Journal of Social Philosophy最新文献_第8页

Social pathologies of informational privacy 信息隐私的社会病态

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-21 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12504

Wulf Loh

{"title":"Social pathologies of informational privacy","authors":"Wulf Loh","doi":"10.1111/josp.12504","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12504","url":null,"abstract":"Following the recent practice turn in privacy research, informational privacy is increasingly analyzed with regard to the “appropriate flow of information” within a given practice, which preserves the “contextual integrity” of that practice (Nissenbaum, 2010, p. 149; 2015). Such a practice-theoretical take on privacy emphasizes the normative structure of practices as well as its structural injustices and power asymmetries, rather than focusing on the intentions and moral considerations of individual or institutional actors. Since privacy norms are seen to be institutionalized via the role obligations of the practice's participants, this approach can analyze structural and systematic privacy infringements in terms of “defective role performances and defective social relations” (Roessler & Mokrosinska, 2013, p. 780).Unfortunately, it is still often somewhat unclear what this exactly means within the context of informational privacy, why these performances and relations are defective and for whom. This raises the common objection of a so-called “practice positivism” (Applbaum, 1999, p. 51), that is, the difficulty of practice–theoretical accounts to take a practice-independent standpoint, from which to normatively evaluate the existing practice norms themselves. For example, Nissenbaum herself initially argues for a “presumption in favor of the status quo” with respect to the appropriateness and flow of privacy norms within a practice (Nissenbaum, 2004, p. 127). Such a “practice conservatism” (Nissenbaum, 2010, p. 169) comes dangerously close to committing a naturalistic fallacy, if not undergirded by practice-external criteria (which is ultimately what she does).Merely resorting to existing practice norms to assess what defective role performances amount to, only shifts the question from how to recognize an appropriate flow of information to the question of how to recognize those defective role performances and social relations. Against this backdrop, the central aim of this article is to shed light on this question without resorting to practice-independent first principles or far-reaching universalistic anthropological assumptions. For this, I will analyze the notion of “defective role performances and social relations” in terms of social pathologies.1 Doing so has two advantages: First of all, it can draw on already existing concepts and distinctions, which help to categorize the different levels of analysis that exist in informational privacy research and situate the notion of “defective role performances” within them (Section 1). Second, those concepts and distinctions can serve as a basis for establishing a typology of phenomena with regard to deficient practices of informational privacy (Section 4).Having thus set the scene in Section 1, I can move on to address the notion of “defective role performances and social relations” w","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 3","pages":"541-561"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12504","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42251597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

You can't tell me what to do! Why should states comply with international institutions? 你无权对我指手画脚!各国为什么要遵守国际机构?

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-18 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12503

Antoinette Scherz

引用次数: 2

Neither race nor ethnicity: Latinidad as a social affordance 既不是种族，也不是民族:拉丁裔是一种社会优势

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-16 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12500

Alejandro Arango, Adam Burgos

引用次数: 0

Tying ourselves to the mast, or acting for the sake of justice? Ethos, individual duties, and social sanctions 把自己绑在桅杆上，还是为了正义而行动?社会风气、个人责任和社会制裁

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-15 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12502

Markus Furendal

{"title":"Tying ourselves to the mast, or acting for the sake of justice? Ethos, individual duties, and social sanctions","authors":"Markus Furendal","doi":"10.1111/josp.12502","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12502","url":null,"abstract":"Political philosophy often focuses on what the state may legitimately do to, or in the name of, its citizens. Yet, how well a society lives up to political-philosophical ideals arguably also depends on the decisions that individuals make in their daily lives regarding, for instance, how to treat others, what to work with, and how to spend their free time. Many contemporary social movements for increased justice hence seem to focus less on reforming institutions and laws, and instead attempt to change the values and principles that individuals accept and act on. In political-philosophical terms, these movements are less interested in the “basic structure” of a society, and more intent on changing its “ethos.”1 Part of this change could happen by influencing what people think are reasonable principles of justice, but the efforts to reform what is seen as acceptable behavior often also involves individuals monitoring each other and issuing positive and negative sanctions in response to each other's actions. Recent years have seen social media and other technological developments boosting the power of such sanctions, allowing millions of strangers to join in the criticism of particular wrongdoers. More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic brought these kinds of social mechanisms to the center of attention, as decentralized and informal monitoring and sanctioning of people's response to pandemic-related regulations appeared to be at least as important as more classical forms of state enforcement. This article assumes that there are, indeed, moral demands on individuals to act in certain ways not only in times of crisis but also in order to further a just society, and sets out and defends an account of the concept of ethos that helps to conceptualize how individual compliance with these demands can be encouraged, or enforced.The assumption that the degree of justice in a society does not only depend on how its institutions are set up is closely associated with philosopher G. A. Cohen's influential critique of John Rawls. The core of their disagreement is that, while Rawls suggests that principles of justice apply primarily to the major political and economic institutions of a society—its basic structure—Cohen argues that principles of justice would also shape a social ethos that inspires citizens to act in particular ways in their daily lives. Specifically, Cohen is skeptical of Rawls's willingness to accept as just equality-upsetting economic incentives that motivate individuals to work productively. Rejecting authoritarian attempts to coerce people to contribute, Cohen suggests that justice rather requires an egalitarian ethos that inspires and motivates individuals to make certain decisions about how much to work and with what.2 Such an ethos, Cohen suggests, is a “moral climate,”3 or “… a structure of response lodged in the motivations that inform everyday life …,”4 that somehow influences individual","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 3","pages":"522-540"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12502","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42492413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Reparations for White supremacy? Charles W. Mills and reparative vs. distributive justice after the structural turn 对白人至上主义的赔偿?查尔斯·w·米尔斯与结构性转变后的补偿性正义与分配正义

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-09 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12499

Jennifer M. Page

引用次数: 1

What is wrong with persecution 迫害有什么错

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-11-10 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12496

Rebecca Buxton

{"title":"What is wrong with persecution","authors":"Rebecca Buxton","doi":"10.1111/josp.12496","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12496","url":null,"abstract":"The fact that persecution is seriously wrong should be obvious. Many of the worst events in human history were acts of persecution. During the reign of the Roman Empire, Christians were beaten, murdered, and forced to fight with wild animals. Until recently, Black Americans were hunted down by mobs and lynched by their compatriots.1 They were often publicly hanged, but some were also burned alive, thrown from tall buildings, and dismembered. The centuries long persecution of Jewish people culminated in the terroristic policies of Nazi Germany and the murders of over six million Jews between 1941 and 1945. These individuals were violently targeted for their perceived membership in a particular social, religious, or political group. We know already, then, that persecution is a terrible injustice. What is not obvious, however, is why exactly this is the case. This might immediately seem like a ridiculous proposition: persecution often involves discrimination, cruelty, extreme violence, and mass murder. Surely we know that persecution is wrong precisely because it involves acts of the worst possible kind? This paper argues that the entire picture of the wrongness of persecution cannot be understood by pointing to these individual elements alone. To put it more strongly, persecution is wrong not only when (or because) it includes these other wrongs. Instead, I argue that part of the wrongness of persecution is located in the condition that it creates for the persecuted, but also for society more generally. In doing so, I follow two similar interventions from David Sussman (2004) on torture and Lea Ypi (2013) on colonialism.2 Both papers begin with the intuition that such acts are serious wrongs. Their aim is to offer a new way of understanding why this is so. Like Ypi's, my title does not include a question mark. I ask you to accept that there is something wrong with persecution. My aim is to offer a new way of understanding what that something is.As such, I will not consider whether persecution is ever justified. There are (at least) two political philosophers who maintain that persecution is compatible with legitimate governance. For St. Augustine (395AD), heretical persecution is “righteous” when the Church inflicts it upon “the impious.” This is what he calls “persecution in the spirit of love.”3 Such persecution was therefore viewed as a legitimate way of punishing those who have strayed from God (Christenson, 1968).4 For Hobbes, persecution is a necessary power of the Sovereign, best described as an extension of the rights of war. Hobbes distinguishes between punishment and persecution: punishment being for misdemeanors committed within the boundaries of the commonwealth and persecution being suffered by those outside it. This “right of nature to make war” extends to all individuals who refuse to be subjected under the sovereign, even citizens. P","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 2","pages":"201-217"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12496","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44701690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The market ideology conception of fetishism: An interpretation and defense 拜物教的市场意识形态概念：解读与辩护

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-11-01 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12497

Antoine Louette

引用次数: 0

Democratic equality and higher education: Moving from access to completion 民主平等与高等教育：从入学到毕业

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-10-17 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12495

Tammy Harel Ben-Shahar, Sigal Ben-Porath, Dustin Webster

引用次数: 0

The wrongs, harms, and ineffectiveness of torture: A moral evaluation from empirical neuroscience 酷刑的错误、伤害和无效性：来自经验神经科学的道德评价