriminate among offenders based on their wealth. However, when enforcement or nonmonetary punishment is discriminatory, a reduction in inequality may increase the social costs of crime and law enforcement, in particular when it occurs among poorer individuals. Thus, there is a complementarity between equity in criminal justice and distributional equity.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12708","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141773471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Politics and income taxes: Progress and progressivity 政治与所得税：进步与累进
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-07-22 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12704
Marcus Berliant, Pierre C. Boyer
{"title":"Politics and income taxes: Progress and progressivity","authors":"Marcus Berliant,&nbsp;Pierre C. Boyer","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12704","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12704","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper begins with a survey of the literature on the political economy approaches to labor income taxation. We focus on recent progress made by examining in detail the specific properties of nonlinear taxes derived in the context of voting. Next, we present new results on the existence of a majority voting equilibrium that unifies work in the standard framework. Finally, we discuss how recent theoretical results help us uncover empirical patterns from the last 50 years in the US tax system, namely, a sharp decrease in top marginal tax rates, the rise of the Earned Income Tax Credit, and increased progressivity in the middle of the income distribution.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141773470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the (robust) ex post stability of constitutions 论宪法的（稳健）事后稳定性
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-07-15 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12707
Daeyoung Jeong, Semin Kim
{"title":"On the (robust) ex post stability of constitutions","authors":"Daeyoung Jeong,&nbsp;Semin Kim","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12707","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12707","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper explores the concept of ex post stability in voting systems, shifting the focus from the traditional ex ante perspective, where preferences are uncertain, to a setting where agents' preferences are fully known. We offer a comprehensive characterization of ex post stable constitutions within deterministic voting rule environments. We bridge the theoretical gap between ex post and ex ante stability, shedding light on their intricate relationship and implications for the design and evolution of voting systems. Additionally, our research further evaluates the resilience of these constitutions to changes in the voting environment, particularly their flexibility in response to varying alternative rule sets. This study not only contributes to a deeper understanding of constitutional stability but also provides insights into the dynamics of collective decision-making processes.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12707","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141624296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Efficiency and equity: A general equilibrium analysis of rent-seeking 效率与公平：寻租的一般均衡分析
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-07-15 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12706
Ben J. Heijdra, Pim Heijnen
{"title":"Efficiency and equity: A general equilibrium analysis of rent-seeking","authors":"Ben J. Heijdra,&nbsp;Pim Heijnen","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12706","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12706","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the rent-seeking phenomenon using a simple, static general equilibrium model. The economy consists of two sectors, both employing a constant returns-to-scale technology with labor as its sole input. One of the sectors is a monopoly, where a continuum of agents compete for a share of monopoly profits (i.e. rent). Agents are heterogeneous in labor productivity and rent-seeking ability: they face a choice between engaging in (productive) work or vying for a share of the rent (i.e., a contest against other rent-seekers). At the aggregate level, rent-seeking reduces the available amount of labor in the economy and thereby lowers output and welfare (rent-seeking is inefficient). At the individual level, rent-seeking shifts income towards rent-seekers. Consequently, an economy with few rent-seekers tends to have high income inequality: an effect that is exacerbated by the fact that rent is decreasing in the number of rent-seekers (low levels of rent-seeking increase inequity). This tradeoff between efficiency and equity is the primary focus of this paper. We investigate how the distribution of rent-seeking ability and the correlation between labor productivity and rent-seeking ability shape this tradeoff.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12706","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141624529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Presenting objects for random allocation 展示随机分配的对象
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-07-12 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12705
Peng Liu, Sijia Xu
{"title":"Presenting objects for random allocation","authors":"Peng Liu,&nbsp;Sijia Xu","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12705","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12705","url":null,"abstract":"<p>For random allocation, whether a desirable rule exists or not hinges on the domain of agents' preferences, whose formation is affected by how objects are presented. We hence propose a model studying how to present objects so that the induced preference domain allows for designing a good rule. Motivated by practices in reality, we model the objects as combinations of several attribute values and a presentation of objects concerns a choice of presenting attributes and a ranking of them. Agents are assumed to formulate their preferences in a lexicographic manner according to the given presentation. We show that the domain of preferences induced by a presentation allows for a strategy-proof, efficient, and envy-free rule if and only if the presented attributes are conditionally binary.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141613646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Weak redistribution and certainty equivalent domination 弱再分配和确定性等价支配
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-06-17 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12703
Stéphane Gauthier, Guy Laroque
{"title":"Weak redistribution and certainty equivalent domination","authors":"Stéphane Gauthier,&nbsp;Guy Laroque","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12703","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12703","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We assess optimal deterministic nonlinear income taxation in a Mirrlees economy with a continuum of risk-averse agents whose utilities are quasilinear in labor. A weak redistribution motive makes random taxes more likely socially dominated by the deterministic policy where after-tax income lotteries are replaced with their certainty equivalents.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141424992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Naïve learning as a coordination device in social networks 将幼稚学习作为社交网络中的协调工具
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-06-12 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12700
Wenhao Cheng
{"title":"Naïve learning as a coordination device in social networks","authors":"Wenhao Cheng","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12700","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12700","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I propose a framework describing how naïve learning in networks may determine coordination outcomes of product adoption. Individuals receive initial signals regarding the value of the product, communicate afterwards, and make adoption decisions based on that. In the framework of DeGroot's Naïve Learning, the model suggests that as beliefs converge, the result will converge to a unique cutoff equilibrium, similar to a global game. I then describe how adoption rates and social welfare depend on network structures by showing that the variance of the unit eigenvector centrality of the listening matrix, which represents inequality in network positions, is a sufficient statistic for adoption in equilibrium. More adoption is expected with high inequality in network positions if the value of the product to be adopted is low, and vice versa. The relationship between social welfare and inequality in network positions aligns with that of adoption and inequality in network positions, except in cases of very low product value, where increased adoption may reduce overall social welfare.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12700","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141308905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Long-term care and myopia: Optimal linear subsidies for private insurance 长期护理与近视：私人保险的最佳线性补贴
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-06-10 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12702
Rosita Jasaityte, Justina Klimaviciute
{"title":"Long-term care and myopia: Optimal linear subsidies for private insurance","authors":"Rosita Jasaityte,&nbsp;Justina Klimaviciute","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12702","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12702","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies optimal linear policy directed at private long-term care insurance in the context where individuals are myopic, that is, underestimate their dependency risk. Without government intervention, myopic individuals underinsure, while the first-best optimum requires full insurance. To decentralize the first-best, one needs personalized linear subsidies on private insurance premiums combined with personalized lump-sum taxes to finance these subsidies and redistribute resources among individuals. In the second-best setting where only uniform instruments can be used, the determination of the optimal insurance subsidy rate includes three main considerations: standard efficiency concern, correction for myopia, and redistributive concerns. While the correction for myopia pushes for a higher subsidy rate, the analysis of the redistributive concerns is far less straightforward. Overall, the redistributive concerns depend on three main factors: whether wealthier individuals are less myopic, how the probability of dependency varies with wealth and what is the type of absolute risk aversion exhibited by individual preferences.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141298553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Welfare reducing vertical integration in a bilateral monopoly under Nash bargaining 纳什讨价还价下双边垄断中减少福利的纵向一体化
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-05-30 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12701
Arijit Mukherjee, Uday Bhanu Sinha
{"title":"Welfare reducing vertical integration in a bilateral monopoly under Nash bargaining","authors":"Arijit Mukherjee,&nbsp;Uday Bhanu Sinha","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12701","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12701","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider a bilateral monopoly where a linear input price is determined by Nash bargaining. We show, with an increasing marginal cost of input production, that vertical integration reduces consumer surplus and welfare compared with bilateral monopoly if the bargaining power of the input supplier is low. This result is important for competition policies as it questions the common wisdom suggesting vertical integration increases welfare by eliminating the problem of double marginalization. Overproduction under bilateral monopoly compared with vertical integration is the reason for our result. Interestingly, consumer surplus and welfare can be higher under a linear input price compared with a two-part tariff input price.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12701","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141182128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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