Journal of Social Philosophy最新文献_第8页

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-11-10 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12496

Rebecca Buxton

{"title":"What is wrong with persecution","authors":"Rebecca Buxton","doi":"10.1111/josp.12496","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12496","url":null,"abstract":"The fact that persecution is seriously wrong should be obvious. Many of the worst events in human history were acts of persecution. During the reign of the Roman Empire, Christians were beaten, murdered, and forced to fight with wild animals. Until recently, Black Americans were hunted down by mobs and lynched by their compatriots.1 They were often publicly hanged, but some were also burned alive, thrown from tall buildings, and dismembered. The centuries long persecution of Jewish people culminated in the terroristic policies of Nazi Germany and the murders of over six million Jews between 1941 and 1945. These individuals were violently targeted for their perceived membership in a particular social, religious, or political group. We know already, then, that persecution is a terrible injustice. What is not obvious, however, is why exactly this is the case. This might immediately seem like a ridiculous proposition: persecution often involves discrimination, cruelty, extreme violence, and mass murder. Surely we know that persecution is wrong precisely because it involves acts of the worst possible kind? This paper argues that the entire picture of the wrongness of persecution cannot be understood by pointing to these individual elements alone. To put it more strongly, persecution is wrong not only when (or because) it includes these other wrongs. Instead, I argue that part of the wrongness of persecution is located in the condition that it creates for the persecuted, but also for society more generally. In doing so, I follow two similar interventions from David Sussman (2004) on torture and Lea Ypi (2013) on colonialism.2 Both papers begin with the intuition that such acts are serious wrongs. Their aim is to offer a new way of understanding why this is so. Like Ypi's, my title does not include a question mark. I ask you to accept that there is something wrong with persecution. My aim is to offer a new way of understanding what that something is.As such, I will not consider whether persecution is ever justified. There are (at least) two political philosophers who maintain that persecution is compatible with legitimate governance. For St. Augustine (395AD), heretical persecution is “righteous” when the Church inflicts it upon “the impious.” This is what he calls “persecution in the spirit of love.”3 Such persecution was therefore viewed as a legitimate way of punishing those who have strayed from God (Christenson, 1968).4 For Hobbes, persecution is a necessary power of the Sovereign, best described as an extension of the rights of war. Hobbes distinguishes between punishment and persecution: punishment being for misdemeanors committed within the boundaries of the commonwealth and persecution being suffered by those outside it. This “right of nature to make war” extends to all individuals who refuse to be subjected under the sovereign, even citizens. P","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 2","pages":"201-217"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12496","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44701690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Democratic equality and higher education: Moving from access to completion 民主平等与高等教育：从入学到毕业

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-10-17 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12495

Tammy Harel Ben-Shahar, Sigal Ben-Porath, Dustin Webster

引用次数: 0

The wrongs, harms, and ineffectiveness of torture: A moral evaluation from empirical neuroscience 酷刑的错误、伤害和无效性：来自经验神经科学的道德评价

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-10-02 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12494

Nayef Al-Rodhan

{"title":"The wrongs, harms, and ineffectiveness of torture: A moral evaluation from empirical neuroscience","authors":"Nayef Al-Rodhan","doi":"10.1111/josp.12494","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12494","url":null,"abstract":"Torture is banned by numerous international and regional treaties.1 The United Nations' Convention against Torture (United Nations, 1984) defines torture as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining […] information or a confession, punishing him […], or intimidating or coercing him […], when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity” (ibid.: Article 1). Nonetheless, torture continues to flourish across the globe.2 Following 9/11 and the subsequent War on Terror, philosophers and policy makers of Western states seriously debated whether there are exceptional circumstances in which torture is morally permissible or even required.The most prominent arguments in favor of the permissibility of torture rest on an appeal to some form of utilitarianism combined with the belief that interrogational torture works.3 In contrast, those arguing for the wrongness of torture typically appeal to the notion of human dignity. In this paper, I make the case that empirical insights from neuroscience and beyond are relevant to this debate as they inform both utilitarian and deontological arguments on torture. Drawing on empirical data, I first show that torture is demonstrably ineffective and there are alternative methods better suited to obtain information. Then I argue that the profound neurological damages caused by torture indeed amount to a disregard for autonomy. Moreover, I explore what psychological and neurological mechanisms underlying the practice of torture. I conclude by canvassing reasons for thinking that torture is likely to persist and argue that this sheds light on human nature and on the nature of states.In contrast to those who argue that torture is sometimes permissible on consequentialist grounds, those who make the case that such methods are categorically forbidden typically take a deontological approach. For the deontologist, torture is wrong in principle, regardless of its consequences. In international law, the right not to be tortured is grounded in human dignity. As the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948) states, “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (Article 1). The Declaration proclaims that human dignity is “inherent” to “all members of the human family” and that the rights that derive from it are “inalienable” (ibid.: Preamble). Although no account of the grounds of human dignity is provided, borrowing a term from John Rawls, we can say there is an international overlapping consensus on the value of dignity as described in the Declaration.Most debates concerning the moral (im)permissibility of torture focus on the victim, overlooking the impact on the ","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 4","pages":"565-582"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12494","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46831880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Contributors 贡献者

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-09-26 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12420

引用次数: 0

Issue Information - NASSP page 发行信息- NASSP页面

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-09-26 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12421

引用次数: 0

Reparative responsibility for the harms of forced migration 对强迫移徙造成的伤害承担赔偿责任

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-09-11 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12493

Laura Santi Amantini

{"title":"Reparative responsibility for the harms of forced migration","authors":"Laura Santi Amantini","doi":"10.1111/josp.12493","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12493","url":null,"abstract":"According to the UNHCR (2021), in 2020 there were over 82 million displaced people worldwide who had been forced to migrate as a result of persecution, conflict, and violence. While few of them had reached Western countries to claim asylum, more than half (48 million) were internally displaced people (IDPs) and a large share of the internationally displaced had moved to neighboring countries. The magnitude of the forced-migration phenomenon is even more striking if we consider that many other people are forced to migrate within or across borders because of development projects, slow-onset environmental degradation, and natural disasters but do not fall under the UNHCR's mandate.Assigning responsibility to address the plight of forced migrants is thus a pressing issue which has attracted increasing attention in normative political theory. It has been argued that, while not all forced migrants are targeted for persecution, all of them typically have their human rights violated and their basic needs unfulfilled. Human rights violations often trigger forced migration, which in turn makes displaced people particularly vulnerable to further human rights violations. Since forced migrants are in urgent need, the dominant understanding of responsibility for forced migrants, both in political theory and in policy, is based on a humanitarian principle sometimes called the “good Samaritan principle” (Parekh, 2020, p. 649). As in Singer's (1972) pond case, when someone faces serious harm we have a moral duty to help if we are capable of helping at a reasonable cost (see Betts & Collier, 2017; Gibney, 2004).The humanitarian principle is forward looking and does not require any prior special connection between the rescuer and the rescued. Indeed, the causal and moral responsibility for the plight of refugees tends to be attributed to the state of origin, while external states tend to be presented as bystanders unimplicated in the harms of forced migration. The humanitarian principle does not determine fair shares of responsibility when several bystanders can step in.1 Moreover, based on the humanitarian principle, the moral obligation to fulfill the needs of forced migrants is not a duty of justice and is subject to costs and capacity assessments.2 In practice, the burden of taking care of forced migrants disproportionally falls upon geographically proximate states, although political theorists have often criticized the proximity distributive criterion as unfair (see Gibney, 2015). Furthermore, the humanitarian principle does not clarify when a state has done its fair share, both in terms of the number of forced migrants it has taken responsibility for and in terms of what is owed to forced migrants (Parekh, 2020, p. 65). In such an “ethics of rescue” frame (Owen, 2020; Parekh, 2020), admission to a safe","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 4","pages":"605-623"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12493","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47045785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Supererogatory and obligatory rescues: Should we institutionalize the duty to intervene? 强制性和强制性救助:我们应该将干预义务制度化吗?

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-07-21 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12491

Sara Van Goozen

引用次数: 0

Direct and structural injustice against refugees 对难民的直接和结构性不公正

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-07-21 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12486

Bradley Hillier-Smith

{"title":"Direct and structural injustice against refugees","authors":"Bradley Hillier-Smith","doi":"10.1111/josp.12486","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12486","url":null,"abstract":"The dominant philosophical approach to understanding the moral duties that states in the Global North have toward the 26 million refugees worldwide is what we can call the Duty of Rescue Approach.1 According to this approach, states in the Global North (hereafter Northern states) are mere innocent bystanders overlooking the humanitarian crisis of refugee displacement unfold, and these states have moral duties to rescue refugees from this situation, at least if such states are able to do so at little cost to themselves.2Serena Parekh's recent normative analysis (2017, 2020) has sought to challenge this dominant approach. Parekh highlights certain Northern state policies and practices used in response to refugees while they are displaced and suggests that refugees endure extensive harms as result of such policies and practices, including the harms of containment and encampment, and their being prevented from accessing adequate refuge. These harms, Parekh argues, are an injustice. Thus, for Parekh, certain Northern states, far from being mere innocent bystanders, are responsible for injustice against refugees.In this article, I fully endorse Parekh's claims that refugees endure certain harms as a result of Northern state practices, and that such harms constitute an injustice against refugees. Yet, I will explore how we ought to understand this injustice. I contest Parekh's claim that the harms refugees endure as a result of Northern state practices are, and ought to be understood as, a structural injustice—an unfortunate, unintended unjust outcome resulting from structural processes (call this Parekh's Structural Injustice Approach). Instead, I contend that these harms are, and ought to be understood as, a direct injustice against refugees—an unjust outcome directly resulting from specific and avoidable policies enacted by relatively unconstrained actors (call this the Direct Injustice Approach). I argue that Parekh's Structural Injustice Approach fails to accurately capture the causal and normative relations between Northern state practices and the harms endured by refugees, and that this approach fails to provide any advancement on, and suffers from same the problems as, the standard Duty of Rescue Approach to which it is ostensibly an alternative. I instead advocate a Direct Injustice Approach to understanding the harms that refugees endure as a result of Northern states practices. If these harms are indeed a direct injustice, then responsible Northern states are certainly not mere innocent bystanders, and are not merely involved in structural processes that have an unintended unjust outcome (as on Parekh's Structural Injustice Approach), but are instead directly committing a grave injustice against innocent refugees and thus have urgent negative duties to refrain from unjustly harming the world's displaced.Section 1 explains Parekh's","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 2","pages":"262-284"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12486","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46764103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Digital participatory democracy: A normative framework for the democratic governance of the digital commons 数字参与式民主：数字公域民主治理的规范框架

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-07-20 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12489

Alec Stubbs

引用次数: 0

Skill-selection and socioeconomic status: An analysis of migration and domestic justice 技能选择和社会经济地位:移民和国内正义的分析

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-07-14 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12485

Michael Ball-Blakely

引用次数: 0