“我们应该如何应对气候变化?美德伦理和聚合问题”

IF 1.1 3区 哲学 Q3 ETHICS
Dominic Lenzi
{"title":"“我们应该如何应对气候变化?美德伦理和聚合问题”","authors":"Dominic Lenzi","doi":"10.1111/josp.12488","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>One of the most discussed questions in climate ethics is whether individuals have a moral responsibility to reduce their emissions, or even to become carbon neutral. However, virtue ethics has been largely absent from this debate. This article explores the implications of a neo-Aristotelian account, examining how we respond to climate change as a shared problem, and the characteristic reasons that motivate us to do what we can in response. I contrast this account with consequentialist and deontological approaches, showing that while virtue concepts will often require individuals to reduce their individual emissions, this does not depend on showing that individual emitting actions are harmful. To understand the virtue-ethical notion of <i>acting well</i> in response to climate change, we must tell a richer story about our moral contexts and characters. In telling such a story, we will see that merely reducing one's personal emissions while refraining from other actions could reflect vice, while acting well could consist in assisting local adaptation or raising awareness, rather than reducing one's emissions to zero.</p><p>Section 1 explores the differences between standard approaches to climate responsibility and virtue ethical approaches, introducing the core theoretical claims of the latter. Section 2 returns to Parfit's discussion of aggregation problems to clarify the basic approach. Section 3 explores the thought that in response to climate change, acting well means doing what we can. This admittedly vague response gives rise to concerns with action-guidance and demandingness. Thus, Section 4 argues that acting well must be understood in light of one's context. This shows that there are many ways to act well in response to climate change, and that the poor and young people who have emitted little can nonetheless respond to climate change as a shared moral problem. Finally, Section 5 explores the importance of exemplary climate actions, their difference from otherwise good actions, and argues that such actions can inspire us to do more than we thought ourselves capable.</p><p>To understand how virtue ethics approaches our question, consider first how most philosophers have approached it. In the large debate about individual climate responsibility, the desiderata for a successful argument are as follows: first, we attribute <i>causal</i> responsibility to an agent for harm resulting from the emission of greenhouse gases. Second, we attribute <i>moral</i> responsibility if the agent knew or should have known that harm would result from these actions. Third, we identify a <i>moral obligation</i> to cease contributing to harm, and/or to compensate those harmed (Vanderheiden, <span>2007</span>).</p><p>The most significant dispute concerns whether the right kind of causal connection holds between individual actions and the harms of climate change (Nefsky, <span>2019</span>). This is difficult to establish since each individual is an extremely small part of causal chains comprising billions of actors stretching back to the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. Several have argued that the actions of individuals make no <i>meaningful</i> difference to the production of harms from climate change. Baylor Johnson (<span>2003</span>) argues that individual acts do not cause climate-related harms. Ronald Sandler (<span>2010</span>) argues that individual actions are “inconsequential” in producing climate change, responding to a similar argument from Dale Jamieson (<span>2007</span>), while Joakim Sandberg (<span>2011</span>) argues that no consequential harms follow from individual actions. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (<span>2005</span>) claims there is nothing morally objectionable about joyriding in an inefficient car since this action produces no discernible harm. Galvin and Harris (<span>2014</span>) argue that since individual actions are impotent, neither rights-based arguments nor expected utility arguments produce moral obligations. Kok-Chor Tan (<span>2015</span>) argues against obligations to change one's lifestyle to become carbon-neutral since the political effects of this remain uncertain. Ben Hale (<span>2011</span>) and Johnson (<span>2003</span>) argue that individual choices not to emit would make no difference due to market forces of demand and supply.<sup>1</sup> Without attributing causal harm, Garrett Cullity (<span>2015</span>) rejects several possible contributions of individuals to collective actions causing climate harm. Instead, Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland (<span>2015</span>) argue that the same climate harms would occur without the contribution of any particular individual.</p><p>Many have objected to these arguments. Steve Vanderheiden (<span>2007</span>) argues that individuals do harm in conjunction with others. Avram Hiller argues that “<i>going on a Sunday drive is the moral equivalent of ruining someone's afternoon</i>” (2011, 57, emphasis original), which implies a significant amount of harm over an entire lifetime (cf. Morgan-Knapp &amp; Goodman, <span>2014</span>). Simo Kyllönen (<span>2016</span>) argues that individuals violate the no harm principle by knowingly contributing to an aggregate harm. Others are less convinced that standard accounts of harm are applicable, given the temporal lag between emissions and climate harm. Lauren Hartzell-Nicholls (<span>2012</span>) argues that individual contributions to climate change are <i>de dicto</i> harmful because they impose threats of harmful conditions upon future people, without being harmful in the standard <i>de re</i> sense. Instead, Elizabeth Cripps (<span>2011</span>) argues that the group roughly comprising wealthy individuals cause morally significant and predicable climate harm, thus violating a form of the harm principle applicable to collectives.</p><p>A similar picture emerges for the other two desiderata. Those skeptical about the causal claim usually deny that individuals are morally responsible for harms caused by climate change (e.g., Baatz, <span>2014</span>; Barry &amp; Øverland, <span>2015</span>; Cullity, <span>2015</span>; Galvin &amp; Harris, <span>2014</span>; Johnson, <span>2003</span>; Sinnott-Armstrong, <span>2005</span>; Tan, <span>2015</span>), while those who defend versions of the causal claim tend to think that moral responsibility can be attributed to individuals, whether directly or in conjunction with others (e.g., Hiller, <span>2011</span>; Kyllönen, <span>2016</span>; Morgan-Knapp &amp; Goodman, <span>2014</span>; Schwenkenbecher, <span>2014</span>; Vanderheiden, <span>2007</span>), or to certain collectives (e.g., Banks, <span>2013</span>; Cripps, <span>2011</span>; Sandberg, <span>2011</span>; Tan, <span>2015</span>; Vance, <span>2016</span>). So too for the third desideratum, some argue that there is nothing individuals are morally obliged to do, aside from engaging in political action (Cullity, <span>2015</span>; Galvin &amp; Harris, <span>2014</span>; Johnson, <span>2003</span>; Sinnott-Armstrong, <span>2005</span>; Tan, <span>2015</span>).<sup>2</sup> Others believe either that there is some weaker form of moral obligation, for instance an imperfect duty to use only their fair share of emissions (Baatz, <span>2014</span>), or an obligation to avoid knowingly or foreseeably harming (Hiller, <span>2011</span>; Kyllönen, <span>2016</span>; Morgan-Knapp &amp; Goodman, <span>2014</span>).</p><p>My intention here is not to vindicate or reject any of these arguments, but to step back from them in order to ask a different question, namely: what does virtue ethics require in response to climate change? This question has received very little attention. The arguments surveyed above narrow the question to a search for individual obligations, grounded upon a causal account of harm resulting from actions that emit greenhouse gases. The most obvious explanation for this narrowed focus is not any one argument, but a set of theoretical assumptions imported from deontological and consequentialist theories. I do not claim that these accounts are mistaken on their own terms, merely that they presuppose a picture of ethical enquiry that is not shared by all theories. In particular, this picture is contested by virtue ethical approaches. Indeed, for this reason virtue ethicists often find existing ethical debates saddled with uncongenial assumptions. As Rosalind Hursthouse (<span>1991</span>) pointed out in the case of abortion, what had previously been regarded as <i>the</i> point of contention, namely the status of the fetus, is simply not decisive for such an approach. We are in a similar situation here. According to virtue-ethical accounts, we do <i>not</i> require a causal account of the harmful action that each individual contributes in order to justify moral responses, as has already been argued in two contributions to this literature (Jamieson, <span>2007</span>; Sandler, <span>2010</span>). Yet as we will see, the significance of this point remains misunderstood, as do the more general implications of thinking about climate change in terms of virtue concepts. Thus, let us first clarify how virtue-ethical responses differ from those considered above.</p><p>To compare the structure of virtue-ethical theories, we must introduce the central concept of virtue. As Christine Swanton (<span>2003</span>, 19–20) puts it, a virtue is “a good quality of character, more specifically a disposition to respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in an excellent or good enough way.” As we will see below, this distinction between excellent and merely good enough action has many implications for thinking about what virtues require of us. But we can already note a further point here. At least for neo-Aristotelians, the moral quality of action, that is, whether something counts as an excellent or good enough response, is tied to the correct judgment of the virtuous person. As Aristotle puts it, virtuous people develop “an eye for things, and so they see correctly” (1934, 1143b).<sup>3</sup> As such, virtues are not merely reliable tendencies to act on moral rules in certain roughly similar circumstances, but complex states of character involving our emotions, our responsiveness to reasons, and the practical judgment to recognize these reasons in context. While the word ‘virtue’ has an old-fashioned ring to it (Williams <span>2006</span>), virtue terms are widespread in common discourse. The most familiar are justice, honesty, courage, generosity, and so on, while their opposites (which may be multiple) are vices such as injustice, selfishness, dishonesty, cowardice, and so on.<sup>4</sup></p><p>How do virtue terms affect our question concerning individuals and climate change? This is something we will explore throughout, but we can already point to several immediate differences. First, we do not begin ethical enquiry by identifying an action, such as emitting CO<sub>2</sub>, and a moral principle, which applies to it. Instead, we begin with the identification of virtue concepts that bear upon the situation (which need not be an action), then explore the characteristic reasons and motivations these imply when judged from a particular context. In this way, we seek to understand the sorts of responses that would count as acting well in response to climate change.</p><p>Second, the issue of moral responsibility looks quite different. Because virtues are habituated traits of character, the scope of moral responsibility is potentially broader than for action-based theories. In the context of climate change, the latter seek to establish that individual <i>actions</i> are harmful, and thus that we have a moral responsibility to cease doing them. Instead, virtue ethical views attribute moral responsibility for <i>characteristic</i> activities, that is, ways of living, because these reflect our moral character. The moral evaluation of action is thus derived from a prior analysis of good or bad moral character. This explains how virtue ethical views can remain uncommitted on the question of whether isolated individual actions produce climate harms. All that virtue ethical views require is that characteristic ways of living can produce climate harms. This is a maximally uncontroversial empirical claim,<sup>5</sup> and one that even skeptics about the harmfulness of individual actions can readily accept. Instead, because virtue ethics is primarily interested in ways of living that express character traits, all that needs to be claimed is that the emissions produced by individuals acting in character over long periods of time can produce climate harms.</p><p>Note that this point already addresses a misunderstanding in the existing debate, where Sinnott-Armstrong asks rhetorically, “How can we tell whether driving a gas guzzler for fun ‘expresses a vice’? On the face of it, it expresses a desire for fun. There is nothing vicious about having fun” (2005, 295). Sinnott-Armstrong's phrase “on the face of it” is unintentionally apt: barring some obvious cases which are always wrong and cannot even be characterized in ethically neutral terms (e.g., murder),<sup>6</sup> we are in need of greater detail about the context of action and the person performing it to decide whether someone's actions are vicious. Consider Sinnott-Armstrong's example not as a one-off action but as a characteristic lifestyle: a person who has a high-emitting lifestyle, knows about the climate crisis, and refuses to change his lifestyle and continues with his ‘innocent’ fun. This tells us far more about such a person's faulty moral character than the (potentially one-off) action of driving an inefficient car for fun. Without going into such details here, while a one-off action may not reflect vice, doing the same thing characteristically may well be selfish or uncaring.</p><p>The third and potentially most controversial move in this account is the absence of any central notion of moral obligation. Virtue ethics, especially in its neo-Aristotelian forms, has little use for the concept of moral obligation, a point that has been familiar since Anscombe (<span>1958</span>).<sup>7</sup> This involves rejecting the common presumption in ethical theory that our weightiest moral reasons must be intelligible as obligations. This thought takes many forms, and it is also present in the debate about climate responsibility. For instance, Cullity worries that focusing upon reasons that cannot be considered individual climate obligations might “make it harder to motivate ourselves to address this problem properly” (2015, 164). However, there is simply no theory-neutral reason to think that our strongest or most motivating moral reasons must be intelligible as moral obligations (Williams <span>2006</span>, 200ff.). Nonetheless, this difference may be overstated since many cases of acting virtuously will <i>indeed</i> be intelligible (by other theorists) in terms of moral obligation. As Hursthouse (<span>1999</span>, 123ff.) points out, there are conceptual connections between obligation-based motives such as acting from a good will, and acting from virtue, since the latter means acting from “a settled state of good character” and for compelling moral reasons (1999, 123). Such reasons can be readily described as acting from duty or on principle.<sup>8</sup> These connections have also been noted in the debate about climate responsibility. For example, Gunnar Björnsson (<span>2021</span>, 259, n. 7) defends a shared obligation to care appropriately about collective problems, which he claims to be structurally similar to acting according to virtue.</p><p>While there are indeed many similarities between acting virtuously and acting on a moral obligation, important differences remain. This is because our choice of moral concepts affects what we consider to be an adequate argument or relevant objection. For instance, Björnsson considers the perspective of climate activists, noting that they often think in terms of doing the best they can, or living up to their moral ideals (2021, 252–3). However, Björnsson simply assumes that these notions can be captured as moral obligations. Yet there is nothing in ordinary notions such as doing the best one can, living up to our moral ideals, or even doing what we believe is required of us that necessitates thinking in terms of moral obligation (at least not in the sense given to this notion in ethical theory). Moreover, as we have already seen, claiming that something is a moral obligation invites challenges concerning the harmfulness of one's individual actions, while also narrowing the moral landscape considerably.<sup>9</sup> An alternative, which I develop in what follows, is to approach such ordinary notions of moral responsibility using virtue terms.</p><p>To sketch the general approach available to virtue theorists, let us return to Derek Parfit's discussion of what he called “aggregation problems,” of which climate change is a paradigm case.<sup>10</sup> In a prescient passage, Parfit wrote:</p><p>“For the sake of small benefits to ourselves, or our families, we may deny others much greater total benefits, or impose on others much greater total harms. We may think this permissible because the effects on each of the others will be either trivial or imperceptible. If this is what we think, what we do will often be much worse for all of us” (1984, 86).</p><p>Although aggregation problems are often couched in terms of narrow self-interest, all that is necessary to produce them is acting on a principle of expanded self-interest which holds that “each rather than none does what will be better for himself, <i>or his family</i>, or <i>those he loves</i>” (1984, 62). Parfit argued that all standard moral theories give rise to aggregation problems, yet it is unclear that this is the case for virtue ethics. Parfit briefly objected that according to such views, there would still be “cases where acting morally (i.e., on the virtues) would be, on the whole, worse for someone” (1984, 87). While an outcome that is merely worse for someone need not be a counter-example for virtue ethics, it might be sufficient to show that acting in conformity with virtue ethics would produce aggregation problems. I will return to this point shortly.</p><p>First, consider Parfit's well-known solution that individuals should become <i>rational altruists</i>. This solution consists in outlining two decision rules that rational altruists would follow, which are designed to eliminate the “five mistakes in moral mathematics” which all standard theories seem to make and thus which produce aggregation problems (1984, 67ff.). Thus, Aggregation Rule 1 states that individuals can depart from “common sense morality” (i.e., the expanded self-interest principle already noted) when this produces an aggregation problem (1984, 100). When this is so, individuals should instead do whatever will <i>actually</i> best support their expanded self-interest, thus avoiding the mistakes in moral mathematics. In resource over-appropriation cases, this requires individuals to restrict what they appropriate on the condition that enough other individuals do so as well, where ‘enough’ is the smallest number of contributors necessary to resolve the aggregation problem (1984, 100–1).<sup>11</sup> Yet Aggregation Rule 1 can create conflicts with partiality to our loved ones that also produce aggregation problems. In response, Parfit introduces Aggregation Rule 2, which states that whenever Aggregation Rule 1 leads to aggregation problems, we should give <i>no priority</i> to our partial aims. Aggregation Rule 2 is conditional, since it only applies when we believe that sufficiently many others will also give no priority to their partial aims (1984, 101).</p><p>This solution is framed in terms of decision rules, rather than the requirements of being disposed to reliably act upon them. To be sure, Parfit (<span>1984</span>, 103) acknowledges that there is already a problem with the dispositions associated with common-sense morality, since our partiality to loved ones may undermine acting in ways that avoid aggregation problems. However, Parfit underestimates the dispositional requirements of his solution, which seems to involve a set of new dispositions to respond to aggregation problems, thereby either supplanting or correcting the dispositions associated with common-sense morality. Unfortunately, it is far from clear how anyone could cultivate the dispositions required to become a rational altruist. In the first place, habituating a disposition requires acting successfully upon it sufficiently many times. To do so, aspiring rational altruists would have to be on the lookout for situations in which sufficiently many other people are likely forego their partial aims in order to cooperate. The conditional nature of Aggregation Rule 2 in particular seems unlikely to be fulfilled very often (if ever), leaving few opportunities to develop such a disposition. Second, Parfit acknowledges that there is a tension among our moral motivations to act on common-sense morality, and motivations to act on Aggregation Rule 1. However, he does not explain how we are to overcome or resolve such tensions. This is made worse when Aggregation Rule 2 is introduced, which would involve either a further disposition and a further motivation to act on it, departing from both Aggregation Rule 1 and common-sense morality, or a modification of the newly-introduced motivation to act on Aggregation Rule 1. In either case, tensions among these moral motivations remain unresolved.</p><p>From a virtue-ethical perspective, issues of habituation and moral motivation are not secondary concerns to that of finding correct decision rules or moral principles, but are a <i>primary</i> focus of ethical theorizing. As such, a solution that rests on dispositions that are impossible to inculcate is no solution at all. Rather than focusing upon decision rules, a virtue-ethical response would attempt to show what kinds of people we would be if we produced aggregation problems, and the characteristic reasons for responding to them. Although virtue ethicists have written little about aggregation problems, the beginning of such a response is available in a remark on Parfit by Philippa Foot. In <i>Natural Goodness</i>, Foot claimed the solution to aggregation problems.</p><p>“Depends on our human way of thinking. We act within a language that allows us to say ‘I owe it to him’ or ‘I suppose I should play my part’ (as we nowadays think, for instance, of taking a bus rather than a car, to reduce traffic on the road, knowing that we ourselves may need to get somewhere urgently by car some other time)” (2001, 44).</p><p>We can begin filling out what this “human way of thinking” means by asking: would a set of virtuous people produce aggregation problems, if each were acting in character? There seems no reason to think not. This possibility depends on empirical variables such as how abundant natural resources are, how many people there are, and what is done with these resources. Thus, Parfit is likely correct that acting well according to virtue ethics could produce an aggregation problem.</p><p>However, <i>once they realized what they were doing</i>, virtuous people would not respond by denying that they should do anything. There is a significant ethical (and ordinarily, legal) difference between unwittingly causing a problem, and continuing to cause it once we have become aware of it. Once virtuous people realized what they were doing, they would certainly <i>not</i> think that continuing to contribute to an aggregation problem is not grounds for serious complaint. It is hard to imagine them responding as Parfit's self-interested agents, who are <i>ex hypothesis</i> motivated only by concern for their own ends and those of their families. Such people might indeed say, “Well, it's true that what we are all doing causes a problem for all of us. But my contribution is so small! Surely <i>I</i> don't have to do anything.” Or, ‘I realize that if we all continue doing this it is worse for everyone. But I don't care. And besides, no one can blame me. I'm not actually harming anyone’. Instead, even <i>enkratic</i> (morally continent) people would say things like, ‘I suppose I should do my part’, even if they do not know the precise effect of their actions. The ongoing Covid-19 pandemic offers many familiar examples: getting vaccinated, wearing a mask in shared spaces, and so on, are individual contributions, which lessen the spread of the virus and consequently save lives. While it will often be impossible to trace the causal effects of such actions from individuals to other individuals, in many societies an ethical norm has already emerged to encourage such actions, and to discourage non-compliance as selfish and irresponsible.</p><p>Therefore, even if they unwittingly produced an aggregation problem, it is plausible to think that virtuous people would not continue perpetuating it precisely <i>because</i> they are just, benevolent, and compassionate. Indeed, Parfit already provides the basis for such a response, writing that the solution to aggregation problems requires that we “care sufficiently about effects on others” (1984, 86). This is a claim about our dispositions, and specifically the reasons to which we are responsive. If benevolence or compassion is the operative virtue, it has an appropriate scope of considerations (factual and normative), and is responsive (cognitively and emotionally) to salient features of the world as we understand it: for instance, to the fate of others. A callous person, that is, someone deficient in benevolence or compassion, would instead object that they do not care whether what they do harms others, while a selfish person would focus on their own interests (or ‘innocent fun’) at the exclusion of others.</p><p>On the view developed thus far, responding to aggregation problems requires recognizing that there is a shared problem towards which I should respond <i>somehow</i>. However, this admittedly vague demand gives rise to further concerns. One issue with vagueness is easy to set aside. First, some might protest that insufficiently clear demands cannot be acted upon. There is little reason for thinking this to be true. As G. A. Cohen pointedly remarked, we seem allergic to vague ethical demands, yet “[w]hen facing our legitimately self-interested choices, we feel no need for a theory that will make everything determinate” (<span>2008</span>, 6). Instead, vagueness might be a more serious concern when we are seeking action-guidance in complex cases. In the above examples, responses appear already well-specified. In the Covid-19 case, government agencies publish recommendations and restrictions, while in the traffic congestion case the set of transport options are determined by available infrastructure and whether one owns a car. However, there are cases in which we may be far less clear about what we should do. Climate change appears to be one such case, given that it is almost impossible to avoid contributing to climate change in <i>any</i> way, and given the multitude of potential actions open to differently situated individuals. Now, it is important to recognise that a similar concern with action-guidance affects all theories. As Stephen Gardiner (<span>2011</span>) has argued, climate change may be so challenging that none of our ethical theories are fully able to address it. Nonetheless, one might worry that an approach grounded in vague virtue terms will offer even less action-guidance than other theories. By exploring what the virtues require in response to climate change, we can address this more serious concern with vagueness.</p><p>One way to fill out what virtue concepts imply is to understand their use, locating them within existing social discourse.<sup>12</sup> While there are many discourses related to climate change, we can begin filling out our response by considering the moral concepts implicit in a recent example, which is both revealing and suitably non-partisan. The United Nations recently produced a booklet entitled <i>170 daily actions to transform our world</i>, aimed at supporting transformative societal change to meet the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).<sup>13</sup> Under “SDG 13: Climate Action,” this booklet lists 10 recommendations including limiting food waste, driving less, organizing tree planting with one's school or company, and spreading awareness about ways to address climate change. This booklet also runs the hopeful slogan across each page: “If you care about the future, be the change. Help to end poverty, to reduce inequalities, and to tackle climate change. Together we can transform the world.” Now, one must take with a grain of salt any hortatory recommendations for individuals to “be the change,” since individual responses have only become more important because policymakers have failed for decades to commit to effective mitigation. It would be dangerous and wrong to imply that collective problems are <i>primarily</i> the responsibility of individuals. As shown by British Petroleum's invention of the carbon footprint, individualizing climate responsibility suits the approximately 90 corporations responsible for two-thirds of all greenhouse gas emissions,<sup>14</sup> who are simultaneously lobbying against climate mitigation while funding climate misinformation (Oreskes &amp; Conway, <span>2010</span>).</p><p>Nonetheless, the appeal to caring about the future is noteworthy, since UN publications are seldom the most radical documents. Yet the phrase running across each page is clearly not meant to be conditional. The point is not that if you happen to care about the future, as you might happen to care about your garden, these are some things you might do; it is that you <i>should</i> care about the future, and as such, these are some of the things you should do. While this booklet does not venture into explaining why, the implication is that failing to care about the future is somehow inappropriate. As noted in Section 2, failing to care about the future means failing to care about the fate of others. Thus, the virtue ethicist can respond that failing to do some or all of these actions implies failing to care sufficiently about others (cf. Björnsson, <span>2021</span>). If so, this would reflect <i>injustice</i>, <i>callousness</i> or <i>indifference</i>, vices which Gardiner (<span>2012</span>) claims are widespread in response to climate change. Since these are vices, their correct attribution implies a judgment of moral blame. The injunction here is that we ought to do what we can to reduce our climate impacts, because we care about others–because we are just, compassionate, and benevolent people. Failing to do what we can, then, is morally blameworthy, because it reflects vices of injustice, callousness, indifference, and so on.</p><p>The critic is again unlikely to be satisfied with the vagueness of this response. Surely, there is a large set of possible actions, and doing some of them might preclude doing others. How can we know which actions are required by justice or benevolence? Moreover, we seem to lack a principled basis for determining when I have done <i>enough</i>. These protests are unlikely to be lessened by the virtue ethicist's response that what counts as acting well is determined both by our characters and by features of our context, and therefore may not be the same for everyone. In other words, the capacity to φ, where φ is some specific moral action, is not something that all (rational) people are or ought to be capable of, except perhaps in a very limited set of cases. Instead, what counts, as acting well for the enkratic person may not be the same as acting well for the fully virtuous person. The critic might now be convinced that virtue ethics is insufficiently action-guiding, perhaps even obscurantist. This raises two essential features of the virtue-ethical conception of moral agency and acting well, which we will address over the next two sections.</p><p>One distinctive feature of virtue ethical approaches is the importance of context in acting well. By context, I mean how the person is morally situated, that is, her social context, and her opportunities for acting, which are not only technological or economic but also shaped by culture. As noted in Section 1, aside from a few cases of intrinsically wrong action, what counts as acting well is difficult to specify independently of context. While context matters to all moral theories, for virtue ethical approaches context is indispensable in the deliberation of the agent looking to act well.</p><p>In contrast, in many accounts context enters the picture only <i>after</i> we have decided what ought to be done, notably by excusing some from the demands of morality. The approaches outlined in Section 1 seek to identify an action (such as reducing one's individual emissions) and a moral principle that generates obligations (such as the no-harm principle). It is only once this general argument has been made that context enters, for instance by exempting some agents from these obligations on the basis of poverty, lack of agency, and so on. Thus, Christian Baatz (<span>2014</span>, 9–10) points out that it is more difficult to live carbon neutrally in some places than in others due to the carbon intensiveness of existing infrastructure. Baatz concludes that there cannot be a moral obligation for carbon neutrality for such people. When context functions as an excusing factor in this way, climate responsibilities will target a very similar set of people, namely the relatively well-off living in wealthy societies, ignoring those living in less favorable circumstances. There are very good reasons for focusing on the climate responsibilities of the relatively well-off, whose per capita contributions to climate change are far higher than those of people in poorer societies (Chakravarty et al., <span>2009</span>). Nonetheless, this focus may imply that poorer people need not respond to climate change on the basis of strong ethical reasons. The analogous conclusion would be that the virtues do not require anything below a certain threshold of material circumstance or bad luck. However, virtue ethical theories emphasize that it is possible to act well, that is, in accordance with virtue, in most (if not all) contexts.<sup>15</sup> Climate change can be understood as a shared moral problem by <i>everyone</i>, and there are many possibilities for us to act well in response, without losing sight of relevant differences that wealth or influence can have upon our responsibilities.</p><p>To illustrate how acting well can require different actions from differently situated people, I will sketch some reasons associated with justice. As we saw in Section 1, virtues are dispositions to respond appropriately to considerations within their ‘field’ (cf. Swanton, <span>2003</span>, 19–20). The ‘field’ of reasons of justice bearing on climate change are likely to be familiar to many readers. Indeed, we have already identified several in Section 2, such as “this is my fair share,” “I owe it to others,” or “I am doing my part.” Nonetheless, we need a richer picture of the person's context to understand what these reasons require.</p><p>There is insufficient space to provide anything beyond a sketch of how context influences how we interpret such reasons, although the following discussion shows what a fuller account would involve. First, consider the exceedingly wealthy. Oxfam estimates that between 1990 and 2015, the wealthiest 1% are responsible for emitting twice as much carbon than the poorest 50%.<sup>16</sup> When this is coupled with their often far greater political power, if an exceedingly wealthy person asked himself what his fair share would involve, the answer might not be merely individual carbon neutrality, but a far more demanding set of activities including lobbying governments for ambitious mitigation policy, ensuring their companies and investments are carbon neutral, investing in renewable energy technologies, funding adaptation, funding public education campaigns to raise awareness about climate change, and so on.</p><p>Leaving aside the exceedingly wealthy, many people are likely to have both the means and opportunity to reduce their emissions, and to engage in collective action aimed at reducing the threat posed by climate change. Acting well on the reason, “this is my fair share.” “I owe it to others,” or “I am doing my part,” is likely to involve the examples we saw in Section 3: reducing food waste, driving less, becoming involved in community tree planting, raising awareness, switching to renewable energy, reducing meat consumption, flying less often or not at all, riding a bicycle or the train, and so on. However, not everyone will be able do all of these things, and not always to the same extent. Climate friendly lifestyles can be more expensive, a fact which reflects the improper pricing of environmental goods rather than the moral goodness of the wealthy.</p><p>In contexts where such options are either absent or prohibitively expensive, acting well may look considerably different. Indeed, in certain contexts, some reasons of justice might also be less applicable. For many in the Global South, their far smaller contributions to climate change and lower wealth likely means that thinking in terms of “my fair share” becomes less meaningful, unless as a demand that <i>others</i> elsewhere start doing their fair share. However, the reason ‘I am doing my part’ appears broader than doing one's fair share, since the latter implies a role in shared efforts to address a social problem. Even in such contexts, doing one's part remains an intelligible basis for acting well in response to climate change. As we saw in the example of traffic congestion, whether we are new to the city and have never driven, or whether we are regularly stuck in gridlock, we can recognize the force of doing our part – and the question of what <i>our</i> part consists in. Young people who have emitted relatively little carbon can recognize this reason of justice, not merely those who have spent their lives driving around in inefficient cars or flying around the world. Doing one's part does not exempt people from responding to climate change simply because they are poor or have emitted little. At the same time, what one's part consists in here could mean something different from reducing one's emissions. For instance, it could mean becoming involved in local climate adaptation projects, or awareness raising of the plight of those most vulnerable to climate change. In these ways, virtue terms make intelligible the moral action of those often ignored in discussions of climate responsibility.</p><p>These responses have revealed another difference between virtue theories and other approaches. In the debate about climate responsibility, it is standard to distinguish between our moral responsibilities as individuals, and those we have as political actors. We saw in Section 1 that many are skeptical about individual responsibilities, but few doubt that climate change imposes on us at least some political responsibilities, perhaps most minimally voting for effective climate policy (Maltais, <span>2013</span>). However, with the exception of the role responsibilities of politicians, this distinction between individual and political responsibilities does not register when using virtue terms. Because human beings are by nature political animals, as Aristotle said, our ethical life is essentially also political in the sense that it is concerned with how we relate to others and to society. Our characteristic ways of relating (or failing to relate) to others in society also reflect our ethical character. This is why an individual response such as carbon neutrality could fall short of acting well, and could even express vices such as selfishness and self-righteousness if carbon neutrality were used as a pretext not to engage in any collective climate efforts. If such a person protested that they had already done their fair share, this would reveal an inappropriate grasp of the reasons of justice bearing upon climate change, and an insufficient concern for others.</p><p>A critic might worry that this seems overly demanding. Surely there comes a time when have we done <i>enough</i> to count as acting well? Some might be prepared to make significant sacrifices (in time and money) to respond to climate change, but does virtue ethics hold that we must all become climate saints or martyrs? Answering this takes us to the second distinctive feature of virtue ethical approaches, namely how moral character affects acting well.</p><p>As noted in Section 1, for neo-Aristotelians the moral quality of action is tied to the correct judgment of the virtuous person. However, recall the distinction between the characteristically excellent action of the fully virtuous person, and the characteristically good enough action of the merely enkratic person. This is brought out in Aristotle's comparison of the deliberation of the ethical ‘novice’ compared to that of the virtuous person.<sup>17</sup> The purpose of this distinction is to show that different actions can count as acting well in light of one's attainment of virtue and practical wisdom. Indeed, as Hursthouse (<span>1999</span>, 125) notes, the ordinary phrase “acting well” is apt to make such a distinction since it can be qualified with adverbs such as “fairly” or “very,” unlike the seemingly binary description ‘acting morally’.</p><p>Before considering how this distinction affects acting well in response to climate change, let us set aside a worry with such reliance upon practical wisdom. The difficulty here again concerns action-guidance, since if we lack wisdom we might be unsure about what a virtuous person would do. Such dependence upon moral wisdom is less of a weakness than it might appear. As Hursthouse (<span>1991</span>, 231) observes, most people would sensibly disregard ethical advice offered by somebody who usually made what appeared to be dubious ethical choices, even if they were well-versed in moral theory. If we lack moral wisdom, we would be better off seeking out those we believe to possess it than attempting to get by without it.</p><p>Reflection on moral exemplars offers one way to get a better grasp of what virtues require, and can inspire us to better actions than we might have performed otherwise. Linda Zagzebski (<span>2010</span>, 55) has explored the importance of our pre-theoretical grasp of exemplars, defining an exemplar are someone who is “defeasibly imitable even if not perfect.” By focusing on exemplars, we can explore some morally excellent responses to climate change, and the strength of reasons we have to perform them.</p><p>To orient discussion, I wish to explore what appear to be the morally excellent actions of Swedish teenager Greta Thunberg. However, an important caveat first. I do not mean to imply that Thunberg herself is an exemplar; morally excellent action is <i>characteristic</i> of exemplars, but can be performed by others people (although not characteristically).<sup>18</sup> As is well known, Thunberg created international headlines by going on strike from school to protest her country's lack of political action on climate change. For 2 weeks, she handed out leaflets in front of the Swedish parliament, bearing the blunt message: “I am doing this because you adults are shitting on my future.”<sup>19</sup> Thunberg's example has since inspired mass protests across the world, and movements such as <i>Fridays for Future</i> and <i>Extinction Rebellion</i>.</p><p>Thunberg's own way of thinking about her actions is noteworthy. When interviewed, Thunberg explained: ‘“I am doing this because nobody else is doing anything. It is my moral responsibility to do what I can… I want the politicians to prioritise the climate question, focus on the climate, and treat it like a crisis.” Now, few philosophers would conclude that it is indeed Thunberg's moral responsibility to strike from school. It would be extremely difficult to support any such a claim on the basis of the arguments we considered in Section 1. Perhaps Thunberg is simply wrong about what is morally required of her?</p><p>We can readily understand this response in terms of virtue theory. Thunberg believes that it is indeed her responsibility to do what she can, a claim that is already more demanding than arguments based on causal responsibility. She also believes that she <i>can</i> do a variety of things that other people around her seem not to think possible or worthwhile. Yet the example shows others that such actions are indeed both possible and worthwhile. Noting the earlier caveat, this kind of response is characteristic of moral exemplars. In relation to climate change, exemplars believe that they both can and ought to do many things that may seem overly demanding to others, including devoting themselves to collective projects aimed at furthering climate action, refusing to fly, becoming vegans, and so on.</p><p>It is of course theoretically intelligible to understand these responses as praiseworthy but not morally required. However, on the basis of virtue terms we can instead say that excellent actions are characteristic of virtuous people, and are recognized as genuine requirements by them, just as good enough actions are requirements for enkratic people. A further point here is that exemplars are unlikely to have the same views about what is morally required as other people. As Aristotle noted, the judgment of the virtuous person concerning <i>what is good</i> is unlikely to be shared by those lacking in virtue (1934, 1144a). As such, the responses of exemplars will often inspiring for enkratic people, just as they appear baffling or stupid to vicious or self-interested people.</p><p>Moral exemplars may also be motivated to do more by the moral failure of others. This connects to the debate about whether those already acting justly ought to “pick up the slack” and do even more to compensate for the unjust inaction of others, or whether it is sufficient to do what would be fair if everyone else were doing their part (Miller, <span>2011</span>; Murphy, <span>2000</span>). Exemplars recognize the failure of others as a reason to do more. However, it seems unlikely that exemplars would be motivated by the thought that in picking up the slack, they were merely doing their fair share, although they may think they are doing their part (see Section 4). They might also be motivated by indignation at the inaction of others, and beyond reasons of justice, by reasons associated with other virtues, such as the benevolent concern with aiding the vulnerable.</p><p>One might wonder whether the virtue ethicist has let off the hook those who fail to respond appropriately to climate change. Isn't it overly demanding, even unfair, to require some people to do more? And do not even morally dubious people have moral responsibilities? Yet we have not argued that some people ought to do more than others in response to climate change. We have said that when faced with shared moral problems, some people can be expected to do more because they possess greater practical wisdom and more reliable motivations, both in terms of the reasons they are responsive to, and their affective attitudes. This does not imply that less virtuous people can <i>justify</i> doing less, especially by reasoning that because they are less virtuous less can be demanded of them. If someone reasoned in this way, they would not be acting well under <i>any</i> description, they would be looking for an excuse for something they were unwilling to do. Those who are selfish, callous, or indifferent to the fate of others are not <i>justified</i> in failing to act. The very application of vice terms implies a judgment of moral blame. The point is instead predictive: we <i>expect</i> that selfish, callous, and indifferent people are unlikely to be moved by moral reasons to act. Indeed, Aristotle believed that vicious people can only be expected to respond to the threat of punishment, since they have been badly brought up and are thus insensitive to moral reasons (1934, 1179b5-15). Less harshly, those insensitive to moral reasons may respond to economic incentives such as cost increases or savings. Yet acting on such motives would be insufficient for acting well. Thus, someone who installed solar panels at home simply to save money would not be acting well in response to climate change, although they would not be acting badly either.</p><p>A final point about demandingness. As Foot pointed out, we seem to have split intuitions about what makes an action demanding, and hence worthy of praise.<sup>20</sup> Although excellent actions, <i>qua</i> excellent, seem to call for more praise, they might not be experienced as more demanding by a virtuous person. On the other hand, it might be more subjectively demanding, and hence potentially more praiseworthy, for an enkratic person to act well, even if what he does is more minimal, because he has to overcome his insufficient motivation a. As such, assessing the demandingness of responses to climate change requires knowing a good deal more about the character and motivations of people.</p><p>I have argued that virtue ethical views offer a distinctive way to think about how we should respond to climate change, and that this may often be more demanding than approaches which depend upon a causal account of harm to generate a moral obligation. This is because virtue terms identify reasons to which (nearly) everyone ought to respond. Virtue terms encourage reflection on what we can do, reasoning from our social context. This involves reasons associated with justice, benevolence, and other virtues, and does not distinguish sharply between actions we do as individuals and actions we do with others. Filling out the vague but correct thought that each of us should do our part when faced with the shared problem of climate change, the resulting view requires much from the wealthiest, but a great deal also from many people with both the means and opportunity to reduce their emissions and to engage in collective action aimed at reducing the threat posed by climate change. This approach also shows that the poor and young people who have emitted little can act well by responding to climate change on the basis of moral reasons. Finally, I explored the importance of exemplary climate actions for how we think about acting well. While the resulting view does not hold that the less virtuous are justified when they do less than others, virtuous people can be expected to do more because they possess greater practical wisdom and moral motivation. Yet such actions can inspire others to do more than they would have done otherwise.</p>","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2022-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12488","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"“How should we respond to climate change? Virtue ethics and aggregation problems”\",\"authors\":\"Dominic Lenzi\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/josp.12488\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>One of the most discussed questions in climate ethics is whether individuals have a moral responsibility to reduce their emissions, or even to become carbon neutral. However, virtue ethics has been largely absent from this debate. This article explores the implications of a neo-Aristotelian account, examining how we respond to climate change as a shared problem, and the characteristic reasons that motivate us to do what we can in response. I contrast this account with consequentialist and deontological approaches, showing that while virtue concepts will often require individuals to reduce their individual emissions, this does not depend on showing that individual emitting actions are harmful. To understand the virtue-ethical notion of <i>acting well</i> in response to climate change, we must tell a richer story about our moral contexts and characters. In telling such a story, we will see that merely reducing one's personal emissions while refraining from other actions could reflect vice, while acting well could consist in assisting local adaptation or raising awareness, rather than reducing one's emissions to zero.</p><p>Section 1 explores the differences between standard approaches to climate responsibility and virtue ethical approaches, introducing the core theoretical claims of the latter. Section 2 returns to Parfit's discussion of aggregation problems to clarify the basic approach. Section 3 explores the thought that in response to climate change, acting well means doing what we can. This admittedly vague response gives rise to concerns with action-guidance and demandingness. Thus, Section 4 argues that acting well must be understood in light of one's context. This shows that there are many ways to act well in response to climate change, and that the poor and young people who have emitted little can nonetheless respond to climate change as a shared moral problem. Finally, Section 5 explores the importance of exemplary climate actions, their difference from otherwise good actions, and argues that such actions can inspire us to do more than we thought ourselves capable.</p><p>To understand how virtue ethics approaches our question, consider first how most philosophers have approached it. In the large debate about individual climate responsibility, the desiderata for a successful argument are as follows: first, we attribute <i>causal</i> responsibility to an agent for harm resulting from the emission of greenhouse gases. Second, we attribute <i>moral</i> responsibility if the agent knew or should have known that harm would result from these actions. Third, we identify a <i>moral obligation</i> to cease contributing to harm, and/or to compensate those harmed (Vanderheiden, <span>2007</span>).</p><p>The most significant dispute concerns whether the right kind of causal connection holds between individual actions and the harms of climate change (Nefsky, <span>2019</span>). This is difficult to establish since each individual is an extremely small part of causal chains comprising billions of actors stretching back to the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. Several have argued that the actions of individuals make no <i>meaningful</i> difference to the production of harms from climate change. Baylor Johnson (<span>2003</span>) argues that individual acts do not cause climate-related harms. Ronald Sandler (<span>2010</span>) argues that individual actions are “inconsequential” in producing climate change, responding to a similar argument from Dale Jamieson (<span>2007</span>), while Joakim Sandberg (<span>2011</span>) argues that no consequential harms follow from individual actions. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (<span>2005</span>) claims there is nothing morally objectionable about joyriding in an inefficient car since this action produces no discernible harm. Galvin and Harris (<span>2014</span>) argue that since individual actions are impotent, neither rights-based arguments nor expected utility arguments produce moral obligations. Kok-Chor Tan (<span>2015</span>) argues against obligations to change one's lifestyle to become carbon-neutral since the political effects of this remain uncertain. Ben Hale (<span>2011</span>) and Johnson (<span>2003</span>) argue that individual choices not to emit would make no difference due to market forces of demand and supply.<sup>1</sup> Without attributing causal harm, Garrett Cullity (<span>2015</span>) rejects several possible contributions of individuals to collective actions causing climate harm. Instead, Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland (<span>2015</span>) argue that the same climate harms would occur without the contribution of any particular individual.</p><p>Many have objected to these arguments. Steve Vanderheiden (<span>2007</span>) argues that individuals do harm in conjunction with others. Avram Hiller argues that “<i>going on a Sunday drive is the moral equivalent of ruining someone's afternoon</i>” (2011, 57, emphasis original), which implies a significant amount of harm over an entire lifetime (cf. Morgan-Knapp &amp; Goodman, <span>2014</span>). Simo Kyllönen (<span>2016</span>) argues that individuals violate the no harm principle by knowingly contributing to an aggregate harm. Others are less convinced that standard accounts of harm are applicable, given the temporal lag between emissions and climate harm. Lauren Hartzell-Nicholls (<span>2012</span>) argues that individual contributions to climate change are <i>de dicto</i> harmful because they impose threats of harmful conditions upon future people, without being harmful in the standard <i>de re</i> sense. Instead, Elizabeth Cripps (<span>2011</span>) argues that the group roughly comprising wealthy individuals cause morally significant and predicable climate harm, thus violating a form of the harm principle applicable to collectives.</p><p>A similar picture emerges for the other two desiderata. Those skeptical about the causal claim usually deny that individuals are morally responsible for harms caused by climate change (e.g., Baatz, <span>2014</span>; Barry &amp; Øverland, <span>2015</span>; Cullity, <span>2015</span>; Galvin &amp; Harris, <span>2014</span>; Johnson, <span>2003</span>; Sinnott-Armstrong, <span>2005</span>; Tan, <span>2015</span>), while those who defend versions of the causal claim tend to think that moral responsibility can be attributed to individuals, whether directly or in conjunction with others (e.g., Hiller, <span>2011</span>; Kyllönen, <span>2016</span>; Morgan-Knapp &amp; Goodman, <span>2014</span>; Schwenkenbecher, <span>2014</span>; Vanderheiden, <span>2007</span>), or to certain collectives (e.g., Banks, <span>2013</span>; Cripps, <span>2011</span>; Sandberg, <span>2011</span>; Tan, <span>2015</span>; Vance, <span>2016</span>). So too for the third desideratum, some argue that there is nothing individuals are morally obliged to do, aside from engaging in political action (Cullity, <span>2015</span>; Galvin &amp; Harris, <span>2014</span>; Johnson, <span>2003</span>; Sinnott-Armstrong, <span>2005</span>; Tan, <span>2015</span>).<sup>2</sup> Others believe either that there is some weaker form of moral obligation, for instance an imperfect duty to use only their fair share of emissions (Baatz, <span>2014</span>), or an obligation to avoid knowingly or foreseeably harming (Hiller, <span>2011</span>; Kyllönen, <span>2016</span>; Morgan-Knapp &amp; Goodman, <span>2014</span>).</p><p>My intention here is not to vindicate or reject any of these arguments, but to step back from them in order to ask a different question, namely: what does virtue ethics require in response to climate change? This question has received very little attention. The arguments surveyed above narrow the question to a search for individual obligations, grounded upon a causal account of harm resulting from actions that emit greenhouse gases. The most obvious explanation for this narrowed focus is not any one argument, but a set of theoretical assumptions imported from deontological and consequentialist theories. I do not claim that these accounts are mistaken on their own terms, merely that they presuppose a picture of ethical enquiry that is not shared by all theories. In particular, this picture is contested by virtue ethical approaches. Indeed, for this reason virtue ethicists often find existing ethical debates saddled with uncongenial assumptions. As Rosalind Hursthouse (<span>1991</span>) pointed out in the case of abortion, what had previously been regarded as <i>the</i> point of contention, namely the status of the fetus, is simply not decisive for such an approach. We are in a similar situation here. According to virtue-ethical accounts, we do <i>not</i> require a causal account of the harmful action that each individual contributes in order to justify moral responses, as has already been argued in two contributions to this literature (Jamieson, <span>2007</span>; Sandler, <span>2010</span>). Yet as we will see, the significance of this point remains misunderstood, as do the more general implications of thinking about climate change in terms of virtue concepts. Thus, let us first clarify how virtue-ethical responses differ from those considered above.</p><p>To compare the structure of virtue-ethical theories, we must introduce the central concept of virtue. As Christine Swanton (<span>2003</span>, 19–20) puts it, a virtue is “a good quality of character, more specifically a disposition to respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in an excellent or good enough way.” As we will see below, this distinction between excellent and merely good enough action has many implications for thinking about what virtues require of us. But we can already note a further point here. At least for neo-Aristotelians, the moral quality of action, that is, whether something counts as an excellent or good enough response, is tied to the correct judgment of the virtuous person. As Aristotle puts it, virtuous people develop “an eye for things, and so they see correctly” (1934, 1143b).<sup>3</sup> As such, virtues are not merely reliable tendencies to act on moral rules in certain roughly similar circumstances, but complex states of character involving our emotions, our responsiveness to reasons, and the practical judgment to recognize these reasons in context. While the word ‘virtue’ has an old-fashioned ring to it (Williams <span>2006</span>), virtue terms are widespread in common discourse. The most familiar are justice, honesty, courage, generosity, and so on, while their opposites (which may be multiple) are vices such as injustice, selfishness, dishonesty, cowardice, and so on.<sup>4</sup></p><p>How do virtue terms affect our question concerning individuals and climate change? This is something we will explore throughout, but we can already point to several immediate differences. First, we do not begin ethical enquiry by identifying an action, such as emitting CO<sub>2</sub>, and a moral principle, which applies to it. Instead, we begin with the identification of virtue concepts that bear upon the situation (which need not be an action), then explore the characteristic reasons and motivations these imply when judged from a particular context. In this way, we seek to understand the sorts of responses that would count as acting well in response to climate change.</p><p>Second, the issue of moral responsibility looks quite different. Because virtues are habituated traits of character, the scope of moral responsibility is potentially broader than for action-based theories. In the context of climate change, the latter seek to establish that individual <i>actions</i> are harmful, and thus that we have a moral responsibility to cease doing them. Instead, virtue ethical views attribute moral responsibility for <i>characteristic</i> activities, that is, ways of living, because these reflect our moral character. The moral evaluation of action is thus derived from a prior analysis of good or bad moral character. This explains how virtue ethical views can remain uncommitted on the question of whether isolated individual actions produce climate harms. All that virtue ethical views require is that characteristic ways of living can produce climate harms. This is a maximally uncontroversial empirical claim,<sup>5</sup> and one that even skeptics about the harmfulness of individual actions can readily accept. Instead, because virtue ethics is primarily interested in ways of living that express character traits, all that needs to be claimed is that the emissions produced by individuals acting in character over long periods of time can produce climate harms.</p><p>Note that this point already addresses a misunderstanding in the existing debate, where Sinnott-Armstrong asks rhetorically, “How can we tell whether driving a gas guzzler for fun ‘expresses a vice’? On the face of it, it expresses a desire for fun. There is nothing vicious about having fun” (2005, 295). Sinnott-Armstrong's phrase “on the face of it” is unintentionally apt: barring some obvious cases which are always wrong and cannot even be characterized in ethically neutral terms (e.g., murder),<sup>6</sup> we are in need of greater detail about the context of action and the person performing it to decide whether someone's actions are vicious. Consider Sinnott-Armstrong's example not as a one-off action but as a characteristic lifestyle: a person who has a high-emitting lifestyle, knows about the climate crisis, and refuses to change his lifestyle and continues with his ‘innocent’ fun. This tells us far more about such a person's faulty moral character than the (potentially one-off) action of driving an inefficient car for fun. Without going into such details here, while a one-off action may not reflect vice, doing the same thing characteristically may well be selfish or uncaring.</p><p>The third and potentially most controversial move in this account is the absence of any central notion of moral obligation. Virtue ethics, especially in its neo-Aristotelian forms, has little use for the concept of moral obligation, a point that has been familiar since Anscombe (<span>1958</span>).<sup>7</sup> This involves rejecting the common presumption in ethical theory that our weightiest moral reasons must be intelligible as obligations. This thought takes many forms, and it is also present in the debate about climate responsibility. For instance, Cullity worries that focusing upon reasons that cannot be considered individual climate obligations might “make it harder to motivate ourselves to address this problem properly” (2015, 164). However, there is simply no theory-neutral reason to think that our strongest or most motivating moral reasons must be intelligible as moral obligations (Williams <span>2006</span>, 200ff.). Nonetheless, this difference may be overstated since many cases of acting virtuously will <i>indeed</i> be intelligible (by other theorists) in terms of moral obligation. As Hursthouse (<span>1999</span>, 123ff.) points out, there are conceptual connections between obligation-based motives such as acting from a good will, and acting from virtue, since the latter means acting from “a settled state of good character” and for compelling moral reasons (1999, 123). Such reasons can be readily described as acting from duty or on principle.<sup>8</sup> These connections have also been noted in the debate about climate responsibility. For example, Gunnar Björnsson (<span>2021</span>, 259, n. 7) defends a shared obligation to care appropriately about collective problems, which he claims to be structurally similar to acting according to virtue.</p><p>While there are indeed many similarities between acting virtuously and acting on a moral obligation, important differences remain. This is because our choice of moral concepts affects what we consider to be an adequate argument or relevant objection. For instance, Björnsson considers the perspective of climate activists, noting that they often think in terms of doing the best they can, or living up to their moral ideals (2021, 252–3). However, Björnsson simply assumes that these notions can be captured as moral obligations. Yet there is nothing in ordinary notions such as doing the best one can, living up to our moral ideals, or even doing what we believe is required of us that necessitates thinking in terms of moral obligation (at least not in the sense given to this notion in ethical theory). Moreover, as we have already seen, claiming that something is a moral obligation invites challenges concerning the harmfulness of one's individual actions, while also narrowing the moral landscape considerably.<sup>9</sup> An alternative, which I develop in what follows, is to approach such ordinary notions of moral responsibility using virtue terms.</p><p>To sketch the general approach available to virtue theorists, let us return to Derek Parfit's discussion of what he called “aggregation problems,” of which climate change is a paradigm case.<sup>10</sup> In a prescient passage, Parfit wrote:</p><p>“For the sake of small benefits to ourselves, or our families, we may deny others much greater total benefits, or impose on others much greater total harms. We may think this permissible because the effects on each of the others will be either trivial or imperceptible. If this is what we think, what we do will often be much worse for all of us” (1984, 86).</p><p>Although aggregation problems are often couched in terms of narrow self-interest, all that is necessary to produce them is acting on a principle of expanded self-interest which holds that “each rather than none does what will be better for himself, <i>or his family</i>, or <i>those he loves</i>” (1984, 62). Parfit argued that all standard moral theories give rise to aggregation problems, yet it is unclear that this is the case for virtue ethics. Parfit briefly objected that according to such views, there would still be “cases where acting morally (i.e., on the virtues) would be, on the whole, worse for someone” (1984, 87). While an outcome that is merely worse for someone need not be a counter-example for virtue ethics, it might be sufficient to show that acting in conformity with virtue ethics would produce aggregation problems. I will return to this point shortly.</p><p>First, consider Parfit's well-known solution that individuals should become <i>rational altruists</i>. This solution consists in outlining two decision rules that rational altruists would follow, which are designed to eliminate the “five mistakes in moral mathematics” which all standard theories seem to make and thus which produce aggregation problems (1984, 67ff.). Thus, Aggregation Rule 1 states that individuals can depart from “common sense morality” (i.e., the expanded self-interest principle already noted) when this produces an aggregation problem (1984, 100). When this is so, individuals should instead do whatever will <i>actually</i> best support their expanded self-interest, thus avoiding the mistakes in moral mathematics. In resource over-appropriation cases, this requires individuals to restrict what they appropriate on the condition that enough other individuals do so as well, where ‘enough’ is the smallest number of contributors necessary to resolve the aggregation problem (1984, 100–1).<sup>11</sup> Yet Aggregation Rule 1 can create conflicts with partiality to our loved ones that also produce aggregation problems. In response, Parfit introduces Aggregation Rule 2, which states that whenever Aggregation Rule 1 leads to aggregation problems, we should give <i>no priority</i> to our partial aims. Aggregation Rule 2 is conditional, since it only applies when we believe that sufficiently many others will also give no priority to their partial aims (1984, 101).</p><p>This solution is framed in terms of decision rules, rather than the requirements of being disposed to reliably act upon them. To be sure, Parfit (<span>1984</span>, 103) acknowledges that there is already a problem with the dispositions associated with common-sense morality, since our partiality to loved ones may undermine acting in ways that avoid aggregation problems. However, Parfit underestimates the dispositional requirements of his solution, which seems to involve a set of new dispositions to respond to aggregation problems, thereby either supplanting or correcting the dispositions associated with common-sense morality. Unfortunately, it is far from clear how anyone could cultivate the dispositions required to become a rational altruist. In the first place, habituating a disposition requires acting successfully upon it sufficiently many times. To do so, aspiring rational altruists would have to be on the lookout for situations in which sufficiently many other people are likely forego their partial aims in order to cooperate. The conditional nature of Aggregation Rule 2 in particular seems unlikely to be fulfilled very often (if ever), leaving few opportunities to develop such a disposition. Second, Parfit acknowledges that there is a tension among our moral motivations to act on common-sense morality, and motivations to act on Aggregation Rule 1. However, he does not explain how we are to overcome or resolve such tensions. This is made worse when Aggregation Rule 2 is introduced, which would involve either a further disposition and a further motivation to act on it, departing from both Aggregation Rule 1 and common-sense morality, or a modification of the newly-introduced motivation to act on Aggregation Rule 1. In either case, tensions among these moral motivations remain unresolved.</p><p>From a virtue-ethical perspective, issues of habituation and moral motivation are not secondary concerns to that of finding correct decision rules or moral principles, but are a <i>primary</i> focus of ethical theorizing. As such, a solution that rests on dispositions that are impossible to inculcate is no solution at all. Rather than focusing upon decision rules, a virtue-ethical response would attempt to show what kinds of people we would be if we produced aggregation problems, and the characteristic reasons for responding to them. Although virtue ethicists have written little about aggregation problems, the beginning of such a response is available in a remark on Parfit by Philippa Foot. In <i>Natural Goodness</i>, Foot claimed the solution to aggregation problems.</p><p>“Depends on our human way of thinking. We act within a language that allows us to say ‘I owe it to him’ or ‘I suppose I should play my part’ (as we nowadays think, for instance, of taking a bus rather than a car, to reduce traffic on the road, knowing that we ourselves may need to get somewhere urgently by car some other time)” (2001, 44).</p><p>We can begin filling out what this “human way of thinking” means by asking: would a set of virtuous people produce aggregation problems, if each were acting in character? There seems no reason to think not. This possibility depends on empirical variables such as how abundant natural resources are, how many people there are, and what is done with these resources. Thus, Parfit is likely correct that acting well according to virtue ethics could produce an aggregation problem.</p><p>However, <i>once they realized what they were doing</i>, virtuous people would not respond by denying that they should do anything. There is a significant ethical (and ordinarily, legal) difference between unwittingly causing a problem, and continuing to cause it once we have become aware of it. Once virtuous people realized what they were doing, they would certainly <i>not</i> think that continuing to contribute to an aggregation problem is not grounds for serious complaint. It is hard to imagine them responding as Parfit's self-interested agents, who are <i>ex hypothesis</i> motivated only by concern for their own ends and those of their families. Such people might indeed say, “Well, it's true that what we are all doing causes a problem for all of us. But my contribution is so small! Surely <i>I</i> don't have to do anything.” Or, ‘I realize that if we all continue doing this it is worse for everyone. But I don't care. And besides, no one can blame me. I'm not actually harming anyone’. Instead, even <i>enkratic</i> (morally continent) people would say things like, ‘I suppose I should do my part’, even if they do not know the precise effect of their actions. The ongoing Covid-19 pandemic offers many familiar examples: getting vaccinated, wearing a mask in shared spaces, and so on, are individual contributions, which lessen the spread of the virus and consequently save lives. While it will often be impossible to trace the causal effects of such actions from individuals to other individuals, in many societies an ethical norm has already emerged to encourage such actions, and to discourage non-compliance as selfish and irresponsible.</p><p>Therefore, even if they unwittingly produced an aggregation problem, it is plausible to think that virtuous people would not continue perpetuating it precisely <i>because</i> they are just, benevolent, and compassionate. Indeed, Parfit already provides the basis for such a response, writing that the solution to aggregation problems requires that we “care sufficiently about effects on others” (1984, 86). This is a claim about our dispositions, and specifically the reasons to which we are responsive. If benevolence or compassion is the operative virtue, it has an appropriate scope of considerations (factual and normative), and is responsive (cognitively and emotionally) to salient features of the world as we understand it: for instance, to the fate of others. A callous person, that is, someone deficient in benevolence or compassion, would instead object that they do not care whether what they do harms others, while a selfish person would focus on their own interests (or ‘innocent fun’) at the exclusion of others.</p><p>On the view developed thus far, responding to aggregation problems requires recognizing that there is a shared problem towards which I should respond <i>somehow</i>. However, this admittedly vague demand gives rise to further concerns. One issue with vagueness is easy to set aside. First, some might protest that insufficiently clear demands cannot be acted upon. There is little reason for thinking this to be true. As G. A. Cohen pointedly remarked, we seem allergic to vague ethical demands, yet “[w]hen facing our legitimately self-interested choices, we feel no need for a theory that will make everything determinate” (<span>2008</span>, 6). Instead, vagueness might be a more serious concern when we are seeking action-guidance in complex cases. In the above examples, responses appear already well-specified. In the Covid-19 case, government agencies publish recommendations and restrictions, while in the traffic congestion case the set of transport options are determined by available infrastructure and whether one owns a car. However, there are cases in which we may be far less clear about what we should do. Climate change appears to be one such case, given that it is almost impossible to avoid contributing to climate change in <i>any</i> way, and given the multitude of potential actions open to differently situated individuals. Now, it is important to recognise that a similar concern with action-guidance affects all theories. As Stephen Gardiner (<span>2011</span>) has argued, climate change may be so challenging that none of our ethical theories are fully able to address it. Nonetheless, one might worry that an approach grounded in vague virtue terms will offer even less action-guidance than other theories. By exploring what the virtues require in response to climate change, we can address this more serious concern with vagueness.</p><p>One way to fill out what virtue concepts imply is to understand their use, locating them within existing social discourse.<sup>12</sup> While there are many discourses related to climate change, we can begin filling out our response by considering the moral concepts implicit in a recent example, which is both revealing and suitably non-partisan. The United Nations recently produced a booklet entitled <i>170 daily actions to transform our world</i>, aimed at supporting transformative societal change to meet the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).<sup>13</sup> Under “SDG 13: Climate Action,” this booklet lists 10 recommendations including limiting food waste, driving less, organizing tree planting with one's school or company, and spreading awareness about ways to address climate change. This booklet also runs the hopeful slogan across each page: “If you care about the future, be the change. Help to end poverty, to reduce inequalities, and to tackle climate change. Together we can transform the world.” Now, one must take with a grain of salt any hortatory recommendations for individuals to “be the change,” since individual responses have only become more important because policymakers have failed for decades to commit to effective mitigation. It would be dangerous and wrong to imply that collective problems are <i>primarily</i> the responsibility of individuals. As shown by British Petroleum's invention of the carbon footprint, individualizing climate responsibility suits the approximately 90 corporations responsible for two-thirds of all greenhouse gas emissions,<sup>14</sup> who are simultaneously lobbying against climate mitigation while funding climate misinformation (Oreskes &amp; Conway, <span>2010</span>).</p><p>Nonetheless, the appeal to caring about the future is noteworthy, since UN publications are seldom the most radical documents. Yet the phrase running across each page is clearly not meant to be conditional. The point is not that if you happen to care about the future, as you might happen to care about your garden, these are some things you might do; it is that you <i>should</i> care about the future, and as such, these are some of the things you should do. While this booklet does not venture into explaining why, the implication is that failing to care about the future is somehow inappropriate. As noted in Section 2, failing to care about the future means failing to care about the fate of others. Thus, the virtue ethicist can respond that failing to do some or all of these actions implies failing to care sufficiently about others (cf. Björnsson, <span>2021</span>). If so, this would reflect <i>injustice</i>, <i>callousness</i> or <i>indifference</i>, vices which Gardiner (<span>2012</span>) claims are widespread in response to climate change. Since these are vices, their correct attribution implies a judgment of moral blame. The injunction here is that we ought to do what we can to reduce our climate impacts, because we care about others–because we are just, compassionate, and benevolent people. Failing to do what we can, then, is morally blameworthy, because it reflects vices of injustice, callousness, indifference, and so on.</p><p>The critic is again unlikely to be satisfied with the vagueness of this response. Surely, there is a large set of possible actions, and doing some of them might preclude doing others. How can we know which actions are required by justice or benevolence? Moreover, we seem to lack a principled basis for determining when I have done <i>enough</i>. These protests are unlikely to be lessened by the virtue ethicist's response that what counts as acting well is determined both by our characters and by features of our context, and therefore may not be the same for everyone. In other words, the capacity to φ, where φ is some specific moral action, is not something that all (rational) people are or ought to be capable of, except perhaps in a very limited set of cases. Instead, what counts, as acting well for the enkratic person may not be the same as acting well for the fully virtuous person. The critic might now be convinced that virtue ethics is insufficiently action-guiding, perhaps even obscurantist. This raises two essential features of the virtue-ethical conception of moral agency and acting well, which we will address over the next two sections.</p><p>One distinctive feature of virtue ethical approaches is the importance of context in acting well. By context, I mean how the person is morally situated, that is, her social context, and her opportunities for acting, which are not only technological or economic but also shaped by culture. As noted in Section 1, aside from a few cases of intrinsically wrong action, what counts as acting well is difficult to specify independently of context. While context matters to all moral theories, for virtue ethical approaches context is indispensable in the deliberation of the agent looking to act well.</p><p>In contrast, in many accounts context enters the picture only <i>after</i> we have decided what ought to be done, notably by excusing some from the demands of morality. The approaches outlined in Section 1 seek to identify an action (such as reducing one's individual emissions) and a moral principle that generates obligations (such as the no-harm principle). It is only once this general argument has been made that context enters, for instance by exempting some agents from these obligations on the basis of poverty, lack of agency, and so on. Thus, Christian Baatz (<span>2014</span>, 9–10) points out that it is more difficult to live carbon neutrally in some places than in others due to the carbon intensiveness of existing infrastructure. Baatz concludes that there cannot be a moral obligation for carbon neutrality for such people. When context functions as an excusing factor in this way, climate responsibilities will target a very similar set of people, namely the relatively well-off living in wealthy societies, ignoring those living in less favorable circumstances. There are very good reasons for focusing on the climate responsibilities of the relatively well-off, whose per capita contributions to climate change are far higher than those of people in poorer societies (Chakravarty et al., <span>2009</span>). Nonetheless, this focus may imply that poorer people need not respond to climate change on the basis of strong ethical reasons. The analogous conclusion would be that the virtues do not require anything below a certain threshold of material circumstance or bad luck. However, virtue ethical theories emphasize that it is possible to act well, that is, in accordance with virtue, in most (if not all) contexts.<sup>15</sup> Climate change can be understood as a shared moral problem by <i>everyone</i>, and there are many possibilities for us to act well in response, without losing sight of relevant differences that wealth or influence can have upon our responsibilities.</p><p>To illustrate how acting well can require different actions from differently situated people, I will sketch some reasons associated with justice. As we saw in Section 1, virtues are dispositions to respond appropriately to considerations within their ‘field’ (cf. Swanton, <span>2003</span>, 19–20). The ‘field’ of reasons of justice bearing on climate change are likely to be familiar to many readers. Indeed, we have already identified several in Section 2, such as “this is my fair share,” “I owe it to others,” or “I am doing my part.” Nonetheless, we need a richer picture of the person's context to understand what these reasons require.</p><p>There is insufficient space to provide anything beyond a sketch of how context influences how we interpret such reasons, although the following discussion shows what a fuller account would involve. First, consider the exceedingly wealthy. Oxfam estimates that between 1990 and 2015, the wealthiest 1% are responsible for emitting twice as much carbon than the poorest 50%.<sup>16</sup> When this is coupled with their often far greater political power, if an exceedingly wealthy person asked himself what his fair share would involve, the answer might not be merely individual carbon neutrality, but a far more demanding set of activities including lobbying governments for ambitious mitigation policy, ensuring their companies and investments are carbon neutral, investing in renewable energy technologies, funding adaptation, funding public education campaigns to raise awareness about climate change, and so on.</p><p>Leaving aside the exceedingly wealthy, many people are likely to have both the means and opportunity to reduce their emissions, and to engage in collective action aimed at reducing the threat posed by climate change. Acting well on the reason, “this is my fair share.” “I owe it to others,” or “I am doing my part,” is likely to involve the examples we saw in Section 3: reducing food waste, driving less, becoming involved in community tree planting, raising awareness, switching to renewable energy, reducing meat consumption, flying less often or not at all, riding a bicycle or the train, and so on. However, not everyone will be able do all of these things, and not always to the same extent. Climate friendly lifestyles can be more expensive, a fact which reflects the improper pricing of environmental goods rather than the moral goodness of the wealthy.</p><p>In contexts where such options are either absent or prohibitively expensive, acting well may look considerably different. Indeed, in certain contexts, some reasons of justice might also be less applicable. For many in the Global South, their far smaller contributions to climate change and lower wealth likely means that thinking in terms of “my fair share” becomes less meaningful, unless as a demand that <i>others</i> elsewhere start doing their fair share. However, the reason ‘I am doing my part’ appears broader than doing one's fair share, since the latter implies a role in shared efforts to address a social problem. Even in such contexts, doing one's part remains an intelligible basis for acting well in response to climate change. As we saw in the example of traffic congestion, whether we are new to the city and have never driven, or whether we are regularly stuck in gridlock, we can recognize the force of doing our part – and the question of what <i>our</i> part consists in. Young people who have emitted relatively little carbon can recognize this reason of justice, not merely those who have spent their lives driving around in inefficient cars or flying around the world. Doing one's part does not exempt people from responding to climate change simply because they are poor or have emitted little. At the same time, what one's part consists in here could mean something different from reducing one's emissions. For instance, it could mean becoming involved in local climate adaptation projects, or awareness raising of the plight of those most vulnerable to climate change. In these ways, virtue terms make intelligible the moral action of those often ignored in discussions of climate responsibility.</p><p>These responses have revealed another difference between virtue theories and other approaches. In the debate about climate responsibility, it is standard to distinguish between our moral responsibilities as individuals, and those we have as political actors. We saw in Section 1 that many are skeptical about individual responsibilities, but few doubt that climate change imposes on us at least some political responsibilities, perhaps most minimally voting for effective climate policy (Maltais, <span>2013</span>). However, with the exception of the role responsibilities of politicians, this distinction between individual and political responsibilities does not register when using virtue terms. Because human beings are by nature political animals, as Aristotle said, our ethical life is essentially also political in the sense that it is concerned with how we relate to others and to society. Our characteristic ways of relating (or failing to relate) to others in society also reflect our ethical character. This is why an individual response such as carbon neutrality could fall short of acting well, and could even express vices such as selfishness and self-righteousness if carbon neutrality were used as a pretext not to engage in any collective climate efforts. If such a person protested that they had already done their fair share, this would reveal an inappropriate grasp of the reasons of justice bearing upon climate change, and an insufficient concern for others.</p><p>A critic might worry that this seems overly demanding. Surely there comes a time when have we done <i>enough</i> to count as acting well? Some might be prepared to make significant sacrifices (in time and money) to respond to climate change, but does virtue ethics hold that we must all become climate saints or martyrs? Answering this takes us to the second distinctive feature of virtue ethical approaches, namely how moral character affects acting well.</p><p>As noted in Section 1, for neo-Aristotelians the moral quality of action is tied to the correct judgment of the virtuous person. However, recall the distinction between the characteristically excellent action of the fully virtuous person, and the characteristically good enough action of the merely enkratic person. This is brought out in Aristotle's comparison of the deliberation of the ethical ‘novice’ compared to that of the virtuous person.<sup>17</sup> The purpose of this distinction is to show that different actions can count as acting well in light of one's attainment of virtue and practical wisdom. Indeed, as Hursthouse (<span>1999</span>, 125) notes, the ordinary phrase “acting well” is apt to make such a distinction since it can be qualified with adverbs such as “fairly” or “very,” unlike the seemingly binary description ‘acting morally’.</p><p>Before considering how this distinction affects acting well in response to climate change, let us set aside a worry with such reliance upon practical wisdom. The difficulty here again concerns action-guidance, since if we lack wisdom we might be unsure about what a virtuous person would do. Such dependence upon moral wisdom is less of a weakness than it might appear. As Hursthouse (<span>1991</span>, 231) observes, most people would sensibly disregard ethical advice offered by somebody who usually made what appeared to be dubious ethical choices, even if they were well-versed in moral theory. If we lack moral wisdom, we would be better off seeking out those we believe to possess it than attempting to get by without it.</p><p>Reflection on moral exemplars offers one way to get a better grasp of what virtues require, and can inspire us to better actions than we might have performed otherwise. Linda Zagzebski (<span>2010</span>, 55) has explored the importance of our pre-theoretical grasp of exemplars, defining an exemplar are someone who is “defeasibly imitable even if not perfect.” By focusing on exemplars, we can explore some morally excellent responses to climate change, and the strength of reasons we have to perform them.</p><p>To orient discussion, I wish to explore what appear to be the morally excellent actions of Swedish teenager Greta Thunberg. However, an important caveat first. I do not mean to imply that Thunberg herself is an exemplar; morally excellent action is <i>characteristic</i> of exemplars, but can be performed by others people (although not characteristically).<sup>18</sup> As is well known, Thunberg created international headlines by going on strike from school to protest her country's lack of political action on climate change. For 2 weeks, she handed out leaflets in front of the Swedish parliament, bearing the blunt message: “I am doing this because you adults are shitting on my future.”<sup>19</sup> Thunberg's example has since inspired mass protests across the world, and movements such as <i>Fridays for Future</i> and <i>Extinction Rebellion</i>.</p><p>Thunberg's own way of thinking about her actions is noteworthy. When interviewed, Thunberg explained: ‘“I am doing this because nobody else is doing anything. It is my moral responsibility to do what I can… I want the politicians to prioritise the climate question, focus on the climate, and treat it like a crisis.” Now, few philosophers would conclude that it is indeed Thunberg's moral responsibility to strike from school. It would be extremely difficult to support any such a claim on the basis of the arguments we considered in Section 1. Perhaps Thunberg is simply wrong about what is morally required of her?</p><p>We can readily understand this response in terms of virtue theory. Thunberg believes that it is indeed her responsibility to do what she can, a claim that is already more demanding than arguments based on causal responsibility. She also believes that she <i>can</i> do a variety of things that other people around her seem not to think possible or worthwhile. Yet the example shows others that such actions are indeed both possible and worthwhile. Noting the earlier caveat, this kind of response is characteristic of moral exemplars. In relation to climate change, exemplars believe that they both can and ought to do many things that may seem overly demanding to others, including devoting themselves to collective projects aimed at furthering climate action, refusing to fly, becoming vegans, and so on.</p><p>It is of course theoretically intelligible to understand these responses as praiseworthy but not morally required. However, on the basis of virtue terms we can instead say that excellent actions are characteristic of virtuous people, and are recognized as genuine requirements by them, just as good enough actions are requirements for enkratic people. A further point here is that exemplars are unlikely to have the same views about what is morally required as other people. As Aristotle noted, the judgment of the virtuous person concerning <i>what is good</i> is unlikely to be shared by those lacking in virtue (1934, 1144a). As such, the responses of exemplars will often inspiring for enkratic people, just as they appear baffling or stupid to vicious or self-interested people.</p><p>Moral exemplars may also be motivated to do more by the moral failure of others. This connects to the debate about whether those already acting justly ought to “pick up the slack” and do even more to compensate for the unjust inaction of others, or whether it is sufficient to do what would be fair if everyone else were doing their part (Miller, <span>2011</span>; Murphy, <span>2000</span>). Exemplars recognize the failure of others as a reason to do more. However, it seems unlikely that exemplars would be motivated by the thought that in picking up the slack, they were merely doing their fair share, although they may think they are doing their part (see Section 4). They might also be motivated by indignation at the inaction of others, and beyond reasons of justice, by reasons associated with other virtues, such as the benevolent concern with aiding the vulnerable.</p><p>One might wonder whether the virtue ethicist has let off the hook those who fail to respond appropriately to climate change. Isn't it overly demanding, even unfair, to require some people to do more? And do not even morally dubious people have moral responsibilities? Yet we have not argued that some people ought to do more than others in response to climate change. We have said that when faced with shared moral problems, some people can be expected to do more because they possess greater practical wisdom and more reliable motivations, both in terms of the reasons they are responsive to, and their affective attitudes. This does not imply that less virtuous people can <i>justify</i> doing less, especially by reasoning that because they are less virtuous less can be demanded of them. If someone reasoned in this way, they would not be acting well under <i>any</i> description, they would be looking for an excuse for something they were unwilling to do. Those who are selfish, callous, or indifferent to the fate of others are not <i>justified</i> in failing to act. The very application of vice terms implies a judgment of moral blame. The point is instead predictive: we <i>expect</i> that selfish, callous, and indifferent people are unlikely to be moved by moral reasons to act. Indeed, Aristotle believed that vicious people can only be expected to respond to the threat of punishment, since they have been badly brought up and are thus insensitive to moral reasons (1934, 1179b5-15). Less harshly, those insensitive to moral reasons may respond to economic incentives such as cost increases or savings. Yet acting on such motives would be insufficient for acting well. Thus, someone who installed solar panels at home simply to save money would not be acting well in response to climate change, although they would not be acting badly either.</p><p>A final point about demandingness. As Foot pointed out, we seem to have split intuitions about what makes an action demanding, and hence worthy of praise.<sup>20</sup> Although excellent actions, <i>qua</i> excellent, seem to call for more praise, they might not be experienced as more demanding by a virtuous person. On the other hand, it might be more subjectively demanding, and hence potentially more praiseworthy, for an enkratic person to act well, even if what he does is more minimal, because he has to overcome his insufficient motivation a. As such, assessing the demandingness of responses to climate change requires knowing a good deal more about the character and motivations of people.</p><p>I have argued that virtue ethical views offer a distinctive way to think about how we should respond to climate change, and that this may often be more demanding than approaches which depend upon a causal account of harm to generate a moral obligation. This is because virtue terms identify reasons to which (nearly) everyone ought to respond. Virtue terms encourage reflection on what we can do, reasoning from our social context. This involves reasons associated with justice, benevolence, and other virtues, and does not distinguish sharply between actions we do as individuals and actions we do with others. Filling out the vague but correct thought that each of us should do our part when faced with the shared problem of climate change, the resulting view requires much from the wealthiest, but a great deal also from many people with both the means and opportunity to reduce their emissions and to engage in collective action aimed at reducing the threat posed by climate change. This approach also shows that the poor and young people who have emitted little can act well by responding to climate change on the basis of moral reasons. Finally, I explored the importance of exemplary climate actions for how we think about acting well. While the resulting view does not hold that the less virtuous are justified when they do less than others, virtuous people can be expected to do more because they possess greater practical wisdom and moral motivation. Yet such actions can inspire others to do more than they would have done otherwise.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":46756,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Social Philosophy\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-07-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12488\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Social Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/josp.12488\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ETHICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Social Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/josp.12488","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2

摘要

气候伦理中讨论最多的问题之一是,个人是否有道德责任减少排放,甚至实现碳中和。然而,美德伦理在这场辩论中基本上是缺席的。本文探讨了新亚里士多德理论的含义,考察了我们如何将气候变化作为一个共同的问题来应对,以及激励我们采取应对措施的特征原因。我将这种解释与结果主义和义务论方法进行了对比,表明虽然美德概念通常要求个人减少个人排放,但这并不取决于表明个人排放行为是有害的。要理解在应对气候变化方面表现良好的道德观念,我们必须讲述一个关于我们的道德背景和性格的更丰富的故事。在讲述这个故事的过程中,我们会看到,仅仅减少个人的排放而不采取其他行动可能是一种恶习,而做得好可能是帮助当地适应或提高认识,而不是将自己的排放减少到零。第1节探讨了气候责任的标准方法与美德伦理方法之间的差异,介绍了后者的核心理论主张。第2节回到Parfit对聚合问题的讨论,以澄清基本方法。第三节探讨了应对气候变化的思想,做好行动意味着尽我们所能。这种公认的模糊反应引起了对行动指导和要求的关注。因此,第4节认为,良好的行为必须根据一个人的背景来理解。这表明,应对气候变化有很多方法可以采取行动,而排放很少的穷人和年轻人仍然可以将气候变化作为一个共同的道德问题来应对。最后,第5节探讨了模范气候行动的重要性,它们与其他良好行动的区别,并认为这些行动可以激励我们做得比我们认为自己有能力做的更多。要理解美德伦理学是如何处理我们的问题的,首先考虑大多数哲学家是如何处理这个问题的。在关于个人气候责任的大规模辩论中,成功论证的理想条件如下:首先,我们将温室气体排放造成的危害归因于一个代理人。第二,如果行为人知道或应该知道这些行为会造成伤害,我们就赋予道德责任。第三,我们确定了一种道德义务,即停止造成伤害,和/或赔偿那些受到伤害的人(Vanderheiden, 2007)。最重要的争议是,个人行为与气候变化的危害之间是否存在正确的因果关系(Nefsky, 2019)。这很难确定,因为每个人都是由数十亿行动者组成的因果链中极小的一部分,可以追溯到工业革命之初。一些人认为,个人的行为对气候变化造成的危害没有实质性的影响。Baylor Johnson(2003)认为,个人行为不会造成与气候相关的危害。罗纳德·桑德勒(2010)认为,个人行为在产生气候变化方面是“无关紧要的”,这是对戴尔·贾米森(2007)类似观点的回应,而乔金·桑德伯格(2011)认为,个人行为不会带来相应的伤害。Walter Sinnott-Armstrong(2005)声称,驾驶一辆效率低下的汽车兜风并没有什么道德上的问题,因为这种行为不会产生明显的伤害。Galvin和Harris(2014)认为,由于个人行为是无能的,基于权利的论点和预期效用的论点都不会产生道德义务。koko - chor Tan(2015)反对改变生活方式以实现碳中和的义务,因为这种方式的政治影响仍然不确定。Ben Hale(2011)和Johnson(2003)认为,由于需求和供给的市场力量,个人选择不排放不会产生任何影响Garrett Cullity(2015)在没有归因于因果伤害的情况下,拒绝了个人对导致气候危害的集体行动的几种可能贡献。相反,Christian Barry和Gerhard Øverland(2015)认为,如果没有任何特定个人的贡献,同样的气候危害也会发生。许多人反对这些观点。史蒂夫·范德海登(2007)认为,个人与他人一起造成伤害。艾弗拉姆·希勒认为,“周日开车兜风在道德上相当于毁了别人的下午”(2011,57,强调原文),这意味着在整个一生中会造成相当大的伤害(参见Morgan-Knapp &古德曼,2014)。Simo Kyllönen(2016)认为,个人故意造成总体伤害,违反了无伤害原则。 然而,在德性的基础上,我们可以说,优秀的行为是有德性的人的特征,被他们认为是真正的要求,就像足够好的行为是有德性的人的要求一样。进一步的观点是,模范不太可能对道德要求有与其他人相同的看法。正如亚里士多德所指出的,有美德的人对善的判断不太可能被那些缺乏美德的人所分享(1934,1144a)。因此,模范的回答往往会鼓舞有才华的人,就像他们在恶毒或自私的人看来莫名其妙或愚蠢一样。道德模范也可能受到他人道德失败的激励而做得更多。这与关于那些已经公正行事的人是否应该“收拾残局”并做更多的事情来弥补其他人的不公正不作为的争论有关,或者如果其他人都尽自己的一份力量,是否足够做公平的事情(Miller, 2011;墨菲,2000)。榜样将他人的失败视为自己做得更多的理由。然而,模范们似乎不太可能被这样的想法所激励,即他们只是在做自己的一份工作,尽管他们可能认为自己在做自己的一份工作(见第4节)。他们也可能被对他人不作为的愤慨所激励,除了正义的原因之外,还有与其他美德相关的原因,比如对帮助弱势群体的仁慈关怀。人们可能会想,美德伦理学家是否放过了那些未能对气候变化做出适当反应的人。要求一些人做得更多,难道不是要求过高,甚至不公平吗?难道连道德上可疑的人都没有道德责任吗?然而,我们并没有争辩说,在应对气候变化方面,有些人应该比其他人做得更多。我们已经说过,当面对共同的道德问题时,一些人可以被期望做得更多,因为他们拥有更大的实践智慧和更可靠的动机,无论是在他们做出反应的原因还是他们的情感态度方面。这并不意味着道德较差的人可以证明做得少是合理的,尤其是通过推理,因为他们不那么道德,所以对他们的要求就更少。如果有人以这种方式推理,他们在任何描述下都不会表现得很好,他们会为他们不愿意做的事情寻找借口。那些自私、无情或对他人命运漠不关心的人没有理由不采取行动。vice的用法本身就暗示着一种道德谴责的判断。相反,这个观点是预言性的:我们认为自私、无情和冷漠的人不太可能受到道德原因的影响而采取行动。事实上,亚里士多德认为,邪恶的人只能对惩罚的威胁做出反应,因为他们受到了糟糕的教育,因此对道德原因不敏感(1934,1179b5-15)。那些对道德原因不敏感的人可能会对成本增加或储蓄等经济激励做出反应。然而,按照这样的动机行事,还不足以表现良好。因此,那些仅仅为了省钱而在家里安装太阳能电池板的人,在应对气候变化方面不会表现得很好,尽管他们也不会表现得很糟糕。关于要求的最后一点。正如富特所指出的,我们似乎对什么使一项行动有要求,从而值得赞扬有不同的直觉虽然优秀的行为,真正优秀的行为,似乎需要更多的赞扬,但对于一个有美德的人来说,他们可能不会被要求更多。另一方面,对于一个有经验的人来说,即使他所做的事情很少,他也可能主观上要求更高,因此可能更值得称赞,因为他必须克服他的动机不足。因此,评估应对气候变化的要求需要对人们的性格和动机有更多的了解。我认为,美德伦理观点提供了一种独特的方式来思考我们应该如何应对气候变化,这可能比依赖于对伤害的因果解释来产生道德义务的方法更苛刻。这是因为美德术语确定了(几乎)每个人都应该回应的理由。美德术语鼓励我们思考我们能做什么,从我们的社会环境中推理。这涉及到与正义、仁慈和其他美德相关的原因,并没有明确区分我们作为个人的行为和我们与他人的行为。 在面对共同的气候变化问题时,我们每个人都应该尽自己的一份力,这一模糊但正确的观点需要最富有的人做出很大的贡献,但也需要许多有能力和机会减少排放并参与旨在减少气候变化威胁的集体行动的人做出很大的贡献。这种方法还表明,排放很少的穷人和年轻人可以在道德原因的基础上通过应对气候变化而表现得很好。最后,我探讨了模范气候行动对于我们如何做好行动的重要性。虽然由此产生的观点并不认为不那么善良的人比别人做得少是合理的,但善良的人可以被期望做得更多,因为他们拥有更大的实践智慧和道德动机。然而,这样的行为可以激励其他人做得比他们本来会做的更多。 考虑到排放和气候危害之间的时间滞后,其他人不太相信危害的标准计算是适用的。Lauren Hartzell-Nicholls(2012)认为,个人对气候变化的贡献是绝对有害的,因为它们对未来的人施加了有害条件的威胁,而不是标准意义上的有害。相反,伊丽莎白·克里普斯(Elizabeth Cripps, 2011)认为,大致由富人组成的群体会造成道德上重大的、可预测的气候危害,从而违反了适用于集体的一种伤害原则。另外两种情况也出现了类似的情况。那些对因果关系主张持怀疑态度的人通常否认个人对气候变化造成的危害负有道德责任(例如,Baatz, 2014;巴里,Øverland, 2015;Cullity, 2015;加尔文,哈里斯,2014;约翰逊,2003;Sinnott-Armstrong, 2005;Tan, 2015),而那些为因果关系主张的版本辩护的人倾向于认为道德责任可以归因于个人,无论是直接还是与他人一起(例如,Hiller, 2011;Kyllonen, 2016;Morgan-Knapp,古德曼,2014;Schwenkenbecher, 2014;Vanderheiden, 2007),或某些集体(例如,Banks, 2013;克里普斯,2011;桑德伯格,2011;棕褐色,2015;万斯,2016)。对于第三个愿望也是如此,一些人认为,除了参与政治行动之外,个人在道德上没有义务去做什么(Cullity, 2015;加尔文,哈里斯,2014;约翰逊,2003;Sinnott-Armstrong, 2005;棕褐色,2015)。2另一些人则认为,要么存在某种较弱形式的道德义务,例如,只使用公平份额的不完美义务(Baatz, 2014),要么有义务避免故意或可预见的伤害(Hiller, 2011;Kyllonen, 2016;Morgan-Knapp,古德曼,2014)。我在这里的目的不是要证明或拒绝这些论点,而是要退一步,以便提出一个不同的问题,即:在应对气候变化时,美德伦理需要什么?这个问题很少受到关注。上述论点将问题缩小到寻找个人义务,并以排放温室气体的行为造成损害的因果解释为基础。对于这种狭隘的焦点,最明显的解释不是任何一个论点,而是从义务论和结果主义理论中引入的一系列理论假设。我并不是说这些说法就其本身而言是错误的,只是它们预设了一种并非所有理论都认同的道德调查图景。特别是,这一图景受到美德伦理方法的质疑。事实上,由于这个原因,美德伦理学家经常发现,现有的伦理辩论背负着不一致的假设。正如Rosalind Hursthouse(1991)在堕胎案例中指出的那样,以前被认为是争论的焦点,即胎儿的地位,对于这种方法来说根本不是决定性的。我们这里的情况类似。根据美德伦理的说法,我们不需要对每个人所做的有害行为进行因果解释,以证明道德反应是合理的,正如在本文献的两篇文章中所论证的那样(Jamieson, 2007;桑德勒,2010)。然而,正如我们将看到的,这一点的重要性仍然被误解,就像从美德概念的角度思考气候变化的更一般含义一样。因此,让我们首先澄清美德伦理的反应与上述考虑的反应有何不同。为了比较德性伦理理论的结构,我们必须引入德性这一核心概念。正如克里斯汀·斯旺顿(2003,19 - 20)所说,美德是“一种良好的性格品质,更具体地说,是一种以一种优秀或足够好的方式回应或承认其领域或领域内的项目的倾向。”正如我们将在下面看到的,优秀行为和仅仅够好的行为之间的区别对思考美德要求我们做什么有很多暗示。但是我们已经注意到更进一步的一点。至少对新亚里士多德主义者来说,行为的道德品质,也就是,某件事是否被视为优秀或足够好的回应,与有德行的人的正确判断有关。正如亚里士多德所说,品德高尚的人发展出“观察事物的眼睛,因此他们看得正确”(1934,1143b)因此,美德不仅仅是在某些大致相似的情况下按照道德准则行事的可靠倾向,而是涉及我们的情感、我们对原因的反应以及在环境中认识这些原因的实际判断的复杂性格状态。虽然“美德”这个词听起来有点过时(Williams 2006),但美德术语在日常话语中广泛存在。最熟悉的是正义、诚实、勇气、慷慨等,而它们的对立面(可能是多重的)是邪恶,如不公正、自私、不诚实、懦弱等。 美德术语如何影响我们关于个人和气候变化的问题?这是我们将在整个过程中探讨的问题,但我们已经可以指出几个直接的差异。首先,我们不会通过确定一种行为(如排放二氧化碳)和适用于该行为的道德原则来开始伦理调查。相反,我们从确定与情境相关的美德概念(不一定是行动)开始,然后探索从特定情境中判断这些概念所隐含的特征原因和动机。通过这种方式,我们试图理解那些在应对气候变化方面表现良好的反应。其次,道德责任问题看起来完全不同。因为美德是性格的习惯特征,道德责任的范围可能比基于行为的理论更广泛。在气候变化的背景下,后者试图确立个人行为是有害的,因此我们有道德责任停止这样做。相反,美德伦理观点将道德责任归因于特征活动,即生活方式,因为这些反映了我们的道德品质。因此,对行为的道德评价源于对道德品质好坏的事先分析。这解释了美德伦理观点如何在孤立的个人行为是否会产生气候危害的问题上保持不确定性。美德伦理观点所要求的是,有特色的生活方式会对气候造成危害。这是一个无可争议的经验主义主张,即使是对个人行为的危害持怀疑态度的人也能欣然接受。相反,因为美德伦理学主要关注的是表达性格特征的生活方式,所以需要指出的是,长期以性格行事的个人所产生的排放会对气候造成危害。请注意,这一点已经解决了现有辩论中的一个误解,Sinnott-Armstrong反问道:“我们怎么能判断开一辆油耗子是为了娱乐‘表现了一种恶习’?”从表面上看,它表达了一种对乐趣的渴望。玩乐并没有什么害处”(2005,295)。sinnot - armstrong的短语“表面上”无意中是恰当的:除了一些明显的情况,这些情况总是错误的,甚至不能用道德中立的术语来描述(例如,谋杀),我们需要更详细地了解行为的背景和实施行为的人,以确定某人的行为是否邪恶。辛诺特-阿姆斯特朗的例子不是一次性的行为,而是一种典型的生活方式:一个人有一种高排放的生活方式,知道气候危机,拒绝改变他的生活方式,继续他的“无辜”的乐趣。这比(可能是一次性的)驾驶低效汽车取乐的行为更能告诉我们这样一个人有缺陷的道德品质。虽然一次性的行为可能不会反映出恶习,但有特征地做同样的事情很可能是自私或漠不关心。第三点,也可能是最具争议的一点,是没有任何关于道德义务的核心概念。7 .德性伦理学,尤其是新亚里士多德形式的德性伦理学,对道德义务的概念几乎没有用处,这一点自安斯科姆(1958)以来就很熟悉了这包括拒绝伦理理论中的普遍假设,即我们最重要的道德原因必须可以理解为义务。这种想法有多种形式,在关于气候责任的辩论中也有体现。例如,Cullity担心,专注于不能被视为个人气候义务的原因可能“使我们更难以激励自己妥善解决这个问题”(2015,164)。然而,根本没有理论中立的理由认为我们最强烈或最具激励作用的道德原因必须是道德义务(Williams 2006, 200ff)。尽管如此,这种差异可能被夸大了,因为许多行为高尚的案例确实可以(被其他理论家)从道德义务的角度来理解。正如赫斯豪斯(1999,123ff.)所指出的,基于义务的动机(如出于善意的行为)和出于美德的行为之间存在概念上的联系,因为后者意味着出于“良好品格的稳定状态”和令人信服的道德原因的行为(1999,123)。这样的理由可以很容易地被描述为出于责任或出于原则在有关气候责任的辩论中也注意到了这些联系。例如,Gunnar Björnsson (2021, 259, n. 7)为适当关心集体问题的共同义务辩护,他声称这在结构上类似于根据美德行事。虽然在道德行为和道德义务行为之间确实有许多相似之处,但重要的区别仍然存在。 特别是聚合规则2的条件性质似乎不太可能经常得到满足(如果有的话),因此很少有机会发展这种倾向。其次,帕菲特承认,在我们按照常识道德行事的道德动机和按照聚合规则1行事的动机之间存在紧张关系。然而,他没有解释我们如何克服或解决这种紧张局势。当引入聚合规则2时,情况会变得更糟,这将涉及进一步的倾向和进一步的动机,背离聚合规则1和常识性道德,或者对新引入的动机进行修改,以执行聚合规则1。在这两种情况下,这些道德动机之间的紧张关系仍未得到解决。从美德伦理的角度来看,习惯化和道德动机问题不是寻找正确的决策规则或道德原则的次要问题,而是伦理理论化的主要焦点。因此,建立在不可能反复灌输的性格上的解决方案根本不是解决方案。而不是专注于决策规则,一个虚拟伦理的回应将试图表明,如果我们产生聚合问题,我们将成为什么样的人,以及回应这些问题的特征原因。尽管美德伦理学家很少写关于聚合问题的文章,但菲利帕·富特(Philippa Foot)在Parfit上的一篇评论中可以找到这种回应的开端。在《自然之善》一书中,富特提出了聚合问题的解决方案。“这取决于我们人类的思维方式。我们在一种允许我们说“我欠他的”或“我想我应该发挥我的作用”的语言中行动(就像我们现在认为,例如,乘坐公共汽车而不是汽车,以减少道路上的交通,知道我们自己可能需要在其他时间开车紧急到达某个地方)。我们可以通过问:如果一群有道德的人每个人都按自己的性格行事,会不会产生聚合问题,来开始充实这种“人类思维方式”的含义?似乎没有理由不这么认为。这种可能性取决于经验变量,如自然资源有多丰富,有多少人,以及如何利用这些资源。因此,帕菲特很可能是正确的,按照美德伦理行事可能会产生聚集问题。然而,一旦他们意识到自己在做什么,善良的人就不会否认他们应该做任何事情。在无意中造成问题和在我们意识到问题后继续造成问题之间存在着重大的道德(通常也是法律)差异。一旦有道德的人意识到他们在做什么,他们肯定不会认为继续促成一个聚集问题不是严重抱怨的理由。很难想象他们会像帕菲特的自利行为者那样做出反应,假设他们的动机仅仅是关心自己和家人的目的。这样的人可能会说:“嗯,我们所做的事情确实会给我们所有人带来问题。但我的贡献是如此之小!当然,我什么都不用做。”或者,‘我意识到,如果我们都继续这样做,对每个人来说都会更糟。但我不在乎。再说,没人能怪我。我并没有伤害任何人。”相反,即使是道德上有节制的人也会说,“我想我应该尽我的一份力”,即使他们不知道自己行为的确切效果。正在进行的Covid-19大流行提供了许多熟悉的例子:接种疫苗,在共用空间戴口罩等等,都是个人的贡献,减少了病毒的传播,从而挽救了生命。虽然往往不可能从个人到其他个人追溯这种行为的因果影响,但在许多社会中已经出现了一种道德规范来鼓励这种行为,并将不遵守视为自私和不负责任。因此,即使他们无意中产生了一个聚合问题,我们也可以合理地认为,善良的人不会因为他们公正、仁慈和富有同情心而继续延续这个问题。事实上,Parfit已经为这种反应提供了基础,他写道,解决聚合问题需要我们“充分关注对他人的影响”(1984,86)。这是一种关于我们性格的主张,特别是关于我们做出反应的原因。如果仁慈或同情是有效的美德,它有一个适当的考虑范围(事实和规范),并对我们所理解的世界的显著特征做出反应(认知和情感上的):例如,对他人的命运。一个冷酷无情的人,即缺乏仁慈或同情心的人,会反对他们不关心他们所做的是否会伤害别人,而一个自私的人会专注于自己的利益(或“无辜的乐趣”)而排斥他人。 根据目前形成的观点,应对聚合问题需要认识到存在一个我应该以某种方式应对的共同问题。然而,这一公认含糊的要求引起了进一步的关注。模糊的一个问题很容易被搁置一边。首先,一些人可能会抗议说,不够明确的要求是无法付诸行动的。几乎没有理由认为这是真的。正如g·a·科恩(G. a . Cohen)尖锐地指出的那样,我们似乎对模糊的道德要求过敏,然而“当我们面对合理的自利选择时,我们觉得不需要一个能使一切都确定的理论”(2008,6)。相反,当我们在复杂的情况下寻求行动指导时,模糊性可能是一个更严重的问题。在上面的例子中,响应似乎已经很好地指定了。在Covid-19的情况下,政府机构发布建议和限制,而在交通拥堵的情况下,一系列交通选择取决于可用的基础设施和是否拥有汽车。然而,在某些情况下,我们可能远不清楚我们应该做什么。气候变化似乎就是这样一个例子,因为几乎不可能以任何方式避免对气候变化做出贡献,而且考虑到不同处境的个人可以采取大量潜在的行动。现在,重要的是要认识到,对行动指导的类似关注影响着所有理论。正如Stephen Gardiner(2011)所指出的,气候变化可能是如此具有挑战性,以至于我们的伦理理论都无法完全解决这个问题。尽管如此,人们可能会担心,一种建立在模糊的美德基础上的方法,将比其他理论提供更少的行动指导。通过探索美德在应对气候变化时需要什么,我们可以用模糊来解决这个更严重的问题。充实美德概念含义的一种方法是理解它们的用途,将它们置于现有的社会话语中虽然有许多与气候变化有关的论述,但我们可以通过考虑最近一个例子中隐含的道德概念来开始我们的回应,这个例子既具有启发性,又适当地超越了党派。联合国最近出版了一本名为《改变世界的170项日常行动》的小册子,旨在支持变革性的社会变革,以实现17项可持续发展目标在“可持续发展目标13:气候行动”一项下,这本小册子列出了10项建议,包括限制食物浪费、减少开车、与学校或公司一起组织植树,以及传播应对气候变化的意识。这本小册子的每一页都写着充满希望的口号:“如果你关心未来,那就做改变。”帮助消除贫困,减少不平等,应对气候变化。我们可以一起改变世界。”现在,人们必须对任何鼓励个人“成为改变者”的建议持保留态度,因为决策者几十年来未能承诺有效减缓气候变化,个人的反应只会变得更加重要。暗示集体问题主要是个人的责任是危险和错误的。正如英国石油公司发明的碳足迹所表明的那样,将气候责任个人化适合约90家公司,这些公司占所有温室气体排放量的三分之二,其中14家公司一边游说反对减缓气候变化,一边资助气候错误信息(奥雷斯克斯&康威,2010)。尽管如此,关注未来的呼吁是值得注意的,因为联合国出版物很少是最激进的文件。然而,每页都出现的这句话显然不是有条件的。重点不在于,如果你碰巧关心未来,就像你可能碰巧关心你的花园一样,这些是你可能会做的事情;而是你应该关心未来,因此,这些是你应该做的事情。虽然这本小册子没有冒险解释原因,但它的含义是,不关心未来在某种程度上是不合适的。如第二节所述,不关心未来意味着不关心他人的命运。因此,美德伦理学家可以回应说,未能采取部分或全部这些行动意味着未能充分关心他人(参见Björnsson, 2021)。如果是这样,这将反映出不公正、无情或冷漠,Gardiner(2012)声称在应对气候变化方面普遍存在的恶习。既然这些都是恶习,它们的正确归因意味着道德谴责的判断。这里的训诫是,我们应该尽我们所能减少对气候的影响,因为我们关心他人——因为我们是公正的、富有同情心的、仁慈的人。因此,不能尽我们所能,在道德上是应该受到谴责的,因为它反映了不公正、麻木不仁、冷漠等等恶习。批评人士也不太可能对这一含糊不清的回应感到满意。 当然,有很多可能的行动,做其中一些可能会妨碍做其他的。我们如何知道哪些行为是正义或仁慈所要求的?此外,我们似乎缺乏一个原则基础来确定我什么时候做得够多了。这些抗议不太可能因为美德伦理学家的回应而减少,即什么是好的行为是由我们的性格和我们所处环境的特征决定的,因此对每个人来说可能都不一样。换句话说,φ的能力,其中φ是某种特定的道德行为,并不是所有(理性的)人都能够或应该能够做到的,除非是在非常有限的情况下。相反,对于一个有修养的人来说,表现得好可能与一个完全有美德的人表现得好是不同的。批评家现在可能会相信,美德伦理学不足以指导行动,甚至可能是蒙昧主义。这就提出了道德能动性和行为良好的美德伦理概念的两个基本特征,我们将在接下来的两节中讨论。美德伦理方法的一个显著特征是环境对行为的重要性。我所说的环境,是指一个人在道德上的处境,也就是说,她的社会环境,以及她的行动机会,这些不仅是技术或经济上的,而且是由文化塑造的。如第1节所述,除了一些本质上错误的行为外,很难独立于上下文来定义什么是良好的行为。虽然环境对所有道德理论都很重要,但对于美德伦理方法来说,环境在寻求良好行为的行为人的审议中是不可或缺的。相比之下,在许多情况下,只有在我们决定应该做什么之后,语境才会进入画面,特别是通过原谅一些人的道德要求。第1节概述的方法试图确定一种行动(如减少个人排放)和一种产生义务的道德原则(如无伤害原则)。只有在提出这一一般性论点之后,情境才会出现,例如,以贫穷、缺乏能动性等为由免除某些代理人的这些义务。因此,Christian Baatz(2014, 9-10)指出,由于现有基础设施的碳强度,在某些地方比在其他地方更难实现碳中和。Baatz的结论是,对这些人来说,不可能有碳中和的道德义务。当环境以这种方式成为借口因素时,气候责任将针对一组非常相似的人,即生活在富裕社会的相对富裕的人,而忽略那些生活在不太有利环境中的人。有很好的理由把重点放在相对富裕的人的气候责任上,他们对气候变化的人均贡献远远高于较贫穷社会的人(Chakravarty等人,2009)。尽管如此,这种关注可能意味着穷人不需要基于强有力的道德理由来应对气候变化。类似的结论是,美德不需要任何低于物质环境或坏运气的阈值。然而,美德伦理理论强调,在大多数(如果不是全部)情况下,有可能表现良好,也就是说,按照美德行事气候变化可以被理解为每个人共同的道德问题,我们有很多可能采取良好的应对措施,而不会忽视财富或影响力可能对我们的责任产生的相关差异。为了说明表现良好如何需要不同处境的人采取不同的行动,我将概述一些与正义有关的原因。正如我们在第1节中所看到的,美德是对其“领域”内的考虑做出适当反应的倾向(参见Swanton, 2003,19 - 20)。关于气候变化的正义理由的“领域”对许多读者来说可能很熟悉。事实上,我们已经在第2节中确定了几个,例如“这是我的公平份额”,“我欠别人的”,或者“我正在尽我的一份力”。尽管如此,我们还是需要对这个人的背景有更全面的了解,才能理解这些原因需要什么。虽然下面的讨论显示了一个更全面的解释将涉及到什么,但除了概述上下文如何影响我们如何解释这些原因之外,没有足够的空间提供任何东西。首先,想想那些超级富有的人。乐施会估计,从1990年到2015年,最富有的1%人口排放的碳是最贫穷的50%人口的两倍。 16当这与他们通常更大的政治权力相结合时,如果一个非常富有的人问自己,他的公平份额将涉及什么,答案可能不仅仅是个人的碳中和,而是一系列要求更高的活动,包括游说政府制定雄心勃勃的缓解政策,确保他们的公司和投资是碳中和的,投资可再生能源技术,资助适应,资助公众教育活动,提高人们对气候变化的认识,等等。撇开那些超级富有的人不谈,许多人可能既有办法也有机会减少排放,并参与旨在减少气候变化带来的威胁的集体行动。表现良好的理由是,“这是我应得的份额。”“我欠别人的”或“我在尽我的一份力”可能涉及我们在第三节看到的例子:减少食物浪费,少开车,参与社区植树,提高意识,改用可再生能源,减少肉类消费,少坐飞机或根本不坐飞机,骑自行车或坐火车,等等。然而,并不是每个人都能做到所有这些事情,而且程度也不尽相同。气候友好型的生活方式可能会更昂贵,这一事实反映了环境产品定价不当,而不是富人的道德善良。在这种情况下,这些选择要么不存在,要么代价高昂,表现得好可能会看起来大不相同。的确,在某些情况下,某些正义理由也可能不太适用。对于全球南方的许多人来说,他们对气候变化的贡献要小得多,财富也少得多,这可能意味着“我的公平份额”的思考变得没有意义,除非作为一种要求,其他地方的其他人也开始承担自己的公平份额。然而,“我在尽自己的一份力”的理由似乎比“尽自己的一份力”更广泛,因为后者意味着在解决社会问题的共同努力中发挥作用。即使在这样的背景下,做好自己的一份工作仍然是应对气候变化的一个显而易见的基础。正如我们在交通拥堵的例子中看到的那样,无论我们是刚到这个城市从未开车的人,还是经常被堵在交通堵塞中,我们都能认识到尽自己一份力的力量——以及我们的责任是什么。那些碳排放量相对较少的年轻人可以认识到这个正义的理由,而不仅仅是那些一生都在驾驶低效汽车或乘飞机环游世界的人。尽自己的一份力量并不能仅仅因为贫穷或排放少就免除人们应对气候变化的责任。与此同时,一个人在这里所扮演的角色可能意味着与减少排放不同的东西。例如,这可能意味着参与当地的气候适应项目,或者提高人们对那些最易受气候变化影响的人的困境的认识。通过这些方式,美德术语使那些在讨论气候责任时经常被忽视的人的道德行为变得容易理解。这些回应揭示了美德理论与其他研究方法之间的另一个差异。在关于气候责任的辩论中,区分我们作为个人的道德责任和我们作为政治行动者的道德责任是标准的。我们在第1节中看到,许多人对个人责任持怀疑态度,但很少有人怀疑气候变化给我们施加了至少一些政治责任,也许最基本的是投票支持有效的气候政策(Maltais, 2013)。然而,除了政治家的角色责任外,在使用美德术语时,个人责任和政治责任之间的这种区别并不存在。因为人类天生是政治动物,正如亚里士多德所说,我们的伦理生活本质上也是政治的,因为它关注我们如何与他人和社会联系。我们在社会中与他人联系(或不联系)的特有方式也反映了我们的道德品质。这就是为什么像碳中和这样的个人反应可能达不到良好的效果,如果碳中和被用作不参与任何集体气候努力的借口,甚至可能表现出自私和自以为是等恶习。如果这样的人抗议说,他们已经尽了自己的一份力,这就表明他对气候变化的正义原因把握得不恰当,对其他人的关心也不够。批评人士可能会担心这似乎过于苛刻。 当然,总有那么一天,我们做得够多,算是做得好吗?有些人可能准备做出重大牺牲(在时间和金钱上)来应对气候变化,但道德伦理是否认为我们都必须成为气候圣人或殉道者?回答这个问题,我们就可以看到美德伦理方法的第二个显著特征,即道德品质如何影响良好的行为。如第一节所述,对于新亚里士多德主义者而言,行为的道德品质与对有德行之人的正确判断息息相关。然而,回想一下完全有道德的人的典型优秀行为,和纯粹有道德的人的典型足够好的行为之间的区别。这在亚里士多德将道德“新手”的思考与有道德的人的思考进行比较时就已显露出来这种区分的目的是为了表明,根据一个人的美德和实践智慧的实现,不同的行为可以算作良好的行为。的确,正如赫斯豪斯(1999,125)所指出的那样,普通短语“表现得很好”很容易做出这样的区分,因为它可以用“相当”或“非常”等副词来修饰,而不像“道德行为”这样看似二元的描述。在考虑这种区别如何影响应对气候变化的行动之前,让我们先把这种依赖于实践智慧的担忧放在一边。这里的困难再次涉及行动指导,因为如果我们缺乏智慧,我们可能不确定一个有美德的人会做什么。这种对道德智慧的依赖,与其说是一种软弱,不如说是一种表面上的软弱。正如赫斯特豪斯(1991,231)所观察到的那样,大多数人会明智地无视那些通常做出可疑道德选择的人提供的道德建议,即使他们精通道德理论。如果我们缺乏道德智慧,我们最好去寻找那些我们认为拥有道德智慧的人,而不是试图在没有道德智慧的情况下生活。对道德典范的反思提供了一种更好地把握美德要求的方式,并能激励我们采取比我们本来可能采取的更好的行动。Linda Zagzebski(2010, 55)探讨了我们在理论之前对榜样的把握的重要性,将榜样定义为“即使不完美,也可以模仿”的人。通过关注范例,我们可以探索一些道德上优秀的应对气候变化的措施,以及我们必须采取这些措施的理由。为了引导讨论的方向,我想探讨一下瑞典少女格蕾塔·桑伯格的道德高尚的行为。但是,首先有一个重要的警告。我并不是说滕伯格本人就是一个典范;道德上优秀的行为是模范的特征,但其他人也可以这样做(尽管不是典型的)众所周知,滕伯格在学校罢课,抗议她的国家在气候变化问题上缺乏政治行动,这让她登上了国际头条。整整两周,她在瑞典议会前散发传单,上面直白地写着:“我这样做是因为你们这些成年人在糟蹋我的未来。从那以后,桑伯格的例子激发了世界各地的大规模抗议活动,以及周五争取未来和灭绝叛乱等运动。桑伯格思考自己行为的方式值得注意。在接受采访时,滕伯格解释说:“我这样做是因为没有人做任何事情。尽我所能是我的道德责任……我希望政治家们优先考虑气候问题,关注气候问题,把它当作一场危机来对待。”现在,很少有哲学家会得出这样的结论:罢课确实是滕伯格的道德责任。根据我们在第1节中所考虑的论据来支持任何这样的主张是极其困难的。也许桑伯格对她的道德要求只是错了?我们可以很容易地从美德理论的角度理解这种反应。Thunberg认为,她确实有责任尽其所能,这一主张已经比基于因果责任的论点更加苛刻。她还相信自己可以做很多别人认为不可能或不值得做的事情。然而,这个例子向其他人表明,这样的行动确实是可能的,也是值得的。注意前面的警告,这种反应是道德模范的特征。在气候变化问题上,模范们认为,他们可以也应该做很多对其他人来说似乎过于苛刻的事情,包括投身于旨在进一步推动气候行动的集体项目、拒绝坐飞机、成为纯素食主义者等等。当然,将这些反应理解为值得赞扬,但在道德上并非必需,在理论上是可以理解的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
“How should we respond to climate change? Virtue ethics and aggregation problems”

One of the most discussed questions in climate ethics is whether individuals have a moral responsibility to reduce their emissions, or even to become carbon neutral. However, virtue ethics has been largely absent from this debate. This article explores the implications of a neo-Aristotelian account, examining how we respond to climate change as a shared problem, and the characteristic reasons that motivate us to do what we can in response. I contrast this account with consequentialist and deontological approaches, showing that while virtue concepts will often require individuals to reduce their individual emissions, this does not depend on showing that individual emitting actions are harmful. To understand the virtue-ethical notion of acting well in response to climate change, we must tell a richer story about our moral contexts and characters. In telling such a story, we will see that merely reducing one's personal emissions while refraining from other actions could reflect vice, while acting well could consist in assisting local adaptation or raising awareness, rather than reducing one's emissions to zero.

Section 1 explores the differences between standard approaches to climate responsibility and virtue ethical approaches, introducing the core theoretical claims of the latter. Section 2 returns to Parfit's discussion of aggregation problems to clarify the basic approach. Section 3 explores the thought that in response to climate change, acting well means doing what we can. This admittedly vague response gives rise to concerns with action-guidance and demandingness. Thus, Section 4 argues that acting well must be understood in light of one's context. This shows that there are many ways to act well in response to climate change, and that the poor and young people who have emitted little can nonetheless respond to climate change as a shared moral problem. Finally, Section 5 explores the importance of exemplary climate actions, their difference from otherwise good actions, and argues that such actions can inspire us to do more than we thought ourselves capable.

To understand how virtue ethics approaches our question, consider first how most philosophers have approached it. In the large debate about individual climate responsibility, the desiderata for a successful argument are as follows: first, we attribute causal responsibility to an agent for harm resulting from the emission of greenhouse gases. Second, we attribute moral responsibility if the agent knew or should have known that harm would result from these actions. Third, we identify a moral obligation to cease contributing to harm, and/or to compensate those harmed (Vanderheiden, 2007).

The most significant dispute concerns whether the right kind of causal connection holds between individual actions and the harms of climate change (Nefsky, 2019). This is difficult to establish since each individual is an extremely small part of causal chains comprising billions of actors stretching back to the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. Several have argued that the actions of individuals make no meaningful difference to the production of harms from climate change. Baylor Johnson (2003) argues that individual acts do not cause climate-related harms. Ronald Sandler (2010) argues that individual actions are “inconsequential” in producing climate change, responding to a similar argument from Dale Jamieson (2007), while Joakim Sandberg (2011) argues that no consequential harms follow from individual actions. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2005) claims there is nothing morally objectionable about joyriding in an inefficient car since this action produces no discernible harm. Galvin and Harris (2014) argue that since individual actions are impotent, neither rights-based arguments nor expected utility arguments produce moral obligations. Kok-Chor Tan (2015) argues against obligations to change one's lifestyle to become carbon-neutral since the political effects of this remain uncertain. Ben Hale (2011) and Johnson (2003) argue that individual choices not to emit would make no difference due to market forces of demand and supply.1 Without attributing causal harm, Garrett Cullity (2015) rejects several possible contributions of individuals to collective actions causing climate harm. Instead, Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland (2015) argue that the same climate harms would occur without the contribution of any particular individual.

Many have objected to these arguments. Steve Vanderheiden (2007) argues that individuals do harm in conjunction with others. Avram Hiller argues that “going on a Sunday drive is the moral equivalent of ruining someone's afternoon” (2011, 57, emphasis original), which implies a significant amount of harm over an entire lifetime (cf. Morgan-Knapp & Goodman, 2014). Simo Kyllönen (2016) argues that individuals violate the no harm principle by knowingly contributing to an aggregate harm. Others are less convinced that standard accounts of harm are applicable, given the temporal lag between emissions and climate harm. Lauren Hartzell-Nicholls (2012) argues that individual contributions to climate change are de dicto harmful because they impose threats of harmful conditions upon future people, without being harmful in the standard de re sense. Instead, Elizabeth Cripps (2011) argues that the group roughly comprising wealthy individuals cause morally significant and predicable climate harm, thus violating a form of the harm principle applicable to collectives.

A similar picture emerges for the other two desiderata. Those skeptical about the causal claim usually deny that individuals are morally responsible for harms caused by climate change (e.g., Baatz, 2014; Barry & Øverland, 2015; Cullity, 2015; Galvin & Harris, 2014; Johnson, 2003; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2005; Tan, 2015), while those who defend versions of the causal claim tend to think that moral responsibility can be attributed to individuals, whether directly or in conjunction with others (e.g., Hiller, 2011; Kyllönen, 2016; Morgan-Knapp & Goodman, 2014; Schwenkenbecher, 2014; Vanderheiden, 2007), or to certain collectives (e.g., Banks, 2013; Cripps, 2011; Sandberg, 2011; Tan, 2015; Vance, 2016). So too for the third desideratum, some argue that there is nothing individuals are morally obliged to do, aside from engaging in political action (Cullity, 2015; Galvin & Harris, 2014; Johnson, 2003; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2005; Tan, 2015).2 Others believe either that there is some weaker form of moral obligation, for instance an imperfect duty to use only their fair share of emissions (Baatz, 2014), or an obligation to avoid knowingly or foreseeably harming (Hiller, 2011; Kyllönen, 2016; Morgan-Knapp & Goodman, 2014).

My intention here is not to vindicate or reject any of these arguments, but to step back from them in order to ask a different question, namely: what does virtue ethics require in response to climate change? This question has received very little attention. The arguments surveyed above narrow the question to a search for individual obligations, grounded upon a causal account of harm resulting from actions that emit greenhouse gases. The most obvious explanation for this narrowed focus is not any one argument, but a set of theoretical assumptions imported from deontological and consequentialist theories. I do not claim that these accounts are mistaken on their own terms, merely that they presuppose a picture of ethical enquiry that is not shared by all theories. In particular, this picture is contested by virtue ethical approaches. Indeed, for this reason virtue ethicists often find existing ethical debates saddled with uncongenial assumptions. As Rosalind Hursthouse (1991) pointed out in the case of abortion, what had previously been regarded as the point of contention, namely the status of the fetus, is simply not decisive for such an approach. We are in a similar situation here. According to virtue-ethical accounts, we do not require a causal account of the harmful action that each individual contributes in order to justify moral responses, as has already been argued in two contributions to this literature (Jamieson, 2007; Sandler, 2010). Yet as we will see, the significance of this point remains misunderstood, as do the more general implications of thinking about climate change in terms of virtue concepts. Thus, let us first clarify how virtue-ethical responses differ from those considered above.

To compare the structure of virtue-ethical theories, we must introduce the central concept of virtue. As Christine Swanton (2003, 19–20) puts it, a virtue is “a good quality of character, more specifically a disposition to respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in an excellent or good enough way.” As we will see below, this distinction between excellent and merely good enough action has many implications for thinking about what virtues require of us. But we can already note a further point here. At least for neo-Aristotelians, the moral quality of action, that is, whether something counts as an excellent or good enough response, is tied to the correct judgment of the virtuous person. As Aristotle puts it, virtuous people develop “an eye for things, and so they see correctly” (1934, 1143b).3 As such, virtues are not merely reliable tendencies to act on moral rules in certain roughly similar circumstances, but complex states of character involving our emotions, our responsiveness to reasons, and the practical judgment to recognize these reasons in context. While the word ‘virtue’ has an old-fashioned ring to it (Williams 2006), virtue terms are widespread in common discourse. The most familiar are justice, honesty, courage, generosity, and so on, while their opposites (which may be multiple) are vices such as injustice, selfishness, dishonesty, cowardice, and so on.4

How do virtue terms affect our question concerning individuals and climate change? This is something we will explore throughout, but we can already point to several immediate differences. First, we do not begin ethical enquiry by identifying an action, such as emitting CO2, and a moral principle, which applies to it. Instead, we begin with the identification of virtue concepts that bear upon the situation (which need not be an action), then explore the characteristic reasons and motivations these imply when judged from a particular context. In this way, we seek to understand the sorts of responses that would count as acting well in response to climate change.

Second, the issue of moral responsibility looks quite different. Because virtues are habituated traits of character, the scope of moral responsibility is potentially broader than for action-based theories. In the context of climate change, the latter seek to establish that individual actions are harmful, and thus that we have a moral responsibility to cease doing them. Instead, virtue ethical views attribute moral responsibility for characteristic activities, that is, ways of living, because these reflect our moral character. The moral evaluation of action is thus derived from a prior analysis of good or bad moral character. This explains how virtue ethical views can remain uncommitted on the question of whether isolated individual actions produce climate harms. All that virtue ethical views require is that characteristic ways of living can produce climate harms. This is a maximally uncontroversial empirical claim,5 and one that even skeptics about the harmfulness of individual actions can readily accept. Instead, because virtue ethics is primarily interested in ways of living that express character traits, all that needs to be claimed is that the emissions produced by individuals acting in character over long periods of time can produce climate harms.

Note that this point already addresses a misunderstanding in the existing debate, where Sinnott-Armstrong asks rhetorically, “How can we tell whether driving a gas guzzler for fun ‘expresses a vice’? On the face of it, it expresses a desire for fun. There is nothing vicious about having fun” (2005, 295). Sinnott-Armstrong's phrase “on the face of it” is unintentionally apt: barring some obvious cases which are always wrong and cannot even be characterized in ethically neutral terms (e.g., murder),6 we are in need of greater detail about the context of action and the person performing it to decide whether someone's actions are vicious. Consider Sinnott-Armstrong's example not as a one-off action but as a characteristic lifestyle: a person who has a high-emitting lifestyle, knows about the climate crisis, and refuses to change his lifestyle and continues with his ‘innocent’ fun. This tells us far more about such a person's faulty moral character than the (potentially one-off) action of driving an inefficient car for fun. Without going into such details here, while a one-off action may not reflect vice, doing the same thing characteristically may well be selfish or uncaring.

The third and potentially most controversial move in this account is the absence of any central notion of moral obligation. Virtue ethics, especially in its neo-Aristotelian forms, has little use for the concept of moral obligation, a point that has been familiar since Anscombe (1958).7 This involves rejecting the common presumption in ethical theory that our weightiest moral reasons must be intelligible as obligations. This thought takes many forms, and it is also present in the debate about climate responsibility. For instance, Cullity worries that focusing upon reasons that cannot be considered individual climate obligations might “make it harder to motivate ourselves to address this problem properly” (2015, 164). However, there is simply no theory-neutral reason to think that our strongest or most motivating moral reasons must be intelligible as moral obligations (Williams 2006, 200ff.). Nonetheless, this difference may be overstated since many cases of acting virtuously will indeed be intelligible (by other theorists) in terms of moral obligation. As Hursthouse (1999, 123ff.) points out, there are conceptual connections between obligation-based motives such as acting from a good will, and acting from virtue, since the latter means acting from “a settled state of good character” and for compelling moral reasons (1999, 123). Such reasons can be readily described as acting from duty or on principle.8 These connections have also been noted in the debate about climate responsibility. For example, Gunnar Björnsson (2021, 259, n. 7) defends a shared obligation to care appropriately about collective problems, which he claims to be structurally similar to acting according to virtue.

While there are indeed many similarities between acting virtuously and acting on a moral obligation, important differences remain. This is because our choice of moral concepts affects what we consider to be an adequate argument or relevant objection. For instance, Björnsson considers the perspective of climate activists, noting that they often think in terms of doing the best they can, or living up to their moral ideals (2021, 252–3). However, Björnsson simply assumes that these notions can be captured as moral obligations. Yet there is nothing in ordinary notions such as doing the best one can, living up to our moral ideals, or even doing what we believe is required of us that necessitates thinking in terms of moral obligation (at least not in the sense given to this notion in ethical theory). Moreover, as we have already seen, claiming that something is a moral obligation invites challenges concerning the harmfulness of one's individual actions, while also narrowing the moral landscape considerably.9 An alternative, which I develop in what follows, is to approach such ordinary notions of moral responsibility using virtue terms.

To sketch the general approach available to virtue theorists, let us return to Derek Parfit's discussion of what he called “aggregation problems,” of which climate change is a paradigm case.10 In a prescient passage, Parfit wrote:

“For the sake of small benefits to ourselves, or our families, we may deny others much greater total benefits, or impose on others much greater total harms. We may think this permissible because the effects on each of the others will be either trivial or imperceptible. If this is what we think, what we do will often be much worse for all of us” (1984, 86).

Although aggregation problems are often couched in terms of narrow self-interest, all that is necessary to produce them is acting on a principle of expanded self-interest which holds that “each rather than none does what will be better for himself, or his family, or those he loves” (1984, 62). Parfit argued that all standard moral theories give rise to aggregation problems, yet it is unclear that this is the case for virtue ethics. Parfit briefly objected that according to such views, there would still be “cases where acting morally (i.e., on the virtues) would be, on the whole, worse for someone” (1984, 87). While an outcome that is merely worse for someone need not be a counter-example for virtue ethics, it might be sufficient to show that acting in conformity with virtue ethics would produce aggregation problems. I will return to this point shortly.

First, consider Parfit's well-known solution that individuals should become rational altruists. This solution consists in outlining two decision rules that rational altruists would follow, which are designed to eliminate the “five mistakes in moral mathematics” which all standard theories seem to make and thus which produce aggregation problems (1984, 67ff.). Thus, Aggregation Rule 1 states that individuals can depart from “common sense morality” (i.e., the expanded self-interest principle already noted) when this produces an aggregation problem (1984, 100). When this is so, individuals should instead do whatever will actually best support their expanded self-interest, thus avoiding the mistakes in moral mathematics. In resource over-appropriation cases, this requires individuals to restrict what they appropriate on the condition that enough other individuals do so as well, where ‘enough’ is the smallest number of contributors necessary to resolve the aggregation problem (1984, 100–1).11 Yet Aggregation Rule 1 can create conflicts with partiality to our loved ones that also produce aggregation problems. In response, Parfit introduces Aggregation Rule 2, which states that whenever Aggregation Rule 1 leads to aggregation problems, we should give no priority to our partial aims. Aggregation Rule 2 is conditional, since it only applies when we believe that sufficiently many others will also give no priority to their partial aims (1984, 101).

This solution is framed in terms of decision rules, rather than the requirements of being disposed to reliably act upon them. To be sure, Parfit (1984, 103) acknowledges that there is already a problem with the dispositions associated with common-sense morality, since our partiality to loved ones may undermine acting in ways that avoid aggregation problems. However, Parfit underestimates the dispositional requirements of his solution, which seems to involve a set of new dispositions to respond to aggregation problems, thereby either supplanting or correcting the dispositions associated with common-sense morality. Unfortunately, it is far from clear how anyone could cultivate the dispositions required to become a rational altruist. In the first place, habituating a disposition requires acting successfully upon it sufficiently many times. To do so, aspiring rational altruists would have to be on the lookout for situations in which sufficiently many other people are likely forego their partial aims in order to cooperate. The conditional nature of Aggregation Rule 2 in particular seems unlikely to be fulfilled very often (if ever), leaving few opportunities to develop such a disposition. Second, Parfit acknowledges that there is a tension among our moral motivations to act on common-sense morality, and motivations to act on Aggregation Rule 1. However, he does not explain how we are to overcome or resolve such tensions. This is made worse when Aggregation Rule 2 is introduced, which would involve either a further disposition and a further motivation to act on it, departing from both Aggregation Rule 1 and common-sense morality, or a modification of the newly-introduced motivation to act on Aggregation Rule 1. In either case, tensions among these moral motivations remain unresolved.

From a virtue-ethical perspective, issues of habituation and moral motivation are not secondary concerns to that of finding correct decision rules or moral principles, but are a primary focus of ethical theorizing. As such, a solution that rests on dispositions that are impossible to inculcate is no solution at all. Rather than focusing upon decision rules, a virtue-ethical response would attempt to show what kinds of people we would be if we produced aggregation problems, and the characteristic reasons for responding to them. Although virtue ethicists have written little about aggregation problems, the beginning of such a response is available in a remark on Parfit by Philippa Foot. In Natural Goodness, Foot claimed the solution to aggregation problems.

“Depends on our human way of thinking. We act within a language that allows us to say ‘I owe it to him’ or ‘I suppose I should play my part’ (as we nowadays think, for instance, of taking a bus rather than a car, to reduce traffic on the road, knowing that we ourselves may need to get somewhere urgently by car some other time)” (2001, 44).

We can begin filling out what this “human way of thinking” means by asking: would a set of virtuous people produce aggregation problems, if each were acting in character? There seems no reason to think not. This possibility depends on empirical variables such as how abundant natural resources are, how many people there are, and what is done with these resources. Thus, Parfit is likely correct that acting well according to virtue ethics could produce an aggregation problem.

However, once they realized what they were doing, virtuous people would not respond by denying that they should do anything. There is a significant ethical (and ordinarily, legal) difference between unwittingly causing a problem, and continuing to cause it once we have become aware of it. Once virtuous people realized what they were doing, they would certainly not think that continuing to contribute to an aggregation problem is not grounds for serious complaint. It is hard to imagine them responding as Parfit's self-interested agents, who are ex hypothesis motivated only by concern for their own ends and those of their families. Such people might indeed say, “Well, it's true that what we are all doing causes a problem for all of us. But my contribution is so small! Surely I don't have to do anything.” Or, ‘I realize that if we all continue doing this it is worse for everyone. But I don't care. And besides, no one can blame me. I'm not actually harming anyone’. Instead, even enkratic (morally continent) people would say things like, ‘I suppose I should do my part’, even if they do not know the precise effect of their actions. The ongoing Covid-19 pandemic offers many familiar examples: getting vaccinated, wearing a mask in shared spaces, and so on, are individual contributions, which lessen the spread of the virus and consequently save lives. While it will often be impossible to trace the causal effects of such actions from individuals to other individuals, in many societies an ethical norm has already emerged to encourage such actions, and to discourage non-compliance as selfish and irresponsible.

Therefore, even if they unwittingly produced an aggregation problem, it is plausible to think that virtuous people would not continue perpetuating it precisely because they are just, benevolent, and compassionate. Indeed, Parfit already provides the basis for such a response, writing that the solution to aggregation problems requires that we “care sufficiently about effects on others” (1984, 86). This is a claim about our dispositions, and specifically the reasons to which we are responsive. If benevolence or compassion is the operative virtue, it has an appropriate scope of considerations (factual and normative), and is responsive (cognitively and emotionally) to salient features of the world as we understand it: for instance, to the fate of others. A callous person, that is, someone deficient in benevolence or compassion, would instead object that they do not care whether what they do harms others, while a selfish person would focus on their own interests (or ‘innocent fun’) at the exclusion of others.

On the view developed thus far, responding to aggregation problems requires recognizing that there is a shared problem towards which I should respond somehow. However, this admittedly vague demand gives rise to further concerns. One issue with vagueness is easy to set aside. First, some might protest that insufficiently clear demands cannot be acted upon. There is little reason for thinking this to be true. As G. A. Cohen pointedly remarked, we seem allergic to vague ethical demands, yet “[w]hen facing our legitimately self-interested choices, we feel no need for a theory that will make everything determinate” (2008, 6). Instead, vagueness might be a more serious concern when we are seeking action-guidance in complex cases. In the above examples, responses appear already well-specified. In the Covid-19 case, government agencies publish recommendations and restrictions, while in the traffic congestion case the set of transport options are determined by available infrastructure and whether one owns a car. However, there are cases in which we may be far less clear about what we should do. Climate change appears to be one such case, given that it is almost impossible to avoid contributing to climate change in any way, and given the multitude of potential actions open to differently situated individuals. Now, it is important to recognise that a similar concern with action-guidance affects all theories. As Stephen Gardiner (2011) has argued, climate change may be so challenging that none of our ethical theories are fully able to address it. Nonetheless, one might worry that an approach grounded in vague virtue terms will offer even less action-guidance than other theories. By exploring what the virtues require in response to climate change, we can address this more serious concern with vagueness.

One way to fill out what virtue concepts imply is to understand their use, locating them within existing social discourse.12 While there are many discourses related to climate change, we can begin filling out our response by considering the moral concepts implicit in a recent example, which is both revealing and suitably non-partisan. The United Nations recently produced a booklet entitled 170 daily actions to transform our world, aimed at supporting transformative societal change to meet the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).13 Under “SDG 13: Climate Action,” this booklet lists 10 recommendations including limiting food waste, driving less, organizing tree planting with one's school or company, and spreading awareness about ways to address climate change. This booklet also runs the hopeful slogan across each page: “If you care about the future, be the change. Help to end poverty, to reduce inequalities, and to tackle climate change. Together we can transform the world.” Now, one must take with a grain of salt any hortatory recommendations for individuals to “be the change,” since individual responses have only become more important because policymakers have failed for decades to commit to effective mitigation. It would be dangerous and wrong to imply that collective problems are primarily the responsibility of individuals. As shown by British Petroleum's invention of the carbon footprint, individualizing climate responsibility suits the approximately 90 corporations responsible for two-thirds of all greenhouse gas emissions,14 who are simultaneously lobbying against climate mitigation while funding climate misinformation (Oreskes & Conway, 2010).

Nonetheless, the appeal to caring about the future is noteworthy, since UN publications are seldom the most radical documents. Yet the phrase running across each page is clearly not meant to be conditional. The point is not that if you happen to care about the future, as you might happen to care about your garden, these are some things you might do; it is that you should care about the future, and as such, these are some of the things you should do. While this booklet does not venture into explaining why, the implication is that failing to care about the future is somehow inappropriate. As noted in Section 2, failing to care about the future means failing to care about the fate of others. Thus, the virtue ethicist can respond that failing to do some or all of these actions implies failing to care sufficiently about others (cf. Björnsson, 2021). If so, this would reflect injustice, callousness or indifference, vices which Gardiner (2012) claims are widespread in response to climate change. Since these are vices, their correct attribution implies a judgment of moral blame. The injunction here is that we ought to do what we can to reduce our climate impacts, because we care about others–because we are just, compassionate, and benevolent people. Failing to do what we can, then, is morally blameworthy, because it reflects vices of injustice, callousness, indifference, and so on.

The critic is again unlikely to be satisfied with the vagueness of this response. Surely, there is a large set of possible actions, and doing some of them might preclude doing others. How can we know which actions are required by justice or benevolence? Moreover, we seem to lack a principled basis for determining when I have done enough. These protests are unlikely to be lessened by the virtue ethicist's response that what counts as acting well is determined both by our characters and by features of our context, and therefore may not be the same for everyone. In other words, the capacity to φ, where φ is some specific moral action, is not something that all (rational) people are or ought to be capable of, except perhaps in a very limited set of cases. Instead, what counts, as acting well for the enkratic person may not be the same as acting well for the fully virtuous person. The critic might now be convinced that virtue ethics is insufficiently action-guiding, perhaps even obscurantist. This raises two essential features of the virtue-ethical conception of moral agency and acting well, which we will address over the next two sections.

One distinctive feature of virtue ethical approaches is the importance of context in acting well. By context, I mean how the person is morally situated, that is, her social context, and her opportunities for acting, which are not only technological or economic but also shaped by culture. As noted in Section 1, aside from a few cases of intrinsically wrong action, what counts as acting well is difficult to specify independently of context. While context matters to all moral theories, for virtue ethical approaches context is indispensable in the deliberation of the agent looking to act well.

In contrast, in many accounts context enters the picture only after we have decided what ought to be done, notably by excusing some from the demands of morality. The approaches outlined in Section 1 seek to identify an action (such as reducing one's individual emissions) and a moral principle that generates obligations (such as the no-harm principle). It is only once this general argument has been made that context enters, for instance by exempting some agents from these obligations on the basis of poverty, lack of agency, and so on. Thus, Christian Baatz (2014, 9–10) points out that it is more difficult to live carbon neutrally in some places than in others due to the carbon intensiveness of existing infrastructure. Baatz concludes that there cannot be a moral obligation for carbon neutrality for such people. When context functions as an excusing factor in this way, climate responsibilities will target a very similar set of people, namely the relatively well-off living in wealthy societies, ignoring those living in less favorable circumstances. There are very good reasons for focusing on the climate responsibilities of the relatively well-off, whose per capita contributions to climate change are far higher than those of people in poorer societies (Chakravarty et al., 2009). Nonetheless, this focus may imply that poorer people need not respond to climate change on the basis of strong ethical reasons. The analogous conclusion would be that the virtues do not require anything below a certain threshold of material circumstance or bad luck. However, virtue ethical theories emphasize that it is possible to act well, that is, in accordance with virtue, in most (if not all) contexts.15 Climate change can be understood as a shared moral problem by everyone, and there are many possibilities for us to act well in response, without losing sight of relevant differences that wealth or influence can have upon our responsibilities.

To illustrate how acting well can require different actions from differently situated people, I will sketch some reasons associated with justice. As we saw in Section 1, virtues are dispositions to respond appropriately to considerations within their ‘field’ (cf. Swanton, 2003, 19–20). The ‘field’ of reasons of justice bearing on climate change are likely to be familiar to many readers. Indeed, we have already identified several in Section 2, such as “this is my fair share,” “I owe it to others,” or “I am doing my part.” Nonetheless, we need a richer picture of the person's context to understand what these reasons require.

There is insufficient space to provide anything beyond a sketch of how context influences how we interpret such reasons, although the following discussion shows what a fuller account would involve. First, consider the exceedingly wealthy. Oxfam estimates that between 1990 and 2015, the wealthiest 1% are responsible for emitting twice as much carbon than the poorest 50%.16 When this is coupled with their often far greater political power, if an exceedingly wealthy person asked himself what his fair share would involve, the answer might not be merely individual carbon neutrality, but a far more demanding set of activities including lobbying governments for ambitious mitigation policy, ensuring their companies and investments are carbon neutral, investing in renewable energy technologies, funding adaptation, funding public education campaigns to raise awareness about climate change, and so on.

Leaving aside the exceedingly wealthy, many people are likely to have both the means and opportunity to reduce their emissions, and to engage in collective action aimed at reducing the threat posed by climate change. Acting well on the reason, “this is my fair share.” “I owe it to others,” or “I am doing my part,” is likely to involve the examples we saw in Section 3: reducing food waste, driving less, becoming involved in community tree planting, raising awareness, switching to renewable energy, reducing meat consumption, flying less often or not at all, riding a bicycle or the train, and so on. However, not everyone will be able do all of these things, and not always to the same extent. Climate friendly lifestyles can be more expensive, a fact which reflects the improper pricing of environmental goods rather than the moral goodness of the wealthy.

In contexts where such options are either absent or prohibitively expensive, acting well may look considerably different. Indeed, in certain contexts, some reasons of justice might also be less applicable. For many in the Global South, their far smaller contributions to climate change and lower wealth likely means that thinking in terms of “my fair share” becomes less meaningful, unless as a demand that others elsewhere start doing their fair share. However, the reason ‘I am doing my part’ appears broader than doing one's fair share, since the latter implies a role in shared efforts to address a social problem. Even in such contexts, doing one's part remains an intelligible basis for acting well in response to climate change. As we saw in the example of traffic congestion, whether we are new to the city and have never driven, or whether we are regularly stuck in gridlock, we can recognize the force of doing our part – and the question of what our part consists in. Young people who have emitted relatively little carbon can recognize this reason of justice, not merely those who have spent their lives driving around in inefficient cars or flying around the world. Doing one's part does not exempt people from responding to climate change simply because they are poor or have emitted little. At the same time, what one's part consists in here could mean something different from reducing one's emissions. For instance, it could mean becoming involved in local climate adaptation projects, or awareness raising of the plight of those most vulnerable to climate change. In these ways, virtue terms make intelligible the moral action of those often ignored in discussions of climate responsibility.

These responses have revealed another difference between virtue theories and other approaches. In the debate about climate responsibility, it is standard to distinguish between our moral responsibilities as individuals, and those we have as political actors. We saw in Section 1 that many are skeptical about individual responsibilities, but few doubt that climate change imposes on us at least some political responsibilities, perhaps most minimally voting for effective climate policy (Maltais, 2013). However, with the exception of the role responsibilities of politicians, this distinction between individual and political responsibilities does not register when using virtue terms. Because human beings are by nature political animals, as Aristotle said, our ethical life is essentially also political in the sense that it is concerned with how we relate to others and to society. Our characteristic ways of relating (or failing to relate) to others in society also reflect our ethical character. This is why an individual response such as carbon neutrality could fall short of acting well, and could even express vices such as selfishness and self-righteousness if carbon neutrality were used as a pretext not to engage in any collective climate efforts. If such a person protested that they had already done their fair share, this would reveal an inappropriate grasp of the reasons of justice bearing upon climate change, and an insufficient concern for others.

A critic might worry that this seems overly demanding. Surely there comes a time when have we done enough to count as acting well? Some might be prepared to make significant sacrifices (in time and money) to respond to climate change, but does virtue ethics hold that we must all become climate saints or martyrs? Answering this takes us to the second distinctive feature of virtue ethical approaches, namely how moral character affects acting well.

As noted in Section 1, for neo-Aristotelians the moral quality of action is tied to the correct judgment of the virtuous person. However, recall the distinction between the characteristically excellent action of the fully virtuous person, and the characteristically good enough action of the merely enkratic person. This is brought out in Aristotle's comparison of the deliberation of the ethical ‘novice’ compared to that of the virtuous person.17 The purpose of this distinction is to show that different actions can count as acting well in light of one's attainment of virtue and practical wisdom. Indeed, as Hursthouse (1999, 125) notes, the ordinary phrase “acting well” is apt to make such a distinction since it can be qualified with adverbs such as “fairly” or “very,” unlike the seemingly binary description ‘acting morally’.

Before considering how this distinction affects acting well in response to climate change, let us set aside a worry with such reliance upon practical wisdom. The difficulty here again concerns action-guidance, since if we lack wisdom we might be unsure about what a virtuous person would do. Such dependence upon moral wisdom is less of a weakness than it might appear. As Hursthouse (1991, 231) observes, most people would sensibly disregard ethical advice offered by somebody who usually made what appeared to be dubious ethical choices, even if they were well-versed in moral theory. If we lack moral wisdom, we would be better off seeking out those we believe to possess it than attempting to get by without it.

Reflection on moral exemplars offers one way to get a better grasp of what virtues require, and can inspire us to better actions than we might have performed otherwise. Linda Zagzebski (2010, 55) has explored the importance of our pre-theoretical grasp of exemplars, defining an exemplar are someone who is “defeasibly imitable even if not perfect.” By focusing on exemplars, we can explore some morally excellent responses to climate change, and the strength of reasons we have to perform them.

To orient discussion, I wish to explore what appear to be the morally excellent actions of Swedish teenager Greta Thunberg. However, an important caveat first. I do not mean to imply that Thunberg herself is an exemplar; morally excellent action is characteristic of exemplars, but can be performed by others people (although not characteristically).18 As is well known, Thunberg created international headlines by going on strike from school to protest her country's lack of political action on climate change. For 2 weeks, she handed out leaflets in front of the Swedish parliament, bearing the blunt message: “I am doing this because you adults are shitting on my future.”19 Thunberg's example has since inspired mass protests across the world, and movements such as Fridays for Future and Extinction Rebellion.

Thunberg's own way of thinking about her actions is noteworthy. When interviewed, Thunberg explained: ‘“I am doing this because nobody else is doing anything. It is my moral responsibility to do what I can… I want the politicians to prioritise the climate question, focus on the climate, and treat it like a crisis.” Now, few philosophers would conclude that it is indeed Thunberg's moral responsibility to strike from school. It would be extremely difficult to support any such a claim on the basis of the arguments we considered in Section 1. Perhaps Thunberg is simply wrong about what is morally required of her?

We can readily understand this response in terms of virtue theory. Thunberg believes that it is indeed her responsibility to do what she can, a claim that is already more demanding than arguments based on causal responsibility. She also believes that she can do a variety of things that other people around her seem not to think possible or worthwhile. Yet the example shows others that such actions are indeed both possible and worthwhile. Noting the earlier caveat, this kind of response is characteristic of moral exemplars. In relation to climate change, exemplars believe that they both can and ought to do many things that may seem overly demanding to others, including devoting themselves to collective projects aimed at furthering climate action, refusing to fly, becoming vegans, and so on.

It is of course theoretically intelligible to understand these responses as praiseworthy but not morally required. However, on the basis of virtue terms we can instead say that excellent actions are characteristic of virtuous people, and are recognized as genuine requirements by them, just as good enough actions are requirements for enkratic people. A further point here is that exemplars are unlikely to have the same views about what is morally required as other people. As Aristotle noted, the judgment of the virtuous person concerning what is good is unlikely to be shared by those lacking in virtue (1934, 1144a). As such, the responses of exemplars will often inspiring for enkratic people, just as they appear baffling or stupid to vicious or self-interested people.

Moral exemplars may also be motivated to do more by the moral failure of others. This connects to the debate about whether those already acting justly ought to “pick up the slack” and do even more to compensate for the unjust inaction of others, or whether it is sufficient to do what would be fair if everyone else were doing their part (Miller, 2011; Murphy, 2000). Exemplars recognize the failure of others as a reason to do more. However, it seems unlikely that exemplars would be motivated by the thought that in picking up the slack, they were merely doing their fair share, although they may think they are doing their part (see Section 4). They might also be motivated by indignation at the inaction of others, and beyond reasons of justice, by reasons associated with other virtues, such as the benevolent concern with aiding the vulnerable.

One might wonder whether the virtue ethicist has let off the hook those who fail to respond appropriately to climate change. Isn't it overly demanding, even unfair, to require some people to do more? And do not even morally dubious people have moral responsibilities? Yet we have not argued that some people ought to do more than others in response to climate change. We have said that when faced with shared moral problems, some people can be expected to do more because they possess greater practical wisdom and more reliable motivations, both in terms of the reasons they are responsive to, and their affective attitudes. This does not imply that less virtuous people can justify doing less, especially by reasoning that because they are less virtuous less can be demanded of them. If someone reasoned in this way, they would not be acting well under any description, they would be looking for an excuse for something they were unwilling to do. Those who are selfish, callous, or indifferent to the fate of others are not justified in failing to act. The very application of vice terms implies a judgment of moral blame. The point is instead predictive: we expect that selfish, callous, and indifferent people are unlikely to be moved by moral reasons to act. Indeed, Aristotle believed that vicious people can only be expected to respond to the threat of punishment, since they have been badly brought up and are thus insensitive to moral reasons (1934, 1179b5-15). Less harshly, those insensitive to moral reasons may respond to economic incentives such as cost increases or savings. Yet acting on such motives would be insufficient for acting well. Thus, someone who installed solar panels at home simply to save money would not be acting well in response to climate change, although they would not be acting badly either.

A final point about demandingness. As Foot pointed out, we seem to have split intuitions about what makes an action demanding, and hence worthy of praise.20 Although excellent actions, qua excellent, seem to call for more praise, they might not be experienced as more demanding by a virtuous person. On the other hand, it might be more subjectively demanding, and hence potentially more praiseworthy, for an enkratic person to act well, even if what he does is more minimal, because he has to overcome his insufficient motivation a. As such, assessing the demandingness of responses to climate change requires knowing a good deal more about the character and motivations of people.

I have argued that virtue ethical views offer a distinctive way to think about how we should respond to climate change, and that this may often be more demanding than approaches which depend upon a causal account of harm to generate a moral obligation. This is because virtue terms identify reasons to which (nearly) everyone ought to respond. Virtue terms encourage reflection on what we can do, reasoning from our social context. This involves reasons associated with justice, benevolence, and other virtues, and does not distinguish sharply between actions we do as individuals and actions we do with others. Filling out the vague but correct thought that each of us should do our part when faced with the shared problem of climate change, the resulting view requires much from the wealthiest, but a great deal also from many people with both the means and opportunity to reduce their emissions and to engage in collective action aimed at reducing the threat posed by climate change. This approach also shows that the poor and young people who have emitted little can act well by responding to climate change on the basis of moral reasons. Finally, I explored the importance of exemplary climate actions for how we think about acting well. While the resulting view does not hold that the less virtuous are justified when they do less than others, virtuous people can be expected to do more because they possess greater practical wisdom and moral motivation. Yet such actions can inspire others to do more than they would have done otherwise.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
2.20
自引率
12.50%
发文量
44
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信