On the Public and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

IF 1.1 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-05-05 DOI:10.1111/jpet.70031

Emma Moreno-García, Ramόn J. Torregrosa

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We extend Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian's (1986) model to a non-cooperative approach where voluntary contributions and taxes coexist to finance public goods. After obtaining the uniqueness of equilibrium, we present different properties of the outcomes, showing the role that the taxes play and the impact on voluntary contributions. We also identify conditions ensuring neutrality. Finally, we present some remarks on welfare and efficiency, pointing out the second-best solution and identifying conditions for efficiency.

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论公共物品的公共性与自愿性提供

我们将Bergstrom， Blume和Varian（1986）的模型扩展到自愿捐款和税收共存的非合作方式，以资助公共产品。在获得均衡的唯一性后，我们给出了结果的不同性质，展示了税收所起的作用和对自愿缴费的影响。我们还确定了确保中立的条件。最后，我们对福利和效率提出了一些看法，指出了次优解决方案，并确定了效率的条件。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Public Economic Theory ECONOMICS-

自引率

36.40%

发文量

期刊介绍： As the official journal of the Association of Public Economic Theory, Journal of Public Economic Theory (JPET) is dedicated to stimulating research in the rapidly growing field of public economics. Submissions are judged on the basis of their creativity and rigor, and the Journal imposes neither upper nor lower boundary on the complexity of the techniques employed. This journal focuses on such topics as public goods, local public goods, club economies, externalities, taxation, growth, public choice, social and public decision making, voting, market failure, regulation, project evaluation, equity, and political systems.