Journal of Social Philosophy最新文献

{"title":"Social pathologies of informational privacy","authors":"Wulf Loh","doi":"10.1111/josp.12504","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12504","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Following the recent practice turn in privacy research, informational privacy is increasingly analyzed with regard to the “appropriate flow of information” within a given practice, which preserves the “contextual integrity” of that practice (Nissenbaum, <span>2010</span>, p. 149; <span>2015</span>). Such a practice-theoretical take on privacy emphasizes the normative structure of practices as well as its structural injustices and power asymmetries, rather than focusing on the intentions and moral considerations of individual or institutional actors. Since privacy norms are seen to be institutionalized via the role obligations of the practice's participants, this approach can analyze structural and systematic privacy infringements in terms of “defective role performances and defective social relations” (Roessler & Mokrosinska, <span>2013</span>, p. 780).</p><p>Unfortunately, it is still often somewhat unclear what this exactly means within the context of informational privacy, why these performances and relations are defective and for whom. This raises the common objection of a so-called “practice positivism” (Applbaum, <span>1999</span>, p. 51), that is, the difficulty of practice–theoretical accounts to take a practice-independent standpoint, from which to normatively evaluate the existing practice norms themselves. For example, Nissenbaum herself initially argues for a “presumption in favor of the status quo” with respect to the appropriateness and flow of privacy norms within a practice (Nissenbaum, <span>2004</span>, p. 127). Such a “practice conservatism” (Nissenbaum, <span>2010</span>, p. 169) comes dangerously close to committing a naturalistic fallacy, if not undergirded by practice-external criteria (which is ultimately what she does).</p><p>Merely resorting to existing practice norms to assess what defective role performances amount to, only shifts the question from how to recognize an appropriate flow of information to the question of how to recognize those defective role performances and social relations. Against this backdrop, the central aim of this article is to shed light on this question without resorting to practice-independent first principles or far-reaching universalistic anthropological assumptions. For this, I will analyze the notion of “defective role performances and social relations” in terms of social pathologies.<sup>1</sup> Doing so has two advantages: First of all, it can draw on already existing concepts and distinctions, which help to categorize the different levels of analysis that exist in informational privacy research and situate the notion of “defective role performances” within them (Section 1). Second, those concepts and distinctions can serve as a basis for establishing a typology of phenomena with regard to deficient practices of informational privacy (Section 4).</p><p>Having thus set the scene in Section 1, I can move on to address the notion of “defective role performances and social relations” w","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 3","pages":"541-561"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12504","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42251597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"You can't tell me what to do! Why should states comply with international institutions?","authors":"Antoinette Scherz","doi":"10.1111/josp.12503","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12503","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Increased international coordination after the Second World War saw both the creation of more multilateral institutions but also the deepening of existing institutions' authority. Since then, many international institutions have faced criticism from both civil society and state representatives (e.g. Zürn et al., <span>2012</span>) which has intensified in recent years. Yet, addressing global problems such as poverty or climate change requires greater international collaboration than ever. So, how should we evaluate the authority of international institutions that demand compliance? When are such institutions legitimate? The question of state legitimacy has been at the core of political philosophy, and the concept and standards of legitimacy in respect of international institutions have recently garnered much attention (e.g. Adams et al., <span>2020</span>; Besson, <span>2014</span>; Buchanan & Keohane, <span>2006</span>; Christiano, <span>2012</span>; Sandven & Scherz, <span>2022</span>). However, one aspect has largely been neglected in this debate, namely how and when legitimate authority is able to bind not only individuals but also states.</p><p>The concept of legitimacy is traditionally applied to state institutions, though questions of legitimacy also arise for international institutions as soon as they demand compliance. International institutions seek to bind and therefore demand compliance primarily of states through their rules or agreements, while they do so of individuals only secondarily through their states. It remains unclear how normative conceptions of legitimacy apply to states. Therefore, it is important to understand how legitimacy is applicable internationally to bind states.</p><p>This paper tackles precisely this question: Under what circumstances <i>should</i> states comply with international institutions? It is generally assumed that legitimate authority can demand compliance of subjected individuals also in cases when compliance conflicts (or is seen to conflict) with their self-interest according to normative considerations such as the common good, rights, or moral reasons. Yet, for states, such normative considerations are often seen as naïve and thus quickly abandoned for realist international relations theories. Therefore, the legitimate authority of international institutions is often challenged on the basis of state sovereignty. On the other hand, if the normative side is taken seriously, state consent is criticized for as a legitimacy standard. Can states be bound in order to solve global problems or to comply with human rights even without their consent? If individuals have a right to “personal pursuits” (Tan, <span>2004</span>) based on their freedom or autonomy, then states might have a similar right to decide for themselves and only be subjected to the authority of international institutions to which they have explicitly consented. However, the use of such “domestic analogies” has often been critici","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 4","pages":"450-470"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12503","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45996494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Neither race nor ethnicity: Latinidad as a social affordance","authors":"Alejandro Arango, Adam Burgos","doi":"10.1111/josp.12500","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12500","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 3","pages":"502-521"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42955357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Tying ourselves to the mast, or acting for the sake of justice? Ethos, individual duties, and social sanctions","authors":"Markus Furendal","doi":"10.1111/josp.12502","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12502","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Political philosophy often focuses on what the state may legitimately do to, or in the name of, its citizens. Yet, how well a society lives up to political-philosophical ideals arguably also depends on the decisions that individuals make in their daily lives regarding, for instance, how to treat others, what to work with, and how to spend their free time. Many contemporary social movements for increased justice hence seem to focus less on reforming institutions and laws, and instead attempt to change the values and principles that individuals accept and act on. In political-philosophical terms, these movements are less interested in the “basic structure” of a society, and more intent on changing its “ethos.”<sup>1</sup> Part of this change could happen by influencing what people think are reasonable principles of justice, but the efforts to reform what is seen as acceptable behavior often also involves individuals monitoring each other and issuing positive and negative sanctions in response to each other's actions. Recent years have seen social media and other technological developments boosting the power of such sanctions, allowing millions of strangers to join in the criticism of particular wrongdoers. More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic brought these kinds of social mechanisms to the center of attention, as decentralized and informal monitoring and sanctioning of people's response to pandemic-related regulations appeared to be at least as important as more classical forms of state enforcement. This article assumes that there are, indeed, moral demands on individuals to act in certain ways not only in times of crisis but also in order to further a just society, and sets out and defends an account of the concept of ethos that helps to conceptualize how individual compliance with these demands can be encouraged, or enforced.</p><p>The assumption that the degree of justice in a society does not only depend on how its institutions are set up is closely associated with philosopher G. A. Cohen's influential critique of John Rawls. The core of their disagreement is that, while Rawls suggests that principles of justice apply primarily to the major political and economic institutions of a society—its basic structure—Cohen argues that principles of justice would also shape a social ethos that inspires citizens to act in particular ways in their daily lives. Specifically, Cohen is skeptical of Rawls's willingness to accept as just equality-upsetting economic incentives that motivate individuals to work productively. Rejecting authoritarian attempts to coerce people to contribute, Cohen suggests that justice rather requires an egalitarian ethos that inspires and motivates individuals to make certain decisions about how much to work and with what.<sup>2</sup> Such an ethos, Cohen suggests, is a “moral climate,”<sup>3</sup> or “… a structure of response lodged in the motivations that inform everyday life …,”<sup>4</sup> that somehow influences individual","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 3","pages":"522-540"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12502","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42492413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Indigenizing wild animal sovereignty","authors":"Dennis Papadopoulos him/his","doi":"10.1111/josp.12498","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12498","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I encountered a turtle midway through crossing the road. I stopped the car and waited for her, but she had seized up. I got out and gently lifted her to the side of the road. It was a face-to-face encounter with a <i>wild</i> animal who had unknowingly entered a “human” world. Her action disrupted my naive attitude that a road is a place for me to drive along, a place for cars, and not a place for turtles. But, she just needed to get to the other side; the road cut through her world. My naive attitude that the road is not a place for turtles fails to acknowledge the turtles' jurisdiction over their habitat on both sides of the road. In this article, I explore how Indigenous political ontology, from the First Nations<sup>1</sup> of Canada and the northern United States, allows us to conceive of a world where animals have jurisdiction over their land. On such an account when roads or other interventions cut through their territories without providing accommodations we have done something wrong.</p><p>Wild animals have their place in the world as part of autonomous communities outside human institutions like industrial agriculture, laboratories, zoos, and our homes. In order to restrain human interventions in the places and practices of autonomous nonhuman animal communities, some have suggested that wild animals be understood as “sovereign” (Donaldson & Kymlicka, <span>2011</span>; Goodin et al., <span>1997</span>). Designating wild animals “sovereign” is one way to establish the jurisdiction of nonhuman animal communities. In line with the norms of international relations, recognizing wild animal communities as sovereign limits foreign (in this case, humans and domestic animals) access to their spaces and establishes limits on the human ability to intervene when it affects their jurisdiction.</p><p>A sovereignty conception of jurisdiction is missing something, namely that wild animal communities have no sovereigns—there are no kings of lion prides, ministers of owl parliaments, or presidents of salamander congresses. Wild animals can only be “sovereign” through human institutions. Recommending a novel institution fails to capture the jurisdiction of wild animals that goes unrecognized when humans fail to appropriately limit their interventions. After all, some humans already advocate for limited interventions in wild animals' territory, for example, when activists and environmental government agencies challenge the construction of highways through wetlands or when Indigenous water protectors and land defenders refuse to allow oil pipelines (Sainato, <span>2021</span>) or the destruction of old-growth forests (Larsen, <span>2021</span>). These advocates are usually not defending the supposed rights of a sovereign nonhuman animal community. Instead, they often defend the rights of First Nations to govern land shared with more-than-human beings.<sup>2</sup></p><p>The shared jurisdiction, attested to in some traditional Indigenous thought, offe","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 4","pages":"583-601"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10947386/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46019553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reparations for White supremacy? Charles W. Mills and reparative vs. distributive justice after the structural turn","authors":"Jennifer M. Page","doi":"10.1111/josp.12499","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12499","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 4","pages":"709-727"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47723449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What is wrong with persecution","authors":"Rebecca Buxton","doi":"10.1111/josp.12496","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12496","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The fact that persecution is seriously wrong should be obvious. Many of the worst events in human history were acts of persecution. During the reign of the Roman Empire, Christians were beaten, murdered, and forced to fight with wild animals. Until recently, Black Americans were hunted down by mobs and lynched by their compatriots.<sup>1</sup> They were often publicly hanged, but some were also burned alive, thrown from tall buildings, and dismembered. The centuries long persecution of Jewish people culminated in the terroristic policies of Nazi Germany and the murders of over six million Jews between 1941 and 1945. These individuals were violently targeted for their perceived membership in a particular social, religious, or political group. We know already, then, that persecution is a terrible injustice. What is not obvious, however, is <i>why</i> exactly this is the case. This might immediately seem like a ridiculous proposition: persecution often involves discrimination, cruelty, extreme violence, and mass murder. Surely we know that persecution is wrong precisely because it involves acts of the worst possible kind? This paper argues that the entire picture of the wrongness of persecution cannot be understood by pointing to these individual elements alone. To put it more strongly, persecution is wrong not only when (or because) it includes these other wrongs. Instead, I argue that part of the wrongness of persecution is located in the condition that it creates for the persecuted, but also for society more generally. In doing so, I follow two similar interventions from David Sussman (2004) on torture and Lea Ypi (<span>2013</span>) on colonialism.<sup>2</sup> Both papers begin with the intuition that such acts are serious wrongs. Their aim is to offer a new way of understanding why this is so. Like Ypi's, my title does not include a question mark. I ask you to accept that there is <i>something</i> wrong with persecution. My aim is to offer a new way of understanding what that something is.</p><p>As such, I will not consider whether persecution is <i>ever</i> justified. There are (at least) two political philosophers who maintain that persecution is compatible with legitimate governance. For St. Augustine (395AD), heretical persecution is “righteous” when the Church inflicts it upon “the impious.” This is what he calls “persecution in the spirit of love.”<sup>3</sup> Such persecution was therefore viewed as a legitimate way of punishing those who have strayed from God (Christenson, <span>1968</span>).<sup>4</sup> For Hobbes, persecution is a necessary power of the Sovereign, best described as an extension of the rights of war. Hobbes distinguishes between punishment and persecution: punishment being for misdemeanors committed within the boundaries of the commonwealth and persecution being suffered by those outside it. This “right of nature to make war” extends to all individuals who refuse to be subjected under the sovereign, even citizens. P","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 2","pages":"201-217"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12496","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44701690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The market ideology conception of fetishism: An interpretation and defense","authors":"Antoine Louette","doi":"10.1111/josp.12497","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12497","url":null,"abstract":"<p>When Charles de Brosses first coined the term ‘fetishism’ in <i>On the Worship of Fetish Gods</i> (1760), it was in a rather misled attempt to demonstrate the immaturity of ‘primitive’ religious cults (de Brosses, <span>1760</span>; see Iacono, <span>1992</span>, 51). Yet a little more than a hundred years later, Marx had turned the concept into one of the most deep-probing tools which social philosophy can bring to the study of capitalism.</p><p>The German philosopher-cum-economist had noticed the way in which his European contemporaries would still sneer at the West African religious habit of treating social objects as ‘independent figures endowed with a life of their own’, and he realized he could turn the joke on them: they themselves did the same with their own ‘immense collection of commodities’ (Capital I, 165 and 125; see also Iacono, <span>1992</span>, 79–80, Heinrich, <span>2012</span>, 179–81 and Graeber, <span>2005</span>).</p><p>The ‘joke’, importantly, was a rather pointed one, and has remained so to this day. Just as Marx hoped to spur his contemporaries out of capitalism, the contemporary literature uses the concept of commodity fetishism to mount a radical critique of the capitalist market. Two main conceptions can be distinguished. According to the first conception, the concept of commodity fetishism alerts us to a form of market ideology that plays a crucial role in the reproduction of market domination (Cohen, <span>2000</span>; Elster, <span>1986</span>). On the second conception, by contrast, commodity fetishism refers to market domination itself, understood as a form of structural domination with a specific profit-maximizing logic (Roberts, <span>2017</span>, Vrousalis, <span>2017</span>, Ripstein, <span>1987</span>).</p><p>In recent years, mainly thanks to the efforts of Roberts (<span>2017</span>), drawing on Arthur Ripstein (<span>1987</span>), the market domination conception seems to have taken precedence. This is unfortunate, I believe. Granted, the market domination conception has the undeniable benefit of emphasizing the profit-maximizing logic that distinguishes market domination from other forms of structural domination. But at a time when the detrimental effects of this logic have become well-known, the concept can provide a better ‘basis for resistance’, as Sally Haslanger would put it (cf. <span>2020</span>, 36), by focusing less on market domination itself than on the exact workings of its ideological reproduction.</p><p>In this paper, therefore, I attempt to go against the grain. As we will see, this requires developing an innovative theoretical framework for understanding ideology—one which not only adapts to the market the influential account which Haslanger and others have offered in relation to racism and sexism (<span>2012</span>, <span>2017c</span>; see also Celikates, <span>2016</span>, Einspahr, <span>2010</span>), but which also refines this account by showing how acknowledging the influence which","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 4","pages":"548-564"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12497","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42952180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Democratic equality and higher education: Moving from access to completion","authors":"Tammy Harel Ben-Shahar, Sigal Ben-Porath, Dustin Webster","doi":"10.1111/josp.12495","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12495","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 3","pages":"404-420"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48846989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The wrongs, harms, and ineffectiveness of torture: A moral evaluation from empirical neuroscience","authors":"Nayef Al-Rodhan","doi":"10.1111/josp.12494","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12494","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Torture is banned by numerous international and regional treaties.<sup>1</sup> The United Nations' <i>Convention against Torture</i> (United Nations, <span>1984</span>) defines torture as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining […] information or a confession, punishing him […], or intimidating or coercing him […], when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity” (ibid.: Article 1). Nonetheless, torture continues to flourish across the globe.<sup>2</sup> Following 9/11 and the subsequent War on Terror, philosophers and policy makers of Western states seriously debated whether there are exceptional circumstances in which torture is morally permissible or even required.</p><p>The most prominent arguments in favor of the permissibility of torture rest on an appeal to some form of utilitarianism combined with the belief that interrogational torture works.<sup>3</sup> In contrast, those arguing for the wrongness of torture typically appeal to the notion of human dignity. In this paper, I make the case that empirical insights from neuroscience and beyond are relevant to this debate as they inform both utilitarian and deontological arguments on torture. Drawing on empirical data, I first show that torture is demonstrably ineffective and there are alternative methods better suited to obtain information. Then I argue that the profound neurological damages caused by torture indeed amount to a disregard for autonomy. Moreover, I explore what psychological and neurological mechanisms underlying the practice of torture. I conclude by canvassing reasons for thinking that torture is likely to persist and argue that this sheds light on human nature and on the nature of states.</p><p>In contrast to those who argue that torture is sometimes permissible on consequentialist grounds, those who make the case that such methods are categorically forbidden typically take a deontological approach. For the deontologist, torture is wrong in principle, regardless of its consequences. In international law, the right not to be tortured is grounded in human dignity. As the United Nations' <i>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</i> (United Nations, <span>1948</span>) states, “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (Article 1). The Declaration proclaims that human dignity is “inherent” to “all members of the human family” and that the rights that derive from it are “inalienable” (ibid.: Preamble). Although no account of the grounds of human dignity is provided, borrowing a term from John Rawls, we can say there is an international overlapping consensus on the value of dignity as described in the Declaration.</p><p>Most debates concerning the moral (im)permissibility of torture focus on the victim, overlooking the impact on the ","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 4","pages":"565-582"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12494","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46831880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}