Introduction to Special Issue “Nonideal Theory and Critical Theory”

Abstract

Nonideal theory and critical theory are two approaches to social critique. Nonideal theory has become increasingly popular in post-Rawlsian political philosophy over the last 15 years (for an overview, see Valentini 2012). It is a broad church, but is often thought to be motivated by a dissatisfaction with ideal theory's lack of practical relevance (Swift 2008, 368). Issues that have preoccupied proponents of nonideal theory are partial compliance (see Rawls 1971, 8–9; Cullity 2004; Chahboun 2015), or the question of how to translate principles of justice into concrete policy recommendations (see, among others, Phillips 1985; Robeyns 2008). Critical theory, on the other hand, is often associated with the Frankfurt School (see Held 1980; Gordon, Hammer, and Honneth 2019), but also refers, more broadly, to work done by critical race theorists and feminist scholars (Mills 1997; Haslanger 2021). It shares with nonideal theory an orientation to real-world circumstances and a commitment to being relevant to action in the face of those circumstances. In the light of this, it is surprising that the relationship between nonideal theory and critical theory has not received more attention in the literature, for instance in the way that the relation between realism and nonideal theory has (for discussions of the latter see Cozzaglio and Favara 2022; Favara 2022; Sleat 2016; Rossi and Sleat 2014). This special issue seeks to fill this gap. The four contributions, while each developing a distinct understanding of this relationship, all agree that critical theory offers important insights which could strengthen the real-world relevance of the nonideal theory enterprise.

The first contribution “Should nonideal theory rely on ideal theory? Lessons from the Frankfurt School,” by Kristina Lepold, addresses the question posed in the title that has been the subject of some debate among nonideal theorists. Drawing inspiration from the Frankfurt School, Lepold argues that if nonideal theory relies on ideal theory to identify injustices, it is a matter of chance whether nonideal theory can help members of the social world to understand the injustices they face. This, however, should give nonideal theorists pause for thought, for the ability of nonideal theory to successfully guide collective action to overcome injustice depends on its ability to contribute to such self-reflection. Lepold concludes by suggesting that nonideal theory should not rely on ideal theory, if it does not want to risk having no practical relevance.

In the second contribution, “Non-ideal theory and critical theory and their relationship to standpoint theory,” Hilkje Hänel demonstrates that there is a methodological overlap between critical theory and some variants of nonideal theory when it comes to analyzing social reality. Both share a commitment to standpoint theory, that is, the assumption that one's social position is relevant to knowledge acquisition. This methodological commonality means that nonideal theory and critical theory face a similar challenge: the critical standpoint is always only a potential and never a given, which Hänel calls the “problem of ideology.” This problem can be addressed by drawing on a theoretical resource that is central to critical theory, namely ideology critique.

In his contribution, “Critical Theory, Ideal Theory, and Conceptual Engineering,” Andrea Sangiovanni picks up on a similar thread. He argues that all social and political philosophy should become critical theory in the sense that it starts theorizing from the current social practices we find ourselves in. This is because disputes about normative concepts, like freedom or justice, can only be resolved by understanding the practical context in which they are meant to do their work. Rather than proceeding a priori, we need to ask which concept is most useful or appropriate in a given context, or which concept best captures the essential features of a set of social practices.

In the final contribution, “Beyond the nonideal: Why critical theory needs a utopian dimension,” Titus Stahl examines central arguments by Marx, Adorno, and others against ideal or utopian theorizing. The essence of these arguments is that political theorists are incapable of envisioning ideal states of affairs under nonideal conditions because the latter severely limit their epistemic, imaginative and conceptual capacities. But Stahl argues that most of these arguments are unconvincing and shows how critical theory can be immanent, starting from within current society and its contradictions, and at the same time construct provisional ideal states of affairs that can orient collective action.

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.