{"title":"Workplace democracy: The argument from the worker–society relation","authors":"Zsolt Kapelner","doi":"10.1111/josp.12559","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12559","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Numerous arguments have been offered for workplace democracy, that is, the idea that employees should have an equal say in governing the firm. Lately, relational arguments, particularly of a republican and relational egalitarian kind, have become prominent. These claim that workers should have a say in how their firm is governed in order to avoid objectionable, for example, dominating or subordinating, relationships within the workplace. While I find these views appealing, I also believe that they are incomplete. By focusing on the moral quality of workers' interpersonal relations within the firm, that is, to bosses and other workers, they ignore the moral quality of workers' relations outside the firm, that is, to the rest of society. Yet, this latter is of no less significance for the justification of workplace democracy. In this article, I argue that part of the reason why workplace democracy should be adopted is that it allows workers to exert appropriate control over the operations of the firm, thus maintaining a grip on the general character of the relation between themselves as workers of the firm and the rest of society. This argument from the <i>worker–society relation</i> is not intended to refute or replace republican and relational egalitarian arguments, but rather to draw attention to a hitherto neglected aspect of the relational value of workplace democracy which the aforementioned approaches usually do not incorporate. In this way, the present argument strengthens the overall relational case for workplace democracy.</p><p>The structure of the article is as follows. First, I introduce the concept of and arguments for workplace democracy, focusing on the most prominent relational arguments, that is, republican and relational egalitarian ones. Second, I introduce the concept of the worker–society relation and discuss its moral significance. Third, I present my argument for workplace democracy based on the worker–society relation. Fourth, I discuss the relationship between the argument from the worker–society relation and republican and relational egalitarian arguments for workplace democracy to show how the former differs from and complements these approaches. The last section concludes.</p><p>Workplace democracy is an arrangement in which all employees of a firm have an equal say in how it is governed, much like in a democratic state where all citizens have an equal say in how the state is governed, except for certain specific groups, such as minors. This broad definition can be further specified in a number of ways. There are many models and institutional designs for workplace democracy but for the purposes of this discussion, I will remain neutral as to which of these is best to implement. I will not discuss whether under workplace democracy employees must exercise their democratic say directly or indirectly through representatives, whether the establishment of workers' councils is required, or whether employee's share in board ","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 2","pages":"167-184"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12559","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139607692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Contributors","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12482","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12482","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 4","pages":"442-443"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143245374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - NASSP Page","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12483","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12483","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 4","pages":"444"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143248928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The libertarian argument for reparations","authors":"Mark R. Reiff","doi":"10.1111/josp.12555","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12555","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The case for reparations for grievous acts of historical injustice has been getting a lot of attention lately, both within and outside academia (e.g., California Reparations Report <span>2023</span>; Coates, <span>2014</span>; Martin & Yaquinto, <span>2007</span>). Those who advance it claim that the injuries inflicted by these acts are ongoing and severe, and the only way that members of the groups that were the focus of these acts can begin to regain the place they would have held within society had these injustices not occurred, or at least be able and willing to move on from them into the future, is to provide current members of these victimized groups reparations for the wrongs committed against their forebearers. In New World societies, talk of reparations has typically focused on two of these historic wrongs. First, the continuing injury inflicted by slavery and the discrimination against Black people that continued in its aftermath. Second, the injury inflicted through the widespread murder and seizure of land by government and government-sanctioned forces from indigenous peoples. In both the New and Old World, however, other groups—for example, religious or ethnic minorities who have been subjected to centuries of persecution—are also sometimes discussed as being entitled to reparations. Whenever reparations are discussed, however, the claim has generally been that these are required for violations of the principle of equality, a principle to which liberal societies have long paid lip service, but which is now (in some quarters, at least) beginning to be taken more seriously.</p><p>But I am going to talk about reparations in a different way. Not because I think that any of the current arguments for reparations for Black and indigenous people or anyone else for that matter do not lead to the conclusions that their proponents say they do. On the contrary, with perhaps a few exceptions, I find these arguments not only valid but also convincing. Accordingly, nothing I will say in this paper should be taken as an argument against any of these existing claims for reparations. But I do want to broaden the current discussion in two ways.</p><p>First, in part I, I am going to set forth what I call a general theory of reparations. In it, I am not only going to talk about reparations as a means of remedying the injuries inflicted by slavery and by the genocide of indigenous peoples, the theft of their land, and the ongoing ripple effects of these historic wrongs. And I am not merely going to add to this a call for reparations for injuries caused by the long-time persecution of the usual religious, ethnic, and other minority populations. I am going to talk about reparations for an even wider variety of historical injustices, including, most importantly, the long-term economic oppression of women, and the historical exploitation of labor.</p><p>Second, in part II, I am going to set forth my argument for reparations, but not one based on the pr","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 4","pages":"643-672"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12555","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139376627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gordon Arlen, Antoinette Scherz, Martin Vestergren
{"title":"New perspectives on the legitimacy of international institutions and power","authors":"Gordon Arlen, Antoinette Scherz, Martin Vestergren","doi":"10.1111/josp.12554","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12554","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In democracies around the world, political forces calling for a rollback of globalization are on the ascendancy. Longstanding consensus about the benefits of free trade and human rights and around the legitimacy of the international institutions enabling these goods has been questioned by successful populist politicians on both sides of the ideological spectrum. Some even claim that the entire liberal international order has become contested, perhaps as never before (Lake et al., <span>2021</span>). An emerging critique of multilateralism argues that states and peoples should not be shackled by international legal arrangements and international law, but rather, that states should “do it alone.” The picture painted is one where state sovereignty is constrained and undermined by international institutions. This view implies that there is necessarily a tradeoff between multilateralism and state autonomy.</p><p>Yet, in our globalized world, the relationship between state autonomy and international legal institutions is more complex than both critics and some defenders of the international order acknowledge. Though states frequently find themselves under pressure to join international legal institutions, this is often because there are good reasons to do so. In a globalized world, membership in these institutions is often crucial for states to function properly, serving their citizens domestically, while also cultivating productive relationships with other states. Therefore, international institutions may contribute to the construction of domestic legitimacy (Buchanan, <span>2011</span>). By imposing reciprocal limitations on states, international institutions may increase, rather than diminish, a state's room to maneuver. Furthermore, the very act of joining and submitting to international authority may be seen as an expression of state autonomy rather than a surrender of it. Without dismissing the growing opposition to international institutions as uninformed, misguided, or insincere, this special symposium seeks to deepen our theoretical understanding of the complex authority and power relations between international legal arrangements and states and between particular international institutions and the broader institutional structure in which they are embedded.</p><p>More specifically, the special symposium explores power relations and legitimacy issues in the context of international legal institutions in two dimensions. It assesses, first, what we call vertical power, that is, power and authority exercised by international bodies over states and societies. The special symposium explores claims made about power abuse and illegitimacy by investigating how this kind of power operates, what sort of legitimacy problems it gives rise to, and the normative conditions and criteria of legitimacy that are relevant. Second, the special symposium addresses questions about the international horizontal allocation of power, that is, the division of function","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 4","pages":"445-449"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12554","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138511968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What is a black radical Kantianism without Du Bois? On method, principle, and abolition democracy","authors":"Elvira Basevich","doi":"10.1111/josp.12552","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12552","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 1","pages":"6-24"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139244563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Alienated dependence: The unfreedom of our social relations","authors":"Tatiana Llaguno","doi":"10.1111/josp.12551","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12551","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Modern individuals grapple with a paradoxical reality: their lives are characterized by a strong feeling of independence as well as by an intense social interconnection. In Karl Marx's words, this paradox is best described as individuals achieving “personal independence” under an “objective dependence” (<span>1993</span>, p. 158). This paper focuses on the notion of objective dependence, which has been insufficiently problematized in recent debates about social interdependence. By bringing to light a distinctively Hegelian-Marxist approach to the problem of dependence and to the problem of objectivity, the article aims at contributing to the ongoing scholarly debate on the ethical and political consequences of dependence as an acknowledged social condition. Starting from the inevitability claim, I push for an understanding of dependence that avoids its reduction to domination and that instead presents it as a complex reality that can be actively and freely experienced. Contrary to what a considerable number of political theorists have argued (see Macpherson, <span>1962</span>), I hold that dependence per se does not lead to unfreedom; although, at present, many relations of dependence do. To understand why this is the case, I defend that the analysis of social dependence must be brought together with the critique of political economy. In fact, when looked from the perspective of our economic relations, the rejection of dependence is not entirely misguided: it points out to defective social relations that we need to untangle in order to criticize. In doing so, I respond to Renault's invitation to deploy dependence as a <i>critical</i> concept (<span>2018</span>, p. 36).</p><p>In what follows, I will delineate my own approach by way of a critical review of the accounts of dependence circulating in contemporary social and political philosophy, focusing on their failure to integrate, to a greater or lesser degree, the specificity of modern relations of dependence, that is, their objectivity. I classify current approaches in two groups: one informed by discussions around care and vulnerability (which tends to provide little systematic understanding of how actual forms of generalized dependence are experienced under capitalist relations) and another informed by the critique of political economy (which tends to downplay the importance of dependence's objective nature). While the former risks offering a defense of dependence that remains blind to important axes of domination, the latter might appear oblivious about the specific nature of modern forms of social domination. The focus on the objective nature of dependence is sanctioned by two theses. First, I claim that when objectivity is taken into account, specific normative failures arise. Second, I believe that the emphasis on objectivity enables important conceptual distinctions. Thus, I will suggest that we need to criticize alienated objective dependence, rather than objective relations of depend","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 2","pages":"185-201"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12551","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139271079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rawls and American political traditions","authors":"David A. Reidy","doi":"10.1111/josp.12549","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12549","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 2","pages":"178-208"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135974425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Contributors","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12479","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 3","pages":"290-291"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50125481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}