Journal of Social Philosophy最新文献_第8页

New perspectives on the legitimacy of international institutions and power 对国际机构和权力合法性的新视角

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-12-04 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12554

Gordon Arlen, Antoinette Scherz, Martin Vestergren

{"title":"New perspectives on the legitimacy of international institutions and power","authors":"Gordon Arlen, Antoinette Scherz, Martin Vestergren","doi":"10.1111/josp.12554","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12554","url":null,"abstract":"In democracies around the world, political forces calling for a rollback of globalization are on the ascendancy. Longstanding consensus about the benefits of free trade and human rights and around the legitimacy of the international institutions enabling these goods has been questioned by successful populist politicians on both sides of the ideological spectrum. Some even claim that the entire liberal international order has become contested, perhaps as never before (Lake et al., 2021). An emerging critique of multilateralism argues that states and peoples should not be shackled by international legal arrangements and international law, but rather, that states should “do it alone.” The picture painted is one where state sovereignty is constrained and undermined by international institutions. This view implies that there is necessarily a tradeoff between multilateralism and state autonomy.Yet, in our globalized world, the relationship between state autonomy and international legal institutions is more complex than both critics and some defenders of the international order acknowledge. Though states frequently find themselves under pressure to join international legal institutions, this is often because there are good reasons to do so. In a globalized world, membership in these institutions is often crucial for states to function properly, serving their citizens domestically, while also cultivating productive relationships with other states. Therefore, international institutions may contribute to the construction of domestic legitimacy (Buchanan, 2011). By imposing reciprocal limitations on states, international institutions may increase, rather than diminish, a state's room to maneuver. Furthermore, the very act of joining and submitting to international authority may be seen as an expression of state autonomy rather than a surrender of it. Without dismissing the growing opposition to international institutions as uninformed, misguided, or insincere, this special symposium seeks to deepen our theoretical understanding of the complex authority and power relations between international legal arrangements and states and between particular international institutions and the broader institutional structure in which they are embedded.More specifically, the special symposium explores power relations and legitimacy issues in the context of international legal institutions in two dimensions. It assesses, first, what we call vertical power, that is, power and authority exercised by international bodies over states and societies. The special symposium explores claims made about power abuse and illegitimacy by investigating how this kind of power operates, what sort of legitimacy problems it gives rise to, and the normative conditions and criteria of legitimacy that are relevant. Second, the special symposium addresses questions about the international horizontal allocation of power, that is, the division of function","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 4","pages":"445-449"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12554","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138511968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

What is a black radical Kantianism without Du Bois? On method, principle, and abolition democracy 没有杜波依斯，何来黑人激进康德主义？论方法、原则和废除民主

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-11-23 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12552

Elvira Basevich

引用次数: 0

Alienated dependence: The unfreedom of our social relations 异化的依赖：我们社会关系的不自由

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-11-15 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12551

Tatiana Llaguno

{"title":"Alienated dependence: The unfreedom of our social relations","authors":"Tatiana Llaguno","doi":"10.1111/josp.12551","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12551","url":null,"abstract":"Modern individuals grapple with a paradoxical reality: their lives are characterized by a strong feeling of independence as well as by an intense social interconnection. In Karl Marx's words, this paradox is best described as individuals achieving “personal independence” under an “objective dependence” (1993, p. 158). This paper focuses on the notion of objective dependence, which has been insufficiently problematized in recent debates about social interdependence. By bringing to light a distinctively Hegelian-Marxist approach to the problem of dependence and to the problem of objectivity, the article aims at contributing to the ongoing scholarly debate on the ethical and political consequences of dependence as an acknowledged social condition. Starting from the inevitability claim, I push for an understanding of dependence that avoids its reduction to domination and that instead presents it as a complex reality that can be actively and freely experienced. Contrary to what a considerable number of political theorists have argued (see Macpherson, 1962), I hold that dependence per se does not lead to unfreedom; although, at present, many relations of dependence do. To understand why this is the case, I defend that the analysis of social dependence must be brought together with the critique of political economy. In fact, when looked from the perspective of our economic relations, the rejection of dependence is not entirely misguided: it points out to defective social relations that we need to untangle in order to criticize. In doing so, I respond to Renault's invitation to deploy dependence as a critical concept (2018, p. 36).In what follows, I will delineate my own approach by way of a critical review of the accounts of dependence circulating in contemporary social and political philosophy, focusing on their failure to integrate, to a greater or lesser degree, the specificity of modern relations of dependence, that is, their objectivity. I classify current approaches in two groups: one informed by discussions around care and vulnerability (which tends to provide little systematic understanding of how actual forms of generalized dependence are experienced under capitalist relations) and another informed by the critique of political economy (which tends to downplay the importance of dependence's objective nature). While the former risks offering a defense of dependence that remains blind to important axes of domination, the latter might appear oblivious about the specific nature of modern forms of social domination. The focus on the objective nature of dependence is sanctioned by two theses. First, I claim that when objectivity is taken into account, specific normative failures arise. Second, I believe that the emphasis on objectivity enables important conceptual distinctions. Thus, I will suggest that we need to criticize alienated objective dependence, rather than objective relations of depend","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 2","pages":"185-201"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12551","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139271079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Rawls and American political traditions 罗尔斯与美国政治传统

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-11-02 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12549

David A. Reidy

引用次数: 0

Contributors 贡献者

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-09-19 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12479

引用次数: 0

Issue Information - NASSP page 问题信息-NASSP页面

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-09-19 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12480

引用次数: 0

Labor automation for fair cooperation: Why and how machines should provide meaningful work for all 公平合作的劳动自动化:机器为什么以及如何为所有人提供有意义的工作

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-08-25 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12548

Denise Celentano

{"title":"Labor automation for fair cooperation: Why and how machines should provide meaningful work for all","authors":"Denise Celentano","doi":"10.1111/josp.12548","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12548","url":null,"abstract":"By affecting work, resources, organizations, and people's lives, automation processes can be disruptive of the basic structure of society. Nonetheless, we may benefit from this disruption, as automation may offer opportunities to make social cooperation fairer. Just as philosophers have addressed the problem of which values and principles should regulate the distribution of goods, so we may consider the problem of the values and principles guiding technological change with regard to work. Indeed, automation is often addressed from a distributive perspective. A prevailing concern in the debate is about making sure that the technologically unemployed will not lose access to income through unconditional redistributive policies, while some have suggested policies like a “robot tax” to disincentivize companies' investment in labor-saving devices. While crucial given the massive increase in profits afforded by automation and the inequalities that go with it, concerns about income are not the only ones raised by automation. Without underestimating their relevance, in this article I leave aside problems about income to focus on automation from the perspective of work. That is, my concern here is on social cooperation from the perspective of contribution instead of distribution, within a framework that may be called technological contributive justice. If UBI advocates expect everyone to benefit from automation in their income, the contributive perspective postulates that everyone should benefit from automation in their work.There are three main reasons behind this shift. First, even in a world in which income were unconditionally accessible to all, there would be the problem of how to fairly organize the un-automated socially necessary labor (e.g., waste collection, care work, etc.). I call this the “somebody's got to do it” problem. It cannot be solved by merely reallocating income, because it concerns the division of labor itself and its norms. Second, by conceptualizing social cooperation only as a matter of markets and distribution but not production, we are not able to see what happens with regard to what people do besides what they own. But this matters too when it comes to pursuing our life plans (see Section 4) as well as the effects on our aims, aspirations, and character (see Section 3.1). Finally, even if work were completely automatable, we would most likely still consider it undesirable to fully automate certain tasks, such as child care or teaching.On the other hand, normative thinking about automation often takes the form of utopias of “full automation.” Recent examples include ideas of “fully automated luxury communism” (Bastani, 2019) or “post-work” views. A fully automated world, Danaher (2019b) argues, would allow us to pursue a life free from the pressures of economic demands and to enjoy activities for their own sake, much like playing games. From the premise that ","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 1","pages":"25-43"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12548","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42612734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A couple of reasons in favor of monogamy 有几个理由支持一夫一妻制

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-08-23 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12544

Kyle York

引用次数: 0

Critical theory, ideal theory, and conceptual engineering 批判理论、理想理论和概念工程

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-08-22 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12545

Andrea Sangiovanni

{"title":"Critical theory, ideal theory, and conceptual engineering","authors":"Andrea Sangiovanni","doi":"10.1111/josp.12545","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12545","url":null,"abstract":"I shall take critical theory to have four main characteristics. First, it is a form of social, cultural, or political critique whose aim is emancipation, where emancipation is liberation from oppression or injustice.1 Second, as a result of its emancipatory focus, critical theory is embedded.2 It is embedded in the sense that it is focused on understanding and overcoming forms of unfreedom that impinge on the lives of people now and around here. Third, as a result of being embedded, its critical component emerges from a diagnosis: how and why do currently existing practices oppress those enmeshed in them? Fourth, it is self-reflexive about the role that theory (including its own theorizing) might play in promoting and/or preventing emancipation. Critical theory is, in short, emancipatory, embedded, diagnostic, and self-reflexive.Critical theory thus always begins from the particular lived experience of people here and now, and focuses on the social structures and practices within which particular choices are channeled and enabled. A critical theory might begin with puzzles such as the following: why do people's educational and professional choices still cluster along gender lines in ways that seem, at least at first glance, to disadvantage women?3 Or: What might explain why many working-class voters resist egalitarian policy-making proposals that would seem, at first glance, to work in their interest?4 Alternatively, critical theory might begin with values that have become particularly salient in contemporary social and political debates, such as solidarity, and ask things like: Why has solidarity become important here and now? What needs does its invocation respond to? What scope, if any, does its invocation have for improving things?5 What might talk of solidarity hide or obscure? For the critical theorist, principles and theories are always enmeshed in particular constellations of power and counter-power; one must always be self-conscious about the needs and functions that principles, forms of consciousness, and theories are meant to meet (in the case of needs) and play (in the case of functions) in any given society. There is therefore no such thing as a division of labor between empirical and normative theorizing; there is no suggestion that the theorist should merely aim to justify political principles and plans, and then leave empirical social scientists or policy analysts to implement them.6 The empirical, descriptive, and diagnostic understanding of how the social world is, and how it constrains, provides the background against which it makes sense to ask and answer normative questions.I will not attempt to specify critical theory any further. Under its heading, we can include classical Frankfurt-style Critical Theory, ideology critique, critical race theory, disability studies, post-colonial theory, and radical feminism,","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 1","pages":"42-59"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12545","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46984711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Against corporate responsibility 违背公司责任

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-08-18 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12547

Lars J. K. Moen

{"title":"Against corporate responsibility","authors":"Lars J. K. Moen","doi":"10.1111/josp.12547","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12547","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate responsibility is the view that certain groups, and not just their members, can be responsible for their causal impact on the world. And in the moral sense I shall consider, these groups, and not just their members, are seen as appropriate targets of reactive attitudes like resentment and gratitude. A key challenge for defenders of corporate responsibility is to show how a group's actions may be unexplainable strictly in terms of individual actions, and that we instead should attribute the actions to the group itself. They will then have grounds for arguing that there is a class of actions for which the group itself, and not necessarily its members, is responsible. Such an argument will imply that an individualist view leaves some responsibility unaccounted for—we get a responsibility void—and that we need to hold the group itself responsible to avoid a deficit in our ascription of responsibility.Pettit (2003, 2007a) takes on this challenge in his defense of corporate responsibility (see also List & Pettit, 2011: ch. 7). He ascribes responsibility particularly to groups acting on attitudes, or beliefs and desires, formed in a procedure aggregating the group members' attitudes. But when members make consistent attitudes toward a set of logically interconnected propositions, such as {p, p → q, q}, the majority attitudes might be inconsistent. To avoid inconsistency, the group therefore needs the capacity to adopt attitudes most of its members reject. It can thus form its own irreducible attitudes. And when the group acts on these attitudes, we cannot assign full responsibility to the group members, who do not hold these attitudes. We must instead hold the group itself responsible as an agent in its own right. Otherwise, Pettit warns us, group agents will be let off the hook too easily; “there will be cases where no one is held responsible for actions that are manifestly matters of agential responsibility” (Pettit, 2007a: 197).Here, we should note that Pettit focuses primarily on cases where the issues on the agenda are clearly connected. We shall see that his example of a workers' committee is one such case. In what follows, I also focus on this type of case, and I shall also give little attention to cases where the connection between issues is less clear, and where individuals have a weaker understanding of the consequences of their actions. But it also seems less plausible that individualist explanations leave responsibility voids in such cases. If the problem of seeing how issues are connected is due to poor organizational design, then individuals high up in the organization's hierarchy might be responsible.1 Of course, even well-organized groups can make decisions without a clear understanding of the effects on future decision making. But when individuals' actions have consequences they cannot be reasonably expected to fores","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 1","pages":"44-61"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12547","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44873138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0