具有外部性的社交互动游戏

IF 1.1 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-03-28 DOI:10.1111/jpet.70021

Subir K. Chakrabarti, Alexander Shapoval, Shlomo Weber

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了一类游戏，在这些游戏中，玩家的收益明显取决于他们的内在偏好，而不是一组可用的选择、社会互动水平和总体社会选择的整体影响。利用潜在函数方法，我们考察了博弈在纯策略中承认纳什均衡的条件，并特别强调了社会互动的作用。然后应用存在性结果来检验引入公共产品和采用新技术的福利后果。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Games of Social Interactions With Externalities

This paper studies a class of games in which players' payoffs explicitly depend on their intrinsic preferences over the set of available alternatives, level of social interaction and the global influence of the aggregate societal choices. Using the potential functions approach, we examine the conditions under which the games admit a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies with a special emphasis on the role of social interactions. The existence results are then applied to examine the welfare consequences of the introduction of common goods and the adoption of new technologies.

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来源期刊

Journal of Public Economic Theory ECONOMICS-

自引率

36.40%

发文量

期刊介绍： As the official journal of the Association of Public Economic Theory, Journal of Public Economic Theory (JPET) is dedicated to stimulating research in the rapidly growing field of public economics. Submissions are judged on the basis of their creativity and rigor, and the Journal imposes neither upper nor lower boundary on the complexity of the techniques employed. This journal focuses on such topics as public goods, local public goods, club economies, externalities, taxation, growth, public choice, social and public decision making, voting, market failure, regulation, project evaluation, equity, and political systems.