Journal of Social Philosophy最新文献

{"title":"Federalism as an institutional doctrine","authors":"Michael Da Silva","doi":"10.1111/josp.12540","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12540","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Federalism is, minimally, a method of allocating final decision-making authority over subjects (e.g., crime, healthcare, and immigration) in a governance unit (e.g., country). Faced with questions of the form “who can decide what when,” federal bodies, like the United States., Canada, Australia, and Germany, provide at least two entities (federal governments, provinces, cities, etc.) with final decision-making “powers” over at least one subject. No other entity is morally permitted to directly interfere (substitute decisions, fine, etc.) with the authority's decision-making regarding those subject(s). This is distinct from the unitary or centralized governance of, for example, France and Israel whereby one central entity possesses all final decision-making authority.<sup>1</sup> Beyond these basics, the meaning of and criteria for evaluating claims about federalism remain contested in law and political science.<sup>2</sup> The broader debates are then oft-ignored in mainstream political philosophy, resulting in conceptual confusion with important practical results discussed below.<sup>3</sup></p><p>The following argues for adopting an “institutional” approach to federalism, rather than more common “ideological” approaches.<sup>4</sup> A long tradition equates federalism with the US Founding Fathers' institutional proposals (Publius, <span>1788/1987</span>). Yet, partly due to empirical developments, the dominant account outside philosophy now holds that federalism is a normative doctrine promoting a secure political organization combining “shared[-]rule and self-rule” and separates this federal “idea” from institutional forms that may realize it (Elazar, <span>1987</span>; Watts, <span>2008</span>). Philosophers often begin by accepting this ideological approach (as I discuss further in Da Silva, <span>2022</span>).<sup>5</sup> Popelier (<span>2021</span>, p. 33) even suggests “all” scholars view this combination as federalism's “normative core.” But philosophical strictures and practical realities demand a more circumscribed approach. The dominant ideological approach is too broad to be a distinct normative doctrine or cannot even apply to many paradigmatic federal bodies. Institutional approaches defining federalism by advocacy for the adoption of federations (defined below) for authority allocation are preferable.</p><p>To establish this, I first detail and defend criteria for evaluating philosophical accounts of federalism. I then elaborate the distinction between ideological and institutional approaches and apply the criteria to the dominant ideological approach and a new specification of an institutional approach inspired by Wheare (<span>1946/1953</span>, p. 11)'s classic, oft-critiqued account. I thereby demonstrate that ideological accounts fail to fulfill many normative adequacy criteria for a philosophical account of federalism and one can articulate a more action-guiding institutional account that avoids common critiques. I finally","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 1","pages":"81-105"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12540","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64056584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Difficulties in nurturing a sense of justice","authors":"Hannes Kuch","doi":"10.1111/josp.12538","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12538","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The paper analyzes Rawls's moral psychology and the claim that a just society must foster a sufficiently strong sense of justice. When Rawls investigates the development of the sense of justice under a just basic structure, he tacitly narrows down the focus: he only demonstrates the development of a sense of justice on the premise that all members of society are already in possession of a full-fledged sense of justice, save the one individual under investigation. This begs the question, largely presupposing what needs to be explained, namely, how citizens at large develop a sense of justice. Rawls's narrowing of perspective leads to distortions in the analysis of stability, particularly with regard to a property-owning democracy. However, in lesser known parts of his work, Rawls offers clues for a more plausible account. Here, the idea is that institutions must be structured such that they enable all of us to nurture the sense of justice of each of us. With this idea of collective self-transformation in place, it becomes clear that economic institutions must be broadly democratized because of their profound educational role. Thus, the choice between a property-owning democracy and liberal socialism falls more strongly upon the latter.</p>","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 2","pages":"238-256"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12538","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45034888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Partial ectogestation and the right to choose the method by which one ends one's pregnancy","authors":"Kristen Hine","doi":"10.1111/josp.12537","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12537","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 1","pages":"143-159"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41412537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Structural transformation and reparative obligation: Reinterpreting the beneficiary pays principle","authors":"Hochan Kim","doi":"10.1111/josp.12524","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12524","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;Unredressed injustices in national and global history raise important normative questions. These questions are highlighted by the growing chorus of voices in public and academic discourse calling for agents, especially those in the Global North, to recognize and redress the major injustices of their past, most notably colonialism, chattel slavery, and segregation.&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt; One is the &lt;i&gt;justification&lt;/i&gt; question: do (some) present-day agents have moral obligations to redress historical injustice, and if so, on what moral grounds? Another is the &lt;i&gt;content&lt;/i&gt; question: assuming that reparative obligations are justified, what exactly do they obligate (some) present-day agents to do?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;One prominent view in the philosophical literature responding to these questions is centered on the Beneficiary Pays Principle (BPP).&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt; Proponents of the BPP have argued that some present-day agents have a moral obligation to redress historical injustices that they themselves did not commit because they enjoy material benefits—wealth, property, and other such resources—as a result of these injustices. Since these benefits were originally acquired unjustly, their contemporary inheritors ought to relinquish them, not just because they lack any legitimate claim to these resources, but also because by retaining these resources they are perpetuating the effects of injustice. This answers the justification question. The BPP also suggests an answer to the content question. While some present-day agents enjoy material benefits from historical injustices, others correspondingly suffer material harms.&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt; It is thus morally legitimate to redistribute the relinquished resources of present-day beneficiaries of a historical injustice toward its present-day victims—even if that redistribution can only partially approximate the holdings that present-day victims would have enjoyed had the historical injustice never occurred.&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt; Altogether, the BPP offers an account of one familiar approach to past wrongdoing, namely the provision of material compensation or &lt;i&gt;reparations&lt;/i&gt;. Indeed, proponents of the BPP contend that the principle is appealing because it avoids many of the thorny moral and epistemic challenges against reparations for major historical injustices.&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But reparations, so understood, is notably removed from a more radical approach to historical injustice proposed by some recent social movements for racial equality and postcolonial global justice. These proposals demand the egalitarian transformation of present-day social structures in order to undo the unjust social, political, and economic legacies of colonialism, slavery, segregation, and so forth.&lt;sup&gt;6&lt;/sup&gt; In alignment with this vision, some philosophical accounts have argued for a &lt;i&gt;structural&lt;/i&gt; approach to historical injustice: because many present-day injustices are products of major historical injustices like colonialism and slavery, a full and proper r","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 4","pages":"688-708"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12524","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64056572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Contributors","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12476","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 2","pages":"150-151"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50116063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Issue Information - NASSP page","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12477","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12477","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 2","pages":"285"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12477","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50116064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Climate hypocrisy and environmental integrity","authors":"Valentin Beck","doi":"10.1111/josp.12522","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12522","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;Climate change poses an existential threat to the world's ecosystems and to human societies. In order to slow and eventually halt global warming, governments, firms, and civil society must enact radical structural change in order to minimize greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel use. Cynicism, pessimism, and defeatism are currently prevalent, however, and threaten to undermine the cooperative spirit needed to achieve a low carbon economy. Climate change denial has played a major role in feeding these destructive attitudes. Since the discovery of the greenhouse effect, the fossil fuel industry and a network of powerful allies have utilized every imaginable tactic to promote business as usual and to foster political inaction. For decades, they have sown doubt and misinformation about global warming, its causes, and its dangerous impact (Oreskes &amp; Conway &lt;span&gt;2012&lt;/span&gt;). In response to widespread acceptance of the proof of anthropogenic warming, these actors have adapted their strategies beyond outright factual denial. One alternative strategy is shifting the public debate to individual morality (Lamb et al., &lt;span&gt;2020&lt;/span&gt;; Mann, &lt;span&gt;2021&lt;/span&gt;), emphasizing how individual lifestyles are inextricably intertwined with the environmentally profligate status quo, and thereby demoralizing the citizens of top emitting nations. The charge of hypocrisy is prominent in such demoralization efforts. It is leveled against climate scientists and activists, pro-environmentalist politicians and their supporters, “eco-celebrities”, or simply “the elites”, who are alleged not to practice what they preach, as they lead energy-intensive lifestyles.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;If this charge were advanced only by agents who attempt to delay climate action, one could dismiss it by pointing to their own immoral activities. Instead of doing these lobbyists the favor of discussing the charge in earnest, one could change the terms of the conversation and redirect attention to the damaging effects of climate denial, and to feasible and urgently needed institutional decarbonization measures. The discursive constellation is more complicated, however, for two reasons. First, the accusation of lifestyle hypocrisy has long been a recurring theme in the general debate on climate change. It is not only discussed by those who are cynical about the prospects for individual and political climate action (such “climate cynicism” is not necessarily strategic). It is also considered by many who reflect, in good faith, on questions of individual morality and integrity in relation to climate change—such as how to reconcile our prosperous way of life with the imperative to leave a habitable world for future generations. Second, the accusation often takes another form, namely when governments or politicians are criticized for actions that contradict their proclaimed concern for climate change mitigation. This second variant of the hypocrisy charge can also be leveled with different motivations","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 2","pages":"223-242"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12522","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47335797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reparations as balance","authors":"Luke Moffett","doi":"10.1111/josp.12523","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12523","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;Reparations are often justified as a means to ensure “peace,” “reconciliation,” or to “vindicate victims” (Bottigliero, &lt;span&gt;2004&lt;/span&gt;, p. 14; Greiff, &lt;span&gt;2006&lt;/span&gt;, pp. 463–466; Laplante, &lt;span&gt;2015&lt;/span&gt;, pp. 555–557). The justification of reparations range from corrective justice notions of &lt;i&gt;restitutio in integrum&lt;/i&gt; (returning all that is lost) to moral notions of recognition and relational restoration, to even communitarian notions of engendering civic trust, social cohesion and transformative explanations of the place of reparations in post-conflict societies. Reparations can seem almost Janus-faced, allowing a broad umbrella of conceptions and expectations to co-exist, but it is worth interrogating the justifications of reparations, as it can help to “serve to clarify the nature and the full extent of our normative commitments” (Greiff, &lt;span&gt;2012&lt;/span&gt;, p. 33).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This article analyses some of the main justifications for reparations so as to challenge some of their normative assumptions in redressing the past. The discussion focuses on three predominate concepts of reparations namely justice, morality/recognition and reconciliation/relational justifications. These accounts do not fully reflect the practice of reparations for mass atrocities, which creates a normative account that is either too utopian to be realized or inadequately provides the conceptual tools to navigate moral challenges to realize effective reparations. Indeed more critical scholars working on these issues point to “rough” or “imperfect” justice (Eizenstat, &lt;span&gt;2003&lt;/span&gt;), but do not provide a coherent account to what this theoretically amounts to. Instead this author proposes reparation as balance to reflect that such measures in practice are part of a negotiated process. Reparation as balance involves the relevant stakeholders finding common ground to redress the past and prevent its non-recurrence in the future. This point is referred to as the “goldilocks' zone” wherein reparations can be conceived as a space to which conflicting perspective can find a harmony to redress the past through a spectrum of measures. Such a position does not fully repair victims' harm as required by &lt;i&gt;restitutio in integrum&lt;/i&gt;, but also does not compromise society's values nor is humiliating to those responsible. This approach envisages reparations as not simply a victim-centered measure to remedy their harm, but also a space for responsible actors to rehabilitate their own moral position in the present and future from their past actions. “Reparations as balance” is informed by many contemporary struggles for reparations by victims, but also an understanding of what has succeeded in practice.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Reparations are a means to find equilibrium after violence, a way to move forward from the violations of the past. There are elements in each of these theories that resonate around the importance of values, the actors' relationship (whether social or not) between perpet","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 4","pages":"624-642"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12523","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49571747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Responding to microaggression with irony: The case of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz","authors":"Sergio Armando Gallegos-Ordorica,&nbsp;Javiera Perez Gomez","doi":"10.1111/josp.12521","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12521","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 2","pages":"300-319"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44315479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Ideal theory, political liberalism, and the well-ordered society","authors":"Samuel Freeman","doi":"10.1111/josp.12520","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12520","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 2","pages":"278-298"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45230417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}