{"title":"地方公共物品经济中的CvdN均衡与份额均衡","authors":"Nathan W. Chan, Anne van den Nouweland","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70030","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>CvdN equilibrium and share equilibrium are both extensions of the cost-shares-based ratio equilibrium for global public good economies to local public good economies. CvdN equilibrium and share equilibrium differ in terms of the stability requirements for equilibrium jurisdictions. While share equilibrium keeps agents' relative cost shares fixed across jurisdictions and allows each agent to consider unilateral moves to alternative jurisdictions, CvdN equilibrium employs the use of share functions that allow for equilibrium adjustments of relative shares in each jurisdiction and requires the agreement of all agents in alternative jurisdictions. Despite these differences, we demonstrate that CvdN equilibrium extends share equilibrium: every arrangement of an economy that is supported in share equilibrium is also a CvdN equilibrium. However, the reverse is not true and CvdN equilibrium may exist when share equilibrium does not. Thus, CvdN equilibrium provides predictions in more economies and does not contradict share equilibrium when it exists.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2025-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70030","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"CvdN Equilibrium and Share Equilibrium in Local Public Good Economies\",\"authors\":\"Nathan W. Chan, Anne van den Nouweland\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/jpet.70030\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>CvdN equilibrium and share equilibrium are both extensions of the cost-shares-based ratio equilibrium for global public good economies to local public good economies. CvdN equilibrium and share equilibrium differ in terms of the stability requirements for equilibrium jurisdictions. While share equilibrium keeps agents' relative cost shares fixed across jurisdictions and allows each agent to consider unilateral moves to alternative jurisdictions, CvdN equilibrium employs the use of share functions that allow for equilibrium adjustments of relative shares in each jurisdiction and requires the agreement of all agents in alternative jurisdictions. Despite these differences, we demonstrate that CvdN equilibrium extends share equilibrium: every arrangement of an economy that is supported in share equilibrium is also a CvdN equilibrium. However, the reverse is not true and CvdN equilibrium may exist when share equilibrium does not. Thus, CvdN equilibrium provides predictions in more economies and does not contradict share equilibrium when it exists.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47024,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Public Economic Theory\",\"volume\":\"27 2\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-04-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.70030\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Public Economic Theory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jpet.70030\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jpet.70030","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
CvdN Equilibrium and Share Equilibrium in Local Public Good Economies
CvdN equilibrium and share equilibrium are both extensions of the cost-shares-based ratio equilibrium for global public good economies to local public good economies. CvdN equilibrium and share equilibrium differ in terms of the stability requirements for equilibrium jurisdictions. While share equilibrium keeps agents' relative cost shares fixed across jurisdictions and allows each agent to consider unilateral moves to alternative jurisdictions, CvdN equilibrium employs the use of share functions that allow for equilibrium adjustments of relative shares in each jurisdiction and requires the agreement of all agents in alternative jurisdictions. Despite these differences, we demonstrate that CvdN equilibrium extends share equilibrium: every arrangement of an economy that is supported in share equilibrium is also a CvdN equilibrium. However, the reverse is not true and CvdN equilibrium may exist when share equilibrium does not. Thus, CvdN equilibrium provides predictions in more economies and does not contradict share equilibrium when it exists.
期刊介绍:
As the official journal of the Association of Public Economic Theory, Journal of Public Economic Theory (JPET) is dedicated to stimulating research in the rapidly growing field of public economics. Submissions are judged on the basis of their creativity and rigor, and the Journal imposes neither upper nor lower boundary on the complexity of the techniques employed. This journal focuses on such topics as public goods, local public goods, club economies, externalities, taxation, growth, public choice, social and public decision making, voting, market failure, regulation, project evaluation, equity, and political systems.