{"title":"Issue Information - NASSP page","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12477","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12477","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 2","pages":"285"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12477","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50116064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Climate hypocrisy and environmental integrity","authors":"Valentin Beck","doi":"10.1111/josp.12522","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12522","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Climate change poses an existential threat to the world's ecosystems and to human societies. In order to slow and eventually halt global warming, governments, firms, and civil society must enact radical structural change in order to minimize greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel use. Cynicism, pessimism, and defeatism are currently prevalent, however, and threaten to undermine the cooperative spirit needed to achieve a low carbon economy. Climate change denial has played a major role in feeding these destructive attitudes. Since the discovery of the greenhouse effect, the fossil fuel industry and a network of powerful allies have utilized every imaginable tactic to promote business as usual and to foster political inaction. For decades, they have sown doubt and misinformation about global warming, its causes, and its dangerous impact (Oreskes & Conway <span>2012</span>). In response to widespread acceptance of the proof of anthropogenic warming, these actors have adapted their strategies beyond outright factual denial. One alternative strategy is shifting the public debate to individual morality (Lamb et al., <span>2020</span>; Mann, <span>2021</span>), emphasizing how individual lifestyles are inextricably intertwined with the environmentally profligate status quo, and thereby demoralizing the citizens of top emitting nations. The charge of hypocrisy is prominent in such demoralization efforts. It is leveled against climate scientists and activists, pro-environmentalist politicians and their supporters, “eco-celebrities”, or simply “the elites”, who are alleged not to practice what they preach, as they lead energy-intensive lifestyles.</p><p>If this charge were advanced only by agents who attempt to delay climate action, one could dismiss it by pointing to their own immoral activities. Instead of doing these lobbyists the favor of discussing the charge in earnest, one could change the terms of the conversation and redirect attention to the damaging effects of climate denial, and to feasible and urgently needed institutional decarbonization measures. The discursive constellation is more complicated, however, for two reasons. First, the accusation of lifestyle hypocrisy has long been a recurring theme in the general debate on climate change. It is not only discussed by those who are cynical about the prospects for individual and political climate action (such “climate cynicism” is not necessarily strategic). It is also considered by many who reflect, in good faith, on questions of individual morality and integrity in relation to climate change—such as how to reconcile our prosperous way of life with the imperative to leave a habitable world for future generations. Second, the accusation often takes another form, namely when governments or politicians are criticized for actions that contradict their proclaimed concern for climate change mitigation. This second variant of the hypocrisy charge can also be leveled with different motivations","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 2","pages":"223-242"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12522","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47335797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reparations as balance","authors":"Luke Moffett","doi":"10.1111/josp.12523","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12523","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Reparations are often justified as a means to ensure “peace,” “reconciliation,” or to “vindicate victims” (Bottigliero, <span>2004</span>, p. 14; Greiff, <span>2006</span>, pp. 463–466; Laplante, <span>2015</span>, pp. 555–557). The justification of reparations range from corrective justice notions of <i>restitutio in integrum</i> (returning all that is lost) to moral notions of recognition and relational restoration, to even communitarian notions of engendering civic trust, social cohesion and transformative explanations of the place of reparations in post-conflict societies. Reparations can seem almost Janus-faced, allowing a broad umbrella of conceptions and expectations to co-exist, but it is worth interrogating the justifications of reparations, as it can help to “serve to clarify the nature and the full extent of our normative commitments” (Greiff, <span>2012</span>, p. 33).</p><p>This article analyses some of the main justifications for reparations so as to challenge some of their normative assumptions in redressing the past. The discussion focuses on three predominate concepts of reparations namely justice, morality/recognition and reconciliation/relational justifications. These accounts do not fully reflect the practice of reparations for mass atrocities, which creates a normative account that is either too utopian to be realized or inadequately provides the conceptual tools to navigate moral challenges to realize effective reparations. Indeed more critical scholars working on these issues point to “rough” or “imperfect” justice (Eizenstat, <span>2003</span>), but do not provide a coherent account to what this theoretically amounts to. Instead this author proposes reparation as balance to reflect that such measures in practice are part of a negotiated process. Reparation as balance involves the relevant stakeholders finding common ground to redress the past and prevent its non-recurrence in the future. This point is referred to as the “goldilocks' zone” wherein reparations can be conceived as a space to which conflicting perspective can find a harmony to redress the past through a spectrum of measures. Such a position does not fully repair victims' harm as required by <i>restitutio in integrum</i>, but also does not compromise society's values nor is humiliating to those responsible. This approach envisages reparations as not simply a victim-centered measure to remedy their harm, but also a space for responsible actors to rehabilitate their own moral position in the present and future from their past actions. “Reparations as balance” is informed by many contemporary struggles for reparations by victims, but also an understanding of what has succeeded in practice.</p><p>Reparations are a means to find equilibrium after violence, a way to move forward from the violations of the past. There are elements in each of these theories that resonate around the importance of values, the actors' relationship (whether social or not) between perpet","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 4","pages":"624-642"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12523","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49571747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Responding to microaggression with irony: The case of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz","authors":"Sergio Armando Gallegos-Ordorica, Javiera Perez Gomez","doi":"10.1111/josp.12521","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12521","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 2","pages":"300-319"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44315479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ideal theory, political liberalism, and the well-ordered society","authors":"Samuel Freeman","doi":"10.1111/josp.12520","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12520","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 2","pages":"278-298"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45230417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Public reason and private bias: Accommodating political disagreement","authors":"Athmeya Jayaram","doi":"10.1111/josp.12518","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12518","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 2","pages":"243-260"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42266948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Microaggressions as negligence","authors":"David Schraub","doi":"10.1111/josp.12519","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12519","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 2","pages":"282-299"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43786120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Addressing the rise of inequalities: How relevant is Rawls's critique of welfare state capitalism?","authors":"Catherine Audard","doi":"10.1111/josp.12517","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12517","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recent studies by economists such as Piketty (<span>2013</span>, <span>2019</span>) and Atkinson (<span>2015</span>) have contested the well-established view that post-war redistribution policies have been successful in the long term at slowing down the rise of structural inequalities. In reality, the claim goes, they have dealt mostly with reducing inequalities of income through redistribution and have left inequalities of wealth and capital ownership uncontrolled. These, according to their studies, have now risen in the developed world and reached levels more typical of 19th Century Europe.</p><p>To make matters worse, perceptions of and attitudes towards fighting inequalities as unjust that Rawls saw as based on a wide consensus of citizens' “considered judgments” (Rawls, <span>1999</span>, p. 17), have changed, leading to them being accepted as the justified and even necessary price to pay for economic growth and as a reward for merit. Economic arguments based on the need for incentives for raising productivity and the “trickle-down effect” have become widely accepted as if the price of economic efficiency should be disconnected from the demands of equity. Meritocracy has provided ethical arguments too. As John Roemer says, “today the most important problem for the social sciences of inequality is understanding how electorates have come to <i>acquiesce</i> to policies which increase inequality… and to try revealing the logic of the micro mechanisms that lead to this acquiescence… to challenge the view that interfering with the incentives the market provides necessarily reduces economic welfare” (Roemer, <span>2011</span>, p. 301).</p><p>Such recent developments, as some critics have argued (Forrester, <span>2019</span>, pp. 278–279), suggest that Rawls's <i>A Theory of Justice</i>, published in 1971, before the watershed of neoliberal welfare policies, should be considered as a product of its time and as still thinking about justice within the context of the post-war market economy of rising demand and economic growth, supported by state interventions. But post-1980s, another ideology has been dominant. “Small government” and limited state intervention are the new norms, even on the Left with the Third Way in Britain, and redistribution is being reconsidered<sup>1</sup> as often too costly and conducing to the rise of a work-shy population, even if the 2020–2022 COVID-19 pandemic has considerably watered down these criticisms.</p><p>In this article, I examine Rawls's “political” critique of WSC and of its inability to fight structural injustices together with his proposal for POD as a realistic prospect and a credible alternative to WSC. Section 2 describes the rise of inequalities of wealth and power as a source of structural injustices, and Rawls's insight as to why WSC is unable to fight them. Section 3 presents Rawls's alternative proposal of POD with its two ambitions, to protect, but also to emancipate citizens and guarantee their fu","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 2","pages":"221-237"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12517","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41708000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The importance of contingently public goods","authors":"Friedemann Bieber","doi":"10.1111/josp.12516","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12516","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Public goods have recently received increasing attention by philosophers. In addition to work on the historical origins of the notion of public goods (Desmarais-Tremblay, <span>2017</span>), their relevance to the thinking of particular political theorists (de Jongh, <span>2022</span>) and the justifiability of particular public goods, such as the arts (Kessler, <span>2018</span>), there have been a number of systematic attempts to develop a normative theory of public goods (see e.g., Kallhoff, <span>2011</span>; Miller, <span>2004</span>). Asking which public goods the state ought to provide, and how the benefits and burdens of their provision ought to be distributed, these contributions can roughly be divided into two camps. One group of authors has addressed these questions within political liberalism, remaining committed to the principle of state neutrality. By taking individual preferences as given, they note that many public goods promise net efficiency gains and ask according to what principles these benefits ought to be distributed (see e.g., Claassen, <span>2013</span>; Cullity, <span>2008</span>; Murphy & Nagel, <span>2001</span>). In so doing, they see themselves as complementing existing theories of justice, which remain mostly silent on the allocation of costs and benefits of public goods (Miller & Taylor, <span>2018</span>, p. 556). Another group of authors has moved beyond the principle of state neutrality, putting forward arguments in favor of the state provision of public goods that are at least in part independent of individual preferences, such as their potential to foster solidarity and to connect people (see e.g., Ferdman, <span>2018</span>; Kallhoff, <span>2014</span>; Kohn, <span>2020</span>). These authors contend that the social value of public goods remains underappreciated, and that the state may be justified in providing them even if doing so does not result in efficiency gains and reject the view that efficiency is the central criterion by which to judge whether the provision of a public good can be justified. This philosophical interest has coincided with a broader sense of neglect of public goods, which has been voiced by journalists and public intellectuals, in particular in Britain and the United States (Irvin, <span>2012</span>; Judt, <span>2010</span>; Lehrer, <span>2020</span>). Yet, despite the recent surge in attention, the philosophical and, more generally, the “scholarly literature on public goods is relatively thin” (Kohn, <span>2020</span>, p. 2).<sup>1</sup></p><p>This article aims to contribute to the philosophical thinking about public goods in three ways. First, highlighting an ambiguity in how the term “public good” is used, Section 2 proposes to distinguish between <i>inherently public goods</i>, which cohere to the economist's definition of a good that is non-rivalrous and non-excludable, and <i>contingently public goods</i>, which are non-rivalrous and, though in principle excludable, p","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 2","pages":"202-222"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12516","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46599291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - NASSP PAGE","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12474","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12474","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 1","pages":"145"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12474","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50147406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}