Journal of Social Philosophy最新文献_第9页

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IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-09-26 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12421

引用次数: 0

Rethinking the right to know and the case for restorative epistemic reparation 重新思考知情权和恢复性认知赔偿的案例

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-09-12 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12492

Melanie Altanian

引用次数: 1

Reparative responsibility for the harms of forced migration 对强迫移徙造成的伤害承担赔偿责任

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-09-11 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12493

Laura Santi Amantini

引用次数: 0

Supererogatory and obligatory rescues: Should we institutionalize the duty to intervene? 强制性和强制性救助:我们应该将干预义务制度化吗?

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-07-21 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12491

Sara Van Goozen

引用次数: 0

Direct and structural injustice against refugees 对难民的直接和结构性不公正

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-07-21 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12486

Bradley Hillier-Smith

{"title":"Direct and structural injustice against refugees","authors":"Bradley Hillier-Smith","doi":"10.1111/josp.12486","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12486","url":null,"abstract":"The dominant philosophical approach to understanding the moral duties that states in the Global North have toward the 26 million refugees worldwide is what we can call the Duty of Rescue Approach.1 According to this approach, states in the Global North (hereafter Northern states) are mere innocent bystanders overlooking the humanitarian crisis of refugee displacement unfold, and these states have moral duties to rescue refugees from this situation, at least if such states are able to do so at little cost to themselves.2Serena Parekh's recent normative analysis (2017, 2020) has sought to challenge this dominant approach. Parekh highlights certain Northern state policies and practices used in response to refugees while they are displaced and suggests that refugees endure extensive harms as result of such policies and practices, including the harms of containment and encampment, and their being prevented from accessing adequate refuge. These harms, Parekh argues, are an injustice. Thus, for Parekh, certain Northern states, far from being mere innocent bystanders, are responsible for injustice against refugees.In this article, I fully endorse Parekh's claims that refugees endure certain harms as a result of Northern state practices, and that such harms constitute an injustice against refugees. Yet, I will explore how we ought to understand this injustice. I contest Parekh's claim that the harms refugees endure as a result of Northern state practices are, and ought to be understood as, a structural injustice—an unfortunate, unintended unjust outcome resulting from structural processes (call this Parekh's Structural Injustice Approach). Instead, I contend that these harms are, and ought to be understood as, a direct injustice against refugees—an unjust outcome directly resulting from specific and avoidable policies enacted by relatively unconstrained actors (call this the Direct Injustice Approach). I argue that Parekh's Structural Injustice Approach fails to accurately capture the causal and normative relations between Northern state practices and the harms endured by refugees, and that this approach fails to provide any advancement on, and suffers from same the problems as, the standard Duty of Rescue Approach to which it is ostensibly an alternative. I instead advocate a Direct Injustice Approach to understanding the harms that refugees endure as a result of Northern states practices. If these harms are indeed a direct injustice, then responsible Northern states are certainly not mere innocent bystanders, and are not merely involved in structural processes that have an unintended unjust outcome (as on Parekh's Structural Injustice Approach), but are instead directly committing a grave injustice against innocent refugees and thus have urgent negative duties to refrain from unjustly harming the world's displaced.Section 1 explains Parekh's","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 2","pages":"262-284"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12486","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46764103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Digital participatory democracy: A normative framework for the democratic governance of the digital commons 数字参与式民主：数字公域民主治理的规范框架

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-07-20 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12489

Alec Stubbs

引用次数: 0

Skill-selection and socioeconomic status: An analysis of migration and domestic justice 技能选择和社会经济地位:移民和国内正义的分析

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-07-14 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12485

Michael Ball-Blakely

引用次数: 0

“How should we respond to climate change? Virtue ethics and aggregation problems” “我们应该如何应对气候变化？美德伦理和聚合问题”

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-07-07 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12488

Dominic Lenzi

{"title":"“How should we respond to climate change? Virtue ethics and aggregation problems”","authors":"Dominic Lenzi","doi":"10.1111/josp.12488","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12488","url":null,"abstract":"One of the most discussed questions in climate ethics is whether individuals have a moral responsibility to reduce their emissions, or even to become carbon neutral. However, virtue ethics has been largely absent from this debate. This article explores the implications of a neo-Aristotelian account, examining how we respond to climate change as a shared problem, and the characteristic reasons that motivate us to do what we can in response. I contrast this account with consequentialist and deontological approaches, showing that while virtue concepts will often require individuals to reduce their individual emissions, this does not depend on showing that individual emitting actions are harmful. To understand the virtue-ethical notion of acting well in response to climate change, we must tell a richer story about our moral contexts and characters. In telling such a story, we will see that merely reducing one's personal emissions while refraining from other actions could reflect vice, while acting well could consist in assisting local adaptation or raising awareness, rather than reducing one's emissions to zero.Section 1 explores the differences between standard approaches to climate responsibility and virtue ethical approaches, introducing the core theoretical claims of the latter. Section 2 returns to Parfit's discussion of aggregation problems to clarify the basic approach. Section 3 explores the thought that in response to climate change, acting well means doing what we can. This admittedly vague response gives rise to concerns with action-guidance and demandingness. Thus, Section 4 argues that acting well must be understood in light of one's context. This shows that there are many ways to act well in response to climate change, and that the poor and young people who have emitted little can nonetheless respond to climate change as a shared moral problem. Finally, Section 5 explores the importance of exemplary climate actions, their difference from otherwise good actions, and argues that such actions can inspire us to do more than we thought ourselves capable.To understand how virtue ethics approaches our question, consider first how most philosophers have approached it. In the large debate about individual climate responsibility, the desiderata for a successful argument are as follows: first, we attribute causal responsibility to an agent for harm resulting from the emission of greenhouse gases. Second, we attribute moral responsibility if the agent knew or should have known that harm would result from these actions. Third, we identify a moral obligation to cease contributing to harm, and/or to compensate those harmed (Vanderheiden, 2007).The most significant dispute concerns whether the right kind of causal connection holds between individual actions and the harms of climate change (Nefsky, 2019). This is difficult to establish since each individual is an extremely sma","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 3","pages":"421-436"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12488","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44684714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

The populist challenge to European Union legitimacy: Old wine in new bottles? 民粹主义对欧盟合法性的挑战:新瓶装旧酒?

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-07-07 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12487

I. Cozzaglio, Dimitrios E. Efthymiou

引用次数: 1

Official apologies as reparations for dirty hands 官方道歉是对肮脏行径的补偿

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-07-07 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12490

Christina Nick

引用次数: 2