Journal of Social Philosophy最新文献

{"title":"Issue Information - NASSP Page","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.70043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70043","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.70043","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147568121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Creative Resolve and the Threshold for a Minimally Good Life: A Reply to Critics","authors":"Nicole Hassoun","doi":"10.1111/josp.70037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70037","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 1","pages":"115-121"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147566533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reparations after species extinctions: An account of reparative interspecies justice","authors":"Anna Wienhues, Alfonso Donoso","doi":"10.1111/josp.12584","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12584","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The “standard” story of reparative justice goes something like this: an individual or a group of individuals (an agent, a community, etc.) has been the subject of injustices. These can be understood as human rights abuses, persecution, misrecognition, discrimination, distributive injustices embodied in the theft of cultural goods or natural resources, and so on. These injustices can then in turn be addressed by mechanisms that may include reparatory, restitutive, or restorative justice. Particularly historic injustices targeting communities are commonly described as appropriate objects of state reparations, such as widely discussed in the context of colonialism and slavery. Against the background of currently high levels of human-induced biodiversity loss, the question that now poses itself is whether a similar (albeit in many respects quite different) story can be told about anthropogenic species extinctions. In light of human-caused extinctions, can (some) humans or human institutions like the state be approached with reparative claims to respond to those losses?</p><p>One place to start this inquiry would be to take inspiration from the environmental ethics literature, which already offers different accounts of moral repair (Almassi, <span>2017</span>) or restitution (Basl, <span>2010</span>) and links these to practices of ecological restoration as moral restitution and/or reparation.<sup>1</sup> Such arguments could plausibly be extended to the subject matter of species extinctions. Yet, in this paper, we aim to show that species extinctions can also be integrated within a non-anthropocentric account of reparative justice that is significantly similar to how reparation is understood within the political theory literature and, thus, linking concerns of environmental ethics to political philosophy. That is, in how far are species extinctions a matter of <i>reparative interspecies justice</i> that is owed to individual nonhuman beings? And consequently, which entities are owed reparation and what would this reparative duty entail?</p><p>That is a novel area of inquiry. Yet, we do not have to fully start from scratch, because several political, environmental, and animal philosophers have already articulated different non-anthropocentric theories of (distributive, capabilities, recognition, etc.) interspecies justice on which such an account of reparative justice can be built (e.g., for book-length renditions, see Baxter, <span>2005</span>; Cochrane, <span>2018</span>; Donaldson & Kymlicka, <span>2011</span>; Garner, <span>2013</span>; Low & Gleeson, <span>1998</span>; Nussbaum, <span>2023</span>; Schlosberg, <span>2007</span>; Wienhues, <span>2020</span>. More on this literature and our understanding of interspecies justice in Section 2.1). Against this background, reparative justice within the context of interspecies justice has not received much philosophical attention to date (apart from Welchman, <span>2021</span>),<sup>2</sup> an","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 1","pages":"81-101"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12584","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141949489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What we owe to impaired agents","authors":"Giacomo Floris","doi":"10.1111/josp.12581","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12581","url":null,"abstract":"<p>According to relational egalitarians, a just society is one where the state considers and treats persons as equals, and persons stand in relations of equality with one another (Anderson, <span>1999</span>; Lippert-Rasmussen, <span>2018</span>; O'Neill, <span>2008</span>; Scheffler, <span>2003</span>; Schemmel, <span>2021</span>; Wolff, <span>1998</span>). Relational egalitarians, however, have so far been mainly concerned with how fully competent adults must be considered and treated as equals, whereas they have said much less about what a relational egalitarian society owes to those individuals whose agential capacities are impaired due to mental health issues, such as depression or drug and alcohol addiction.<sup>1</sup> The aim of this article is to address this lacuna in the relational egalitarian literature.</p><p>Exploring this issue is important for at least two reasons. First, impaired agents represent some of the most vulnerable members of society: they are often looked down upon by others and are deprived of the conditions necessary to exercise their political rights, take part in social cooperation, and establish meaningful social relationships. Therefore, it is crucial to develop an account of what is owed to impaired agents to enrich our understanding of what is required to achieve an inclusive society of equals. Second, this exploration will enable us to address a neglected tension between the demands of relational equality, and shed light on the role of its most fundamental background commitment: the principle of basic moral equality.</p><p>This article is divided into two parts. In the first part, I propose a novel theory of respect for persons' agential capacities that defines what a relational egalitarian society owes to impaired agents as a matter of respect for their equal standing. In Section 2, I illustrate how the social condition of impaired agents generates a tension between two core demands of relational equality. On the one hand, relational egalitarians argue that the state should express appropriate respect for persons' equal standing by refraining from making demeaning judgments about their variable agential capacities, which would allow ranking them on a scale of moral personality. On the other hand, they maintain that the state should enable everyone to <i>function</i> as equal citizens. However, I argue that a duty to refrain from assessing individuals' agential endowments is sometimes incompatible with a duty to ensure that impaired agents have access to the assistance necessary to be able to function as equal citizens.</p><p>To overcome this tension, in Section 3, I develop a <i>dualist</i> account of respect for persons' agential capacities. According to this account, respect does not only entail abstaining from assessing individuals' agential capacities, but it also requires a positive duty to offer help and support to address mental health issues that diminish moral personality. Call this kind of respect, <","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 1","pages":"27-43"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12581","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141569789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Understanding the Conditions for Human Flourishing: Comments on Nicole Hassoun's A Minimally Good Life","authors":"Carol C. Gould","doi":"10.1111/josp.70033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70033","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 1","pages":"102-105"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147564295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reparative justice, historical injustice, and the nonidentity problem","authors":"Felix Lambrecht","doi":"10.1111/josp.12583","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12583","url":null,"abstract":"<p>History is riddled with injustice. Nazi Germany murdered and stole from millions during the Holocaust. Imperial powers expropriated land, relocated populations, and violently maintain(ed) oppressive colonial systems. The slave trade created unimaginable suffering and oppression. These are examples of <i>historical injustice</i>.</p><p>Historical injustices are unjust actions occurring in the past in which the original individual perpetrators and victims are no longer alive. There is widespread intuition that historical injustices require reparative justice. Yet despite this reparative intuition, reparative justice for historical injustices encounters significant philosophical problems. In this paper, I consider one popular philosophical objection: The Nonidentity Objection.<sup>1</sup> The Nonidentity Objection says that contemporary individuals are not owed reparative duties for historical injustices because, without the historical injustice they would not have come to exist.<sup>2</sup> I show that the objection does not succeed. I accept the claim that particular individuals would not have come to exist without the injustice but deny that it vitiates their claim to reparative justice. I argue that the Objection only challenges reparations if we assume a model of reparative justice on which claims to reparations are generated by the harms that result from an injustice. If we use a different model of reparative justice, the Nonidentity Objection does not succeed and we can vindicate reparations.</p><p>I begin (Section 2) by presenting a general understanding of reparative justice, including three questions any model of reparative justice must answer. I sketch a popular model of reparative justice (the <i>Harm Model</i>) that is often used in the context of historical injustice to answer these questions. Next (Section 3), I present the Nonidentity Objection that challenges the possibility of reparative justice for historical injustice. I argue (Section 4) that the Objection only applies to arguments that assume the Harm Model. I offer an alternative model of reparative justice (the <i>Wrongful Interaction Model</i>) on which reparations address the wrongful actions of the injustice. I develop this model by drawing on accounts of relational (second-personal) morality,<sup>3</sup> and demonstrate how the model overcomes the Objection.<sup>4</sup> I conclude (Section 5) by introducing three new problems that my model faces. I argue that we should prefer my model over the Harm Model because these challenges pose a less intractable threat than the nonidentity problem.</p><p>Reparative justice starts from the intuition that injustices require repair. Reparative justice is distinct from distributive justice. Distributive justice concerns an allocation of resources, burdens or benefits, or a fair state of affairs. In contrast, reparative justice concerns what is owed to victims of a discrete unjust action. Where distributive justice determines allocat","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 1","pages":"61-80"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12583","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141745446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"On Virtues and Duties in A Minimally Good Life","authors":"Liam Murphy","doi":"10.1111/josp.70038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70038","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 1","pages":"109-111"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147564296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Hassoun on Sufficiency and Contentment","authors":"George Sher","doi":"10.1111/josp.70039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70039","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 1","pages":"106-108"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147565730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A troubled inheritance: Overcoming the temporality problem in cases of historical injustice","authors":"Renaud-Philippe Garner, Marion Godman","doi":"10.1111/josp.12582","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12582","url":null,"abstract":"<p>What are historical injustices? They are not merely injustices of <i>historical significance</i>, such as the trial of Captain Dreyfus. Instead, they are historical in the sense that they occurred in the <i>remote past</i> such that many, if not all, of those directly concerned can neither be brought to justice nor given justice. But historical injustices are also not irrelevant to the present. Indeed, to give a positive account of the relationship between historical injustices and the present is the point of the paper.</p><p>Some commonly agreed restrictions are worth mentioning from the outset. Historical injustices do not typically represent unsolved common law crimes or ancient wrongful convictions like the case of Captain Dreyfus. Instead, the paradigmatic cases of historical injustices refer to crimes committed by <i>one (or more) groups against other groups</i>, for example, the forced displacement of the Sámi by representatives of the Nordic states, the Spanish colonization of Latin America, or chattel slavery in the United States of America (Nuti, <span>2019</span>). Moreover, not all groups seem to matter to us. We discuss and care about cases of injustice that concern groups that have some connection to the living (we hardly debate the crimes or suffering of the Carthaginians or the Hittites). Thus, historical injustices are not reducible to academic historical debates about the dead; they are normative debates for the living. Faced with a troubled past, we ask what we should think, feel, and most importantly <i>do</i> in the present.</p><p>So, when we speak of historical injustices we are referring to acts or events, between groups, that occurred in the sufficiently remote past, such that many of its participants are beyond punishment or reparations. This temporal dimension, referred to by Stark recently as the “temporality problem” (<span>2024</span>) of historical injustices, raises a unique challenge. Whether or not the passage of time lessens the duty to repair (see Sher, <span>1981</span>; Spinner-Halev, <span>2007</span>; Waldron, <span>1992</span>), the fact that wrongdoers and the wronged are no longer with us certainly complicates answers to the question of <i>who owes what to whom</i>?—especially, if are trying to avoid visiting the sins of the parents on their children.</p><p>This paper aims to address the relationship between the past and the present in the case of historical injustice. We argue that the right account of historical injustice must explain the temporal dimension and relation between groups of the past and the present. To this end, we consider three accounts: the enduring or structural account, the institutional liability account, and the national community account. Due to their shortcomings, we present a novel account of inherited agency based on social learning.</p><p>Many historical injustices have ongoing effects on the living. Can this feature explain how the present is linked to the past? This has in","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 1","pages":"44-60"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12582","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141569790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Equal Societies, Autonomous Lives: Reconciling social equality and relational autonomy","authors":"Hugo Cossette-Lefebvre","doi":"10.1111/josp.12579","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12579","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Relational egalitarians flesh out the idea of what it means to treat persons as equals in society. On many influential accounts, relating as equals requires, among other things, to respect others as equal, autonomous agents (Hojlund, <span>2021</span>; Scheffler, <span>2015</span>; Schemmel <span>2021a</span>; Schuppert, <span>2015</span>). However, the attempt to subsume respect for personal autonomy under social equality is prima facie suspect: people can presumably endorse social inequalities. We can ask two sets of questions when confronted with situations such as these: first, are these truly autonomous choices? For instance, following substantivist approaches to autonomy, some may question whether choosing subservience or a subordinate status can be an autonomous choice because one would thereby fail to be self-respecting, to see what is effectively in their own interest, or because this choice is often made against a social background that diminishes their available options or controls over their life (Babbitt <span>1993</span>; Hill, <span>1991</span>; Oshana, <span>2006</span>). And, second, these types of cases raise a challenge for relational egalitarians in that it is unclear what it means to treat presumably autonomous agents as equals here. On one hand, respecting their autonomy requires that one should respect their decisions to endorse social inequalities. On the other hand, relational egalitarians should be capable of criticizing social hierarchies and should aim to equalize them. How, then, can we resolve this apparent tension?</p><p>In this article, I show how debates between relational autonomy theorists hold important lessons for relational egalitarians. The connections between the two theoretical families have not been extensively studied (for recent exceptions, see Stoljar & Voigt, <span>2021a</span>). Relational autonomy theorists argue that personal autonomy is deeply connected to the social relations we engage in our lives and our socio-political position in society (Mackenzie, <span>2014</span>; Mackenzie & Stoljar, <span>2000a</span>, <span>2000b</span>; Meyers, <span>2002</span>, <span>2005</span>; Westlund, <span>2009</span>). Similarly, relational egalitarians argue that egalitarians should be concerned first and foremost with how people are treated and regarded in society (Anderson, <span>1999</span>; Fourie et al., <span>2015</span>; Lippert-Rasmussen, <span>2018</span>; Schemmel, <span>2021a</span>). I argue that by connecting social equality and relational autonomy, it is possible to resolve this apparent tension between respect for autonomy and the protection of social equality. More precisely, I argue that relational egalitarians should adopt a constitutivist, externalist understanding of autonomy. I point out that a constitutivist, externalist understanding of autonomy is not designed to evaluated particular individual decisions, but rather to identify the required external conditions to guarantee ","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 1","pages":"4-26"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12579","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141640801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}