Journal of Social Philosophy最新文献_第10页

Contributors 贡献者

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-09-26 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12420

引用次数: 0

Issue Information - NASSP page 发行信息- NASSP页面

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-09-26 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12421

引用次数: 0

Rethinking the right to know and the case for restorative epistemic reparation 重新思考知情权和恢复性认知赔偿的案例

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-09-12 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12492

Melanie Altanian

{"title":"Rethinking the right to know and the case for restorative epistemic reparation","authors":"Melanie Altanian","doi":"10.1111/josp.12492","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12492","url":null,"abstract":"In the spirit of this special issue to center on wronged individuals and groups, their account of how the wrongs should be understood and repaired, and what actions promote repair, this article focuses on individuals and groups wronged by genocide and their entitlement to epistemic reparation in the aftermath of genocide. I argue that epistemic reparation requires not only fulfillment of the informational needs of victims, survivors, and descendants, including access to archives, documents, and provision of knowledge about violations. In addition, taking into account the idea of epistemic injuries, which are part and parcel of genocidal atrocities, epistemic reparation also ought to include recognition and re-establishment of victims' epistemic standing or epistemic recognition in short. This insight is suggested by the fact that genocide is enabled, “justified” and even prescribed through a genocidal epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance constituted by not only the propagation of falsehoods and misinformation about social reality but also abuses of epistemic authority and epistemic authoritarianism, which systematically exclude targeted groups from the community of epistemic trust. Epistemic trust is the kind of trust that allows us to gain or generate knowledge and other kinds of epistemic inputs from and with others. For example, we trust that others tell us the truth—or at least, what they hold to be true and to not intentionally deceive us—and we trust others to recognize us as trustworthy epistemic contributors, or to do their best to understand our words as we intend them. To be systematically and unwarrantedly epistemically distrusted means to be deprived of the epistemic recognition and consequently, social uptake necessary to participate, for example, in the generation of a shared understanding of social reality and to revise misunderstandings imposed by those with dominating power—in the case at hand, genocide advocates and perpetrators. Accordingly, epistemic reparation ought to include the revision of dysfunctional epistemic practices that underlie and sustain a genocidal epistemology. This would make epistemic reparation not only instrumentally valuable insofar as it may, for example through educational and informational measures, prevent the recurrence of these wrongs, but also intrinsically valuable insofar as it re-asserts and repairs survivors and descendants’ epistemic standing. It provides them with epistemic recognition that has been systematically withdrawn from them, making epistemic reparation a crucial element of restorative justice.In what follows, I start by introducing the idea of a “genocidal epistemology” based on the example of the Armenian genocide of 1915–1917. This historical genocide continues to be systematically denied by the succeeding governments of Turkey, making it a useful case study for exploring the value of epistemic r","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 4","pages":"728-745"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12492","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48045116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Reparative responsibility for the harms of forced migration 对强迫移徙造成的伤害承担赔偿责任

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-09-11 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12493

Laura Santi Amantini

{"title":"Reparative responsibility for the harms of forced migration","authors":"Laura Santi Amantini","doi":"10.1111/josp.12493","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12493","url":null,"abstract":"According to the UNHCR (2021), in 2020 there were over 82 million displaced people worldwide who had been forced to migrate as a result of persecution, conflict, and violence. While few of them had reached Western countries to claim asylum, more than half (48 million) were internally displaced people (IDPs) and a large share of the internationally displaced had moved to neighboring countries. The magnitude of the forced-migration phenomenon is even more striking if we consider that many other people are forced to migrate within or across borders because of development projects, slow-onset environmental degradation, and natural disasters but do not fall under the UNHCR's mandate.Assigning responsibility to address the plight of forced migrants is thus a pressing issue which has attracted increasing attention in normative political theory. It has been argued that, while not all forced migrants are targeted for persecution, all of them typically have their human rights violated and their basic needs unfulfilled. Human rights violations often trigger forced migration, which in turn makes displaced people particularly vulnerable to further human rights violations. Since forced migrants are in urgent need, the dominant understanding of responsibility for forced migrants, both in political theory and in policy, is based on a humanitarian principle sometimes called the “good Samaritan principle” (Parekh, 2020, p. 649). As in Singer's (1972) pond case, when someone faces serious harm we have a moral duty to help if we are capable of helping at a reasonable cost (see Betts & Collier, 2017; Gibney, 2004).The humanitarian principle is forward looking and does not require any prior special connection between the rescuer and the rescued. Indeed, the causal and moral responsibility for the plight of refugees tends to be attributed to the state of origin, while external states tend to be presented as bystanders unimplicated in the harms of forced migration. The humanitarian principle does not determine fair shares of responsibility when several bystanders can step in.1 Moreover, based on the humanitarian principle, the moral obligation to fulfill the needs of forced migrants is not a duty of justice and is subject to costs and capacity assessments.2 In practice, the burden of taking care of forced migrants disproportionally falls upon geographically proximate states, although political theorists have often criticized the proximity distributive criterion as unfair (see Gibney, 2015). Furthermore, the humanitarian principle does not clarify when a state has done its fair share, both in terms of the number of forced migrants it has taken responsibility for and in terms of what is owed to forced migrants (Parekh, 2020, p. 65). In such an “ethics of rescue” frame (Owen, 2020; Parekh, 2020), admission to a safe","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 4","pages":"605-623"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12493","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47045785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Supererogatory and obligatory rescues: Should we institutionalize the duty to intervene? 强制性和强制性救助:我们应该将干预义务制度化吗?

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-07-21 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12491

Sara Van Goozen

引用次数: 0

Direct and structural injustice against refugees 对难民的直接和结构性不公正

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-07-21 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12486

Bradley Hillier-Smith

{"title":"Direct and structural injustice against refugees","authors":"Bradley Hillier-Smith","doi":"10.1111/josp.12486","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12486","url":null,"abstract":"The dominant philosophical approach to understanding the moral duties that states in the Global North have toward the 26 million refugees worldwide is what we can call the Duty of Rescue Approach.1 According to this approach, states in the Global North (hereafter Northern states) are mere innocent bystanders overlooking the humanitarian crisis of refugee displacement unfold, and these states have moral duties to rescue refugees from this situation, at least if such states are able to do so at little cost to themselves.2Serena Parekh's recent normative analysis (2017, 2020) has sought to challenge this dominant approach. Parekh highlights certain Northern state policies and practices used in response to refugees while they are displaced and suggests that refugees endure extensive harms as result of such policies and practices, including the harms of containment and encampment, and their being prevented from accessing adequate refuge. These harms, Parekh argues, are an injustice. Thus, for Parekh, certain Northern states, far from being mere innocent bystanders, are responsible for injustice against refugees.In this article, I fully endorse Parekh's claims that refugees endure certain harms as a result of Northern state practices, and that such harms constitute an injustice against refugees. Yet, I will explore how we ought to understand this injustice. I contest Parekh's claim that the harms refugees endure as a result of Northern state practices are, and ought to be understood as, a structural injustice—an unfortunate, unintended unjust outcome resulting from structural processes (call this Parekh's Structural Injustice Approach). Instead, I contend that these harms are, and ought to be understood as, a direct injustice against refugees—an unjust outcome directly resulting from specific and avoidable policies enacted by relatively unconstrained actors (call this the Direct Injustice Approach). I argue that Parekh's Structural Injustice Approach fails to accurately capture the causal and normative relations between Northern state practices and the harms endured by refugees, and that this approach fails to provide any advancement on, and suffers from same the problems as, the standard Duty of Rescue Approach to which it is ostensibly an alternative. I instead advocate a Direct Injustice Approach to understanding the harms that refugees endure as a result of Northern states practices. If these harms are indeed a direct injustice, then responsible Northern states are certainly not mere innocent bystanders, and are not merely involved in structural processes that have an unintended unjust outcome (as on Parekh's Structural Injustice Approach), but are instead directly committing a grave injustice against innocent refugees and thus have urgent negative duties to refrain from unjustly harming the world's displaced.Section 1 explains Parekh's","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 2","pages":"262-284"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12486","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46764103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Digital participatory democracy: A normative framework for the democratic governance of the digital commons 数字参与式民主：数字公域民主治理的规范框架

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-07-20 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12489

Alec Stubbs

引用次数: 0

Skill-selection and socioeconomic status: An analysis of migration and domestic justice 技能选择和社会经济地位:移民和国内正义的分析

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-07-14 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12485

Michael Ball-Blakely

引用次数: 0

“How should we respond to climate change? Virtue ethics and aggregation problems” “我们应该如何应对气候变化？美德伦理和聚合问题”

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-07-07 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12488

Dominic Lenzi

{"title":"“How should we respond to climate change? Virtue ethics and aggregation problems”","authors":"Dominic Lenzi","doi":"10.1111/josp.12488","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12488","url":null,"abstract":"One of the most discussed questions in climate ethics is whether individuals have a moral responsibility to reduce their emissions, or even to become carbon neutral. However, virtue ethics has been largely absent from this debate. This article explores the implications of a neo-Aristotelian account, examining how we respond to climate change as a shared problem, and the characteristic reasons that motivate us to do what we can in response. I contrast this account with consequentialist and deontological approaches, showing that while virtue concepts will often require individuals to reduce their individual emissions, this does not depend on showing that individual emitting actions are harmful. To understand the virtue-ethical notion of acting well in response to climate change, we must tell a richer story about our moral contexts and characters. In telling such a story, we will see that merely reducing one's personal emissions while refraining from other actions could reflect vice, while acting well could consist in assisting local adaptation or raising awareness, rather than reducing one's emissions to zero.Section 1 explores the differences between standard approaches to climate responsibility and virtue ethical approaches, introducing the core theoretical claims of the latter. Section 2 returns to Parfit's discussion of aggregation problems to clarify the basic approach. Section 3 explores the thought that in response to climate change, acting well means doing what we can. This admittedly vague response gives rise to concerns with action-guidance and demandingness. Thus, Section 4 argues that acting well must be understood in light of one's context. This shows that there are many ways to act well in response to climate change, and that the poor and young people who have emitted little can nonetheless respond to climate change as a shared moral problem. Finally, Section 5 explores the importance of exemplary climate actions, their difference from otherwise good actions, and argues that such actions can inspire us to do more than we thought ourselves capable.To understand how virtue ethics approaches our question, consider first how most philosophers have approached it. In the large debate about individual climate responsibility, the desiderata for a successful argument are as follows: first, we attribute causal responsibility to an agent for harm resulting from the emission of greenhouse gases. Second, we attribute moral responsibility if the agent knew or should have known that harm would result from these actions. Third, we identify a moral obligation to cease contributing to harm, and/or to compensate those harmed (Vanderheiden, 2007).The most significant dispute concerns whether the right kind of causal connection holds between individual actions and the harms of climate change (Nefsky, 2019). This is difficult to establish since each individual is an extremely sma","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 3","pages":"421-436"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12488","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44684714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

The populist challenge to European Union legitimacy: Old wine in new bottles? 民粹主义对欧盟合法性的挑战:新瓶装旧酒?

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-07-07 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12487

Ilaria Cozzaglio, Dimitrios Efthymiou

{"title":"The populist challenge to European Union legitimacy: Old wine in new bottles?","authors":"Ilaria Cozzaglio, Dimitrios Efthymiou","doi":"10.1111/josp.12487","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12487","url":null,"abstract":"The European Union's (EU's) legitimacy is currently under pressure from what is widely perceived as a populist challenge. Populists charge the EU as being undemocratic, unrepresentative, technocratic, and tied to the interests of the elite; as serving neither the will nor the interests of the people; and as simultaneously paying too little attention to the concerns of its member states while also being only timidly cosmopolitan. These claims have stimulated a debate among scholars in the social sciences on what populism is, and on the legitimacy of populists' claims. Scholars have often described populist stances as illiberal and antidemocratic (Mudde, 2004; Müller, 2017; Urbinati, 2019a) and criticized them for their antipluralistic attitude (Galston, 2018). This paper aims to assess the normative and conceptual cogency of these diverse claims.In this regard, we make three arguments. First, the critique of illiberalism and antidemocraticism does not target populists specifically, because some populists appeal to the principle of equality, solidarity and have a cosmopolitan picture of the international society. Second, a critique of the populist conception of international legitimacy should look not only at their claims on input legitimacy, but also at those on output legitimacy, and at the incoherence that characterizes their appeal to one or the other of their preferred theories of legitimacy—Rousseaueanian or Hobbesian. Finally, we suggest that what is inherently problematic in any populist claim on the EU's legitimacy, regardless of any other characterization is the way in which they conceive of the distinction between the elite and the people—a distinction that grounds their political position in international relations. We conclude that populism amounts to neither a normatively distinct approach for assessing EU's legitimacy, in terms of both input and output legitimacy, nor it is conceptually necessary to grasp internal diversities within political unions such as the EU, because the distinction between the people and the elite on which it is conceptually grounded often relies on a fallacy.The article develops as follows. In Section 2 we contextualize our investigation within the scholarship on the EU's legitimacy and summarize how scholars have characterized populism by resorting to either thick or thin accounts. While the latter focus almost exclusively on the populist appeal to the distinction between the people and the elite, the former include illiberalism and antidemocraticism among the characteristics of populism. We then argue that developing a critique of populism by focusing on illiberalism and antidemocraticism is not distinctive of populism because, as we show in Section 3, the reality of populist movements is complex and variegated. In that section, we bring in examples from populists in Germany, Italy, and the UK to show that among many illiberal and antidemo","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 4","pages":"510-525"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12487","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45691734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0