Journal of Social Philosophy最新文献

{"title":"A troubled inheritance: Overcoming the temporality problem in cases of historical injustice","authors":"Renaud-Philippe Garner, Marion Godman","doi":"10.1111/josp.12582","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12582","url":null,"abstract":"<p>What are historical injustices? They are not merely injustices of <i>historical significance</i>, such as the trial of Captain Dreyfus. Instead, they are historical in the sense that they occurred in the <i>remote past</i> such that many, if not all, of those directly concerned can neither be brought to justice nor given justice. But historical injustices are also not irrelevant to the present. Indeed, to give a positive account of the relationship between historical injustices and the present is the point of the paper.</p><p>Some commonly agreed restrictions are worth mentioning from the outset. Historical injustices do not typically represent unsolved common law crimes or ancient wrongful convictions like the case of Captain Dreyfus. Instead, the paradigmatic cases of historical injustices refer to crimes committed by <i>one (or more) groups against other groups</i>, for example, the forced displacement of the Sámi by representatives of the Nordic states, the Spanish colonization of Latin America, or chattel slavery in the United States of America (Nuti, <span>2019</span>). Moreover, not all groups seem to matter to us. We discuss and care about cases of injustice that concern groups that have some connection to the living (we hardly debate the crimes or suffering of the Carthaginians or the Hittites). Thus, historical injustices are not reducible to academic historical debates about the dead; they are normative debates for the living. Faced with a troubled past, we ask what we should think, feel, and most importantly <i>do</i> in the present.</p><p>So, when we speak of historical injustices we are referring to acts or events, between groups, that occurred in the sufficiently remote past, such that many of its participants are beyond punishment or reparations. This temporal dimension, referred to by Stark recently as the “temporality problem” (<span>2024</span>) of historical injustices, raises a unique challenge. Whether or not the passage of time lessens the duty to repair (see Sher, <span>1981</span>; Spinner-Halev, <span>2007</span>; Waldron, <span>1992</span>), the fact that wrongdoers and the wronged are no longer with us certainly complicates answers to the question of <i>who owes what to whom</i>?—especially, if are trying to avoid visiting the sins of the parents on their children.</p><p>This paper aims to address the relationship between the past and the present in the case of historical injustice. We argue that the right account of historical injustice must explain the temporal dimension and relation between groups of the past and the present. To this end, we consider three accounts: the enduring or structural account, the institutional liability account, and the national community account. Due to their shortcomings, we present a novel account of inherited agency based on social learning.</p><p>Many historical injustices have ongoing effects on the living. Can this feature explain how the present is linked to the past? This has in","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 1","pages":"44-60"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12582","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141569790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Equal Societies, Autonomous Lives: Reconciling social equality and relational autonomy","authors":"Hugo Cossette-Lefebvre","doi":"10.1111/josp.12579","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12579","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Relational egalitarians flesh out the idea of what it means to treat persons as equals in society. On many influential accounts, relating as equals requires, among other things, to respect others as equal, autonomous agents (Hojlund, <span>2021</span>; Scheffler, <span>2015</span>; Schemmel <span>2021a</span>; Schuppert, <span>2015</span>). However, the attempt to subsume respect for personal autonomy under social equality is prima facie suspect: people can presumably endorse social inequalities. We can ask two sets of questions when confronted with situations such as these: first, are these truly autonomous choices? For instance, following substantivist approaches to autonomy, some may question whether choosing subservience or a subordinate status can be an autonomous choice because one would thereby fail to be self-respecting, to see what is effectively in their own interest, or because this choice is often made against a social background that diminishes their available options or controls over their life (Babbitt <span>1993</span>; Hill, <span>1991</span>; Oshana, <span>2006</span>). And, second, these types of cases raise a challenge for relational egalitarians in that it is unclear what it means to treat presumably autonomous agents as equals here. On one hand, respecting their autonomy requires that one should respect their decisions to endorse social inequalities. On the other hand, relational egalitarians should be capable of criticizing social hierarchies and should aim to equalize them. How, then, can we resolve this apparent tension?</p><p>In this article, I show how debates between relational autonomy theorists hold important lessons for relational egalitarians. The connections between the two theoretical families have not been extensively studied (for recent exceptions, see Stoljar & Voigt, <span>2021a</span>). Relational autonomy theorists argue that personal autonomy is deeply connected to the social relations we engage in our lives and our socio-political position in society (Mackenzie, <span>2014</span>; Mackenzie & Stoljar, <span>2000a</span>, <span>2000b</span>; Meyers, <span>2002</span>, <span>2005</span>; Westlund, <span>2009</span>). Similarly, relational egalitarians argue that egalitarians should be concerned first and foremost with how people are treated and regarded in society (Anderson, <span>1999</span>; Fourie et al., <span>2015</span>; Lippert-Rasmussen, <span>2018</span>; Schemmel, <span>2021a</span>). I argue that by connecting social equality and relational autonomy, it is possible to resolve this apparent tension between respect for autonomy and the protection of social equality. More precisely, I argue that relational egalitarians should adopt a constitutivist, externalist understanding of autonomy. I point out that a constitutivist, externalist understanding of autonomy is not designed to evaluated particular individual decisions, but rather to identify the required external conditions to guarantee ","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 1","pages":"4-26"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12579","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141640801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Demands of Creative Resolve: Comments on Hassoun's A Minimally Good Life","authors":"Johann Go","doi":"10.1111/josp.70034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70034","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In <i>A Minimally Good Life</i>, Nicole Hassoun develops a new virtue she calls <i>creative resolve</i>. Creative resolve is “the disposition to commit, imagine, and act to help people secure the things they need to live well enough insofar as necessary, possible, and otherwise morally permissible (and it can also help us secure other significant moral goods)” (Hassoun <span>2024</span>). It is about being able to respond to apparent tragedy by cultivating creativity (looking for alternatives and creative solutions) and resolve (not giving up on a problem). While I am broadly sympathetic to the concept of creative resolve, I shall show that it currently has ambiguities that make it unclear how <i>demanding</i> it should be and it is unclear how the virtue of creative resolve fits more broadly within Hassoun's sufficientarian theory of the minimally good life.</p><p>It is commonly accepted that normative theories should be appropriately demanding (Estlund <span>2011</span>, <span>2020</span>; Gheaus <span>2013</span>; Gilabert and Lawford-Smith <span>2012</span>). They should neither be too demanding nor insufficiently demanding for both practical and principled reasons. Practically, unduly demanding theories risk non-compliance, and insufficiently demanding theories may not secure ideals that could be secured if people were asked to do more. As a matter of principle, overly demanding theories may affect other moral goods and breach certain agent-relative prerogatives to pursue our own interests, and unduly lenient theories leave important moral pursuits unachieved.</p><p>These are all issues Hassoun is aware of in <i>A Minimally Good Life</i> (hereinafter, <i>MGL</i>), as she mentions the importance of creative resolve not crowding out other morally important pursuits. However, I think further clarity could be offered on these matters.</p><p>The final question around the demandingness of creative resolve—and in some ways the most important—is whether the virtue of creative resolve is consistent with the normative theory of sufficiency defended by Hassoun in <i>MGL</i> or if something more demanding is in fact needed. Creative resolve is ostensibly treated as a virtue that mandates fairly demanding duties. However, there may be an important tension between the virtue of creative resolve and the relatively less demanding theory of the minimally good life that Hassoun develops in the rest of the book. This raises concerns around the internal consistency of different parts of <i>MGL</i>.</p><p>The virtue of creative resolve may require something more creative and <i>demanding</i> than sufficientarianism and more than what Hassoun has defended in other policy areas such as in the area of access to essential medicines and pharmaceutical reform (Hassoun <span>2020</span>). Many may feel that in a highly unequal world, the pursuit of sufficientarianism does not show enough resolve or creativity. Creative resolve may mandate something much more outside","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 1","pages":"112-114"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.70034","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147562162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Issue Information - NASSP Page","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12575","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12575","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12575","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145297363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Subsidiarity, Federalism, and Beyond","authors":"Erika Arban","doi":"10.1111/josp.70012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 3","pages":"369-377"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145296971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"On the Jewish Roots of Subsidiarity and Its Consequences for Modern Political Theory","authors":"Pablo Ortúzar-Madrid","doi":"10.1111/josp.70008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 3","pages":"437-446"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145296978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Subsidiarity in the Shadow of Sovereignty","authors":"Loren King","doi":"10.1111/josp.70014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70014","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Subsidiarity frustrates. Emerging from Catholic roots to become an explicit part of EU law,<sup>1</sup> the principle admits of clear articulation as an ideal (‘vest authority as close as feasible to those most affected’) but then invites conflicting interpretations and elaborations.</p><p>As a workable principle, subsidiarity founders seemingly when we need it most: when we ask what, precisely, that principle regulates. Andreas Føllesdal has shown that distinct interpretations of subsidiarity have strikingly incongruous political implications, with any “apparent consensus … gained only by obfuscation” (Føllesdal <span>1998</span>, 190). And as a moral precept, subsidiarity promises a politics sensitive to diverse needs and responsive to local knowledge; yet in practice, any implementation of the ideal pulls us back toward an authoritative center to regulate disputes and coordinate all of this local wisdom. Jenna Bednar describes subsidiarity as “the soul of federalism” (Bednar <span>2014</span>, 231) and she has in mind two complementary rationales: ensuring that political power is close to the people affected, while also finding efficient ways to satisfy diverse preferences. Of particular interest in Bednar's account is the epistemic role for subsidiarity in bringing a wider range of perspectives to bear on judging new policies than might otherwise be the case in a more centralized system. Here, then, the justification of subsidiarity appeals to efficiency and accountability, not simply for any given snapshot of needs, interests, and associated policies, but also (and more critically) to the constitutional and administrative system as a whole.<sup>2</sup> Still, these epistemic hopes for subsidiarity seem to assume, as Jacob Levy puts it, “a fantastic level of competence, knowledge, and disinterestedness on the part of the body that allocates decision-making authority in each case—itself usually one of the contenders for the authority at stake” (Levy <span>2007</span>, 462).</p><p>I love subsidiarity for these frustrations and ambiguities. In this respect, it is the perfect moral maxim for the real worlds of political institutions and practices, where most of us, most of the time, muddle through the messy day-to-day complexities of living together, while leaving space for dissent and resistance.</p><p>Levy argues that subsidiarity “fails as an institutional decision rule,” but he prefaces that indictment with the thought that it “may offer a useful critical language” (Levy <span>2007</span>, 462). That, I think, is a thought worth pursuing. Perhaps we will be less frustrated with subsidiarity if we see it not primarily as a decision rule or principle of institutional design, but also, and perhaps more importantly, as an essential challenge to the dominant vocabulary of the sovereign territorial state?</p><p>To be sure, subsidiarity labors under the long shadow of the Westphalian imaginary, a vision of politics anchored in justifying coercion","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 3","pages":"427-436"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.70014","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145297576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Subsidiarity as a Normative Political Concept: Contemporary and Historical Reflections","authors":"Michael Da Silva,&nbsp;Daniel Weinstock","doi":"10.1111/josp.70013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70013","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Subsidiarity is a principle holding that final decision-making authority (viz., the power not to have another entity substitute its own decisions, issue fines, etc.) should presumptively belong to the candidate authority claimant “closest” to the decision or those affected by or subject to that decision.¹ Most definitions of subsidiarity include a proviso holding that its constitutive presumption only applies where a unit is capable of addressing the underlying issue.² When faced with questions concerning who should have the final word on decisions about a given subject (education, healthcare, defense, etc.) or particular issues (whether to permit minority schools, require vaccines, go to war, etc.), in other words, one should presumptively favor the “closest” unit capable of addressing the subject or issue.</p><p>Subsidiarity so understood has a long historical pedigree. While scholars debate whether earlier arguments favoring the authority of closer decision-making units are continuous with the contemporary concept of subsidiarity—and whether it even makes sense to talk of “closer” units—(at least) analogous concepts appear throughout the history of political thought.³ Key historical figures, like Aristotle, Saint Thomas Aquinas, and Johannes Althusius are often read as supporting analogous principles, if not subsidiarity itself.⁴ Recent work suggests comparable concepts have appeared across the globe, potentially assuaging concerns that subsidiarity is irremediably tied to Western preconceptions.⁵</p><p>Subsidiarity also plays prominent roles in diverse contemporary legal and political debates. It features or is often invoked in international law, European Union law, and many states' domestic constitutional laws—and features prominently in doctrinal and normative analyses of international, regional, and domestic governance. It is raised in relevant debates to identify the entities that could possess constitutional or devolved authority in states; guide the allocation of authority to those bodies; structure international law; establish boundaries of transnational authority; constitute state boundaries; keep peace; or justify transfers of funds between entities.⁶ It is thus raised to explain why and when, for example, Germany should be able to make decisions independent of the E.U. and why its länder (known in other countries as states, provinces, cantons, etc.) should be able to make decisions free from central/federal government interference. Depending on the domain in which it applies, subsidiarity can impact everything from who is in a state (if, e.g., Germany should set immigration policy) to health outcomes (if, e.g., Saxony should control health policy). Subsidiarity is not, however, only invoked in constitutional contexts. To wit, it also features in persistent debates about the relationship between the state and other entities that claim authority. It is, for example, ","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 3","pages":"363-368"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.70013","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145297557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"No Place for Subsidiarity in the European Union. An Integrated Approach to Subsidiarity and Legal Order","authors":"Bertjan Wolthuis","doi":"10.1111/josp.70010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70010","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;The question whether the principle of subsidiarity can apply in a given legal or political order is not systematically addressed in subsidiarity research.&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt; An explanation is that the conditions under which subsidiarity can apply appear to be straightforward and undemanding. They are already met, it may seem, wherever there is a government hierarchy. Two levels suffice. Authority should then be allocated to, or exercised at, the lower level, according to the principle of subsidiarity.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The premise of this article&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt; is that the applicability conditions of subsidiarity are not as straightforward and undemanding as may seem. One claim in this article is that the conditions vary with the specific conception of subsidiarity that is adopted. Not all conceptions presuppose a government hierarchy. Some conceptions presuppose an assistance relation between smaller and larger units of authority (Cahill &lt;span&gt;2017&lt;/span&gt;). Another claim is that the applicability conditions of these conceptions are not always met. And this is not necessarily a flaw of the legal order in question. In some legal orders, the principle of subsidiarity is simply out of place, inconsistent with the structure that these orders ought to have in light of principles of democracy and rule of law. It is therefore crucial, I propose, to study the conditions under which a conception of subsidiarity can apply and to examine whether those conditions are met, or could be met, by the legal order in which the principle is supposed to apply. Ideally, the literature should relate subsidiarity conceptions to types of legal orders. The conditions of applicability connect the two.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Within the confines of this article, I cannot present a comprehensive theory of subsidiarity and the conditions of this principle's application, in which a typology of conceptions is related to a typology of legal orders. What I can do here, however, is illustrate a more integrated approach to subsidiarity in which conceptions and their conditions of application are confronted with kinds of legal order. The question that I shall address in this article is whether subsidiarity can apply in the case of the European Union. The answer to that question is surely important in itself (Section 3.2) but the aim here is also to develop, in the course of the case study, an integrated approach to subsidiarity and legal order. This approach can then be used and further developed in other cases. I shall argue that the applicability conditions of the hierarchical and the assistance conception of subsidiarity are not met in the case of the European Union (hereafter also: EU). I explain as well why the principle that is referred to as subsidiarity within EU law is not a principle of subsidiarity. It has the name but not the defining feature of the principle. I also ask whether the EU legal order should be transformed to make room for subsidiarity. I argue for a negative answer. In the final section, I col","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 3","pages":"378-388"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.70010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145297553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Beyond Subsidiarity: Normative Principles for Authority Allocation in Democracies","authors":"Colin W. Rowe","doi":"10.1111/josp.70009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 3","pages":"389-400"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145297516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}