Journal of Social Philosophy最新文献_第7页

Accountability in criminal justice 刑事司法问责制

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-23 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12560

Erin I. Kelly

引用次数: 0

Should nonideal theory rely on ideal theory? Lessons from the Frankfurt School 非理想理论应该依赖理想理论吗？法兰克福学派的启示

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-15 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12556

Kristina Lepold

{"title":"Should nonideal theory rely on ideal theory? Lessons from the Frankfurt School","authors":"Kristina Lepold","doi":"10.1111/josp.12556","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12556","url":null,"abstract":"While ideal theory tells us “what a perfectly just society would be like” (Rawls, 1971, p. 8), our current social world is far from perfectly just, and we clearly want to know how to orient ourselves and act in these less than perfectly just, or unjust, circumstances. This is why many political philosophers1 today agree that what is needed is nonideal theory. There is, however, disagreement on one key issue. While some—most notably Charles W. Mills and Amartya Sen—have argued that nonideal theory does not need to build on ideal theory and should do without it, others have pointed out ways in which ideal theory may still be necessary for doing nonideal theory, and that ideal theory should not be dismissed so easily for the project of nonideal theory. The central question, then, is whether nonideal theory should rely on ideal theory.In what follows, I would like to take up this question and propose an answer to it. I will do so by considering a more specific question. Taking the Frankfurt School as my point of departure, I would like to examine whether nonideal theory, when guided by ideal theory, can help members of the social world to understand injustices and thus contribute to their self-reflection. Advocates of nonideal theory should be concerned about the ability of nonideal theory to contribute to self-reflection, because whether it can successfully inform collective action to overcome injustice depends on its ability to contribute to self-reflection. In other words, what is at stake is nothing less than the practical relevance of political philosophy. As I will argue, however, reliance on ideal theory renders the ability of nonideal theory to contribute to self-reflection uncertain and therefore a matter of sheer luck. As a result, the ability of nonideal theory to successfully guide action is in constant doubt. I will therefore conclude by suggesting that if political philosophy wants to be practically relevant, nonideal theory should not rely on ideal theory.My argument will involve four steps. First, I will explain my understanding of ideal and nonideal theory (Section 1), before addressing the debate about the role of ideal theory for nonideal theory (Section 2). I will then turn to the Frankfurt School and outline its basic approach to injustice and social problems in general (Section 3). Finally, I will examine what lessons advocates of nonideal theory can learn from the Frankfurt School, which is where the main action of this paper takes place (Section 4). I will conclude with a summary of the argument.How best to define “ideal theory” and “nonideal theory” has been the subject of some debate (see, e.g., Mills, 2005; Robeyns, 2008; Stemplowska, 2008; Simmons, 2010; Valentini, 2012). As I understand it, ideal theory is concerned with finding out when the social world, or parts of the social world, are organized in such a wa","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 1","pages":"7-23"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12556","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139922438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Dakota land recovery in Minnesota: An experiment in reparative justice 明尼苏达州达科塔土地的恢复：补偿性司法实验

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-14 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12550

Waziyatawin

引用次数: 0

Knowing your past: Trauma, stress, and mnemonic epistemic injustice 了解你的过去：创伤、压力和记忆性认识论的不公正

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12557

Katherine Puddifoot, Clara Sandelind

{"title":"Knowing your past: Trauma, stress, and mnemonic epistemic injustice","authors":"Katherine Puddifoot, Clara Sandelind","doi":"10.1111/josp.12557","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12557","url":null,"abstract":"There is strong psychological evidence suggesting that sometimes social and institutional structures cause people to experience, or exacerbate existing, trauma and severe stress. Evidence further suggests that trauma and stress can lead autobiographical memories to become disorganized and distorted. In this way, social and institutional structures can cause significant harm by denying some individuals access to a specific kind of knowledge; knowledge about their personal past. When people are being denied access to this kind of knowledge, their objective, basic interests in good epistemic agency, capacity for autonomy, and general well-being, are curtailed. In this paper, we argue that these memory distortions therefore constitute a distinctive form of mnemonic epistemic injustice: some people are unjustly disadvantaged as epistemic agents by being avoidably and foreseeably denied access to epistemic goods required to support their objective interests, due to social and institutional structures that cause some of their memories to become distorted or disorganized.1 They are denied something that they are entitled to, that is, freedom from the imposition of stress and trauma that brings epistemic costs and other damage to their objective needs.Moreover, this injustice can be further compounded in cases where trauma and stress make it harder for an individual to be believed because their testimony contains untruths due to memory errors. Memories that are distorted and disorganized often exist alongside core memories about important events that are accurate. When it is assumed that certain core aspects of a person's account of their own experiences are false there can be an additional epistemic injustice that compounds the initial injustice of having one's memories distorted. The compound epistemic injustice that we describe can be experienced by people who are speaking untruths (due to memory errors), as a response to the untruths that they are speaking. It can even happen in cases where the hearer responds reasonably to the untruths of the speaker when denying their account credibility. These compound epistemic injustices therefore differ significantly from standard cases of testimonial injustice where a person has their testimony dismissed as lacking credibility when there is little or no good reason to believe that they are speaking untruths (Fricker, 2007). The compound injustices that we describe are interesting because they can be jointly caused by two or more different unjust features of social and institutional structures, that is, those features that cause the memory distortions and those that lead the memory errors to be misinterpreted. They show how different features of social and institutional structures can conspire to make it especially difficult for marginalized individuals to be believed.We illustrate these points via the case study of asylum seekers in the United Kingdo","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 2","pages":"261-281"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12557","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140482592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Care and exploitation in precarious employment in academic philosophy 学术哲学不稳定就业中的关爱与剥削

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-01-29 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12558

Christine Wieseler

引用次数: 0

Workplace democracy: The argument from the worker–society relation 工作场所民主：工人与社会关系的论证

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-01-22 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12559

Zsolt Kapelner

{"title":"Workplace democracy: The argument from the worker–society relation","authors":"Zsolt Kapelner","doi":"10.1111/josp.12559","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12559","url":null,"abstract":"Numerous arguments have been offered for workplace democracy, that is, the idea that employees should have an equal say in governing the firm. Lately, relational arguments, particularly of a republican and relational egalitarian kind, have become prominent. These claim that workers should have a say in how their firm is governed in order to avoid objectionable, for example, dominating or subordinating, relationships within the workplace. While I find these views appealing, I also believe that they are incomplete. By focusing on the moral quality of workers' interpersonal relations within the firm, that is, to bosses and other workers, they ignore the moral quality of workers' relations outside the firm, that is, to the rest of society. Yet, this latter is of no less significance for the justification of workplace democracy. In this article, I argue that part of the reason why workplace democracy should be adopted is that it allows workers to exert appropriate control over the operations of the firm, thus maintaining a grip on the general character of the relation between themselves as workers of the firm and the rest of society. This argument from the worker–society relation is not intended to refute or replace republican and relational egalitarian arguments, but rather to draw attention to a hitherto neglected aspect of the relational value of workplace democracy which the aforementioned approaches usually do not incorporate. In this way, the present argument strengthens the overall relational case for workplace democracy.The structure of the article is as follows. First, I introduce the concept of and arguments for workplace democracy, focusing on the most prominent relational arguments, that is, republican and relational egalitarian ones. Second, I introduce the concept of the worker–society relation and discuss its moral significance. Third, I present my argument for workplace democracy based on the worker–society relation. Fourth, I discuss the relationship between the argument from the worker–society relation and republican and relational egalitarian arguments for workplace democracy to show how the former differs from and complements these approaches. The last section concludes.Workplace democracy is an arrangement in which all employees of a firm have an equal say in how it is governed, much like in a democratic state where all citizens have an equal say in how the state is governed, except for certain specific groups, such as minors. This broad definition can be further specified in a number of ways. There are many models and institutional designs for workplace democracy but for the purposes of this discussion, I will remain neutral as to which of these is best to implement. I will not discuss whether under workplace democracy employees must exercise their democratic say directly or indirectly through representatives, whether the establishment of workers' councils is required, or whether employee's share in board ","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 2","pages":"167-184"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12559","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139607692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Contributors 贡献者

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-01-08 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12482

引用次数: 0

Recognition of Reviewers 表彰审查员

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-01-08 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12553

引用次数: 0

Issue Information - NASSP Page 发行信息- NASSP页面

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-01-08 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12483

引用次数: 0

The libertarian argument for reparations 自由主义者关于赔偿的论点

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-01-03 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12555

Mark R. Reiff

{"title":"The libertarian argument for reparations","authors":"Mark R. Reiff","doi":"10.1111/josp.12555","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12555","url":null,"abstract":"The case for reparations for grievous acts of historical injustice has been getting a lot of attention lately, both within and outside academia (e.g., California Reparations Report 2023; Coates, 2014; Martin & Yaquinto, 2007). Those who advance it claim that the injuries inflicted by these acts are ongoing and severe, and the only way that members of the groups that were the focus of these acts can begin to regain the place they would have held within society had these injustices not occurred, or at least be able and willing to move on from them into the future, is to provide current members of these victimized groups reparations for the wrongs committed against their forebearers. In New World societies, talk of reparations has typically focused on two of these historic wrongs. First, the continuing injury inflicted by slavery and the discrimination against Black people that continued in its aftermath. Second, the injury inflicted through the widespread murder and seizure of land by government and government-sanctioned forces from indigenous peoples. In both the New and Old World, however, other groups—for example, religious or ethnic minorities who have been subjected to centuries of persecution—are also sometimes discussed as being entitled to reparations. Whenever reparations are discussed, however, the claim has generally been that these are required for violations of the principle of equality, a principle to which liberal societies have long paid lip service, but which is now (in some quarters, at least) beginning to be taken more seriously.But I am going to talk about reparations in a different way. Not because I think that any of the current arguments for reparations for Black and indigenous people or anyone else for that matter do not lead to the conclusions that their proponents say they do. On the contrary, with perhaps a few exceptions, I find these arguments not only valid but also convincing. Accordingly, nothing I will say in this paper should be taken as an argument against any of these existing claims for reparations. But I do want to broaden the current discussion in two ways.First, in part I, I am going to set forth what I call a general theory of reparations. In it, I am not only going to talk about reparations as a means of remedying the injuries inflicted by slavery and by the genocide of indigenous peoples, the theft of their land, and the ongoing ripple effects of these historic wrongs. And I am not merely going to add to this a call for reparations for injuries caused by the long-time persecution of the usual religious, ethnic, and other minority populations. I am going to talk about reparations for an even wider variety of historical injustices, including, most importantly, the long-term economic oppression of women, and the historical exploitation of labor.Second, in part II, I am going to set forth my argument for reparations, but not one based on the pr","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 4","pages":"643-672"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12555","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139376627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0