Journal of Social Philosophy最新文献_第8页

Can narratives about sovereign debt be generally ideologically suspicious? An exercise in broadening the scope of ideology critique 关于主权债务的叙述在意识形态上是否普遍可疑?拓宽意识形态批判范围的练习

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-02-12 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12511

Ben Cross, Janosch Prinz

{"title":"Can narratives about sovereign debt be generally ideologically suspicious? An exercise in broadening the scope of ideology critique","authors":"Ben Cross, Janosch Prinz","doi":"10.1111/josp.12511","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12511","url":null,"abstract":"Our interest here is in the fourth of these theories. It strikes us as particularly interesting because it differs significantly from what are perhaps the most familiar notions of ideology. While the most familiar notions of ideology are arguably those which focus on the process of how a belief is generated, Prinz and Rossi (2017, p. 341) “focus not on the process of belief acquisition, but on the formation of the meaning of the relevant concept.” Furthermore, unlike the second type, it does not, strictly speaking, presuppose the existence of any particular distorting form of power, even if power asymmetries “are likely to be part of the picture” (Prinz & Rossi, 2021, p. 121).However, we also think that the full potential of this novel theory of ideology has yet to be realized. As the theory currently stands, or at least, as we understand it, it focuses exclusively on how a narrative is used by certain people in a particular instance. If so, it does not rule out the possibility of addressing the disconnect by controlling or revising the way in which manifest and/or operative concepts are used. As a result, its conclusions are confined to a particular local case.As an example of this, Prinz and Rossi (2021) criticize the use of technocratic and moralistic narratives in debates about sovereign debt during the post-2008 financial crises facing Greece and other European states. They argue that the use of these narratives during this period was ideological because there was a substantial difference between the appearance and the reality of their use. If their argument is sound, it tells us that technocratic and moralistic narratives about sovereign debt were used ideologically in this particular context. It allows for the possibility that the use of these narratives could be plausibly regarded as nonideological in other times and places.Our interest, then, is in the extent to which it is possible to extend Prinz and Rossi's method of ideology critique, such that we can bridge the gap between: (i) P being used ideologically in a particular context and (ii) having reasons to regard P as in some sense pejoratively ideological across different contexts. Our main aim in this article is to show how it is possible to bridge this gap.Our basic idea is this: we can bridge the gap between the fact that a narrative is ideological in a particular context and the claim that it is ideological across different contexts by showing that it is resistant to various mechanisms that might otherwise prevent it from functioning ideologically. The crucial step between (i) and (ii) is thus to find some way of showing that P is resistant to the kind of reform or oversight that would bring manifest and operative concepts more closely into line with each other.Our idea might be best illustrated with a contrast case. Consider the medical profession. Let us grant, as seems plausible enou","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 1","pages":"116-132"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12511","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45060507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Fame and redemption: On the moral dangers of celebrity apologies 名誉与救赎：论名人道歉的道德危险

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-30 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12510

Benjamin Matheson

{"title":"Fame and redemption: On the moral dangers of celebrity apologies","authors":"Benjamin Matheson","doi":"10.1111/josp.12510","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12510","url":null,"abstract":"Like most celebrity apologies, Woods offered his apology publicly. But he did not just apologize to those he directly wronged. He also apologized to his fans.Why do celebrities sometimes apologize to their fans? Why do celebrities typically publicly apologize? In this paper, I first consider three possible explanations for why celebrities typically apologize publicly and sometimes also include their fans among the targets of their apology. I then identify three moral dangers of celebrity apologies, the third of which arises specifically for fan-targeted apologies, and each of which teaches us important lessons about the practice of celebrity apologies. From these individual lessons, I draw more general lessons about apologies from those with elevated social positions. So, while my initial focus is on celebrities and on learning about an important and undertheorized social phenomenon, this investigation into celebrity apologies aims to illuminate a more general social phenomenon by using celebrity apologies as a case study.In Section 2, I outline an account of apology and redemption, drawing primarily on Radzik's (2009) work. In Sections 3, 5, I consider three possible explanations for why celebrities apologies are often both fan-targeted and publicly given. Because my focus is on such apologies, I set aside standard reasons for why people might apologize (e.g., a desire to make amends), though I discuss the relevance of celebrities also being motivated by these other reasons. The first explanation I consider is that celebrities are motivated to set the public record straight. The second I consider is that celebrities see themselves as having role model obligations. And the third is that celebrities aim to maintain their fame—that is, their positive celebrity status—and its associated powers.In Sections 6, 8, I then identify three moral dangers of celebrity apologies and then draw out lessons each danger teaches us about the practice of celebrity apologies. First, by apologizing publicly celebrities can set the public narrative about their misdeed in their favor. So, we have reason not to trust celebrity apologies. Second, even when they do not set the public narrative in their favor, a publicly given celebrity apology can still function to disempower the victim from having control over their own life narrative. So, celebrity apologies can present an additional harm to victims. Third, publicly given fan-targeted apologies block a celebrity from, what I will call, moral redemption. So, celebrities ought to be concerned about caring about their fame more than anything else. Additionally, the third moral danger also risks exacerbating the first two moral dangers.According to Linda Radzik (2009, p. 113), redemption is the “proper end state of responses to wrongdoing.” She holds that “When one is redeemed, one has justifiably regained one's moral standing” (Radzik, <sp","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 1","pages":"98-115"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12510","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49568313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Political liberalism today 今天的政治自由主义

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-25 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12509

J. Donald Moon

引用次数: 0

The possibility of social unity in the Liberal democratic state 自由民主国家社会统一的可能性

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-24 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12507

Kaveh Pourvand

引用次数: 0

Issue Information - NASSP PAGE 发行信息- NASSP页

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-23 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12424

引用次数: 0

Contributors 贡献者

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-23 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12423

引用次数: 0

Analyzing social wrongs 分析社会错误

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-10 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12505

Hilkje C. Hänel, Sally Haslanger, Odin Kroeger

{"title":"Analyzing social wrongs","authors":"Hilkje C. Hänel, Sally Haslanger, Odin Kroeger","doi":"10.1111/josp.12505","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12505","url":null,"abstract":"Academic philosophy has witnessed a significant change in the last years from nonideal investigations of social wrongs as being a rather marginal topic in comparison to what was assumed to be more fundamental questions to those very investigations drawing significant attention and taking their rightful place in the midst of the profession of philosophy. Yet, despite these advances and the increasing awareness of social wrongs in relation to—for example, gender, race, class, and disability—social philosophers are still regularly asked to justify what they are doing or to justify that what they are doing is rightfully called philosophy. This special issue is motivated by the following three ideas: First, to increase awareness for nonideal investigations into gender, race, class, and disability. Second, to draw attention to the insight that our philosophical methods and the topics we are concerned with are not two separate issues; in fact, what we investigate and how we do so are tightly connected. Third, to question the ways in which philosophy as a discipline excludes certain voices, topics, and methods.Many of the papers in this issue were the result of a conference marked by the attempt to bring investigations of social wrongs in the tradition of post-Analytic philosophy to the German-speaking philosophy world—a context still very much behind on investigations of social wrongs in a nonideal manner. This conference, which took place in Vienna, and which was organized in 2014 by Hilkje C. Hänel, Daniel James, and Odin Kroeger, served as an international forum for social philosophers to think about the way in which we do philosophy and the topics that are often strikingly absent from philosophy. Since then, much has changed, but the need to question what philosophy is, what it can do, and who is doing it remains. Before we provide a brief overview of the papers in this issue, let us say a bit more about the three aspects mentioned above.Discussions of gender, race, and disability have slowly paved their way into the midst of philosophical theorizing and have become an essential aspect of academia; this is evidenced by recent hires in feminist philosophy and critical race studies, the emergence of journals on the topics of gender, race, and most recently, disability, or the central place that these topics take in the APA newsletter, conferences, as well as book and article publications. (This is of course due to the resistant struggle of a few to make our profession better and more welcoming for marginalized and oppressed philosophers.) However, neither nonideal investigations of social wrongs in general nor debates on gender, race, and disability—and many other important sites of oppression and injustice—have a secure place within academic philosophy yet; as can be seen by recent backlashes against trans philosophy or the metaphysical debates that claim that gender and race (and likely disability) are not substantive debates within","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"53 4","pages":"448-453"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12505","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48860842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Justice for (and by) philosophers: Professional ethics and punishing our own 哲学家的正义:职业道德和惩罚我们自己

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-10 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12508

Timothy Weidel

引用次数: 0

The normative justification of obligatory integration policies 强制性一体化政策的规范性理由

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-05 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12506

Matthias Hoesch

{"title":"The normative justification of obligatory integration policies","authors":"Matthias Hoesch","doi":"10.1111/josp.12506","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12506","url":null,"abstract":"Since the late 1990s a class of political measures that can be called “obligatory integration policies” has constantly gained importance in Europe (cf. Goodman, 2010; Goodman & Wright, 2015; Joppke, 2017; Michalowski & van Oers, 2012; Triadafilopoulos, 2011). These policies require immigrants to take certain actions or to demonstrate certain competences that, in the eyes of the host society, serve their integration.Some of these measures are aimed at integration in a general sense. The requirement in several European states to take up residence in a particular place (“residence condition”), for instance, is intended to “facilitate the integration [of immigrants]” (EuGH Press Release No. 22/16), without specifying what integration consists in. Typically, however, these measures focus on learning the host society's language as the key to integration. In particular, many Western states prescribe some groups of immigrants to attend language classes. Often, these measures additionally seek to promote “civic” integration, for example, when integration courses encompass, beside language lessons, units about the host society's values, politics, culture, and history.Obligatory integration policies are obligatory in the sense that they do not seek to promote attendance with incentives, but to compel it with sanctions or penalties. In case of incentives, immigrants are at liberty to respond to them or not. If, for example, the state subsidizes language courses so that the fee is very low or if the state pays grants to immigrants for successfully joining classes, many immigrants will decide to participate of their own free will. In case of obligatory integration policies, however, immigrants cannot choose whether or not they respond to an incentive; they simply have to comply with the legal obligation and any violation is deemed to be wrongdoing. In recent decades, there has been a shift in many European states from integration policies based on incentives toward obligatory integration policies. When, for instance, publicly subsidized integration courses were established in Germany in 2005, about a third of the participants in the courses were obliged to attend, whereas a majority chose voluntarily to embrace the opportunity to learn the language for a low price. The amendment of the legal rules underlying integration courses through the so-called Integrationsgesetz in 2016, lead to an increase in the share of the obligatory participants to two-thirds (193,000 persons in 2017).1From the point of view of normative theory, the distinction between obligatory integration policies and those merely involving incentives for voluntary compliance is of major importance. Obviously, there is nothing pro tanto unjust about states creating incentives for immigrants to integrate, as long as the incentives in question are reasonable in scope and ","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 3","pages":"562-578"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12506","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41834646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Political activism, egalitarian justice, and public reason 政治激进主义、平等正义和公共理性

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-28 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12501

Blain Neufeld

引用次数: 0