Journal of Social Philosophy最新文献

{"title":"Issue Information - NASSP page","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12418","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"53 2","pages":"289"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12418","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134802147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"CONTRIBUTORS","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12417","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"53 2","pages":"146-147"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134802148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Basic racial realism, social constructionism, and the ordinary concept of race","authors":"Aaron M. Griffith","doi":"10.1111/josp.12470","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12470","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Joshua Glasgow and Jonathan M. Woodward (<span>2015</span>) have proposed a new account of the metaphysics of race, which they call “basic racial realism.” According to the view, races are kinds whose members are united by sharing similarities, for example, visible traits like skin color, that are not directly relevant to science. They argue that basic racial realism has certain dialectical advantages over the other parties to the debate over race, viz. racial antirealism, biological racial realism, and racial social constructionism.</p><p>Glasgow and Woodward should be commended for introducing basic racial realism to the debate over the reality of race. It offers a novel account of race that promises to track the ordinary concept of race without undermining the social and political significance of race. For all those benefits, however, basic racial realism faces certain troubles. I argue, first, that basic racial realism is not as consistent with the ordinary concept of race as Glasgow and Woodward make it out to be. Second, I argue that basic racial realism does not enjoy the dialectical advantages over social constructionism that they suggest it does. In the third section, I defend social constructionism about race against their charge that it violates the ordinary concept of race. I conclude with general reflections about the comparative surprises that basic racial realism and constructionism give us regarding race.</p><p>The three familiar positions in the debate are racial antirealism, biological racial realism, and racial social constructionism. Basic racial realism says that race is real (pace the antirealist) but is neither a natural kind nor a social kind (pace the biological realist and the social constructionist, respectively). On Glasgow and Woodward's view race is a “basic kind,” that is, a kind whose members are united merely by sharing a similarity, but a similarity that is not directly relevant to science (<span>2015</span>, p. 451). (Basic kinds as such, they claim, lack causal powers and so their essential properties sometimes fail to overlap with properties that are useful to science.) Basic kinds are not gerrymandered or arbitrary sets, then, but objective, mind-independent kinds that do not rise to the scientific importance of natural or social kinds. Races are basic kinds in that they are “groups of people who are distinguished from other groups by having certain visible features (like skin color) to a significantly disproportionate degree” (<span>2015</span>, p. 452).<sup>1</sup></p><p>According to Glasgow and Woodward, familiar parties to the race debate share a commitment to “elitism” about kinds. Such elitism has it that only kinds that are directly relevant to science, whether natural or social, are real. They find the elitist assumption implausible because basic kinds seem to qualify as real on a plausible conception of reality—objective and mind-independent similarity—without being the direct objects of scientifi","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 2","pages":"236-247"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12470","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46890187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Race and evaluation of philosophical skill: A virtue theoretical explanation of why people of color are so absent from philosophy","authors":"Eric Bayruns García","doi":"10.1111/josp.12472","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12472","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 3","pages":"386-408"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142324647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Is affirmative action racist? Reflections toward a theory of institutional racism","authors":"César Cabezas","doi":"10.1111/josp.12467","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12467","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 2","pages":"218-235"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50143228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The dignity of work: An ethical argument against mandatory retirement","authors":"Nancy S. Jecker","doi":"10.1111/josp.12471","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12471","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 2","pages":"152-168"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44092377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Human rights as protections against rational despair","authors":"Tony Reeves","doi":"10.1111/josp.12469","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12469","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 2","pages":"169-182"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44892834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Toward a republican theory of secession","authors":"Lluis Perez-Lozano","doi":"10.1111/josp.12468","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12468","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Like most theories of democracy, democratic republicanism has usually taken for granted who the <i>demos</i> is. However, precisely one of the most frequent sources of political conflicts in contemporary history is the determination of its boundaries, particularly –though not only– in secession conflicts. This article aims to answer a related question: <i>what kind of right to secede from a modern democratic state</i>,<sup>1</sup> <i>if any, can be acknowledged from a democratic republican viewpoint</i>? By answering this question, I hope to make a contribution both to republican literature (in which secession has barely been analyzed) and also to the normative literature on secession (in which republicanism has very rarely been used as a normative framework).</p><p>The core tenet of the republican theory of secession developed here is the recognition of a non-unilateral<sup>2</sup> right of secession for any democratic secessionist community within a democratic state, coupled symmetrically with a non-unilateral right to territorial unity for that democratic host state. The rationale behind this theory is to deny both sides the power to impose their will without having to consider the interests and opinions of the other side; that is, to deny arbitrary power, which in republican terms is synonymous with domination. As we will see, this in turn minimizes the chances of permanent majorities and powerful minorities achieving arbitrary power in center-periphery conflicts.</p><p>This article does not discuss secession as a general phenomenon, but focuses particularly on secession conflicts where both secessionists and the host state (and the unionists within it) are peaceful<sup>3</sup> and democratic. The rationale behind this analytical choice is to minimize what we might call <i>normative noise</i>, i.e., normative issues that distract our attention from the ones that we initially intended to discuss. Modern democracies, however imperfect they may be, are the closest polities to democratic republican ideals that exist in our contemporary world. Thus, when neither the host state nor the potentially seceding territory are attempting to move away from this political model in a non-democratic direction, secession appears normatively “naked” in democratic-republican terms. I am not trying to find out whether democratic secessionists are legitimated in seceding from undemocratic states, nor whether democratic states are legitimated in suppressing an undemocratic secessionist attempt.</p><p>The article presents this theory over eight sections: (1) a review of current theories of right of secession, pointing out why republicanism can be a useful framework to overcome their weaknesses; (2) an overview of the main tenets of republicanism, explaining why (and how) republicanism must analyze secession conflicts as a type of factional conflicts; (3) the presentation of the normative core of my republican theory of secession, based on non-unilateralism; (4) t","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"53 3","pages":"421-440"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12468","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43042204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Contributors","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12414","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"53 1","pages":"4-5"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134814225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Frank Cunningham (1940–2022)","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12466","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12466","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"53 1","pages":"6-7"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134814226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}