Journal of Public Economic Theory最新文献

{"title":"On the Role of the Congestion Technology in Tax Competition With Unemployment","authors":"Johannes Pauser","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70125","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The present study examines the role of the congestion technology in a tax competition framework with productive government spending and unemployment. Considering two well-known specifications of congestion, the congestion technology can be shown to be crucial for the analysis of efficiency in both public provision and private utilization levels of a congestible public input in the decentralized equilibrium: Under the common specification of decreasing marginal congestion, efficiency in the non-cooperative equilibrium with capital and lump-sum taxation depends solely on the magnitude of the production and congestion elasticities. By contrast, factor prices, such as the level of wage rigidity and corresponding employment levels are, in addition, important in determining whether both provision and utilization levels of the public input are efficient in the case of increasing marginal congestion. Numerical analysis is employed to supplement the results of the theoretical and graphical analysis and to further compare the social optimum to the decentralized equilibria.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70125","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148467033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"FDI Versus R&D in an Endogenous Growth Model","authors":"Thanh Tam Nguyen-Huu,&nbsp;Ngoc-Sang Pham","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70126","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We investigate the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) and research and development (R&amp;D) in the transitional dynamics of host countries using an optimal growth model. FDI may benefit the host country's GNP by enabling multinational enterprises to hire local workers. However, if the host country focuses solely on FDI, it may fall into a middle-income trap. Most importantly, we show that if the host country invests in R&amp;D, its economy can reach sustained growth. In this case, FDI benefits the host country, but only in the early stages of its development process.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148466751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"On Aubin's Veto Mechanism: A Survey","authors":"Carlos Hervés-Beloso,&nbsp;Javier Hervés-Estévez,&nbsp;Adán Salas-Gutiérrez","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70127","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We revisit Aubin's veto mechanism—known as the fuzzy veto—in which agents may participate in a blocking coalition with only a fraction of their endowments, and show that its Core-Walras equivalence stems directly from the classical Debreu-Scarf and Aumann theorems. We first demonstrate that the Aubin core coincides with the set of Edgeworth allocations and, hence, with the set of Walrasian allocations. By modeling any <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>n</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $n$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>-agent economy as a continuum economy with <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>n</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $n$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> types of agents, we prove that Aubin's result is a particular instance of Aumann's Core-Walras equivalence for atomless economies. We then incorporate the contributions of Schmeidler, Grodal, and Vind and translate them into Aubin coalitions in finite economies, showing that the grand coalition in which each agent contributes almost all of her endowments, suffices to eliminate every non-Walrasian allocation. We also prove, in the case when the number of agents <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>n</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $n$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> greatly exceeds the number of commodities <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>m</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $m$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>, that coalitions involving few agents (at most <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mn>2</mn>\u0000 \u0000 <mi>m</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $2m$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>), characterize the Aubin core. Finally, we characterize Walrasian allocations as precisely those that are robustly efficient. This analysis unifies several critical strands of the core literature and clarifies the foundational role and interpretation of Aubin's mechanism in general equilibrium theory.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70127","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148394992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Harmonic Cost Sharing","authors":"Daniel Heyen,&nbsp;Matthew McGinty","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70123","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines the total cost of public good provision when contributors face heterogeneous quadratic cost functions. We demonstrate that while the total cost of equal provision depends only on the arithmetic mean of marginal cost slopes, the total cost of cost-effective provision depends on their harmonic mean. This relationship reveals that greater heterogeneity monotonically increases the cost savings from cost-effective instead of equal provision. We propose a zero-sum transfer system that implements cost-effective levels while achieving equal cost sharing. Our framework offers a practical method to operationalize principles like Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) in international environmental agreements, resolving the tension between cost-effectiveness and equity concerns.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70123","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148324711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Theory of Social Impact Bonds","authors":"Daniel L. Tortorice,&nbsp;David E. Bloom,&nbsp;Paige Kirby,&nbsp;John Regan","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70122","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Social impact bonds (SIBs) are a new financing mechanism for public goods. In a SIB, an investor provides capital to a service provider for a social intervention. The investor receives a return from the government based on the outcome of the intervention relative to a predetermined benchmark. We describe the basic structure of an SIB and provide some descriptive statistics for these financial instruments including data on performance when available. We then consider a formal model of SIBs and examine their ability to finance positive net present value projects that traditional debt finance cannot. We find that SIBs expand the set of implementable projects if governments are pessimistic (relative to the investor) about the probability an intervention would succeed or if, due to political risks, the government is particularly averse to states of the world where social projects provide no financial benefits. As various public programs include both these features, we conclude that SIBs should be considered for projects when traditional debt finance has been rejected.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148324283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Split the Budget Surplus: Towards a Second Best Mechanism for a Discrete Public Good Under Private Information","authors":"Licun Xue","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70121","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose and study the following mechanism: Agents simultaneously make contributions. If the total contribution is below the cost, contributions are refunded; otherwise the public good is provided and budget surplus, if there is any, is shared equally among the agents. Our mechanism mitigates the incentive to under-contribute in the well-studied “subscription mechanism” where budget surplus is retained by the mechanism designer. We identify conditions under which our mechanism achieves the maximal total expected gain among all Bayesian mechanisms that are incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget-balanced.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70121","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148282011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Presumption of Patent Validity and Litigation Incentives","authors":"Alice Guerra,&nbsp;Tapas Kundu","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70119","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze the effects of the presumption of patent validity on litigation incentives and outcomes. We develop a litigation game between a patent holder and an alleged infringing firm. A court resolves the dispute if there is a trial. We model the court's decision-making as a learning process based on evidence and consider the presumption as a factor influencing the court's prior belief of patent validity. The presumption affects the trial outcome in two ways—directly by biasing the prior, and indirectly by affecting the incentives to invest in evidence-seeking activities. We show that its effect on the likelihood of trial is ambiguous. Moreover, when patent validity is uncertain, the presumption generates a trade-off: it reduces resource dissipation, but increases the probability of judicial errors. With pre-trial settlement, even low-merit patents are profitably asserted, and a stronger presumption raises the settlement payments extracted through credible enforcement threats. Taken together, our results suggest a cautious or limited application of the presumption, especially in environments where patent validity is highly uncertain.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70119","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148281955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Optimal Funded Pension for Consumers With Heterogeneous Self-Control","authors":"Kazuki Kumashiro","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70117","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study designs an optimally funded pension scheme for consumers with self-control problems. The model assumes that consumers' self-control costs are private information and that they can borrow against their future pension benefits. Pension plans are offered to consumers to maximize social welfare, including self-control costs. Results demonstrate that, under certain assumptions, a fully funded pension scheme with benefits equal to the return on contributions is Pareto efficient and satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint. Under this scheme, consumers more likely to feel temptation choose smaller premiums. In implementing this scheme, the government does not even need to know the distribution of types.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148237830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Life Expectancy and Public Debt in an Aging Economy With Social Security","authors":"Mitsuru Ueshina","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70118","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study clarifies the effects of population aging due to rising life expectancy on the ratio of public debt to GDP and economic growth rate using an endogenous growth model with social security. A previous empirical study demonstrates that population aging increases the ratio of public debt to GDP. Population aging can significantly impact national finances through the pay-as-you-go pension system. Therefore, this study demonstrates that population aging increases the ratio of public debt to GDP by introducing a pay-as-you-go pension system into the overlapping generations model. Additionally, we demonstrate that population aging due to rising life expectancies reduces the rate of economic growth under realistic conditions, which is consistent with the empirical results. Furthermore, although an increase in the replacement rate in the pay-as-you-go pension system monotonically reduces the economic growth rate, there is a replacement rate that maximizes social welfare under certain conditions.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148237547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Higher Education Subsidies and the Universal Insurance Against a Short Life","authors":"Gregory Ponthiere","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70120","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines the potential role of higher education subsidies as an insurance device against the risk of having a short life, that is, as a device reducing the variance in lifetime well-being due to unequal longevities. We use a two-period dynamic OLG economy with human capital and risky lifetime to study the impact of a subsidy on higher education (financed by taxing labor earnings at older ages) on the distribution of lifetime well-being between long-lived and short-lived individuals. It is shown that, whereas the subsidy on higher education necessarily improves the lot of short-lived individuals in comparison to the laissez-faire, it is only when the subsidy is higher than a critical threshold that this can reduce inequalities in lifetime well-being between long-lived and short-lived individuals. Whether one adopts the utilitarian or the ex post egalitarian social welfare function, the optimal subsidy on higher education lies above the critical threshold, but is larger under the latter social objective.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70120","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148237553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}