Journal of Social Philosophy最新文献

{"title":"The mirage of a “paradox” of dehumanization: How to affirm the reality of dehumanization","authors":"Maria Kronfeldner","doi":"10.1111/josp.12566","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12566","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper argues that the so-called ‘paradox’ of dehumanization is a mirage arising from misplaced abstraction. The alleged ‘paradox’ is taken as a challenge that arises from a skeptical stance. After reviewing the history of that skeptical stance, it is reconstructed as an argument with two premises. With the help of an epistemologically structured but pluralistic frame it is then shown how the two premises of the Skeptic's argument can both be debunked. As part of that it emerges that there are a couple of ways how dehumanization can be realized, and one such realization can be sufficient for affirming the reality of dehumanization for a specific case.</p>","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 3","pages":"468-487"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12566","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141569788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Non-ideal theory and critical theory and their relationship to standpoint theory","authors":"Hilkje C. Hänel","doi":"10.1111/josp.12580","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12580","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper brings together two distinct areas of philosophy that have so far not received much attention together: Critical Theory and non-ideal theory. Its main argument is that these two yet distinct areas of philosophy share a methodological stance when it comes to analyzing social reality, namely standpoint theory. While there is a well-acknowledged relation between Critical Theory and standpoint theory, the claim that non-ideal theory is committed to standpoint theory as a methodology deserves further explanation. In a co-authored paper, Johanna Müller and I (<span>2022</span>) argue for a descriptive claim, they urge non-ideal theorists to engage in an act of self-clarification about the way in which they are doing non-ideal theory and argue that the commitment to start from real world injustices always already entails a commitment to standpoint theory. According to this claim, any theorist is embedded in a given ideology and, thus, needs methodological tools to overcome the ideological arrogance that might prevent them from analyzing particular instances of injustice.¹</p><p>Here, I want to make an explicitly normative claim, namely that taking seriously the pervasiveness of ideology and the resulting challenge of false consciousness, means that any endeavor in non-ideal theory that is not committed to standpoint theory is fruitless. This claim is not just about self-clarification. Instead, it proposes a way in which non-ideal theory <i>should</i> proceed.² To do so, I am guided by three claims: First, if non-ideal theory is theory that is non-idealizing (as Hänel &amp; Müller, <span>2022</span>; Khader, <span>forthcoming</span>; and Mills, <span>2005</span> show), then ideology is a barrier to such theorizing. Second, critical standpoints (as advanced by versions of standpoint theory) can function as a tool to overcome such barriers, yet, critical standpoints have to be achieved or struggled for and are not necessarily given due to a person's social group memberships or social identities. And, third, being subject to (intersecting) oppressions can be an epistemic advantage insofar as it provides the moral ruptures or internal contradictions needed to achieve a critical standpoint. It should be noted that the paper's aim is rather modest insofar as none of its claims are original in themselves, rather I am relying on the toolbox of Critical Theorists, standpoint theorists, and non-ideal theorists. What is new is (a) the way in which I let these traditions talk to each other and (b) my focus on the “trap of ideology”; neither do non-ideal theorists concern themselves with this particular dimension of ideology as an obstacle for theorizing, nor do contemporary standpoint epistemologists pay much attention to this problem.</p><p>In recent years, feminist philosophers and other moral and political philosophers have been increasingly disappointed with the dominant Rawlsian paradigm of doing normative theory in which the","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 1","pages":"24-41"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12580","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141548856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Issue Information - NASSP Page","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12530","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12530","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 2","pages":"164"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12530","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141424944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Contributors","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12528","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12528","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 2","pages":"165-166"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141424945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Editor's introduction: Special issue—Rawls at 100; Theory at 50","authors":"David Reidy","doi":"10.1111/josp.12565","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12565","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 2","pages":"167-177"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141060459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Lottocracy and class-specific political institutions: A plebeian constitutionalist defense","authors":"Vincent Harting","doi":"10.1111/josp.12564","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12564","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Skepticism about the democratic nature of elections-based institutional systems is a growing sentiment among political theorists. There are many reasons explaining such skepticism, but one prominent concern is that these systems make representatives susceptible to capture by economic elites, in other words, <i>oligarchic capture</i>. Champions of electoral democracy commonly claim that oligarchic capture can be fought through legally-based, formal mechanisms of regulation, such as campaign finance and anti-money-in-politics legislation. But others think that elections, <i>as such</i>, are an important factor contributing to this problem. Authors have thus claimed that we should either fully replace (e.g., Guerrero, <span>2014</span>; Van Reybrouck, <span>2016</span>) or complement (e.g., Abizadeh, <span>2020</span>; Arlen, <span>2019</span>; Arlen &amp; Rossi, <span>2020</span>; Gastil &amp; Wright, <span>2019</span>; Landemore, <span>2020</span>; McCormick, <span>2011</span>) election-based political systems with <i>empowered “lottocratic” political institutions</i> (henceforth LPIs), wherein representatives are selected randomly from a relevant demographic and then frequently rotated.ⁱ This, some argue, would help solving the oligarchical tendencies of electoral democracy and better realize its normative aspirations.</p><p>This article has two distinct aims: First, to suggest that we should reconsider our optimism regarding the anti-oligarchic strength of LPIs. Second, to show how we can amend the design of LPIs to resist oligarchic capture, particularly by making them <i>class-specific</i> so that they are more explicitly oriented to the satisfaction of the interests of nonwealthy citizens. The reason for my moderate pessimism is that LPIs might suffer from similar oligarchic ills as those plaguing electoral systems. Under nonideal conditions, where there is significant wealth inequality and a power imbalance between, on the one hand, influential organized elites and, on the other, widely economically self-interested and politically unorganized citizens, many representatives in LPIs would still have strong incentives to neglect the pursuit of responsive and democratic outcomes—despite the presence of legal mechanisms of regulation. Call this the <i>problem of incentives-based capture</i> (henceforth PIC). Thus, my argument is that we must think beyond formal, legally based measures of regulation, and focus on <i>informal</i> mechanisms, particularly on how the prevalence of <i>class-based solidarity</i> among lottocratic representatives could counteract PIC. Drawing on recent “plebeian” approaches in democratic constitutional theory, I shall defend the claim that introducing class-specific criteria in institutional design can help to buttress a reluctance among representatives to follow wealth-generated incentives. Plebeian constitutionalists usually argue that selecting members only with that class-specific profile makes it more","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 3","pages":"447-467"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12564","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140841766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Issue Information - NASSP page","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12527","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12527","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 1","pages":"5"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12527","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140145610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"CONTRIBUTORS","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12525","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12525","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 1","pages":"4"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140145645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The harms of the internalized oppression worry","authors":"Nicole Dular,&nbsp;Madeline Ward","doi":"10.1111/josp.12562","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12562","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 2","pages":"320-339"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140150890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reparations: Special issue","authors":"Christina Nick,&nbsp;Susan Stark","doi":"10.1111/josp.12561","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12561","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recent and renewed concern for racial injustice has revived interest in the importance of making reparations for oppressed peoples (Coates, <span>2014</span>). Philosophers and socio-political theorists have responded by reinvigorating longstanding debates about the requirement for reparations for colonialism, genocide, institutionalized slavery and racial subjugation (Lyons, <span>2017</span>; Thompson, <span>2018</span>), as well as exploring the role of reparations in transitional justice (Murphy, <span>2017</span>; Pityana, <span>2018</span>). These debates have also been advanced by social movements such as Black Lives Matter and Rhodes Must Fall, which have highlighted the need to reckon with historical injustices and their continued legacies of harm. These movements have brought into sharper relief the vast magnitude of systemic racism and of the ongoing harms that result from historical wrongs. Indeed, awareness is growing that these colonial and racist structures, as well as intergenerational harms, touch every aspect of contemporary social life. In recent years, the scholarly terrain surrounding reparations has expanded to include work addressing the prospect of reparations for women (Nuti, <span>2019</span>), Latinx Americans (Corlett <span>2018</span>), and climate refugees (Buxton, <span>2019</span>). Scholars have also defended new moral bases for reparations in cases such as police shootings (Page, <span>2019</span>), mass incarceration (King and Page <span>2018</span>), and ecological degradation (Katz, <span>2018</span>).</p><p>This volume aims to center wronged individuals and groups in the sense that wronged peoples are the final arbiters of how the wrongs are to be understood, what are their precise contours, how, and to what extent repair can be made, and which particular actions will promote repair. This special issue explores a variety of issues related to reparation-making as a way to mitigate the ongoing effects of these historical wrongs. In particular, it considers a number of questions confronted by those who wish to make a compelling case for reparations.</p><p>The first question addressed by this special issue is the problem of who ought to make reparations. At first, one might think simply that the perpetrators of injustice ought to pay reparations. The problem with this view, of course, is that many of these large-scale, historical injustices were committed such a long time ago that the perpetrators are now long deceased. Given this, we might instead argue that those who benefitted from these injustices (Butt, <span>2014</span>) or the institutions of which the perpetrators were a part (Thompson, <span>2018</span>) ought to pay reparations.</p><p>Second, and related, is the matter of to whom reparations are owed. As is the case with the perpetrators, the injustices in question were committed long in the past, so that none of their victims are alive today. As a result, some argue that we owe reparations to the de","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 4","pages":"585-589"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12561","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140025977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}