Climate hypocrisy and environmental integrity

IF 1.1 3区 哲学 Q3 ETHICS
Valentin Beck
{"title":"Climate hypocrisy and environmental integrity","authors":"Valentin Beck","doi":"10.1111/josp.12522","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Climate change poses an existential threat to the world's ecosystems and to human societies. In order to slow and eventually halt global warming, governments, firms, and civil society must enact radical structural change in order to minimize greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel use. Cynicism, pessimism, and defeatism are currently prevalent, however, and threaten to undermine the cooperative spirit needed to achieve a low carbon economy. Climate change denial has played a major role in feeding these destructive attitudes. Since the discovery of the greenhouse effect, the fossil fuel industry and a network of powerful allies have utilized every imaginable tactic to promote business as usual and to foster political inaction. For decades, they have sown doubt and misinformation about global warming, its causes, and its dangerous impact (Oreskes &amp; Conway <span>2012</span>). In response to widespread acceptance of the proof of anthropogenic warming, these actors have adapted their strategies beyond outright factual denial. One alternative strategy is shifting the public debate to individual morality (Lamb et al., <span>2020</span>; Mann, <span>2021</span>), emphasizing how individual lifestyles are inextricably intertwined with the environmentally profligate status quo, and thereby demoralizing the citizens of top emitting nations. The charge of hypocrisy is prominent in such demoralization efforts. It is leveled against climate scientists and activists, pro-environmentalist politicians and their supporters, “eco-celebrities”, or simply “the elites”, who are alleged not to practice what they preach, as they lead energy-intensive lifestyles.</p><p>If this charge were advanced only by agents who attempt to delay climate action, one could dismiss it by pointing to their own immoral activities. Instead of doing these lobbyists the favor of discussing the charge in earnest, one could change the terms of the conversation and redirect attention to the damaging effects of climate denial, and to feasible and urgently needed institutional decarbonization measures. The discursive constellation is more complicated, however, for two reasons. First, the accusation of lifestyle hypocrisy has long been a recurring theme in the general debate on climate change. It is not only discussed by those who are cynical about the prospects for individual and political climate action (such “climate cynicism” is not necessarily strategic). It is also considered by many who reflect, in good faith, on questions of individual morality and integrity in relation to climate change—such as how to reconcile our prosperous way of life with the imperative to leave a habitable world for future generations. Second, the accusation often takes another form, namely when governments or politicians are criticized for actions that contradict their proclaimed concern for climate change mitigation. This second variant of the hypocrisy charge can also be leveled with different motivations: by advocates of effective climate action, but also by cynical disinformation campaigners who intend to sow division and doubt about such action. The discursive variability of the climate hypocrisy charge means that a solid understanding of its relevance is needed.</p><p>In recent years, empirical studies have begun to shed light on various discursive references to climate hypocrisy (see Gunster et al., <span>2018</span>; Schneider et al., <span>2016</span>) as well as on the frequently stark discrepancies between green rhetoric and the real world actions of governments (Stevenson, <span>2021</span>) and of fossil fuel companies (Li et al., <span>2022</span>). This article complements such approaches with a systematic philosophical analysis, by focusing on the precise conceptual delineation and normative evaluation of climate hypocrisy and adjacent varieties of ecological inconsistency. Such conceptual and normative work is needed, as the meaning and significance of hypocrisy is generally not well-understood. This is partly because even classical references to “hypocrisy” such as those in the bible do not explicitly denote a unified phenomenon, but point to a group of loosely related inconsistencies. Accordingly, everyday accusations of hypocrisy are often framed in vague terms. Their normative relevance is also frequently left unstated. The same is true for climate hypocrisy. A systematic conceptual and normative approach can clarify matters. I present such an account here, arguing that different instances of climate hypocrisy and related ecological inconsistencies are differently problematic depending on how detrimental they are to an agent's attainment of environmental integrity.</p><p>I proceed in four main steps. I first outline two prominent variants of the climate hypocrisy charge: (1) the accusation of “lifestyle hypocrisy”, and (2) criticisms of governments and other political representatives who fail to fulfill their stated climate commitments (see Section 2). Next, I provide a conceptual analysis of climate hypocrisy, which ties it to the core phenomenon of dissimulation of environmental virtue (Section 3). I then introduce a notion of environmental integrity to evaluate how problematic climate hypocrisy is where it actually occurs (Section 4). In the final step, I show how the general notion of integrity allows us to assess the moral significance of different uses of the accusation and to clear the fog of moral disinformation (Section 5).</p><p>The term “hypocrisy” is often vaguely applied to those who, in biblical terms, “say one thing and do something else” (Matthew 23,2). But verifying or refuting a hypocrisy charge requires a more precise interpretation which allows us to distinguish hypocrisy from other adjacent behavioral inconsistencies, such as weakness of will or caprice. Precisely delineating hypocrisy turns out to be difficult, however. The bible—the text that has most influenced our conception of hypocrisy—uses “hypocrisy” in several ways. In the Old Testament (and the Qu'ran), the term “hypocrite” is used as a vague critique for people who are “corrupt in character” or “impious”—newer translations use alternative descriptors such as “godless,” “nefarious,” or “despisers of God”. In the New Testament, a more specific understanding of “hypocrite” emerges. It refers to those who (i) portray their religiosity or morality insincerely, (ii) are guilty of inconsistencies in blame and advice, or (iii) are guilty of complacency. Is it possible, however, to delineate an overarching phenomenon under which these different behavioral patterns can be subsumed?</p><p>The philosophical debate is inconclusive on this subject.<sup>1</sup> The seminal essay “Let us not be hypocritical” by Judith Shklar (<span>1984</span>, Ch. 2) proceeds by interpreting philosophical and literary classics. Shklar highlights the descriptive and evaluative complexity of the phenomenon without attempting to provide a single definition. Christine McKinnon (<span>1991</span>) narrowly frames hypocrisy as manipulative deception about moral qualities for reputational gain. She thereby reduces hypocrisy to only one of its variants and leaves the problem of conceptual unity unaddressed. Crisp &amp; Cowton (<span>1994</span>: 346–7) do address the problem, but do not succeed in showing that what they identify as hypocrisy's four main forms (“pretence”, “blame”, “inconsistency”, and “complacency”) are all instantiations of a singular, more general phenomenon. They propose that each form is a failure to take morality seriously (ibid., 347), which does not rule out clearly non-hypocritical behavior such as blatant amorality. Szabados and Soifer (<span>2004</span>) have presented the most comprehensive study of hypocrisy to date, in which they look at this phenomenon from multiple angles and discuss numerous examples. However, they, too, “offer no comprehensive theory, either conceptual or ethical” (ibid., 335). Instead of identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions, they content themselves with “uncover[ing] some recurring elements of hypocrisy, such as the need for an audience, an element of deception (whether of oneself or of others), and an element of self-interest (typically a concern for a good reputation in terms of prevailing norms […])” (ibid., 339).</p><p>In contrast to approaches that describe family resemblances between loosely connected behaviors, I propose a unified interpretation of hypocrisy as dissimulation of virtue. This understanding is meant to capture what is central in classical and contemporary understandings without being fully determined by them. The narrowing of conceptual scope comes with a much needed gain in conceptual clarity. Furthermore, even behaviors that fall outside the spectrum of variations of hypocrisy can nevertheless be assessed using the same evaluative standard, which will show that they are often no better (see Section 4). To begin, let me first outline the most important general conceptual features of hypocrisy as dissimulation of virtue, before setting out the conditions for climate hypocrisy specifically.</p><p>A helpful general definition is available from the Oxford English Dictionary Online, whereupon “hypocrisy” consists of “assuming of a false appearance of virtue or goodness, with dissimulation of real character or inclinations”. This definition captures much of what is essential, and is therefore rightly used as a starting point in several philosophical accounts (e.g., Shklar, <span>1984</span>: 47; Wallace, <span>2010</span>: 308).<sup>2</sup> However, to more precisely delineate hypocrisy requires expanding from this definition. I will do so by specifying six aspects that together help us categorize different variations.</p><p>First, hypocrisy emanates from an agent-relative inconsistency; the behavior in question must be inconsistent with the very norms that the agent has committed to in some or other communication. This feature explains why reproaches of hypocrisy are so easy to level: accusers need not themselves commit to the hypocritically expressed norm in order for their critique to be legitimate (Shklar, <span>1984</span>: 48; Wallace, <span>2010</span>: 307).</p><p>Second, agents can dissimulate different personal qualities ranging from religious virtues (such as piety) to broadly ethical and narrowly moral qualities (Crisp &amp; Cowton, <span>1994</span>: 344).<sup>3</sup> Agents can also dissimulate a moral motivation for a morally correct action which they perform out of self-interest. In addition, the motives for which people can be hypocritical are also very broad, and may include self-promotion and reputational gain, shame, servility, but also respect for fellow human beings and for the recognition of moral norms.<sup>4</sup></p><p>Third, virtue dissimulation requires that the agent intentionally portrays herself as compliant with the norm(s) in question. Whether this criterion is met may not always be evident, since communicative expression is notoriously opaque and subject to misinterpretation. Take the example of a woman, Carlova, who regularly uses a petrol car over more sustainable alternatives. She posts a new picture on her social media profile that shows her on a bicycle. It would be uncharitable to take the post as an instance of hypocrisy, if Carlova's intention were simply to update her profile with a picture to her liking, as she engages in no dissimulation. She would have acted hypocritically, according to this criterion, only if she had shared the picture with the intention to portray herself as an environmentally conscientious, regular cyclist.</p><p>Fourth, next to the standard case of conscious dissimulation of personal qualities, which is often performed with the intention to deceive others, agents can be unconsciously hypocritical by deceiving themselves about their character (Statman, <span>1997</span>; Szabados &amp; Soifer, <span>2004</span>, Ch. 13). Hypocrisy can arise from a range of cognitive dispositions of untruthfulness, including intentional false self-portrayal, “bullshitting” in the sense of indifference to the truth (Frankfurt, <span>1986</span>), and self-deceived false self-portrayal. To specify our example accordingly, assume that Carlova had shared the picture with the intention to convey personal environmental frugality, while unconsciously suppressing awareness of her unsustainable lifestyle.</p><p>Fifth, not only individuals, but also group agents—such as companies, governments, clubs or NGOs—can hypocritically dissimulate agential qualities, above and beyond any hypocrisy by their members. Such group agency is genuinely collective (as opposed to being a mere aggregate of individual actions), when a group possesses collective decision-making structures such that its collective attitudes and actions are not reducible to the attitudes and actions of individual members (List &amp; Pettit, <span>2011</span>).</p><p>Sixth, hypocrisy can be constituted via different modes of communication. These comprise both language-based and non-verbal forms of symbolic expression (as in the case of Carlova's post), and different kinds of speech-acts, including assertion and moral address. Hypocritical assertion occurs when an agent dissimulates personal qualities either through explicit statements or by intentional conversational implicature. Alternatively, agents can dissimulate personal qualities via moral address, including blame, advice, or praise. It is controversial whether agents categorically lack the “standing” to blame or criticize others for actions that they themselves perform(ed) (Wallace, <span>2010</span>; Dover, <span>2019</span> for a more permissive view), or to give advice to others that they do not follow. What matters for the purposes of this article is that agents can engage in hypocritical and objectionable moral address. This includes praise, namely when an agent dissimulates moral or ethical qualities by praising someone else—for example when an organization portrays itself in a positive light by awarding a prize to someone for an achievement that stands in stark contrast to its own conduct.</p><p>Not every inconsistency in moral address constitutes hypocrisy, however. Agents can avoid dissimulating moral or ethical qualities by explicitly admitting that they are not (yet) living in compliance with the norms that underpin their address. The classic example is doctors who give medical advice (e.g., to give up smoking), but openly admit to not following the advice themselves, from a weakness of will. One can criticize them for not following their own medical advice, or encourage them to overcome their addiction. But to criticize them for giving the advice is misguided (Wallace, <span>2010</span>: 329, fn. 37). We would not want to disincentivize objectively warranted advice just because the advisor does not follow it. Moral address that is self-revealing in such a way appears unobjectionable. Moreover, the description of hypocrisy seems misplaced whenever an honest admission of non-compliance rules out a false portrayal of the corresponding agential qualities (the third condition).<sup>5</sup></p><p>Let us now focus on the conditions under which climate hypocrisy obtains, starting with the variant of lifestyle hypocrisy. Are advocates of climate action with high consumption lifestyles necessarily hypocritical, as is sometimes suggested? The short answer is: No. Whether an agent acts hypocritically depends not just on the norms they promote and comply with, but also on what claims or implications they make about themselves. As long as one does not overstate one's own efforts to live sustainably within the existing profligate system, it is not hypocritical to pressure governments to decarbonize, although this does not settle the question of whether and to what extent undisguised individual profligacy is morally acceptable (see Section 4). Of course, individuals can be hypocritical about their lifestyles, when they falsely assert or intentionally imply that they have a modest or reduced carbon footprint. Alternatively, individuals can be hypocritical in their moral address (for example in blame, advice or praise given to others with respect to personal carbon impact) when such address accompanies a false self-portrayal of the related moral qualities. Individuals can even be hypocritical in assertions or moral address regarding their climate related donations or advocacy efforts. Hypocrisy in all these areas is avoidable, however. All one needs to do is clearly differentiate between personal and governmental responsibilities for emission reduction, adaptation and compensation, and to refrain from dissimulating personal qualities.</p><p>One might think that individually profligate advocates of climate action are bound to be hypocritical in their criticisms of governments and their representatives, or of corporations who are aggravating the problem of climate change. Not so. It can be argued that hypocritical blame involves the violation of an equality requirement, insofar as blamers exempt themselves from the principles to which they hold others accountable (Wallace, <span>2010</span>). But advocates of political climate action do not violate this requirement in their criticisms of governments and firms. This is because they do not blame these group agents and representatives for falling short of their personal responsibilities, but for failing to comply with normative standards specific to the sphere of political or corporate agency—such as when a government is blamed for catering to special interests, or when a fossil fuel company is blamed for financing climate denial. These agents not only have vastly greater political power than individuals, they are indispensable when it comes to structural decarbonization. Although individual responsibility arguably matters, too (see Section 4), it is not hypocritical, but warranted and even required for citizens to focus their criticism on governments and companies who fail to do their fair share, or worse, who actively undermine decarbonization efforts.<sup>6</sup></p><p>This leads to the conceptual assessment of political climate hypocrisy (see Section 2.2). Governments and political representatives can be hypocritical analogously to individual citizens, when they make false or intentionally misleading assertions related to emission reduction; for example when they downplay their country's causal contribution to the climate crisis or exaggerate the positive environmental effect of their policies. Governmental climate hypocrisy can also occur in false or intentionally misleading assertions about adaptation and victim compensation measures. Likewise, governments can engage in moral address hypocrisy, such as when they portray moral or ethical qualities in climate-related blame or advice addressed to other governments, while concealing how they exempt themselves from the relevant normative standards. Greta Thunberg indirectly pointed to the additional possibility of hypocritical praise, when she told members of US congress: “Please save your praise, we don't want it. Don't invite us here to tell us how inspiring we are without doing anything about it.”<sup>7</sup> Praise by political representatives can be hypocritical, namely when their underlying intention is to present themselves in a morally or ethically positive light that does not match their behavior. The agent-relativity of this phenomenon is such that, as with lifestyle hypocrisy, political representatives can avoid being hypocritical by not dissimulating personal qualities.<sup>8</sup></p><p>This section's conceptual analysis provides the tools for detecting inaccuracies in charges of climate hypocrisy, insofar as the behavior and attitudes of the accused agents do not meet the relevant conditions. Such inaccuracies may arise often, given the frequency and imprecision of hypocrisy charges and their strategic use by fossil fuel lobbyists. In particular, generalized accusations of hypocrisy leveled at broad or stylized groups (such as “climate activists”, “tree huggers” or “elitists”) do not account for the broad range of individual variation in compliance with and communicative reference to the relevant behavioral norms. Likewise, generalized accusations of political hypocrisy cannot account for the manifold ways in which governments and political representatives communicate their efforts related to climate action. Those who pronounce the relevant normative commitments run a higher risk of inconsistency than those who refrain from doing so. However, even agents who publicly affirm the relevant norms can avoid hypocrisy if they remain honest in assertions about their achievements and refrain from engaging in hypocritical moral address.</p><p>Although lifestyle and political climate hypocrisy share conceptual characteristics, their normative underpinnings are very different, due to the primacy of political climate action. I have so far considered the conceptual conditions for climate hypocrisy, discussed how the corresponding charges can be incorrect, and shown how agents can avoid being hypocritical. The charge of climate hypocrisy is not always refutable on factual grounds, however. So, exactly how problematic is climate hypocrisy, where it actually obtains?</p><p>The climate hypocrisy charge can be advanced strategically or earnestly (see Section 1). The lifestyle hypocrisy charge is frequently pressed by climate deniers, but it can also be leveled by an environmentalist who finds it relevant, perhaps even despite being aware of the disinformation and demoralization strategies in which it is often embedded. Political climate hypocrisy, too, can be criticized by opponents and proponents of political decarbonization, because it need not be accompanied by the demand that political leaders leave fossil fuels in the ground. The accusation could be used by a lobbyist who is bothered not by a government's feeble record on decarbonization, but by its commitment to allegedly unachievable or unnecessary goals. And while corporate greenwashing is typically denounced by environmentalists, it can also be criticized by those who object only to the green rhetoric, not to the inaction. This discursive and evaluative diversity can lead to mistaken views about how problematic climate hypocrisy really is, and what (if anything) should be done to avoid it.</p><p>My proposal is that we judge climate hypocrisy according to the degree to which it hinders the attainment of environmental integrity. In order to carve out this notion, it will be helpful to first assess the pitfalls of two methods by which environmental underachievers can attain the agent-relative consistency needed for avoiding climate hypocrisy. First, they could downgrade or eliminate their ambitions regarding their climate responsibilities (assuming they have any in the first place). Second, they could maintain high ambitions, but sincerely communicate the extent to which they fail to live up to them.</p><p>When it comes to the first strategy, personal and political responsibility are disanalogous. Global warming poses a particularly grave collective action problem which can only be effectively tackled in the political sphere, by way of government regulation and international cooperation (Gardiner, <span>2011</span>, Ch. 1 and 4). In order to avoid or limit catastrophic harms, governments must cut emissions through deep structural changes to the economic modes of production and consumption, including energy generation and consumption, agriculture and forestation, transportation and construction, taxation, and trade, etc. Individuals could therefore feel justified in blaming the system for their environmental profligacy. It is true that even elected government representatives can partially blame systemic deficits for their climate inaction, since they are constrained by election cycles and the present-oriented reporting of media outlets. They can further deflect responsibility by pointing to the inaction of their peers. However, they cannot plausibly deny that governments bear a primary responsibility to implement encompassing climate policies via international cooperation. Slowing and eventually stopping global warming necessitates collective action by way of nationally and internationally coordinated government action, which must include measures such as: effective carbon pricing, eliminating fossil fuel subsidies, incentivizing renewable energy use, and the comprehensive decarbonization of all energy sectors and of the electric power grid (Mann, <span>2021</span>, Ch. 5 and 6). Different states have different climate responsibilities, stemming from their historical contributions to the climate crisis and their present capacities to solve it (Caney, <span>2018</span>). But given that political climate action is indispensable for avoiding climate catastrophe, it is unacceptable for governments to avoid hypocrisy simply by repudiating responsibility for emission reduction, adaptation, and victim compensation, such that their pronouncements on these issues are consistent with their inaction. This is especially true for industrialized nations, who owe much of their wealth to the development and use of fossil-fuel technologies and who have more direct avenues for shaping the contours of a decarbonized world, compared to small developing nations with a minimal political clout.</p><p>The case of individual climate responsibility is more complicated. Even personally profligate advocates of structural decarbonization can avoid being hypocritical by categorically separating political from personal responsibility, and by downplaying the latter's importance. Personal responsibility could thus be completely rejected along the following lines: (1) It would be hypocritical to pretend that personal fossil fuel frugality matters, while maintaining profligate consumption habits. (2) We do not want to be hypocrites. (3) Therefore, let us stop pretending that personal fossil fuel frugality matters.</p><p>The problem is that on moral grounds, personal climate responsibility cannot be entirely dismissed (Fragnière, <span>2016</span>; Hourdequin, <span>2010</span>). Although pressuring governments to minimize the damage from climate change is the most important task for citizens, climate responsibility is not entirely reducible to the political sphere. Instead, political and personal responsibility are complementary and interdependent. The required decarbonization measures concern radical changes in all economic sectors, sustained by a major shift towards renewable energy sources that includes leaving much of the remaining fossil fuels in the ground. Although such measures must be guided and implemented via government regulation and international cooperation, they would have a pervasive impact on personal behavior. The necessary structural changes can arguably also be partly stimulated by altered consumer behavior from the bottom up, particularly in contexts where political reforms are blocked by special interest groups. Avoiding climate hypocrisy via eliminating environmentalist ambitions is therefore a morally unacceptable strategy for political representatives and for private citizens. In order to be environmentally responsible agents, both must resist the temptation to inaction.</p><p>In addition to being morally objectionable, leveling down one's standards (whether consciously or subconsciously) may not even yield the intended outcome of avoiding hypocrisy, depending on how we understand complacency—a vice that often overlaps with hypocrisy, but is separable from it. Jason Kawall helpfully analyses complacency as an “epistemically culpable overestimate of one's efforts and achievements, and a resultant excessive self-satisfaction”, which “produce a lack of desire or felt need to improve or maintain one's efforts with respect to a project” (Kawall <span>2004</span>: 353). On this definition, agents can be merely complacent without also being hypocritical, if they culpably overestimate their own efforts and achievements, but do so by “minding their own business” and by refraining from overselling their personal qualities or accomplishments in communication with others. Accordingly, individuals and collectives can avoid climate hypocrisy at the price of complacency, if they silently overestimate their environmental achievements. The likelihood of this scenario can be left open. What this comparison of proximate vices confirms, however, is that some alternatives to hypocrisy—unconcealed amorality, ruefully shed ambitions, or pure complacency—are morally unacceptable.</p><p>I can now evaluate the second method of avoiding climate hypocrisy, namely affirming atmospheric responsibility while remaining sincere and adequately self-reflective about the extent of one's failings. As with a doctor who advises patients to reduce sugar, but admits being addicted to sweets, agents can confess to not living up to moral norms whose validity they recognize. Intuitively, this strategy seems less problematic than the first. We would not want to be treated by someone who withholds objectively warranted medical advice merely in order to remain consistent with their own unhealthy lifestyle. Analogously, individual and collective agents seem to do better in moral terms when they keep track of the real extent of their climate responsibility while remaining honest about their record, than if they stop affirming the relevant norms merely for reasons of internal consistency.<sup>9</sup></p><p>A notion of environmental integrity is not only capable of backing these intuitions, but also offers guidance for the evaluation of climate hypocrisy more generally. Environmental integrity is to be understood as a subjective character trait and virtue in a broad sense (distinct from ecological integrity as intactness of natural objects or ecosystems), namely as a stable disposition for minimizing environmental harm where this is reasonably possible and not in conflict with other normative requirements. This disposition involves epistemic as well pragmatic personal qualities, which are justifiable via different moral theories.<sup>10</sup> On the epistemic level, environmental integrity requires agents to assess their environmental responsibilities conscientiously and to represent their views truthfully to others and themselves. They should not deceive themselves or others about how their behavior is causally related to reasonably avoidable environmental harm. This epistemic requirement applies to individuals and group agents alike, and includes the human contribution to climate change as only one object of environmental concern, albeit a major one. On the pragmatic level, environmental integrity requires agents to be genuinely committed to acting on their environmental responsibilities, which includes acting jointly with others to overcome structural and political hurdles to environmentally responsible agency.</p><p>Understood in this way, environmental integrity is a moral virtue. This contrasts with some other interpretations of integrity, such as self-integration as internal consistency of lower- and higher-order volitions (as in Harry Frankfurt's work), or dedication to projects that are constitutive of the agent's identity and may be in tension with moral agency (as in Bernard Williams's writings) (for discussion, see Calhoun, <span>1995</span>: 236–246). Environmental integrity morally requires agents to be epistemically and pragmatically committed to minimizing environmental harm, and to work with others towards achieving the social and economic background conditions for environmentally responsible agency. While this notion thus places moral demands on agents, it can still accommodate reasonable disagreement about the substance of environmentally responsible agency. In this respect, attributions of environmental integrity broadly align with attributions of integrity generally, as these do not ordinarily presuppose full moral agreement between those who attribute and those who possess such integrity, although a person of integrity must subscribe to a “defensible picture of what is right” (Cox et al., <span>2003</span>: 9; see also Calhoun, <span>1995</span>).</p><p>I am highlighting these connecting lines between the area-specific notion of environmental integrity and integrity more generally without presupposing a comprehensive conception of the latter. It must suffice here to show how the former broadly mirrors epistemic and pragmatic components of the general notion of integrity as conceived in ordinary discourse and by a number of contemporary accounts.<sup>11</sup> On the epistemic level, integrity in general can be taken to require not just a range of dispositions of outward sincerity, including truthfulness and avoidance of deception,<sup>12</sup> but also a sufficient degree of self-knowledge (Taylor, <span>1985</span>, Ch. 5; Cox et al., <span>2003</span>) and reflexivity with regards to the formation and adaptation of one's values, convictions and commitments over time (ibid.). The latter should arguably include a disposition to reflect on the justifiability of convictions and commitments, both in inner dialogue and in reasoned deliberation with others (Calhoun, <span>1995</span>; Scherkoske, <span>2013</span>). Character traits such as self-deception, complacency, fanaticism, dogmatism, or arrogance therefore undermine the integrity of those that possess them. On the pragmatic level, integrity generally involves a disposition to act on the values and commitments which one responsibly forms and defends in deliberation with others (Taylor, <span>1985</span>, Ch. 5; Calhoun, <span>1995</span>; Cox et al., <span>2003</span>; Scherkoske, <span>2013</span>). Both of these components of integrity are replicated in other area-specific notions such as professional or intellectual integrity.</p><p>Identifying the epistemic and pragmatic components of environmental integrity enables us to justify why avoiding hypocrisy via honest admission of shortcomings is better than avoiding hypocrisy by affirming no standards, but remains problematic. Those who avoid being hypocritical by conscientiously assessing and affirming their climate responsibilities, while being honest and adequately self-reflective about their moral failures, do significantly better epistemically than those who fail to register or acknowledge such responsibilities. But the former still lack environmental integrity on the pragmatic level, as they are not sufficiently committed to acting on their acknowledged climate responsibilities. Environmental integrity thus allows for incremental fulfillment. As with the general concept of integrity, and with other specific notions, it concerns personal qualities that agents can have more or less of (Cox et al., <span>2003</span>).</p><p>According to Hourdequin (<span>2010</span>), a notion of integrity can be used to argue against views that affirm only political and not personal environmental responsibilities. For her, integrity requires agents to harmonize their commitments in the personal and political sphere, to make them an integral part of their lives and to thereby achieve a form of self-integration or unity (ibid.: 447–449). The notion of environmental integrity that I defend resembles the one articulated by Hourdequin to the extent that I also emphasize the interrelatedness and inseparability of personal and political climate action, both of which are located on the pragmatic level of this virtue. However, the present account of environmental integrity is more specific, first, when it comes to the epistemic aspects of this notion, which relate to ways in which agents think and talk about their environmental responsibilities, and second, with regards to affirming that agents can fulfill the requirements of environmental integrity to varying degrees.</p><p>Environmental integrity, as I conceive of it, can be classified among a set of virtues of sustainability, which are “those virtues that will play an especially important role in allowing us to pursue and lead sustainable, flourishing lives” (Kawall, <span>2021</span>: xxvi). I hope to have clarified how environmental integrity, as it is characterized here, is an important virtue for the pursuit of sustainable lives and societies, although more space would be needed to delineate its relation to other virtues, such as simplicity, humility, cooperativeness, and conscientiousness (compare ibid.). The virtue of environmental responsibility (see Thompson, <span>2012</span>) is also related, although I hope to have drawn the difference: An attribution of environmental integrity presupposes agreement about substantive minimum requirements entailed by the pragmatic component, but does not require agreement on the full extent of environmental responsibility of individual or collective agents. Environmental integrity is thus a useful notion whenever comprehensive agreement is hard to come by.</p><p>I can now explain how environmental integrity allows us to morally assess climate hypocrisy. Recall that hypocrisy comes in different forms (see Section 3), and includes comparatively benign manifestations, for example, when agents are unaware of a minor inconsistency between their self-portrayal and behavior, or when agents deceive themselves about having a moral motivation for a permissible action that they perform for self-interested reasons. Hypocrisy also comes in more objectionable variants, most notably when it is paired with sustained and deliberate efforts at deception. Hypocrisy is considerably more problematic if it is deeply rooted in the agent's character, such that it will be predictably reproduced over time. Such differences must also be taken into account when evaluating climate hypocrisy. I propose that whether and to what degree an instance of climate hypocrisy is morally objectionable depends on how detrimental it is to an agent's attainment of environmental integrity. Instances of climate hypocrisy must thus be judged not in isolation, but with respect to the role they play in an agent's character development over time.</p><p>In accordance with this criterion, climate hypocrisy can be very objectionable, namely when it forms a part of a group's or individual's continual effort to deceive others or themselves about their own environmental record, for financial, political or reputational gain. Companies or states whose economies are built around the continued extraction or use of fossil fuels, some of whom dare to brand themselves as leaders in “carbon-neutrality”,<sup>13</sup> demonstrate a thorough lack of environmental integrity. In contrast, climate hypocrisy can also occur within an ongoing and genuine struggle to achieve environmental integrity: during an individual's attempts to attain a sustainable lifestyle or a government's or firm's transition to genuine structural decarbonization. Moreover, it makes a difference whether the inconsistency in question is a short-lived or ongoing deviation from an agent's self-representation. Take the example of a climate activist who conceals that he once broke a voluntary pledge not to fly for personal travel, compared to a politician who continuously violates a climate pledge by secretly running a campaign financed by the fossil fuel lobby. On the level of group agency, compare a government who on one occasion slightly oversells its efforts to decarbonize, with another that engages in sustained patterns of greenwashing its laissez-faire policies.</p><p>In summary, although environmental integrity epistemically requires agents to be sincere and adequately self-reflective about their ecological track record, a gradable understanding of these epistemic demands allows us to state that climate hypocrisy is less detrimental when it stems from minor forms of self-deception, compared to more pervasive self-delusions and to sustained efforts at deception. In the same vein, a gradable understanding of the pragmatic demands of environmental integrity allows us to state that climate hypocrisy is objectionable to the degree that it inhibits an agent's practical commitment to reducing environmental harm through personal and political action. Minor inconsistencies that are not pragmatically inhibitive must receive a different evaluation than hypocritical dissimulation which functions as a cover-up for sustained inaction, or even worse, for contrarian action that reverses whatever fragile political progress on climate has been made. The Trump administration's pronouncements on climate change are illustrative of the latter type of climate hypocrisy. For example, when asked by a debate moderator about his administration's stance on climate change, Trump glossed over his fossil fuel-friendly, climate contrarian agenda, by saying: “I want crystal clean water and air. I want beautiful clean air. We have now the lowest carbon. If you look at our numbers right now, we are doing phenomenally.”<sup>14</sup></p><p>Next to a gradable understanding of environmental integrity and the way in which climate hypocrisy may inhibit its attainment, we also need an account of mitigating circumstances. First, individual and collective attainment of environmental integrity may be hindered by socially adverse conditions. This is certainly the case in our profligate global economic system, which normalizes environmentally damaging behavior, externalizes its costs, and lacks effective sanction mechanisms that would align self-interested and other-regarding reasons for sustainable agency. Second, avoiding the types of inconsistencies that give rise to climate hypocrisy is harder for governments and other group agents with many subdivisions and a complex structure that suffers from institutional inertia. One can realistically expect that governments who are truly committed to climate action will show some inconsistencies between word and deed that give rise to at least minor hypocrisies. Due to their ponderousness, group agents may display discrepancies between self-portrayal and behavior during transitional phases even as they make credible efforts to decarbonize. In contrast, inconsistencies that give rise to climate hypocrisy could also reflect a group's irresponsible environmental agency over time. Instead of a uniform condemnation of climate hypocrisy, we therefore need contextual and differentiated assessments of the degree to which the behavioral patterns in question are detrimental to the agents' attainment of environmental integrity within the given social circumstances.</p><p>The preceding observations underline the need for a normative perspective in which the goals of avoiding hypocrisy and of attaining moral integrity are understood to be intertwined. Immanuel Kant argued that a certain amount of play-acting about genuinely moral attitudes can be a good thing, as long as it strengthens or contributes to the development of genuinely moral dispositions over time (Kant, <span>1781/1787</span>: A748/B776, and Kant, <span>1798</span>, §14). Kant mostly restricted this developmental stage argument to comparatively benign cases. However, the more general insight contained in his view is that the evaluation of dissimulated morality should focus on whether the instance in question is detrimental or conducive to the development of moral character. I have made an analogous case for the assessment of climate hypocrisy.</p><p>I began with an outline of the perplexing diversity of the aims and valuations associable with the charge of climate hypocrisy (in Section 2). I then conceptually analyzed climate hypocrisy as the object of contention (in Section 3) and proposed an evaluative framework for it based on the notion of environmental integrity (in Section 4). In this final section, I reflect on criteria for clarifying the significance of any given accusation of climate hypocrisy.</p><p>One might think, based on the preceding line of reasoning, that an accusation of climate hypocrisy is only legitimate if it demonstrates a genuine concern for the virtue of environmental integrity and its enablement through social background conditions. Climate deniers use the hypocrisy charge to further an agenda which stands in utmost disregard of this virtue, while many hypocrisy charges made by climate activists express the relevant concern at least implicitly. Take the example of McKibben's charge against Trudeau and Turnbull, which demonstrates a concern for the environmental integrity of the accused by serving as a reminder that these heads of state must follow up their rhetoric with action (compare Section 2.2). Indeed, as I have argued above, taking the notion of environmental integrity seriously requires holding governments and their representatives accountable, not simply for expressing commitment to comprehensive decarbonization, but for holistically aligning their political agency with such commitments.</p><p>However, this way of denoting the legitimate uses of the climate hypocrisy charge runs into two challenges. First, it can be difficult to determine the degree to which agents show real concern for environmental integrity in terms of a conscientious assessment and truthful communication of their own and other people's environmental responsibilities.<sup>15</sup> Verifying the existence of such concern requires seeing through false pretenses, which can be hard, because the motivations behind any criticism can remain obscure to an observer. However, the criterion of environmental integrity could still justify why certain types of the climate hypocrisy charge are illegitimate. It could thus provide guidance to observers who attempt to form accurate case-by-case judgments on the basis of additional empirical evidence.</p><p>But there is a second, more fundamental challenge. The agent-relativity of hypocrisy is such that one may legitimately criticize a hypocrite for dissimulating a norm without committing to the same norm (see Section 3). Imagine someone who is “pro-choice” and who points out the hypocrisy of a “pro-life” advocate who has an abortion. Clearly, this accuser need not hold that abortions are wrong. Analogously, one need not affirm the virtue of environmental integrity in order to point out climate hypocrisy. So what, if anything, is wrong with how climate deniers use this criticism?</p><p>Several things. First, even fossil fuel lobbyists now often pay lip service to the need to “address” climate change, which shows that, although one can consistently raise the climate hypocrisy charge while rejecting agential qualities associated with environmental integrity, such a stance has become unfashionable. This is reflected in the widespread shift from theoretical to practical climate denial, which can in turn be explained by the increase in general awareness of climate change and the environmental hazards it brings, including heat-waves, wild-fires, droughts, and floods. Accordingly, even fossil fuel companies now express concern for qualities associated with environmental integrity. A comprehensive examination of four American and European oil and gas majors (Chevron, ExxonMobile, BP, and Shell) found that, despite increasing tendencies to engage in green rhetoric, none of these firms “is currently on the way to a clean energy transition”, and that “accusations of greenwashing (…) are well-founded” (Li et al., <span>2022</span>: 19). Disclosing the fossil fuel industry's very own climate hypocrisy is surely one way of shedding light on the insincere manner in which their lobbyists raise the climate hypocrisy charge. It is not without irony that the work of fossil fuel lobbyists and their allies demonstrably involves a stunning amount of hypocrisy. David Runciman (<span>2017</span>) pointed out that professional climate deniers are hypocritical “about the doubt”. More hypocrisy can be found in their purely practical climate denial and organized delay of climate action, up to the point at which they level the hypocrisy charge theatrically and simulate moral concern to disguise their real agenda.<sup>16</sup></p><p>Second, the accusations of fossil fuel lobbyists and their allies are standardly absent of concern for integrity in general. A cynical dictator like Putin might feel no need to dissimulate concern for the environment. If he keeps his communications consistent with his amoral stance, it is impossible to simply return the climate hypocrisy charge to him. However, anyone who voices this charge cannot consistently repudiate the importance of integrity in general without thereby counteracting the force of their accusation. There is ample empirical evidence that climate deniers lack concern for integrity in general and thereby negate the norms they commit to when they accuse others of hypocrisy. Their decades-long theoretical denial of fossil-fuel-generated global warming, whose degree they accurately predicted as early as the 1970s (Supran et al., <span>2023</span>), stands in extreme opposition to the epistemic dispositions of outward-sincerity that are required for integrity (see Section 4).<sup>17</sup> Moreover, the way in which climate denialists have spread the charge of climate hypocrisy reveals a lack of genuine interest in the integrity of those whom they accuse, as the following observations make clear.</p><p>Fossil-fuel lobbyists and their allies utilize both variants of the climate hypocrisy charge with the goal of preventing decarbonization by disinforming, distracting, and confusing the public about our capacities and responsibilities to solve the climate crisis. (1) With the accusation of lifestyle hypocrisy they (a) attempt to discredit proponents of climate action and deny them the moral standing for their advocacy, and (b) individualize climate responsibility by promoting a “free-market” and anti-government ideology that reduces social and environmental problems to mere results of variations in individual agency (Schneider et al., <span>2016</span>). They thus moralize the socially comprehensive task of decarbonization by obfuscating the difference between personal and political climate responsibilities and by falsely suggesting that if global heating poses any challenge at all, it resides on the level of individual consumption choices (Lamb et al., <span>2020</span>; Mann, <span>2021</span>, Ch. 4).<sup>18</sup> As such, the denialist use of the lifestyle hypocrisy charge is a red herring (compare Aiken, <span>2009</span>: 112), because the accusers' aim is to distract from the necessity of political climate action by steering the conversation to individual behavior. (2) Opponents of climate action frame political climate hypocrisy as resulting from an allegedly mistaken belief that governments can achieve decarbonization (Gunster et al., <span>2018</span>). This is another way to pretend that “there is no alternative” to the present fossil-fuel based economic system (Schneider et al., <span>2016</span>: 30, 108). Industry activists thus disseminate both variants of the accusation, alongside other falsehoods, with the aim of sabotaging our focus on and faith in our collective ability to tackle global heating through political measures.</p><p>Their indifference to the integrity of the accused is also evident when fossil fuel lobbyists and their allies often point out climate hypocrisies that are not really problematic (on the basis of the evaluative criteria outlined in Section 4). Those engaged in climate denial and delay take advantage of the fact that hypocrisy is a very widespread and multifaceted, yet poorly understood phenomenon, which occurs on all sides of the political spectrum, in more and less objectionable forms. They inflate minor inconsistencies and suggest false equivalence between very different grades of moral deficiency, as exemplified by the shopping bag “incident” involving McKibben (see Section 2). Apart from being harmless, this is not even a case of hypocrisy, assuming that McKibben has never committed to refraining from the occasional use of plastic bags. Such indiscriminate blaming only serves to undermine consensus on environmental values and to erode belief in environmentally responsible agency in the political, economic, and private realms. Overall, the denialist use of the hypocrisy charge exemplifies at least three of the six different modes of pathological blame distinguished by Miranda Fricker (<span>2016</span>: 168–170), insofar as: (1) the blamed party is often not even blameworthy and/or hypocritical, (2) the blame is frequently not proportionate to the wrongdoing, such as when the charge targets only minor hypocrisies, and (3) the blame is often “not expressed in the proper ethical register” (ibid.: 169), such as when a fleeting motive is misportrayed as a persistent character trait.</p><p>Of course, it may sometimes happen that accusations by climate deniers contain a correct description of a problematic case of climate hypocrisy. Whether the indisputable inconsistencies shown by “eco-celebrities”, who own multiple estates and fly in private jets, amount to hypocrisy in the sense of dissimulated virtue depends on how sincere these individuals are about their lavish lifestyles. But even those who avoid being hypocritical through admission of personal profligacy cannot avert some loss of environmental integrity. That some denialist accusations of climate hypocrisy contain kernels of truth renders the strategy more effective, but does not change the deeply dishonest manner in which they are raised.</p><p>To conclude, members of the denial and delay network show a profound lack of concern for integrity on both the epistemic and pragmatic level: on the former, they fail to truthfully assess and communicate their own and other people's convictions and commitments; on the latter, beyond failing to fulfill their share of atmospheric responsibility as industry representatives, they sabotage the work of others who strive to create more sustainable socio-political conditions. These actors thus stand in extreme opposition to the agential qualities associable with integrity in general.</p><p>Fossil fuel lobbyists and their allies in industry, media, and politics are not the only ones who level the charge of climate hypocrisy destructively, however, as their propaganda reaches a broad audience. As a result, many people express denialist ideas and attitudes without strategic intent. How objectionable is a non-strategic denialist use of the climate hypocrisy charge? It might be less reprehensible than calculated forms of denial, if there is no conscious deception or manipulation. It is still objectionable, however, insofar as an accuser merely voices indiscriminate cynicism about morally responsible agency and thereby fails to show a proper concern for integrity in themselves and others. In contrast to cynical uses, constructive uses of a hypocrisy charge do not function as conversation stoppers (see Dover, <span>2019</span>), but as starting points for an ameliorative discussion that is adequately reflective of the behavioral aspects that can undermine the agent's integrity.</p><p>This article examined the normative significance of climate hypocrisy by analyzing different varieties and conceptual conditions and by showing how the area-specific notion of environmental integrity and the general notion of integrity may function as evaluative standards. Attaining a thorough understanding of climate hypocrisy's relevance can help us transcend the unhealthy fixation on agential consistency, which alone is of little value. All too often, the charge of hypocrisy is made in an indiscriminate manner that obscures morally significant differences between varieties of inconsistency. This article makes the case for focusing on a positive and substantive correlate: Instead of worrying about short-term consistency, the aim should be to establish the long-term conditions for environmental responsibility and integrity, and for moral integrity more generally. Such a focus equips us with the intellectual means to counter one common method by which cynicism and divisiveness are spread—by those who deliberately misuse moral language in their reckless pursuit of economic and political power, and by those who fall prey to their manipulations.</p><p>The authors declare no conflicts of interest.</p>","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 2","pages":"223-242"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12522","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Social Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/josp.12522","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract

Climate change poses an existential threat to the world's ecosystems and to human societies. In order to slow and eventually halt global warming, governments, firms, and civil society must enact radical structural change in order to minimize greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel use. Cynicism, pessimism, and defeatism are currently prevalent, however, and threaten to undermine the cooperative spirit needed to achieve a low carbon economy. Climate change denial has played a major role in feeding these destructive attitudes. Since the discovery of the greenhouse effect, the fossil fuel industry and a network of powerful allies have utilized every imaginable tactic to promote business as usual and to foster political inaction. For decades, they have sown doubt and misinformation about global warming, its causes, and its dangerous impact (Oreskes & Conway 2012). In response to widespread acceptance of the proof of anthropogenic warming, these actors have adapted their strategies beyond outright factual denial. One alternative strategy is shifting the public debate to individual morality (Lamb et al., 2020; Mann, 2021), emphasizing how individual lifestyles are inextricably intertwined with the environmentally profligate status quo, and thereby demoralizing the citizens of top emitting nations. The charge of hypocrisy is prominent in such demoralization efforts. It is leveled against climate scientists and activists, pro-environmentalist politicians and their supporters, “eco-celebrities”, or simply “the elites”, who are alleged not to practice what they preach, as they lead energy-intensive lifestyles.

If this charge were advanced only by agents who attempt to delay climate action, one could dismiss it by pointing to their own immoral activities. Instead of doing these lobbyists the favor of discussing the charge in earnest, one could change the terms of the conversation and redirect attention to the damaging effects of climate denial, and to feasible and urgently needed institutional decarbonization measures. The discursive constellation is more complicated, however, for two reasons. First, the accusation of lifestyle hypocrisy has long been a recurring theme in the general debate on climate change. It is not only discussed by those who are cynical about the prospects for individual and political climate action (such “climate cynicism” is not necessarily strategic). It is also considered by many who reflect, in good faith, on questions of individual morality and integrity in relation to climate change—such as how to reconcile our prosperous way of life with the imperative to leave a habitable world for future generations. Second, the accusation often takes another form, namely when governments or politicians are criticized for actions that contradict their proclaimed concern for climate change mitigation. This second variant of the hypocrisy charge can also be leveled with different motivations: by advocates of effective climate action, but also by cynical disinformation campaigners who intend to sow division and doubt about such action. The discursive variability of the climate hypocrisy charge means that a solid understanding of its relevance is needed.

In recent years, empirical studies have begun to shed light on various discursive references to climate hypocrisy (see Gunster et al., 2018; Schneider et al., 2016) as well as on the frequently stark discrepancies between green rhetoric and the real world actions of governments (Stevenson, 2021) and of fossil fuel companies (Li et al., 2022). This article complements such approaches with a systematic philosophical analysis, by focusing on the precise conceptual delineation and normative evaluation of climate hypocrisy and adjacent varieties of ecological inconsistency. Such conceptual and normative work is needed, as the meaning and significance of hypocrisy is generally not well-understood. This is partly because even classical references to “hypocrisy” such as those in the bible do not explicitly denote a unified phenomenon, but point to a group of loosely related inconsistencies. Accordingly, everyday accusations of hypocrisy are often framed in vague terms. Their normative relevance is also frequently left unstated. The same is true for climate hypocrisy. A systematic conceptual and normative approach can clarify matters. I present such an account here, arguing that different instances of climate hypocrisy and related ecological inconsistencies are differently problematic depending on how detrimental they are to an agent's attainment of environmental integrity.

I proceed in four main steps. I first outline two prominent variants of the climate hypocrisy charge: (1) the accusation of “lifestyle hypocrisy”, and (2) criticisms of governments and other political representatives who fail to fulfill their stated climate commitments (see Section 2). Next, I provide a conceptual analysis of climate hypocrisy, which ties it to the core phenomenon of dissimulation of environmental virtue (Section 3). I then introduce a notion of environmental integrity to evaluate how problematic climate hypocrisy is where it actually occurs (Section 4). In the final step, I show how the general notion of integrity allows us to assess the moral significance of different uses of the accusation and to clear the fog of moral disinformation (Section 5).

The term “hypocrisy” is often vaguely applied to those who, in biblical terms, “say one thing and do something else” (Matthew 23,2). But verifying or refuting a hypocrisy charge requires a more precise interpretation which allows us to distinguish hypocrisy from other adjacent behavioral inconsistencies, such as weakness of will or caprice. Precisely delineating hypocrisy turns out to be difficult, however. The bible—the text that has most influenced our conception of hypocrisy—uses “hypocrisy” in several ways. In the Old Testament (and the Qu'ran), the term “hypocrite” is used as a vague critique for people who are “corrupt in character” or “impious”—newer translations use alternative descriptors such as “godless,” “nefarious,” or “despisers of God”. In the New Testament, a more specific understanding of “hypocrite” emerges. It refers to those who (i) portray their religiosity or morality insincerely, (ii) are guilty of inconsistencies in blame and advice, or (iii) are guilty of complacency. Is it possible, however, to delineate an overarching phenomenon under which these different behavioral patterns can be subsumed?

The philosophical debate is inconclusive on this subject.1 The seminal essay “Let us not be hypocritical” by Judith Shklar (1984, Ch. 2) proceeds by interpreting philosophical and literary classics. Shklar highlights the descriptive and evaluative complexity of the phenomenon without attempting to provide a single definition. Christine McKinnon (1991) narrowly frames hypocrisy as manipulative deception about moral qualities for reputational gain. She thereby reduces hypocrisy to only one of its variants and leaves the problem of conceptual unity unaddressed. Crisp & Cowton (1994: 346–7) do address the problem, but do not succeed in showing that what they identify as hypocrisy's four main forms (“pretence”, “blame”, “inconsistency”, and “complacency”) are all instantiations of a singular, more general phenomenon. They propose that each form is a failure to take morality seriously (ibid., 347), which does not rule out clearly non-hypocritical behavior such as blatant amorality. Szabados and Soifer (2004) have presented the most comprehensive study of hypocrisy to date, in which they look at this phenomenon from multiple angles and discuss numerous examples. However, they, too, “offer no comprehensive theory, either conceptual or ethical” (ibid., 335). Instead of identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions, they content themselves with “uncover[ing] some recurring elements of hypocrisy, such as the need for an audience, an element of deception (whether of oneself or of others), and an element of self-interest (typically a concern for a good reputation in terms of prevailing norms […])” (ibid., 339).

In contrast to approaches that describe family resemblances between loosely connected behaviors, I propose a unified interpretation of hypocrisy as dissimulation of virtue. This understanding is meant to capture what is central in classical and contemporary understandings without being fully determined by them. The narrowing of conceptual scope comes with a much needed gain in conceptual clarity. Furthermore, even behaviors that fall outside the spectrum of variations of hypocrisy can nevertheless be assessed using the same evaluative standard, which will show that they are often no better (see Section 4). To begin, let me first outline the most important general conceptual features of hypocrisy as dissimulation of virtue, before setting out the conditions for climate hypocrisy specifically.

A helpful general definition is available from the Oxford English Dictionary Online, whereupon “hypocrisy” consists of “assuming of a false appearance of virtue or goodness, with dissimulation of real character or inclinations”. This definition captures much of what is essential, and is therefore rightly used as a starting point in several philosophical accounts (e.g., Shklar, 1984: 47; Wallace, 2010: 308).2 However, to more precisely delineate hypocrisy requires expanding from this definition. I will do so by specifying six aspects that together help us categorize different variations.

First, hypocrisy emanates from an agent-relative inconsistency; the behavior in question must be inconsistent with the very norms that the agent has committed to in some or other communication. This feature explains why reproaches of hypocrisy are so easy to level: accusers need not themselves commit to the hypocritically expressed norm in order for their critique to be legitimate (Shklar, 1984: 48; Wallace, 2010: 307).

Second, agents can dissimulate different personal qualities ranging from religious virtues (such as piety) to broadly ethical and narrowly moral qualities (Crisp & Cowton, 1994: 344).3 Agents can also dissimulate a moral motivation for a morally correct action which they perform out of self-interest. In addition, the motives for which people can be hypocritical are also very broad, and may include self-promotion and reputational gain, shame, servility, but also respect for fellow human beings and for the recognition of moral norms.4

Third, virtue dissimulation requires that the agent intentionally portrays herself as compliant with the norm(s) in question. Whether this criterion is met may not always be evident, since communicative expression is notoriously opaque and subject to misinterpretation. Take the example of a woman, Carlova, who regularly uses a petrol car over more sustainable alternatives. She posts a new picture on her social media profile that shows her on a bicycle. It would be uncharitable to take the post as an instance of hypocrisy, if Carlova's intention were simply to update her profile with a picture to her liking, as she engages in no dissimulation. She would have acted hypocritically, according to this criterion, only if she had shared the picture with the intention to portray herself as an environmentally conscientious, regular cyclist.

Fourth, next to the standard case of conscious dissimulation of personal qualities, which is often performed with the intention to deceive others, agents can be unconsciously hypocritical by deceiving themselves about their character (Statman, 1997; Szabados & Soifer, 2004, Ch. 13). Hypocrisy can arise from a range of cognitive dispositions of untruthfulness, including intentional false self-portrayal, “bullshitting” in the sense of indifference to the truth (Frankfurt, 1986), and self-deceived false self-portrayal. To specify our example accordingly, assume that Carlova had shared the picture with the intention to convey personal environmental frugality, while unconsciously suppressing awareness of her unsustainable lifestyle.

Fifth, not only individuals, but also group agents—such as companies, governments, clubs or NGOs—can hypocritically dissimulate agential qualities, above and beyond any hypocrisy by their members. Such group agency is genuinely collective (as opposed to being a mere aggregate of individual actions), when a group possesses collective decision-making structures such that its collective attitudes and actions are not reducible to the attitudes and actions of individual members (List & Pettit, 2011).

Sixth, hypocrisy can be constituted via different modes of communication. These comprise both language-based and non-verbal forms of symbolic expression (as in the case of Carlova's post), and different kinds of speech-acts, including assertion and moral address. Hypocritical assertion occurs when an agent dissimulates personal qualities either through explicit statements or by intentional conversational implicature. Alternatively, agents can dissimulate personal qualities via moral address, including blame, advice, or praise. It is controversial whether agents categorically lack the “standing” to blame or criticize others for actions that they themselves perform(ed) (Wallace, 2010; Dover, 2019 for a more permissive view), or to give advice to others that they do not follow. What matters for the purposes of this article is that agents can engage in hypocritical and objectionable moral address. This includes praise, namely when an agent dissimulates moral or ethical qualities by praising someone else—for example when an organization portrays itself in a positive light by awarding a prize to someone for an achievement that stands in stark contrast to its own conduct.

Not every inconsistency in moral address constitutes hypocrisy, however. Agents can avoid dissimulating moral or ethical qualities by explicitly admitting that they are not (yet) living in compliance with the norms that underpin their address. The classic example is doctors who give medical advice (e.g., to give up smoking), but openly admit to not following the advice themselves, from a weakness of will. One can criticize them for not following their own medical advice, or encourage them to overcome their addiction. But to criticize them for giving the advice is misguided (Wallace, 2010: 329, fn. 37). We would not want to disincentivize objectively warranted advice just because the advisor does not follow it. Moral address that is self-revealing in such a way appears unobjectionable. Moreover, the description of hypocrisy seems misplaced whenever an honest admission of non-compliance rules out a false portrayal of the corresponding agential qualities (the third condition).5

Let us now focus on the conditions under which climate hypocrisy obtains, starting with the variant of lifestyle hypocrisy. Are advocates of climate action with high consumption lifestyles necessarily hypocritical, as is sometimes suggested? The short answer is: No. Whether an agent acts hypocritically depends not just on the norms they promote and comply with, but also on what claims or implications they make about themselves. As long as one does not overstate one's own efforts to live sustainably within the existing profligate system, it is not hypocritical to pressure governments to decarbonize, although this does not settle the question of whether and to what extent undisguised individual profligacy is morally acceptable (see Section 4). Of course, individuals can be hypocritical about their lifestyles, when they falsely assert or intentionally imply that they have a modest or reduced carbon footprint. Alternatively, individuals can be hypocritical in their moral address (for example in blame, advice or praise given to others with respect to personal carbon impact) when such address accompanies a false self-portrayal of the related moral qualities. Individuals can even be hypocritical in assertions or moral address regarding their climate related donations or advocacy efforts. Hypocrisy in all these areas is avoidable, however. All one needs to do is clearly differentiate between personal and governmental responsibilities for emission reduction, adaptation and compensation, and to refrain from dissimulating personal qualities.

One might think that individually profligate advocates of climate action are bound to be hypocritical in their criticisms of governments and their representatives, or of corporations who are aggravating the problem of climate change. Not so. It can be argued that hypocritical blame involves the violation of an equality requirement, insofar as blamers exempt themselves from the principles to which they hold others accountable (Wallace, 2010). But advocates of political climate action do not violate this requirement in their criticisms of governments and firms. This is because they do not blame these group agents and representatives for falling short of their personal responsibilities, but for failing to comply with normative standards specific to the sphere of political or corporate agency—such as when a government is blamed for catering to special interests, or when a fossil fuel company is blamed for financing climate denial. These agents not only have vastly greater political power than individuals, they are indispensable when it comes to structural decarbonization. Although individual responsibility arguably matters, too (see Section 4), it is not hypocritical, but warranted and even required for citizens to focus their criticism on governments and companies who fail to do their fair share, or worse, who actively undermine decarbonization efforts.6

This leads to the conceptual assessment of political climate hypocrisy (see Section 2.2). Governments and political representatives can be hypocritical analogously to individual citizens, when they make false or intentionally misleading assertions related to emission reduction; for example when they downplay their country's causal contribution to the climate crisis or exaggerate the positive environmental effect of their policies. Governmental climate hypocrisy can also occur in false or intentionally misleading assertions about adaptation and victim compensation measures. Likewise, governments can engage in moral address hypocrisy, such as when they portray moral or ethical qualities in climate-related blame or advice addressed to other governments, while concealing how they exempt themselves from the relevant normative standards. Greta Thunberg indirectly pointed to the additional possibility of hypocritical praise, when she told members of US congress: “Please save your praise, we don't want it. Don't invite us here to tell us how inspiring we are without doing anything about it.”7 Praise by political representatives can be hypocritical, namely when their underlying intention is to present themselves in a morally or ethically positive light that does not match their behavior. The agent-relativity of this phenomenon is such that, as with lifestyle hypocrisy, political representatives can avoid being hypocritical by not dissimulating personal qualities.8

This section's conceptual analysis provides the tools for detecting inaccuracies in charges of climate hypocrisy, insofar as the behavior and attitudes of the accused agents do not meet the relevant conditions. Such inaccuracies may arise often, given the frequency and imprecision of hypocrisy charges and their strategic use by fossil fuel lobbyists. In particular, generalized accusations of hypocrisy leveled at broad or stylized groups (such as “climate activists”, “tree huggers” or “elitists”) do not account for the broad range of individual variation in compliance with and communicative reference to the relevant behavioral norms. Likewise, generalized accusations of political hypocrisy cannot account for the manifold ways in which governments and political representatives communicate their efforts related to climate action. Those who pronounce the relevant normative commitments run a higher risk of inconsistency than those who refrain from doing so. However, even agents who publicly affirm the relevant norms can avoid hypocrisy if they remain honest in assertions about their achievements and refrain from engaging in hypocritical moral address.

Although lifestyle and political climate hypocrisy share conceptual characteristics, their normative underpinnings are very different, due to the primacy of political climate action. I have so far considered the conceptual conditions for climate hypocrisy, discussed how the corresponding charges can be incorrect, and shown how agents can avoid being hypocritical. The charge of climate hypocrisy is not always refutable on factual grounds, however. So, exactly how problematic is climate hypocrisy, where it actually obtains?

The climate hypocrisy charge can be advanced strategically or earnestly (see Section 1). The lifestyle hypocrisy charge is frequently pressed by climate deniers, but it can also be leveled by an environmentalist who finds it relevant, perhaps even despite being aware of the disinformation and demoralization strategies in which it is often embedded. Political climate hypocrisy, too, can be criticized by opponents and proponents of political decarbonization, because it need not be accompanied by the demand that political leaders leave fossil fuels in the ground. The accusation could be used by a lobbyist who is bothered not by a government's feeble record on decarbonization, but by its commitment to allegedly unachievable or unnecessary goals. And while corporate greenwashing is typically denounced by environmentalists, it can also be criticized by those who object only to the green rhetoric, not to the inaction. This discursive and evaluative diversity can lead to mistaken views about how problematic climate hypocrisy really is, and what (if anything) should be done to avoid it.

My proposal is that we judge climate hypocrisy according to the degree to which it hinders the attainment of environmental integrity. In order to carve out this notion, it will be helpful to first assess the pitfalls of two methods by which environmental underachievers can attain the agent-relative consistency needed for avoiding climate hypocrisy. First, they could downgrade or eliminate their ambitions regarding their climate responsibilities (assuming they have any in the first place). Second, they could maintain high ambitions, but sincerely communicate the extent to which they fail to live up to them.

When it comes to the first strategy, personal and political responsibility are disanalogous. Global warming poses a particularly grave collective action problem which can only be effectively tackled in the political sphere, by way of government regulation and international cooperation (Gardiner, 2011, Ch. 1 and 4). In order to avoid or limit catastrophic harms, governments must cut emissions through deep structural changes to the economic modes of production and consumption, including energy generation and consumption, agriculture and forestation, transportation and construction, taxation, and trade, etc. Individuals could therefore feel justified in blaming the system for their environmental profligacy. It is true that even elected government representatives can partially blame systemic deficits for their climate inaction, since they are constrained by election cycles and the present-oriented reporting of media outlets. They can further deflect responsibility by pointing to the inaction of their peers. However, they cannot plausibly deny that governments bear a primary responsibility to implement encompassing climate policies via international cooperation. Slowing and eventually stopping global warming necessitates collective action by way of nationally and internationally coordinated government action, which must include measures such as: effective carbon pricing, eliminating fossil fuel subsidies, incentivizing renewable energy use, and the comprehensive decarbonization of all energy sectors and of the electric power grid (Mann, 2021, Ch. 5 and 6). Different states have different climate responsibilities, stemming from their historical contributions to the climate crisis and their present capacities to solve it (Caney, 2018). But given that political climate action is indispensable for avoiding climate catastrophe, it is unacceptable for governments to avoid hypocrisy simply by repudiating responsibility for emission reduction, adaptation, and victim compensation, such that their pronouncements on these issues are consistent with their inaction. This is especially true for industrialized nations, who owe much of their wealth to the development and use of fossil-fuel technologies and who have more direct avenues for shaping the contours of a decarbonized world, compared to small developing nations with a minimal political clout.

The case of individual climate responsibility is more complicated. Even personally profligate advocates of structural decarbonization can avoid being hypocritical by categorically separating political from personal responsibility, and by downplaying the latter's importance. Personal responsibility could thus be completely rejected along the following lines: (1) It would be hypocritical to pretend that personal fossil fuel frugality matters, while maintaining profligate consumption habits. (2) We do not want to be hypocrites. (3) Therefore, let us stop pretending that personal fossil fuel frugality matters.

The problem is that on moral grounds, personal climate responsibility cannot be entirely dismissed (Fragnière, 2016; Hourdequin, 2010). Although pressuring governments to minimize the damage from climate change is the most important task for citizens, climate responsibility is not entirely reducible to the political sphere. Instead, political and personal responsibility are complementary and interdependent. The required decarbonization measures concern radical changes in all economic sectors, sustained by a major shift towards renewable energy sources that includes leaving much of the remaining fossil fuels in the ground. Although such measures must be guided and implemented via government regulation and international cooperation, they would have a pervasive impact on personal behavior. The necessary structural changes can arguably also be partly stimulated by altered consumer behavior from the bottom up, particularly in contexts where political reforms are blocked by special interest groups. Avoiding climate hypocrisy via eliminating environmentalist ambitions is therefore a morally unacceptable strategy for political representatives and for private citizens. In order to be environmentally responsible agents, both must resist the temptation to inaction.

In addition to being morally objectionable, leveling down one's standards (whether consciously or subconsciously) may not even yield the intended outcome of avoiding hypocrisy, depending on how we understand complacency—a vice that often overlaps with hypocrisy, but is separable from it. Jason Kawall helpfully analyses complacency as an “epistemically culpable overestimate of one's efforts and achievements, and a resultant excessive self-satisfaction”, which “produce a lack of desire or felt need to improve or maintain one's efforts with respect to a project” (Kawall 2004: 353). On this definition, agents can be merely complacent without also being hypocritical, if they culpably overestimate their own efforts and achievements, but do so by “minding their own business” and by refraining from overselling their personal qualities or accomplishments in communication with others. Accordingly, individuals and collectives can avoid climate hypocrisy at the price of complacency, if they silently overestimate their environmental achievements. The likelihood of this scenario can be left open. What this comparison of proximate vices confirms, however, is that some alternatives to hypocrisy—unconcealed amorality, ruefully shed ambitions, or pure complacency—are morally unacceptable.

I can now evaluate the second method of avoiding climate hypocrisy, namely affirming atmospheric responsibility while remaining sincere and adequately self-reflective about the extent of one's failings. As with a doctor who advises patients to reduce sugar, but admits being addicted to sweets, agents can confess to not living up to moral norms whose validity they recognize. Intuitively, this strategy seems less problematic than the first. We would not want to be treated by someone who withholds objectively warranted medical advice merely in order to remain consistent with their own unhealthy lifestyle. Analogously, individual and collective agents seem to do better in moral terms when they keep track of the real extent of their climate responsibility while remaining honest about their record, than if they stop affirming the relevant norms merely for reasons of internal consistency.9

A notion of environmental integrity is not only capable of backing these intuitions, but also offers guidance for the evaluation of climate hypocrisy more generally. Environmental integrity is to be understood as a subjective character trait and virtue in a broad sense (distinct from ecological integrity as intactness of natural objects or ecosystems), namely as a stable disposition for minimizing environmental harm where this is reasonably possible and not in conflict with other normative requirements. This disposition involves epistemic as well pragmatic personal qualities, which are justifiable via different moral theories.10 On the epistemic level, environmental integrity requires agents to assess their environmental responsibilities conscientiously and to represent their views truthfully to others and themselves. They should not deceive themselves or others about how their behavior is causally related to reasonably avoidable environmental harm. This epistemic requirement applies to individuals and group agents alike, and includes the human contribution to climate change as only one object of environmental concern, albeit a major one. On the pragmatic level, environmental integrity requires agents to be genuinely committed to acting on their environmental responsibilities, which includes acting jointly with others to overcome structural and political hurdles to environmentally responsible agency.

Understood in this way, environmental integrity is a moral virtue. This contrasts with some other interpretations of integrity, such as self-integration as internal consistency of lower- and higher-order volitions (as in Harry Frankfurt's work), or dedication to projects that are constitutive of the agent's identity and may be in tension with moral agency (as in Bernard Williams's writings) (for discussion, see Calhoun, 1995: 236–246). Environmental integrity morally requires agents to be epistemically and pragmatically committed to minimizing environmental harm, and to work with others towards achieving the social and economic background conditions for environmentally responsible agency. While this notion thus places moral demands on agents, it can still accommodate reasonable disagreement about the substance of environmentally responsible agency. In this respect, attributions of environmental integrity broadly align with attributions of integrity generally, as these do not ordinarily presuppose full moral agreement between those who attribute and those who possess such integrity, although a person of integrity must subscribe to a “defensible picture of what is right” (Cox et al., 2003: 9; see also Calhoun, 1995).

I am highlighting these connecting lines between the area-specific notion of environmental integrity and integrity more generally without presupposing a comprehensive conception of the latter. It must suffice here to show how the former broadly mirrors epistemic and pragmatic components of the general notion of integrity as conceived in ordinary discourse and by a number of contemporary accounts.11 On the epistemic level, integrity in general can be taken to require not just a range of dispositions of outward sincerity, including truthfulness and avoidance of deception,12 but also a sufficient degree of self-knowledge (Taylor, 1985, Ch. 5; Cox et al., 2003) and reflexivity with regards to the formation and adaptation of one's values, convictions and commitments over time (ibid.). The latter should arguably include a disposition to reflect on the justifiability of convictions and commitments, both in inner dialogue and in reasoned deliberation with others (Calhoun, 1995; Scherkoske, 2013). Character traits such as self-deception, complacency, fanaticism, dogmatism, or arrogance therefore undermine the integrity of those that possess them. On the pragmatic level, integrity generally involves a disposition to act on the values and commitments which one responsibly forms and defends in deliberation with others (Taylor, 1985, Ch. 5; Calhoun, 1995; Cox et al., 2003; Scherkoske, 2013). Both of these components of integrity are replicated in other area-specific notions such as professional or intellectual integrity.

Identifying the epistemic and pragmatic components of environmental integrity enables us to justify why avoiding hypocrisy via honest admission of shortcomings is better than avoiding hypocrisy by affirming no standards, but remains problematic. Those who avoid being hypocritical by conscientiously assessing and affirming their climate responsibilities, while being honest and adequately self-reflective about their moral failures, do significantly better epistemically than those who fail to register or acknowledge such responsibilities. But the former still lack environmental integrity on the pragmatic level, as they are not sufficiently committed to acting on their acknowledged climate responsibilities. Environmental integrity thus allows for incremental fulfillment. As with the general concept of integrity, and with other specific notions, it concerns personal qualities that agents can have more or less of (Cox et al., 2003).

According to Hourdequin (2010), a notion of integrity can be used to argue against views that affirm only political and not personal environmental responsibilities. For her, integrity requires agents to harmonize their commitments in the personal and political sphere, to make them an integral part of their lives and to thereby achieve a form of self-integration or unity (ibid.: 447–449). The notion of environmental integrity that I defend resembles the one articulated by Hourdequin to the extent that I also emphasize the interrelatedness and inseparability of personal and political climate action, both of which are located on the pragmatic level of this virtue. However, the present account of environmental integrity is more specific, first, when it comes to the epistemic aspects of this notion, which relate to ways in which agents think and talk about their environmental responsibilities, and second, with regards to affirming that agents can fulfill the requirements of environmental integrity to varying degrees.

Environmental integrity, as I conceive of it, can be classified among a set of virtues of sustainability, which are “those virtues that will play an especially important role in allowing us to pursue and lead sustainable, flourishing lives” (Kawall, 2021: xxvi). I hope to have clarified how environmental integrity, as it is characterized here, is an important virtue for the pursuit of sustainable lives and societies, although more space would be needed to delineate its relation to other virtues, such as simplicity, humility, cooperativeness, and conscientiousness (compare ibid.). The virtue of environmental responsibility (see Thompson, 2012) is also related, although I hope to have drawn the difference: An attribution of environmental integrity presupposes agreement about substantive minimum requirements entailed by the pragmatic component, but does not require agreement on the full extent of environmental responsibility of individual or collective agents. Environmental integrity is thus a useful notion whenever comprehensive agreement is hard to come by.

I can now explain how environmental integrity allows us to morally assess climate hypocrisy. Recall that hypocrisy comes in different forms (see Section 3), and includes comparatively benign manifestations, for example, when agents are unaware of a minor inconsistency between their self-portrayal and behavior, or when agents deceive themselves about having a moral motivation for a permissible action that they perform for self-interested reasons. Hypocrisy also comes in more objectionable variants, most notably when it is paired with sustained and deliberate efforts at deception. Hypocrisy is considerably more problematic if it is deeply rooted in the agent's character, such that it will be predictably reproduced over time. Such differences must also be taken into account when evaluating climate hypocrisy. I propose that whether and to what degree an instance of climate hypocrisy is morally objectionable depends on how detrimental it is to an agent's attainment of environmental integrity. Instances of climate hypocrisy must thus be judged not in isolation, but with respect to the role they play in an agent's character development over time.

In accordance with this criterion, climate hypocrisy can be very objectionable, namely when it forms a part of a group's or individual's continual effort to deceive others or themselves about their own environmental record, for financial, political or reputational gain. Companies or states whose economies are built around the continued extraction or use of fossil fuels, some of whom dare to brand themselves as leaders in “carbon-neutrality”,13 demonstrate a thorough lack of environmental integrity. In contrast, climate hypocrisy can also occur within an ongoing and genuine struggle to achieve environmental integrity: during an individual's attempts to attain a sustainable lifestyle or a government's or firm's transition to genuine structural decarbonization. Moreover, it makes a difference whether the inconsistency in question is a short-lived or ongoing deviation from an agent's self-representation. Take the example of a climate activist who conceals that he once broke a voluntary pledge not to fly for personal travel, compared to a politician who continuously violates a climate pledge by secretly running a campaign financed by the fossil fuel lobby. On the level of group agency, compare a government who on one occasion slightly oversells its efforts to decarbonize, with another that engages in sustained patterns of greenwashing its laissez-faire policies.

In summary, although environmental integrity epistemically requires agents to be sincere and adequately self-reflective about their ecological track record, a gradable understanding of these epistemic demands allows us to state that climate hypocrisy is less detrimental when it stems from minor forms of self-deception, compared to more pervasive self-delusions and to sustained efforts at deception. In the same vein, a gradable understanding of the pragmatic demands of environmental integrity allows us to state that climate hypocrisy is objectionable to the degree that it inhibits an agent's practical commitment to reducing environmental harm through personal and political action. Minor inconsistencies that are not pragmatically inhibitive must receive a different evaluation than hypocritical dissimulation which functions as a cover-up for sustained inaction, or even worse, for contrarian action that reverses whatever fragile political progress on climate has been made. The Trump administration's pronouncements on climate change are illustrative of the latter type of climate hypocrisy. For example, when asked by a debate moderator about his administration's stance on climate change, Trump glossed over his fossil fuel-friendly, climate contrarian agenda, by saying: “I want crystal clean water and air. I want beautiful clean air. We have now the lowest carbon. If you look at our numbers right now, we are doing phenomenally.”14

Next to a gradable understanding of environmental integrity and the way in which climate hypocrisy may inhibit its attainment, we also need an account of mitigating circumstances. First, individual and collective attainment of environmental integrity may be hindered by socially adverse conditions. This is certainly the case in our profligate global economic system, which normalizes environmentally damaging behavior, externalizes its costs, and lacks effective sanction mechanisms that would align self-interested and other-regarding reasons for sustainable agency. Second, avoiding the types of inconsistencies that give rise to climate hypocrisy is harder for governments and other group agents with many subdivisions and a complex structure that suffers from institutional inertia. One can realistically expect that governments who are truly committed to climate action will show some inconsistencies between word and deed that give rise to at least minor hypocrisies. Due to their ponderousness, group agents may display discrepancies between self-portrayal and behavior during transitional phases even as they make credible efforts to decarbonize. In contrast, inconsistencies that give rise to climate hypocrisy could also reflect a group's irresponsible environmental agency over time. Instead of a uniform condemnation of climate hypocrisy, we therefore need contextual and differentiated assessments of the degree to which the behavioral patterns in question are detrimental to the agents' attainment of environmental integrity within the given social circumstances.

The preceding observations underline the need for a normative perspective in which the goals of avoiding hypocrisy and of attaining moral integrity are understood to be intertwined. Immanuel Kant argued that a certain amount of play-acting about genuinely moral attitudes can be a good thing, as long as it strengthens or contributes to the development of genuinely moral dispositions over time (Kant, 1781/1787: A748/B776, and Kant, 1798, §14). Kant mostly restricted this developmental stage argument to comparatively benign cases. However, the more general insight contained in his view is that the evaluation of dissimulated morality should focus on whether the instance in question is detrimental or conducive to the development of moral character. I have made an analogous case for the assessment of climate hypocrisy.

I began with an outline of the perplexing diversity of the aims and valuations associable with the charge of climate hypocrisy (in Section 2). I then conceptually analyzed climate hypocrisy as the object of contention (in Section 3) and proposed an evaluative framework for it based on the notion of environmental integrity (in Section 4). In this final section, I reflect on criteria for clarifying the significance of any given accusation of climate hypocrisy.

One might think, based on the preceding line of reasoning, that an accusation of climate hypocrisy is only legitimate if it demonstrates a genuine concern for the virtue of environmental integrity and its enablement through social background conditions. Climate deniers use the hypocrisy charge to further an agenda which stands in utmost disregard of this virtue, while many hypocrisy charges made by climate activists express the relevant concern at least implicitly. Take the example of McKibben's charge against Trudeau and Turnbull, which demonstrates a concern for the environmental integrity of the accused by serving as a reminder that these heads of state must follow up their rhetoric with action (compare Section 2.2). Indeed, as I have argued above, taking the notion of environmental integrity seriously requires holding governments and their representatives accountable, not simply for expressing commitment to comprehensive decarbonization, but for holistically aligning their political agency with such commitments.

However, this way of denoting the legitimate uses of the climate hypocrisy charge runs into two challenges. First, it can be difficult to determine the degree to which agents show real concern for environmental integrity in terms of a conscientious assessment and truthful communication of their own and other people's environmental responsibilities.15 Verifying the existence of such concern requires seeing through false pretenses, which can be hard, because the motivations behind any criticism can remain obscure to an observer. However, the criterion of environmental integrity could still justify why certain types of the climate hypocrisy charge are illegitimate. It could thus provide guidance to observers who attempt to form accurate case-by-case judgments on the basis of additional empirical evidence.

But there is a second, more fundamental challenge. The agent-relativity of hypocrisy is such that one may legitimately criticize a hypocrite for dissimulating a norm without committing to the same norm (see Section 3). Imagine someone who is “pro-choice” and who points out the hypocrisy of a “pro-life” advocate who has an abortion. Clearly, this accuser need not hold that abortions are wrong. Analogously, one need not affirm the virtue of environmental integrity in order to point out climate hypocrisy. So what, if anything, is wrong with how climate deniers use this criticism?

Several things. First, even fossil fuel lobbyists now often pay lip service to the need to “address” climate change, which shows that, although one can consistently raise the climate hypocrisy charge while rejecting agential qualities associated with environmental integrity, such a stance has become unfashionable. This is reflected in the widespread shift from theoretical to practical climate denial, which can in turn be explained by the increase in general awareness of climate change and the environmental hazards it brings, including heat-waves, wild-fires, droughts, and floods. Accordingly, even fossil fuel companies now express concern for qualities associated with environmental integrity. A comprehensive examination of four American and European oil and gas majors (Chevron, ExxonMobile, BP, and Shell) found that, despite increasing tendencies to engage in green rhetoric, none of these firms “is currently on the way to a clean energy transition”, and that “accusations of greenwashing (…) are well-founded” (Li et al., 2022: 19). Disclosing the fossil fuel industry's very own climate hypocrisy is surely one way of shedding light on the insincere manner in which their lobbyists raise the climate hypocrisy charge. It is not without irony that the work of fossil fuel lobbyists and their allies demonstrably involves a stunning amount of hypocrisy. David Runciman (2017) pointed out that professional climate deniers are hypocritical “about the doubt”. More hypocrisy can be found in their purely practical climate denial and organized delay of climate action, up to the point at which they level the hypocrisy charge theatrically and simulate moral concern to disguise their real agenda.16

Second, the accusations of fossil fuel lobbyists and their allies are standardly absent of concern for integrity in general. A cynical dictator like Putin might feel no need to dissimulate concern for the environment. If he keeps his communications consistent with his amoral stance, it is impossible to simply return the climate hypocrisy charge to him. However, anyone who voices this charge cannot consistently repudiate the importance of integrity in general without thereby counteracting the force of their accusation. There is ample empirical evidence that climate deniers lack concern for integrity in general and thereby negate the norms they commit to when they accuse others of hypocrisy. Their decades-long theoretical denial of fossil-fuel-generated global warming, whose degree they accurately predicted as early as the 1970s (Supran et al., 2023), stands in extreme opposition to the epistemic dispositions of outward-sincerity that are required for integrity (see Section 4).17 Moreover, the way in which climate denialists have spread the charge of climate hypocrisy reveals a lack of genuine interest in the integrity of those whom they accuse, as the following observations make clear.

Fossil-fuel lobbyists and their allies utilize both variants of the climate hypocrisy charge with the goal of preventing decarbonization by disinforming, distracting, and confusing the public about our capacities and responsibilities to solve the climate crisis. (1) With the accusation of lifestyle hypocrisy they (a) attempt to discredit proponents of climate action and deny them the moral standing for their advocacy, and (b) individualize climate responsibility by promoting a “free-market” and anti-government ideology that reduces social and environmental problems to mere results of variations in individual agency (Schneider et al., 2016). They thus moralize the socially comprehensive task of decarbonization by obfuscating the difference between personal and political climate responsibilities and by falsely suggesting that if global heating poses any challenge at all, it resides on the level of individual consumption choices (Lamb et al., 2020; Mann, 2021, Ch. 4).18 As such, the denialist use of the lifestyle hypocrisy charge is a red herring (compare Aiken, 2009: 112), because the accusers' aim is to distract from the necessity of political climate action by steering the conversation to individual behavior. (2) Opponents of climate action frame political climate hypocrisy as resulting from an allegedly mistaken belief that governments can achieve decarbonization (Gunster et al., 2018). This is another way to pretend that “there is no alternative” to the present fossil-fuel based economic system (Schneider et al., 2016: 30, 108). Industry activists thus disseminate both variants of the accusation, alongside other falsehoods, with the aim of sabotaging our focus on and faith in our collective ability to tackle global heating through political measures.

Their indifference to the integrity of the accused is also evident when fossil fuel lobbyists and their allies often point out climate hypocrisies that are not really problematic (on the basis of the evaluative criteria outlined in Section 4). Those engaged in climate denial and delay take advantage of the fact that hypocrisy is a very widespread and multifaceted, yet poorly understood phenomenon, which occurs on all sides of the political spectrum, in more and less objectionable forms. They inflate minor inconsistencies and suggest false equivalence between very different grades of moral deficiency, as exemplified by the shopping bag “incident” involving McKibben (see Section 2). Apart from being harmless, this is not even a case of hypocrisy, assuming that McKibben has never committed to refraining from the occasional use of plastic bags. Such indiscriminate blaming only serves to undermine consensus on environmental values and to erode belief in environmentally responsible agency in the political, economic, and private realms. Overall, the denialist use of the hypocrisy charge exemplifies at least three of the six different modes of pathological blame distinguished by Miranda Fricker (2016: 168–170), insofar as: (1) the blamed party is often not even blameworthy and/or hypocritical, (2) the blame is frequently not proportionate to the wrongdoing, such as when the charge targets only minor hypocrisies, and (3) the blame is often “not expressed in the proper ethical register” (ibid.: 169), such as when a fleeting motive is misportrayed as a persistent character trait.

Of course, it may sometimes happen that accusations by climate deniers contain a correct description of a problematic case of climate hypocrisy. Whether the indisputable inconsistencies shown by “eco-celebrities”, who own multiple estates and fly in private jets, amount to hypocrisy in the sense of dissimulated virtue depends on how sincere these individuals are about their lavish lifestyles. But even those who avoid being hypocritical through admission of personal profligacy cannot avert some loss of environmental integrity. That some denialist accusations of climate hypocrisy contain kernels of truth renders the strategy more effective, but does not change the deeply dishonest manner in which they are raised.

To conclude, members of the denial and delay network show a profound lack of concern for integrity on both the epistemic and pragmatic level: on the former, they fail to truthfully assess and communicate their own and other people's convictions and commitments; on the latter, beyond failing to fulfill their share of atmospheric responsibility as industry representatives, they sabotage the work of others who strive to create more sustainable socio-political conditions. These actors thus stand in extreme opposition to the agential qualities associable with integrity in general.

Fossil fuel lobbyists and their allies in industry, media, and politics are not the only ones who level the charge of climate hypocrisy destructively, however, as their propaganda reaches a broad audience. As a result, many people express denialist ideas and attitudes without strategic intent. How objectionable is a non-strategic denialist use of the climate hypocrisy charge? It might be less reprehensible than calculated forms of denial, if there is no conscious deception or manipulation. It is still objectionable, however, insofar as an accuser merely voices indiscriminate cynicism about morally responsible agency and thereby fails to show a proper concern for integrity in themselves and others. In contrast to cynical uses, constructive uses of a hypocrisy charge do not function as conversation stoppers (see Dover, 2019), but as starting points for an ameliorative discussion that is adequately reflective of the behavioral aspects that can undermine the agent's integrity.

This article examined the normative significance of climate hypocrisy by analyzing different varieties and conceptual conditions and by showing how the area-specific notion of environmental integrity and the general notion of integrity may function as evaluative standards. Attaining a thorough understanding of climate hypocrisy's relevance can help us transcend the unhealthy fixation on agential consistency, which alone is of little value. All too often, the charge of hypocrisy is made in an indiscriminate manner that obscures morally significant differences between varieties of inconsistency. This article makes the case for focusing on a positive and substantive correlate: Instead of worrying about short-term consistency, the aim should be to establish the long-term conditions for environmental responsibility and integrity, and for moral integrity more generally. Such a focus equips us with the intellectual means to counter one common method by which cynicism and divisiveness are spread—by those who deliberately misuse moral language in their reckless pursuit of economic and political power, and by those who fall prey to their manipulations.

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

气候虚伪和环境完整性
气候变化对世界生态系统和人类社会构成了生存威胁。为了减缓并最终停止全球变暖,政府、企业和民间社会必须实施彻底的结构性改革,以最大限度地减少化石燃料使用产生的温室气体排放。然而,犬儒主义、悲观主义和失败主义目前盛行,并有可能破坏实现低碳经济所需的合作精神。否认气候变化在助长这些破坏性态度方面发挥了重要作用。自从发现温室效应以来,化石燃料行业及其强大的盟友网络利用了一切可以想象到的策略来促进一切正常,并助长政治上的无所作为。几十年来,他们播下了对全球变暖、其原因及其危险影响的怀疑和错误信息(Oreskes &amp;康威2012)。作为对人为变暖证据被广泛接受的回应,这些行动者已经调整了他们的策略,而不是完全否认事实。另一种策略是将公众辩论转向个人道德(Lamb et al., 2020;Mann, 2021),强调个人生活方式如何与环境挥霍现状密不可分,从而使排放大国的公民士气低落。在这种败坏道德的努力中,伪善的指控是突出的。它针对的是气候科学家和活动家,亲环境主义政治家和他们的支持者,“生态名人”,或者简称为“精英”,因为他们过着能源密集型的生活方式,被指控没有实践他们所宣扬的。如果这一指控只是由那些试图拖延气候行动的代理人提出的,人们可以通过指出他们自己的不道德行为来驳斥它。与其帮助这些游说者认真地讨论这项指控,不如改变谈话的内容,把注意力转移到否认气候变化的破坏性影响上,转移到可行的、迫切需要的制度性脱碳措施上。然而,由于两个原因,话语星座更为复杂。首先,在关于气候变化的一般性辩论中,对虚伪生活方式的指责一直是一个反复出现的主题。这不仅仅是那些对个人和政治气候行动前景持怀疑态度的人在讨论(这种“气候犬儒主义”不一定是战略性的)。许多人真诚地思考与气候变化有关的个人道德和诚信问题,比如如何协调我们繁荣的生活方式与为子孙后代留下一个宜居世界的必要性。其次,这种指责往往以另一种形式出现,即政府或政治家因与其宣称的减缓气候变化的关切相悖的行动而受到批评。这种伪善指控的第二种变体也可以用不同的动机来解释:一方面是倡导有效气候行动的人,另一方面是愤世嫉俗的造谣者,他们打算在这些行动中播下分裂和怀疑的种子。气候伪善指控的话语可变性意味着需要对其相关性有一个坚实的理解。近年来,实证研究已经开始揭示各种关于气候伪善的话语引用(见Gunster等人,2018;Schneider et al., 2016),以及政府(Stevenson, 2021)和化石燃料公司(Li et al., 2022)的绿色言论与现实世界行动之间经常存在明显差异。本文通过系统的哲学分析来补充这些方法,重点关注气候伪善和生态不一致的相关品种的精确概念描述和规范评估。这种概念性和规范性的工作是必要的,因为伪善的意义和重要性通常没有得到很好的理解。部分原因是,即使是圣经中提到的“伪善”,也没有明确指出一个统一的现象,而是指向一组松散相关的不一致。因此,对伪善的日常指责往往是含糊其辞的。它们的规范性相关性也经常未被说明。在气候问题上的虚伪也是如此。系统的概念和规范方法可以澄清问题。我在这里提出了这样一个解释,认为气候伪善和相关的生态不一致的不同实例有不同的问题,这取决于它们对代理人实现环境完整性的危害程度。我主要分为四个步骤。我首先概述了气候伪善指控的两种主要变体:(1)对“生活方式伪善”的指控;(2)对政府和其他政治代表未能履行其声明的气候承诺的批评(见第2节)。 以麦基本对特鲁多和特恩布尔的指控为例,这表明了对被告环境完整性的关注,提醒这些国家元首必须言行一致(比较第2.2节)。事实上,正如我在上面所说的,认真对待环境完整性的概念要求政府及其代表承担责任,不仅要表达对全面脱碳的承诺,而且要全面地使其政治机构与这些承诺保持一致。然而,这种表示气候伪善指控的合法用途的方式遇到了两个挑战。首先,很难确定行动者对环境完整性表现出真正关注的程度,即对自己和他人的环境责任进行认真的评估和真实的交流验证这种担忧的存在需要看穿虚假的借口,这可能是困难的,因为任何批评背后的动机对观察者来说都是模糊的。然而,环境完整性的标准仍然可以证明为什么某些类型的气候伪善指控是不合理的。因此,它可以为试图根据额外的经验证据形成准确的个案判断的观察员提供指导。但还有第二个更根本的挑战。伪善的主体相对性是这样的,人们可以合理地批评伪善者不遵守同一规范而掩饰规范(见第3节)。想象一下,一个“支持选择”的人,指出了一个堕胎的“支持生命”倡导者的虚伪。显然,原告不必认为堕胎是错误的。类似地,人们不必为了指出气候虚伪而肯定环境完整性的优点。那么,气候变化否认者利用这种批评有什么错呢?几件事情。首先,即使是化石燃料游说者现在也经常口头上说需要“解决”气候变化,这表明,尽管一个人可以不断地提出气候伪善的指控,同时拒绝与环境完整性相关的代理品质,但这种立场已经变得不流行了。这反映在从理论到实践的气候否认的广泛转变上,这反过来又可以通过对气候变化及其带来的环境危害(包括热浪、野火、干旱和洪水)的普遍认识的提高来解释。因此,即使是化石燃料公司现在也表达了对与环境完整性相关的质量的关注。对四家美国和欧洲石油和天然气巨头(雪佛龙、埃克森美孚、英国石油和壳牌)的全面考察发现,尽管参与绿色言论的趋势越来越大,但这些公司中没有一家“目前正在向清洁能源转型”,而且“对洗绿的指责(……)是有根据的”(Li et al., 2022: 19)。揭露化石燃料行业自身在气候问题上的伪善,无疑是一种揭露其说客提出气候伪善指控的不真诚方式的方式。具有讽刺意味的是,化石燃料游说者及其盟友的工作显然涉及到惊人数量的虚伪。David Runciman(2017)指出,专业的气候否认者“对怀疑”是虚伪的。更多的伪善体现在他们纯粹出于实际目的的否认气候变化和有组织地拖延气候变化行动上,直到他们戏剧性地将伪善指控升级,并模拟道德关切来掩盖他们真正的议程。第二,对化石燃料游说者及其盟友的指责通常缺乏对诚信的关注。像普京这样愤世嫉俗的独裁者可能觉得没有必要掩饰对环境的关注。如果他的沟通与他的非道德立场保持一致,就不可能简单地把气候伪善的指控还给他。然而,任何提出这种指控的人都不可能始终如一地否定诚信的重要性,而不因此抵消他们指控的力量。有充分的经验证据表明,气候否认者总体上缺乏对诚信的关注,因此在指责他人虚伪时,他们否定了自己所承诺的规范。早在20世纪70年代,他们就准确地预测了全球变暖的程度(Supran等人,2023年),他们长达数十年的理论否认了化石燃料产生的全球变暖,这与诚信所要求的外在真诚的认知倾向极端对立(见第4节)此外,气候变化否认者散布气候变化伪善指控的方式表明,他们对他们所指责的人的正直缺乏真正的兴趣,下面的观察结果清楚地说明了这一点。 化石燃料游说者及其盟友利用这两种气候伪善指控的变体,目的是通过误导、分散和混淆公众对我们解决气候危机的能力和责任的认识,来阻止脱碳。(1)指责生活方式虚伪,他们(a)试图诋毁气候行动的支持者,并否认他们倡导的道德立场,(b)通过推广“自由市场”和反政府意识形态,将社会和环境问题减少为个体机构变化的结果,从而将气候责任个人化(Schneider等人,2016)。因此,他们通过混淆个人和政治气候责任之间的差异,并错误地暗示,如果全球变暖构成任何挑战,那么它就存在于个人消费选择的层面上,从而使脱碳的社会综合任务道德化(Lamb等人,2020;曼,2021,第4章).18因此,否认主义者使用生活方式虚伪的指控是转移注意力(比较Aiken, 2009: 112),因为指控者的目的是通过将谈话转向个人行为来分散政治气候行动的必要性。(2)气候行动的反对者认为,政治上的气候虚伪是由于人们错误地认为政府可以实现脱碳(Gunster et al., 2018)。这是另一种假装目前以化石燃料为基础的经济体系“别无选择”的方式(Schneider等人,2016:30,108)。因此,行业活动人士传播了这两种指控的变体,以及其他谎言,目的是破坏我们对通过政治措施解决全球变暖问题的集体能力的关注和信心。当化石燃料游说者和他们的盟友经常指出没有真正问题的气候伪善(基于第4节概述的评估标准)时,他们对被告诚信的漠不关心也很明显。那些否认和拖延气候变化的人利用了这样一个事实,即伪善是一种非常普遍和多方面的现象,但人们对这种现象知之甚少,这种现象出现在政治光谱的各个方面,其形式或多或少令人反感。他们夸大了细微的不一致,并在不同等级的道德缺陷之间提出了错误的等同,就像涉及McKibben的购物袋“事件”一样(见第二节)。除了无害之外,假设麦吉本从未承诺不偶尔使用塑料袋,这甚至算不上虚伪。这种不分青红皂白的指责只会破坏对环境价值的共识,侵蚀政治、经济和私人领域中对环境负责的机构的信念。总体而言,对伪善指控的否认主义使用至少体现了米兰达·弗里克(2016:168-170)区分的六种不同病态指责模式中的三种,因为:(1)被指责的一方通常甚至不应该受到指责和/或虚伪,(2)指责往往与不法行为不成比例,例如当指控只针对轻微的伪善时,以及(3)指责往往“没有在适当的道德记录中表达”(同上)。169),比如当一个短暂的动机被错误地描绘成一个持久的性格特征。当然,有时气候否认者的指控可能包含对气候伪善问题案例的正确描述。拥有多处房产、乘坐私人飞机的“生态名人”所表现出的无可争议的不一致,是否在伪装的美德意义上等同于虚伪,取决于这些人对自己奢侈生活方式的真诚程度。但是,即使是那些通过承认个人挥霍而避免虚伪的人,也无法避免环境完整性的某种损失。一些否认论者对气候伪善的指责包含了事实的核心,这使得该策略更加有效,但并没有改变提出这些指责的极不诚实的方式。总而言之,拒绝和延迟网络的成员在认知和实用层面上都表现出对诚信的严重缺乏关注:在前者上,他们无法真实地评估和沟通自己和他人的信念和承诺;在后者方面,他们除了未能履行作为行业代表的大气责任外,还破坏了其他人努力创造更可持续的社会政治条件的工作。因此,这些行为者与一般意义上与正直相关的行为品质是极端对立的。化石燃料游说者及其在工业界、媒体和政界的盟友并不是唯一破坏性地指责气候伪善的人,然而,他们的宣传达到了广泛的受众。因此,许多人表达否认的思想和态度,没有战略意图。 一个非战略性的否认者使用气候伪善的指控是多么令人反感?如果没有有意识的欺骗或操纵,它可能比蓄意的否认形式更不应该受到谴责。然而,只要原告只是对道德上负责任的机构发出不加区分的玩世不恭的声音,从而未能对自己和他人的正直表现出适当的关注,这仍然是令人反感的。与愤世嫉俗的用法相反,建设性地使用伪善指控并不会阻止谈话(见Dover, 2019),而是作为改善性讨论的起点,充分反映可能破坏代理人诚信的行为方面。本文通过分析不同的品种和概念条件,并通过展示特定地区的环境完整性概念和一般完整性概念如何作为评估标准,研究了气候伪善的规范意义。彻底了解气候伪善的相关性,可以帮助我们超越对机构一致性的不健康执着,这种执着本身没有什么价值。人们常常不分青红皂白地指责伪善,这掩盖了各种不一致在道德上的显著差异。这篇文章将重点放在积极和实质性的关联上:与其担心短期的一致性,目标应该是为环境责任和诚信以及更普遍的道德诚信建立长期的条件。这样的关注使我们有了理智的手段来对抗一种常见的愤世嫉俗和分裂的传播方式——那些在不计后果地追求经济和政治权力的过程中故意滥用道德语言的人,以及那些成为他们操纵的牺牲品的人。作者声明无利益冲突。 接下来,我对气候伪善进行了概念分析,将其与掩饰环境美德的核心现象联系起来(第3节)。然后,我引入了环境完整性的概念,以评估气候伪善在实际发生的地方有多成问题(第4节)。在最后一步,我展示了诚信的一般概念如何使我们能够评估指控的不同用途的道德意义,并清除道德虚假信息的迷雾(第5节)。“伪善”这个词常常模糊地用于那些在圣经中“说一套做一套”的人(马太福音23章2节)。但是,验证或驳斥伪善指控需要更精确的解释,这使我们能够将伪善与其他相邻的行为不一致(如意志薄弱或反复无常)区分开来。然而,准确地描述伪善是很困难的。圣经——对我们对伪善的概念影响最大的经文——在几个方面使用了“伪善”。在《旧约》(和《古兰经》)中,“伪君子”一词被用来模糊地批评那些“品行败坏”或“不虔诚”的人——较新的翻译使用了“不信神”、“邪恶”或“藐视上帝”等替代描述。在新约中,出现了对“伪君子”更具体的理解。它指的是那些(i)不真诚地描绘他们的宗教信仰或道德,(ii)在指责和建议上不一致,或(iii)自满的人。然而,是否有可能描绘出一种总体现象,将这些不同的行为模式归入其中?关于这个问题的哲学辩论没有定论朱迪思·施克拉的开创性论文《让我们不要虚伪》(1984年,第2章)从解释哲学和文学经典开始。Shklar强调了这种现象的描述和评估的复杂性,而没有试图提供一个单一的定义。克里斯汀·麦金农(1991)狭隘地将伪善定义为为了获得声誉而对道德品质的操纵性欺骗。因此,她将伪善简化为它的一种变体,而没有解决概念统一的问题。脆,考顿(1994:346-7)确实解决了这个问题,但并没有成功地表明,他们认为虚伪的四种主要形式(“假装”、“责备”、“不一致”和“自满”)都是一种单一的、更普遍的现象的实例。他们提出,每一种形式都是未能认真对待道德(同上,347),这并不排除明显不虚伪的行为,如公然不道德。Szabados和Soifer(2004)提出了迄今为止最全面的伪善研究,他们从多个角度看待这一现象,并讨论了许多例子。然而,它们也“没有提供全面的理论,无论是概念上的还是伦理上的”(同上,335)。他们没有确定必要和充分条件,而是满足于“揭露一些反复出现的伪善元素,例如对观众的需求,欺骗元素(无论是自己还是他人),以及自利元素(通常是对主流规范中良好声誉的关注[…])”(同上,339)。与描述松散关联行为之间的家族相似性的方法相反,我提出了一个统一的解释,即伪善是对美德的伪装。这种理解是为了抓住古典和当代理解的核心,而不是完全由它们决定。概念范围的缩小带来了非常需要的概念清晰度的提高。此外,即使是不属于虚伪变化范围的行为,也可以使用相同的评估标准进行评估,这将表明它们通常并没有更好(参见第4节)。首先,让我先概述伪善作为美德掩饰的最重要的一般概念特征,然后再具体阐述气候伪善的条件。《牛津在线英语词典》给出了一个很有用的定义,根据这个定义,“伪善”包括“假借美德或善良的外表,掩盖真实的性格或倾向”。这个定义抓住了许多本质的东西,因此被正确地用作几个哲学论述的起点(例如,Shklar, 1984: 47;[j] .中国科学:自然科学然而,要更精确地描述伪善需要从这个定义扩展。为此,我将具体说明六个方面,它们共同帮助我们对不同的变体进行分类。首先,伪善来自于代理人相对的不一致;所讨论的行为必须与行为人在某些或其他交流中所承诺的规范不一致。 这一特征解释了为什么对伪善的指责是如此容易被纠正:为了使他们的批评是合法的,指控者不需要自己致力于伪善表达的规范(Shklar, 1984: 48;华莱士,2010:307)。其次,代理人可以伪装不同的个人品质,从宗教美德(如虔诚)到广泛的伦理和狭隘的道德品质(克里斯普&安普;2)行为人也可以出于自身利益,为道德正确的行为伪装道德动机。此外,人们伪善的动机也很广泛,可能包括自我推销和名誉利益、羞耻、奴性,但也包括对人类同胞的尊重和对道德规范的认可。第三,美德伪装要求行为人有意地将自己描绘成符合相关规范的人。是否符合这一标准可能并不总是显而易见的,因为交际表达是出了名的不透明和容易被误解。以Carlova女士为例,她经常使用汽油车而不是更可持续的替代品。她在社交媒体上发布了一张她骑自行车的新照片。如果卡洛娃的意图仅仅是用自己喜欢的照片更新自己的个人资料,那么将这条帖子视为虚伪的例子就太无情了,因为她从不掩饰。根据这一标准,只有当她分享这张照片的目的是把自己描绘成一个有环保意识的、经常骑自行车的人时,她才会表现得虚伪。第四,除了有意识地掩饰个人品质的标准案例(通常是为了欺骗他人而进行的)之外,行为人也可能无意识地通过欺骗自己的性格而变得虚伪(Statman, 1997;安,Soifer, 2004,第13章)。虚伪可以从一系列不真实的认知倾向中产生,包括故意虚假的自我描绘,对真相漠不关心的“胡扯”(法兰克福,1986),以及自欺欺人的虚假自我描绘。为了具体说明我们的例子,假设Carlova分享这张照片的目的是传达个人的环保节俭,同时无意识地压抑了她不可持续的生活方式的意识。第五,不仅是个人,公司、政府、俱乐部或非政府组织等团体的代理人也可以伪善地掩饰代理的品质,超越其成员的任何伪善。当一个群体拥有集体决策结构,使得其集体态度和行动不能简化为个体成员的态度和行动时,这样的群体代理是真正的集体(而不仅仅是个人行动的集合)。佩蒂特,2011)。第六,虚伪可以通过不同的沟通方式构成。这些包括基于语言和非语言形式的符号表达(如卡洛瓦的帖子),以及不同类型的言语行为,包括断言和道德地址。当行为人通过明确的陈述或有意的对话暗示来掩饰个人品质时,就会出现伪善的断言。或者,代理人可以通过道德讲话来掩饰个人品质,包括责备、建议或赞扬。主体是否绝对缺乏指责或批评他人行为的“立场”是有争议的(Wallace, 2010;多佛(Dover, 2019),以获得更宽容的观点),或者给别人提供他们不遵循的建议。对于本文的目的而言,重要的是代理人可以从事虚伪和令人反感的道德演讲。这包括表扬,即当一个代理人通过表扬别人来掩饰道德或伦理品质时——例如,当一个组织通过奖励一个与自己的行为形成鲜明对比的成就的人来描绘自己的积极形象时。然而,并不是所有道德上的不一致都构成虚伪。代理人可以通过明确承认他们(还)没有按照支撑其地址的规范生活,从而避免掩饰道德或伦理品质。一个典型的例子是医生给出医疗建议(例如,戒烟),但公开承认自己没有听从建议,因为意志薄弱。人们可以批评他们不听从自己的医疗建议,也可以鼓励他们克服毒瘾。但是批评他们给出的建议是错误的(华莱士,2010:329,fn)。37)。我们不希望仅仅因为建议者不遵循建议就不鼓励客观可靠的建议。以这种方式自我表露的道德演说似乎是无可非议的。 此外,只要诚实地承认不遵守,就可以排除对相应代理品质的错误描述(第三个条件),那么描述伪善似乎就放错了地方。现在让我们从虚伪的生活方式开始,来关注气候虚伪产生的条件。倡导以高消费的生活方式来应对气候变化的人就一定像人们有时说的那样虚伪吗?简短的回答是:不。一个行为人的行为是否虚伪,不仅取决于他们提倡和遵守的规范,还取决于他们对自己的主张或暗示。只要一个人不夸大自己在现有挥霍体系中可持续生活的努力,向政府施压去碳化就不是虚伪的,尽管这并不能解决是否以及在多大程度上不加掩饰的个人挥霍在道德上是可以接受的问题(见第4节)。当然,当个人错误地断言或故意暗示他们的碳足迹适度或减少时,他们对自己的生活方式可能是虚伪的。另一种情况是,当个人对自己的道德品质有错误的自我描述时,他们可能会在道德讲话中表现得虚伪(例如,就个人的碳影响向他人提出指责、建议或赞扬)。个人甚至可以伪善的断言或道德演讲关于他们的气候相关捐款或倡导努力。然而,所有这些领域的虚伪都是可以避免的。人们所需要做的就是明确区分个人和政府在减排、适应和补偿方面的责任,并避免掩饰个人品质。有人可能会认为,那些挥金如土的气候行动倡导者在批评加剧气候变化问题的政府及其代表或企业时,必然是虚伪的。不是这样的。可以说,伪善的指责涉及违反平等要求,因为指责者将自己从他们要求他人负责的原则中解脱出来(华莱士,2010)。但是,政治气候行动的倡导者在批评政府和企业时并没有违反这一要求。这是因为他们并不指责这些团体的代理人和代表没有尽到个人责任,而是指责他们没有遵守特定于政治或企业机构领域的规范标准——比如当政府被指责为迎合特殊利益时,或者当化石燃料公司被指责为否认气候变化提供资金时。这些机构不仅比个人拥有更大的政治权力,而且在结构性脱碳方面也是不可或缺的。虽然个人责任也很重要(见第4节),但这不是虚伪的,而是有理由的,甚至是公民必须把批评的重点放在政府和公司身上,这些政府和公司没有尽到自己的责任,或者更糟的是,他们积极地破坏了脱碳的努力。这导致了对政治气候伪善的概念性评估(见2.2节)。当政府和政治代表在减排问题上作出虚假或故意误导的断言时,他们也可能像个别公民一样虚伪;例如,当他们淡化本国对气候危机的因果贡献或夸大其政策对环境的积极影响时。政府的气候伪善也可能出现在关于适应和受害者赔偿措施的虚假或故意误导的断言中。同样,政府也可能在道德问题上表现出虚伪,比如在向其他政府提出与气候有关的指责或建议时,将道德或伦理品质描绘出来,同时隐瞒自己如何不受相关规范标准的约束。格蕾塔•桑伯格(Greta Thunberg)间接指出了虚伪赞美的额外可能性,她告诉美国国会议员:“请省省你们的赞美吧,我们不想要。”不要邀请我们来这里告诉我们,我们是多么鼓舞人心,而不做任何事情。政治代表的赞扬可能是虚伪的,也就是说,当他们的潜在意图是在道德或伦理方面表现出与他们的行为不符的积极态度时。这种现象的代理人相对性是这样的,就像生活方式的虚伪一样,政治代表可以通过不掩饰个人品质来避免虚伪。8本节的概念分析提供了工具,用于发现对气候伪善指控的不准确性,只要被指控的代理人的行为和态度不符合相关条件。鉴于伪善指控的频率和不准确性,以及化石燃料游说者对其的战略利用,这种不准确的说法可能经常出现。 特别是,针对广泛的或程式化的群体(如“气候活动家”、“拥抱树木者”或“精英主义者”)的笼统的伪善指控,并不能解释在遵守相关行为规范和交流参考方面的广泛个体差异。同样,对政治虚伪的笼统指责也不能解释政府和政治代表在气候行动方面所做努力的多种沟通方式。那些宣布相关规范承诺的人比那些不这样做的人有更高的不一致风险。然而,即使是公开肯定相关规范的代理人,如果他们在断言自己的成就时保持诚实,并且不进行虚伪的道德演讲,也可以避免虚伪。尽管生活方式和政治气候虚伪具有共同的概念特征,但由于政治气候行动的首要地位,它们的规范基础非常不同。到目前为止,我已经考虑了气候伪善的概念条件,讨论了相应的指控如何是不正确的,并展示了代理人如何避免伪善。然而,在事实基础上,对气候伪善的指控并不总是可以反驳的。那么,在气候问题上的虚伪到底有多大的问题,它到底是从哪里来的?对气候伪善的指控可以有策略地推进,也可以认真地推进(见第1节)。生活方式虚伪的指控经常被气候否认者提出,但也可以被环境保护主义者提出,他们认为这是相关的,甚至可能意识到它经常嵌入的虚假信息和道德败坏策略。政治上的气候伪善也会受到政治脱碳的反对者和支持者的批评,因为它不需要伴随着要求政治领导人将化石燃料留在地下的要求。游说者可能会利用这一指责,他们不是被政府在脱碳方面的软弱记录所困扰,而是被政府对据称无法实现或不必要的目标的承诺所困扰。虽然环保主义者通常会谴责企业“漂绿”,但也会受到那些只反对绿色修辞、不反对不作为的人的批评。这种话语和评估的多样性可能导致错误的观点,即气候虚伪的问题到底有多严重,以及应该做些什么(如果有的话)来避免它。我的建议是,我们根据它阻碍实现环境完整性的程度来判断气候虚伪。为了阐明这一概念,首先评估两种方法的陷阱将会有所帮助,通过这两种方法,环境差生可以获得避免气候伪善所需的代理相对一致性。首先,他们可以降低或消除他们在气候责任方面的雄心(假设他们一开始就有)。第二,他们可以保持很高的抱负,但真诚地沟通他们没有达到目标的程度。当涉及到第一个战略时,个人责任和政治责任是不同的。全球变暖是一个特别严重的集体行动问题,只能通过政府监管和国际合作在政治领域得到有效解决(加德纳,2011,第1章和第4章)。为了避免或限制灾难性的危害,政府必须通过对生产和消费的经济模式进行深层次的结构性改革来减少排放,包括能源生产和消费、农业和造林、交通和建筑、税收和贸易等。因此,个人有理由将他们在环境方面的挥霍归咎于体制。的确,即使是民选的政府代表也可以将他们在气候问题上的不作为部分归咎于系统性赤字,因为他们受到选举周期和媒体以当前为导向的报道的限制。他们可以通过指责同伴的不作为来进一步推卸责任。然而,他们也不能否认,各国政府在通过国际合作实施全面的气候政策方面负有主要责任。减缓并最终阻止全球变暖需要通过国家和国际协调的政府行动采取集体行动,其中必须包括以下措施:有效的碳定价,取消化石燃料补贴,激励可再生能源的使用,以及所有能源部门和电网的全面脱碳(Mann, 2021,第5和6章)。不同的国家有不同的气候责任,这源于它们对气候危机的历史贡献和它们目前解决气候危机的能力(Caney, 2018)。 但是,考虑到政治上的气候行动对于避免气候灾难是必不可少的,政府仅仅通过否认减排、适应和受害者赔偿的责任来避免虚伪是不可接受的,这样他们在这些问题上的声明与他们的无所作为是一致的。工业化国家尤其如此。与政治影响力微乎其微的发展中小国相比,工业化国家的财富很大程度上得益于化石燃料技术的开发和使用,它们在塑造一个去碳化世界的轮廓方面拥有更直接的途径。个人气候责任的情况更为复杂。即使是那些个人挥霍无度的结构性脱碳倡导者,也可以通过明确地将政治责任与个人责任分开,并淡化后者的重要性,来避免虚伪。因此,个人责任可以按照以下方式完全拒绝:(1)假装个人节约化石燃料很重要,同时保持挥霍的消费习惯是虚伪的。我们不想做伪君子。因此,让我们停止假装个人节约化石燃料很重要。问题是,从道德的角度来看,个人的气候责任不能完全被忽视(fragni<e:1>, 2016;Hourdequin, 2010)。尽管对公民来说,迫使政府将气候变化造成的损害降到最低是最重要的任务,但气候责任并不能完全归结为政治领域。相反,政治责任和个人责任是相辅相成、相互依存的。所需的脱碳措施涉及所有经济部门的根本变化,由向可再生能源的重大转变维持,包括将大部分剩余的化石燃料留在地下。虽然这些措施必须通过政府监管和国际合作来指导和实施,但它们会对个人行为产生普遍影响。可以说,必要的结构性变革也可能在一定程度上受到自下而上的消费者行为改变的刺激,尤其是在政治改革受到特殊利益集团阻挠的情况下。因此,对于政治代表和普通公民来说,通过消除环保主义者的野心来避免气候虚伪是一种道德上不可接受的策略。为了成为对环境负责的代理人,两者都必须抵制不作为的诱惑。除了在道德上令人反感之外,降低一个人的标准(无论是有意识的还是潜意识的)甚至可能不会产生避免伪善的预期结果,这取决于我们如何理解自满——一种经常与伪善重叠的恶习,但与伪善是可分离的。Jason Kawall将自满分析为“对自己的努力和成就的认识上的错误高估,以及由此产生的过度自我满足”,这“导致缺乏欲望或感觉需要改进或保持一个人对项目的努力”(Kawall 2004: 353)。根据这一定义,代理人可以仅仅自满而不虚伪,如果他们有过错地高估了自己的努力和成就,但这样做是通过“关注自己的事业”和在与他人交流时避免过度推销自己的个人品质或成就。因此,个人和集体可以避免以自满为代价的气候虚伪,如果他们默默地高估了他们的环境成就。出现这种情况的可能性可以留待确定。然而,这种近似罪恶的比较所证实的是,一些伪善的替代品——毫不掩饰的不道德,悔恨地放弃野心,或者纯粹的自满——在道德上是不可接受的。我现在可以评估避免气候虚伪的第二种方法,即肯定对大气的责任,同时对自己的失败程度保持真诚和充分的自我反思。就像一个医生建议病人少吃糖,但却承认自己对甜食上瘾一样,代理人也可以承认自己没有遵守他们认可的道德规范。直观地看,这种策略似乎比第一种策略问题更少。我们不想接受那些仅仅为了保持自己不健康的生活方式而拒绝客观合理的医疗建议的人的治疗。类似地,当个人和集体行为者在对自己的记录保持诚实的同时跟踪自己的气候责任的真实程度时,他们似乎在道德方面做得更好,而不是仅仅因为内部一致性的原因而停止肯定相关规范。环境完整性的概念不仅能够支持这些直觉,而且还为更普遍地评估气候虚伪提供指导。 环境完整性应被理解为广义上的主观性格特征和美德(不同于生态完整性,即自然物体或生态系统的完整性),即在合理可能且不与其他规范性要求相冲突的情况下,将环境危害降到最低的稳定处置。这种倾向包括认识论和实用主义的个人品质,这可以通过不同的道德理论来证明在认知层面上,环境完整性要求行动者认真评估他们的环境责任,并如实向他人和自己表达他们的观点。他们不应该欺骗自己或他人,谎称自己的行为与合理可避免的环境危害有因果关系。这一认知要求同样适用于个人和群体行动者,并将人类对气候变化的贡献作为环境关注的一个对象,尽管是一个主要对象。在实际层面上,环境完整性要求行动者真正致力于履行其环境责任,其中包括与其他各方共同采取行动,克服对环境负责的机构的结构和政治障碍。以这种方式理解,环境完整性是一种道德美德。这与对完整性的其他一些解释形成了对比,例如将自我整合视为低阶和高阶意志的内部一致性(如Harry Frankfurt的作品),或致力于构成主体身份的项目,并可能与道德代理关系紧张(如Bernard Williams的作品)(有关讨论,参见Calhoun, 1995: 236-246)。在道德上,环境完整性要求行动者在认识上和实际行动上承诺尽量减少对环境的危害,并与他人共同努力实现对环境负责的机构的社会和经济背景条件。虽然这一概念因此对代理人提出了道德要求,但它仍然可以容纳对环境负责的代理人的实质的合理分歧。在这方面,环境完整性的归因与完整性的归因大体一致,因为这些通常不以那些归因者和拥有这种完整性的人之间的完全道德一致为前提,尽管一个正直的人必须赞同“对什么是正确的可辩护的图景”(Cox et al., 2003: 9;参见Calhoun, 1995)。我在强调特定地区的环境完整性概念与更普遍的完整性概念之间的联系,而不预设后者的全面概念。这里必须充分说明,前者如何广泛地反映了在日常话语和许多当代叙述中所构想的一般完整性概念的认识论和实用主义组成部分在认知层面上,一般来说,正直不仅需要一系列外在真诚的倾向,包括诚实和避免欺骗,而且还需要足够程度的自我认识(Taylor, 1985,第5章;Cox et al., 2003)和反身性在一个人的价值观、信念和承诺的形成和适应方面(同上)。可以说,后者应该包括在内心对话和与他人的理性审议中反思信念和承诺的正当性的倾向(Calhoun, 1995;Scherkoske, 2013)。因此,自我欺骗、自满、狂热、教条主义或傲慢等性格特征会破坏拥有它们的人的正直。在实用主义层面上,诚信通常涉及一种对价值观和承诺采取行动的倾向,这种价值观和承诺是一个人在与他人商议时负责任地形成和捍卫的(Taylor, 1985,第5章;卡尔霍恩,1995;Cox et al., 2003;Scherkoske, 2013)。诚信的这两个组成部分可以在其他特定领域的概念中复制,例如专业或知识诚信。确定环境完整性的认识论和实用主义组成部分,使我们能够证明为什么通过诚实承认缺点来避免虚伪比通过肯定没有标准来避免虚伪更好,但仍然存在问题。那些通过认真评估和肯定自己的气候责任,同时诚实地对自己的道德失误进行充分的自我反思,从而避免虚伪的人,在认识上比那些没有登记或承认这些责任的人做得好得多。但前者在实际层面上仍然缺乏环境完整性,因为它们没有充分承诺履行其公认的气候责任。因此,环境完整性允许增量实现。与诚信的一般概念和其他具体概念一样,它涉及个体或多或少可以拥有的个人品质(Cox et al., 2003)。 根据Hourdequin(2010)的说法,诚信的概念可以用来反对那些只肯定政治责任而不肯定个人环境责任的观点。对她来说,正直要求行动者协调他们在个人和政治领域的承诺,使这些承诺成为他们生活的组成部分,从而实现一种自我整合或统一的形式(同上:447-449)。我所捍卫的环境完整性的概念类似于Hourdequin所阐述的,在某种程度上,我也强调了个人和政治气候行动的相互关联和不可分割性,这两者都位于这种美德的实用主义层面。然而,目前对环境完整性的描述更加具体,首先,涉及到这一概念的认识论方面,涉及到主体思考和谈论其环境责任的方式,其次,涉及到确认主体可以在不同程度上满足环境完整性的要求。正如我所设想的那样,环境完整性可以归类为一系列可持续性的美德,这些美德将在让我们追求和领导可持续的繁荣生活中发挥特别重要的作用”(Kawall, 2021: xxvi)。我希望已经阐明了环境完整性,正如它在这里所描述的那样,是如何成为追求可持续生活和社会的重要美德的,尽管需要更多的空间来描述它与其他美德的关系,如简单、谦卑、合作和尽责(同上)。环境责任的美德(见Thompson, 2012)也是相关的,尽管我希望能够得出区别:环境完整性的归属以对务实成分所包含的实质性最低要求达成一致为前提,但不需要对个人或集体代理人的全部环境责任达成一致。因此,在难以达成全面协议的情况下,环境完整性是一个有用的概念。我现在可以解释环境完整性如何让我们从道德上评估气候虚伪。回想一下,伪善有不同的形式(见第3节),包括相对良性的表现,例如,当行为人没有意识到他们的自我描述和行为之间的轻微不一致时,或者当行为人欺骗自己有道德动机时,他们出于自身利益的原因进行了允许的行为。虚伪还会以更令人反感的形式出现,尤其是当它与持续而蓄意的欺骗相结合时。如果虚伪深深根植于代理人的性格中,那么随着时间的推移,它将可预见地再现,那么它的问题就大得多。在评估气候虚伪时,也必须考虑到这些差异。我认为,一个气候伪善的例子是否以及在多大程度上在道德上令人反感,取决于它对一个行动者实现环境完整性的危害有多大。因此,不能孤立地判断气候伪善的例子,而是要考虑到它们在代理人的性格发展中所起的作用。根据这一标准,气候伪善是非常令人反感的,也就是说,当一个团体或个人为了经济、政治或声誉的利益而不断地在自己的环境记录上欺骗他人或自己时。以持续开采或使用化石燃料为经济基础的公司或国家,其中一些还敢标榜自己是“碳中和”的领导者,13表明它们完全缺乏环境完整性。相比之下,气候伪善也可能发生在实现环境完整性的持续和真正的斗争中:在个人试图实现可持续生活方式或政府或公司向真正的结构性脱碳过渡的过程中。此外,所讨论的不一致是短暂的还是持续的偏离代理的自我表示也有区别。以一位气候活动家为例,他隐瞒自己曾经违背了不乘飞机私人旅行的自愿承诺,而一位政治家则不断违反气候承诺,秘密开展由化石燃料游说团体资助的竞选活动。在集体代理的层面上,将一个政府与另一个政府进行比较,前者在某一场合略微夸大了其在脱碳方面的努力,而后者则持续奉行其自由放任政策的绿色主义模式。 总之,尽管环境完整性在认识论上要求代理人真诚并充分反思他们的生态记录,但对这些认识论要求的可分等级理解使我们能够声明,与更普遍的自我欺骗和持续的欺骗相比,气候伪善源于较小形式的自我欺骗时危害较小。同样,对环境完整性的实用主义要求的可分级理解使我们能够指出,气候伪善在某种程度上是令人反感的,因为它抑制了代理人通过个人和政治行动减少环境危害的实际承诺。不具有实际抑制作用的小矛盾必须得到不同的评价,而不是虚伪的掩饰,后者的作用是掩盖持续的不作为,或者更糟的是,掩盖逆转气候问题上脆弱的政治进展的逆势行动。特朗普政府关于气候变化的声明是后一种气候虚伪的例证。例如,当辩论主持人问及特朗普在气候变化问题上的立场时,特朗普掩饰了他对化石燃料友好、反对气候变化的议程,他说:“我想要清澈的水和空气。我想要美丽清新的空气。现在我们有最低的碳。如果你看看我们现在的数据,你会发现我们做得非常出色。除了对环境完整性的分级理解和气候伪善可能阻碍其实现的方式之外,我们还需要对缓解环境的情况进行说明。首先,个人和集体实现环境完整性可能受到不利的社会条件的阻碍。这在我们挥霍无度的全球经济体系中无疑是一个例子,它使破坏环境的行为正常化,使其成本外部化,并且缺乏有效的制裁机制来协调自利和他人的可持续代理理由。其次,对于政府和其他分支众多、结构复杂、受制度惯性影响的团体而言,避免导致气候伪善的各种不一致更加困难。我们可以现实地预期,那些真正致力于气候行动的政府将在言行之间表现出一些不一致,这至少会导致一些小小的虚伪。由于他们的沉重,群体代理可能在过渡阶段表现出自我描述和行为之间的差异,即使他们做出了可信的努力去脱碳。相反,随着时间的推移,导致气候虚伪的不一致也可能反映出一个集团不负责任的环境机构。因此,我们不需要统一谴责气候伪善,而是需要对相关行为模式在多大程度上不利于行动者在给定的社会环境中实现环境完整性进行情境化和差异化的评估。前面的观察强调了需要一种规范的观点,在这种观点中,避免虚伪和实现道德诚信的目标被理解为相互交织的。伊曼努尔·康德认为,一定数量的关于真正道德态度的戏剧表演可以是一件好事,只要它随着时间的推移加强或有助于真正道德倾向的发展(康德,1781/1787:A748/B776,康德,1798,§14)。康德大多将这一发展阶段的论证局限于相对良性的案例。然而,他的观点中包含的更普遍的见解是,对伪装道德的评价应该集中在所讨论的实例是有害的还是有利于道德品质的发展。对于气候伪善的评估,我也做过类似的案例。我首先概述了与气候伪善指控相关的各种令人困惑的目标和评估(见第二节)。然后,我从概念上分析了气候伪善作为争论的对象(在第3节中),并提出了一个基于环境完整性概念的评估框架(在第4节中)。在最后一节中,我反思了澄清任何针对气候虚伪的指控的重要性的标准。有人可能会认为,基于前面的推理,对气候伪善的指责只有在真正关注环境完整性的美德及其通过社会背景条件实现的情况下才是合法的。气候变化否认者利用伪善的指控来推进一个完全无视这种美德的议程,而气候活动家提出的许多伪善指控至少含蓄地表达了相关的担忧。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.20
自引率
12.50%
发文量
44
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