Journal of Social Philosophy最新文献

{"title":"Kant's Metaphysics of Race, Its Distinctiveness, and Its Normativity","authors":"Reza Mosayebi","doi":"10.1111/josp.12612","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12612","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Drawing on the contemporary taxonomy of the metaphysics of race, this paper shows that Kant's theory of race occupies a distinct metaphysical position on race. Second, it argues that Kant's metaphysics of race inherently produces racist claims. Contrasting Kant's race theory with other metaphysical positions on race allows us to both understand his theory and its racist aspects better, and to improve the map of metaphysical positions on race. Closer analysis of Kant's metaphysics of race reveals that, contrary to common belief, it is not race essentialism (traditional racialism), it is inaccurate to see it just as a variant of race naturalism, and both racial development and racial hierarchy in Kant's theory are more complex than they seem on most scholars' reading of him. Kant's metaphysics of race, which will be called <i>race teleo-rationalism</i>, shows that racism could be justified by “reason” and its a priori principles and assumptions.</p>","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 3","pages":"374-386"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12612","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148904297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"We-Mode as Layered Agency","authors":"Lukas Schwengerer","doi":"10.1111/josp.12600","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12600","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;We humans are social beings.\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 As such, our agency can take on goals and means that are not only determined by an agent individually but by cooperating and coordinating with other people. Agents that are part of groups can act with the group in mind. They can act as group members taking on the group's motivational structure. I can act as a member of the philosophy department aiming for what the department agreed on, even if that might conflict with my personal beliefs. I can shut out these personal beliefs for a moment and reason from the group's standpoint. And I can also switch from my reasoning as a group member back to my individual point of view when the situation requires it. I suggest that this ability to switch between agencies is best described as a form of layered agency—a we-mode layer of agency.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The idea of layered agency has been proposed by Nguyen (&lt;span&gt;2019&lt;/span&gt;, &lt;span&gt;2020&lt;/span&gt;) in his seminal work on striving play—play we partake in with the aim of experiencing a struggle. I argue that the idea can also be explanatory powerful in the social realm more generally. How we reason in many cooperative activities is best described as taking on a new layer of agency that is jointly established with other people. The ability of agents to submerse themselves in this jointly established layer of agency is the key to understanding actions in a group mindset, the nature of social groups, and the mental states of group agents.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Much of our social life is shaped by this ability to take on a we-mode as a temporary layer of agency. I can smoothly transition from practical reasoning based on my own individual goals to reasoning based on goals established jointly with other people, such as the goals of the philosophy department. I can also transition between different we-modes as different temporary layers of agency. At one point, I reason as part of the philosophy department, at another point, I reason as part of a football team. The goals of these groups are different, and some accepted cornerstones that guide my reasoning will also be different. These cornerstones are goals and attitudes that provide fixed points for practical reasoning as a department member or a member of the football team. As a philosophy department, we might have jointly accepted that Katherine is a good job candidate and, in my reasoning as part of the department, this acceptance is held fixed to guide practical reasoning. But as part of the football team, nothing requires me to hold that acceptance fixed to guide my reasoning. The football team is not interested in good job candidates for a philosophy department. There has not been any agreement on job applicants at all for the football team. My practical reasoning has different cornerstones depending on what layer of agency I take on board: the philosophy department layer or the football team layer. I can switch between these different kinds of agencies with the","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 3","pages":"276-286"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12600","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148904166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Earth System in the Anthropocene and the Primacy of Joint Collective Ownership","authors":"Dominic Lenzi","doi":"10.1111/josp.12608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12608","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;When human beings began making claims to possess the ‘bounty of nature,’ the functioning of the Earth was physically independent of our species. That this is no longer the case is a profound and shocking development. According to the United Nations, human beings have “transformed the Earth's natural systems, exceeding their capacity and disrupting their self-regulatory mechanisms, with irreversible consequences for global humanity” (United Nations &lt;span&gt;2022&lt;/span&gt;). Long noted by natural scientists, the extent of this transformation is often marked by the label ‘Anthropocene’, i.e. the epoch characterized by human impacts upon the Earth (Crutzen &lt;span&gt;2002&lt;/span&gt;).\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 From a physical perspective, the Anthropocene signals a radical break with the past, “an entirely new, no-analogue state of the Earth system” (Kim &lt;span&gt;2021&lt;/span&gt;, 4).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Might the Anthropocene also represent a conceptual break with the past? At least in political philosophy, the question has gone largely unnoticed. As Chris Armstrong (&lt;span&gt;2017&lt;/span&gt;) showed, much political philosophy conceives of the Earth and its benefits in roughly the same way as theorists from earlier centuries, namely as useful objects available in nature uncreated by human beings.\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 For instance, in Beitz’ (&lt;span&gt;1975&lt;/span&gt;) influential account natural resources are useful objects lying under our feet, which brings to mind deposits of gold or oil. This intuitive view remains sufficiently widespread that the term ‘natural resource’ often goes undefined. Thus, cosmopolitans as well as their opponents use the term synonymously with economic or material benefits (cf. Beitz &lt;span&gt;1975&lt;/span&gt;; Miller &lt;span&gt;2007&lt;/span&gt;; Moore &lt;span&gt;2012&lt;/span&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I believe that conceptual revision is required concerning the implicit object of such theorizing, namely &lt;i&gt;the Earth as a storehouse of natural resources&lt;/i&gt;. As Mary Midgley already pointed out, this is the flawed ‘world-picture’ that political philosophy inherited from the social contract tradition, in which “the natural world existed only as a static background”, a mere “convenient stage for the human drama” (Midgley &lt;span&gt;2005&lt;/span&gt;, 350).\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 This picture has recently come under attack, with some arguing that the new realities of the Anthropocene require a reorientation of theory around the interconnections between human activity and planetary functioning (Jamieson and Di Paola &lt;span&gt;2016&lt;/span&gt;; Dryzek and Pickering &lt;span&gt;2019&lt;/span&gt;; Eckersley &lt;span&gt;2017&lt;/span&gt;).\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 Nonetheless, the intuitive conception of the Earth as a storehouse of resources remains largely intact in contemporary political philosophy, and in political thought more generally.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Without denying the importance of considering fair entitlements to natural resources, the aim of this article is to begin a more general r","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 3","pages":"353-362"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12608","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Issue Information - NASSP Page","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.70047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70047","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.70047","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148904169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Stigma and Rawlsian Liberalism","authors":"Euan Allison","doi":"10.1111/josp.12595","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12595","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;Stigma can be deeply morally troubling. For many Rawlsian liberals, the appropriate stance for the state to adopt is one of &lt;i&gt;anti-stigma&lt;/i&gt;.\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 By this I do not simply mean that the liberal state should seek to mitigate the downstream consequences of stigma—though it should certainly do that too.\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 Stigma is, plausibly, objectionable independently of such consequences. Rather, the view I have in mind is that the liberal state should aim at undermining the very stigmatizing attitudes and associated social norms that account for the presence of stigmas in the first place.\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On the face of it, it can seem puzzling that Rawlsian liberals would commit themselves to this position. After all, a distinguishing feature of Rawlsian liberalism is that it imposes demanding restrictions on what counts as legitimate justification for government action:&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;\u0000 &lt;i&gt;Reciprocity Principle&lt;/i&gt;: When making political decisions, citizens must rely only on considerations that they can reasonably expect all reasonable people to accept.\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But there often is reasonable disagreement about stigmatizing attitudes. Many people believe, for example, that it is immoral to sell sex. The persistence of such beliefs and associated social norms is, we might suppose, implicated in the ongoing stigmatization of sex work. But our objections to this belief, insofar as we have them, cannot themselves count in favor of using the state to undermine public support for the belief. This is precisely the sort of consideration that the Reciprocity Principle is meant to exclude. So how then can the liberal state be justified in opposing stigmatizing attitudes in general, given that many of them (including some that are implicated in the most morally troubling stigmas) are subject to reasonable disagreement?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The literature furnishes us with two strategies. First, there is the strategy inspired by Rawls himself (1999 [1971]): the problem with stigma is that it threatens the “social bases of self-respect” via the production of shame. Call this the “Self-Respect Strategy.” Second, some Rawlsian liberals argue that stigma should be rejected because of its dependence on hierarchical social relations, which are independently objectionable (e.g., Anderson (&lt;span&gt;1999&lt;/span&gt;)). Call this the “Hierarchy Strategy.” The promise of such strategies is that they offer us reasons for opposing the &lt;i&gt;patterning&lt;/i&gt; of stigmatizing responses within a community without requiring us to take a stand on the content of stigmatizing attitudes themselves. When lots of people within a community take up and communicate stigmatizing attitudes, that can threaten putatively uncontroversial liberal values in ways that do not depend on the content of such attitudes being objectionable.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In this p","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 3","pages":"287-296"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12595","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Taboos as Drivers for Counterculture: Normalizing Misogyny in Incel Communities and Beyond","authors":"Mihaela Popa-Wyatt,&nbsp;Justina Berškytė","doi":"10.1111/josp.12610","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12610","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;Countercultures are defined in opposition to the mainstream. They permit the exploration, promotion, and adoption of ideas and practices placed outside the &lt;i&gt;status quo&lt;/i&gt;. One way to do so is by exploiting taboo utterances that are prohibited in mainstream culture. We define taboo utterances as those that either constitute socially prohibited acts (e.g., slurs), express elements of a prohibited ideology (e.g., claims advocating the subjugation of women), or promote socially prohibited actions (e.g., violence against women). Such transgressive utterances help create, negotiate, and reproduce countercultural roles and ideologies. Adopting a countercultural role can function as an act of resistance that seeks to redefine the mainstream community's standards, values, and expectations.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In this paper, we explain this process by building on a framework of social role revision put forth by Berškytė and Popa-Wyatt (&lt;span&gt;2025&lt;/span&gt;). In their account, reclaimed slurs and self-derogatory terms are critical to revising in-group social roles. We expand on this proposal in two ways: (i) we show that taboo utterances can also be used to revise these roles; (ii) we extend the mechanism of role revision not only for the in-group but also for the out-group. Our contribution is to show how exploiting taboo utterances can help construct ideological roles both for in-groups and out-groups which, we argue, are key drivers to reproducing countercultural ideologies. These ideological roles enrich the landscape of social roles.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;We proceed as follows. Section 2 outlines how taboos affect countercultures. We describe the different functions of taboos and how they might be exploited to resist or challenge mainstream norms, values, and expectations. In Section 3, we outline social roles, highlighting mechanisms for reproducing or revising unjust social roles. In Section 4, we introduce our case study of the manosphere incel (involuntary celibate) counterculture. The manosphere is a collection of online spaces united by its misogynistic and anti-feminist rhetoric. One such space consists of forums hosting manosphere incels, that is, men who desire but are unable to obtain an intimate relationship and place the blame for their failure on women. Incels adopt a nihilistic ideology (known as the blackpill\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 ), perpetuating the narrative that one's immutable features and women's shallow nature relegate incels to a permanent low social standing. We end with brief ethical implications by considering how these countercultural norms might extend and normalize beyond the incel counterculture (Section 5). We conclude in Section 6.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Taboos are prohibitions on transgressive behavior: they function to delineate acceptable and unacceptable behaviors within a group, community, or society. They thus act as a boundary for what can be said or done, typically concerning issues that violate moral and social norms.\u0000 &lt;s","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 3","pages":"363-373"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12610","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148904190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Alienation as a Social Pathology: Evaluating Jaeggi's Concept of Alienation","authors":"Wouter Wiersma","doi":"10.1111/josp.12604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12604","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;Alienation is one of the most important concepts for critical theory.\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 According to Axel Honneth, “we inevitably find ourselves falling back on the concept of alienation” if we want to criticize social conditions that do not primarily violate principles of justice but “conflict with the conditions of willing and of executing what we will” (2016, vii). This suggests that alienation refers to a societal flaw, one that is different from injustice. I contend that alienation should instead be understood as a &lt;i&gt;social pathology&lt;/i&gt;.\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;As a solution to these problems, I propose understanding instances of structural alienation as blockages of social freedom. This enables us to think of alienation as a social problem requiring a social solution. This is an important insight given the centrality of the alienation concept. It suggests a way in which that concept can be employed in the critical theory tradition to criticize social conditions.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This paper is structured as follows. I first reconstruct Jaeggi's account of alienation (Section 2). I then discuss the role of social pathologies in the critical theory tradition and the implications this has for understanding alienation as a social pathology (Section 3). I then show how Jaeggi conflates two kinds of appropriation, which means that she cannot clearly distinguish between pertinent kinds of alienation (Section 4). This leaves her unable to articulate alienation as a structural social pathology (Section 5). In the final sections, I argue that, to understand the phenomenon of structural alienation, we must connect it to an account of social freedom (Sections 6 and 7). This solves the problem with Jaeggi's account. Introducing a theory of social freedom enables us to take the objective appropriability of social structures into account. This, in turn, makes it possible to think of alienation as a social phenomenon.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Jaeggi motivates her revision of the alienation concept by arguing that previous accounts of alienation always run into the same set of problems, namely the problem of essentialism and the problem of perfectionism.\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 In the following, I will reconstruct the way Jaeggi presents both the problem of essentialism and the problem of perfectionism. This, then, sets the stage for Jaeggi's proposed alternative.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Jaeggi follows Honneth's interpretation of social philosophy as the identification of social pathologies.\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;17&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 She maintains that “social pathology is to be understood as the result of the inability of society to properly express the rational potential, already inherent in its institutions, practices, and everyday routines” (Jaeggi &lt;span&gt;2017&lt;/span&gt;, 60). Jaeggi characterizes alienation as a key concept for social philosophy. As such, she must view alienation as a social pathology.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;My the","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 3","pages":"342-352"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12604","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148904319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Democratic Legitimacy of the Micro-Deliberative Shortcut: A Defense of Randomly Selecting Legislators","authors":"Eric Shoemaker","doi":"10.1111/josp.12598","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12598","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;The recent increase in the use of minipublics composed of randomly selected citizens for political purposes has been an exciting development in the history of democracy. The real-world instantiations of these bodies, such as the Ireland Citizens' Assembly, and the Citizens Convention for Climate in France, have been precipitated by the enthusiastic scholarly attention minipublics have received over the past several decades from philosophers and political scientists.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Some of these philosophers and political scientists have argued that elected legislators should be replaced by “deliberative minipublics.” Such legislatures would be composed of randomly selected citizens. Several of the arguments made by these theorists in favor of empowered minipublics focus on the epistemic properties of bodies composed of randomly selected citizens.\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 These theorists argue that such bodies, when they are fit into the appropriate institutional structure, make more informed decisions that are more conducive to advancing the public interest. Others have focused their advocacy around the egalitarian character of deliberative minipublics.\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 Others claim that distributing legislative power by lot is a potent means of preventing corruption.\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 Some have focused on the potential for empowered minipublics to act as a means of republican education and mobilization.\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;One of the most compelling and extensively developed criticisms raised against legislative minipublics comes from Cristina Lafont, articulated first in “Deliberation, participation, and democratic legitimacy: Should deliberative mini-publics shape public policy?” and subsequently in her book &lt;i&gt;Democracy Without Shortcuts&lt;/i&gt;. In the context of defending a participatory conception of deliberative democracy, Lafont argues that minipublics should not be given decisive legislative power because democratic legitimacy requires both that the whole public deliberates, and that the whole public's opinion be decisive. When a minipublic deliberates, Lafont grants, their decision is a good indicator of what the public would have wanted if it had deliberated—but in fact, the public has not deliberated.\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 Giving this counterfactual version of public opinion power over the law is an attempt to take what she calls the “micro-deliberative shortcut” to democracy.\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;6&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 Lafont's book has been the subject of extensive commentary,\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;7&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 and because of the strength of the case Lafont makes against minipublics, her objection looms large over the advocacy for empowering deliberative minipublics. In this article, I aim to answer Lafont's objection, and defend the “micro-deliberative shortcut.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In section one, I analyze La","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 3","pages":"297-310"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12598","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Sci-Fi Parenthood and the End of Love","authors":"Daniela Cutas","doi":"10.1111/josp.12603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12603","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;Over recent decades, ever more sophisticated reproductive technologies have raised concerns over the increasing medicalization of some of the most intimate forms of human interaction, as well as the decreased willingness to accept risks in human reproduction. Concerns have been formulated, among others, in terms of uptake of certain technologies—notably those that allow the selection between embryos or embryo modification—signaling defects in parental expectations and, ultimately, in parental love. While such concerns have been raised and rebutted before, they are worth revisiting for two reasons. First, they have recently been defended in two papers by Gheaus and so have not been put to rest. Second, and more interestingly, while some of the arguments that underpin them should be rejected, they may also lead us to a more plausible and pertinent account.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Contrary to recent claims in the philosophical literature, in this paper, I hope to show that the alleged threat that these technologies pose to interpersonal relationships, be it between parents or between parents and children, and, ultimately, to love and intimacy, is neither unprecedented nor fatal—nor even a threat at all—at least not in the ways in which these threats have been framed. While innovations in human reproduction may well be problematic—and not problematized enough so far—I will suggest that progress and uptake of such technologies need not express nor realize shortcomings in love nor, eventually, its demise.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The increasing capacity to detect and eliminate abnormalities in embryos, to “fix” them, or to simply select away the “imperfect” ones, creates expectations that parents pursue such technologies and make the “right,” “responsible” choices. Innovations in technologies of human reproduction take us further and further from culturally entrenched ideals of romantic love between parents and unconditional love for children. Not only that, but they have triggered warnings in terms of “the end of men” (once women no longer need men's reproductive contributions) (see e.g., Cook &lt;span&gt;2009&lt;/span&gt;; Bindel &lt;span&gt;2016&lt;/span&gt;) or “the end of sex” (once it is no longer needed for reproduction) (see, e.g., Greely &lt;span&gt;2016&lt;/span&gt;; Prasad &lt;span&gt;2012&lt;/span&gt;). Journalists, filmmakers, and novelists have exploited these worries and evoked dystopic futures devoid of intimacy, individuality, and creativity. These bleak futures foretold baby factories such as in the 1932 novel Brave New World and societies in which adults are forbidden from touching each other, such as in the 1993 Sci-Fi action film Demolition Man.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;What I mean by “Sci-Fi parenthood” in this paper is recourse to technology by prospective parents in order to select or shape their offspring according to specifications. The “end of love” is the expression I use, in line with similar “ends” cited above, to capture some of the ways in which love has been conceptualized in relation to emerging reproductive technolog","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 3","pages":"334-341"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12603","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Grave Injustice: Disrespect Toward the Dead, Transgenerational Publicity, and Reparations","authors":"Timothy Waligore","doi":"10.1111/josp.12602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12602","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 3","pages":"321-333"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}