Journal of Social Philosophy最新文献

{"title":"Explain Yourself: The Ethics of Soliciting Advice","authors":"Jordan Desmond","doi":"10.1111/josp.12601","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12601","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many of our decisions, from the profoundly life-changing to the ultimately inconsequential, involve receiving advice from others. Whether from qualified experts, trusted companions, or complete strangers, the advice we receive from others often plays a significant role in determining both how we act and, in many cases, the extent to which our pursuits are successful.</p><p>Given this, one might expect to find a considerable literature on the moral dimensions of advisory relationships. And, to be sure, it is not as if an ethical analysis of advice has gone completely overlooked by moral philosophers. Indeed, a rich and engaging literature has developed over the last few decades that takes up the ethics of advice from the perspective of the <i>advisor</i> (e.g., Hinchman <span>2005</span>; Fleming <span>2016</span>; Jonas <span>2017</span>; Archard <span>2021</span>). But while much has been said about what might be owed by those engaged in the practice of <i>giving</i> advice, relatively little has been said about the sorts of moral obligations that might attach to the practice of <i>receiving</i> advice.</p><p>With the above case in mind, this paper defends two claims about the duties advisees owe to their advisors. First, I argue that advisees such as Arnold owe to advisors such as Betty what I will alternately call a <i>duty of explanation</i> or a <i>duty to explain</i>. In other words, I argue that when advisees opt not to follow the advice of their advisors, advisors are entitled to, and advisees are obliged to provide, an explanation for this decision. Second, I argue that the strength of this obligation will track the extent to which the advisory relationship from which it arises occurs within the context of a greater relationship in which trust plays a constitutive role, such as friendship. Thus, while Arnold would owe Betty an explanation in the case described <i>even if they were strangers</i>, the fact that Betty is a close friend to Arnold renders his duty to explain himself a particularly stringent one.</p><p>The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 defends an account of advice according to which advising represents a form of directive testimony the defining feature of which is an intention on the part of the advisor to deliberate and issue practical recommendations from the perspective of the advisee. In Section 3, I establish the first central claim of the paper by demonstrating why we ought to understand Arnold as obligated to explain himself to Betty. Section 4 takes up the second central claim of the paper. Here, I begin by establishing the existence of duties to explain between strangers. I then demonstrate that, to the extent that we are inclined to find duties of explanation owed to friends weightier than those owed to strangers, this intuition is best explained by the significance of trust to relations of friendship. Finally, in Section 5, I identify two qualifications for the attribution of duties to explain. For duties ","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 3","pages":"311-320"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12601","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148904078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Property as power: A theory of representation","authors":"Rutger Claassen","doi":"10.1111/josp.12587","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12587","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Inequalities in wealth are a major concern in societal debates today (Atkinson, <span>2015</span>; Piketty, <span>2014</span>). Economic analyses abound showing that wealthy individuals and corporations can achieve commanding heights in the economy. They dominate more vulnerable parties, such as workers, consumers, members of less developed countries, the natural environment, and democracy itself (Christophers, <span>2019</span>; Eeckhout, <span>2021</span>; Mazzucato, <span>2018</span>). How to respond to private owners imposing widespread negative effects on non-owners?</p><p>Liberal-democratic theory and practice responds to this problem of ownership power by subjecting owners to the power of the state. The state apparatus is called upon to regulate owners in the public interest. Through state regulation imposed on owners, the interests of non-owners are represented <i>indirectly</i>. I call this “the regulation model.” The main claim of this paper is that liberal-democratic theory and practice should end its exclusive reliance on the regulation model and expand its toolkit of representation with an “incorporation model.” Under this model, non-owner interests are represented <i>directly</i>, by those who are owners, when they make decisions about how to use their assets. In most cases, this requires that property is incorporated, that is, transferred to a corporate legal structure, in which owners are held to account by non-owners. Representation is a key notion in political philosophy, expressing the demand that political rulers should rule in the interest of citizens, who can hold them to account for doing so. The present paper offers a systematic application of this concept to the powers granted with ownership.</p><p>After an introduction of the regulation and incorporation models (Section 2), the first step is to identify the non-owners whose interests merit representation. Here I argue for a <i>representation imperative</i>: when the purposes determined by owners lead to structural effects on third parties, then these have a claim to be represented. This is an application of the all-affected principle, similar to the principle's application in the context of the boundary problem (Section 3). In the second step, I argue for an <i>incorporation imperative</i>: where non-owners are affected and state regulation is unable to represent their interests, then an incorporation structure should be imposed, through which non-owner interests are represented (Section 4). As a third step, I argue for a <i>power-sharing imperative</i>: to organize accountability, owners and non-owners should share power within the incorporated structure. Owners should not operate as independent trustees who can decide how to represent non-owners without any checks and balances; but nor should they be mere delegates of non-owners (Section 5). In Section 6, I respond to an egalitarian objection to my proposal, that is, that redistribution, not representation, is neede","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 2","pages":"169-187"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12587","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142221667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Unilateral Action on Climate Change and the Moral Obligation to Take Leadership","authors":"Daniel Steel,&nbsp;Rachel Cripps,&nbsp;C. Tyler DesRoches,&nbsp;Paul Bartha,&nbsp;Kian Mintz-Woo","doi":"10.1111/josp.12592","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12592","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We claim that a moral obligation to take climate leadership by means of unilateral mitigation depends on the existence of a plausible follow-the-leader mechanism whereby unilateral mitigation by some increases the probability of sufficient mitigation by others to avert catastrophic climate impacts. By understanding these mechanisms, we can better articulate the obligation for climate leadership across various sectors, from government to individual actors, in the fight against climate change.</p>","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 2","pages":"219-229"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12592","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148300060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Silent Dogwhistles","authors":"Anna Klieber","doi":"10.1111/josp.12597","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12597","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;Dogwhistles have recently begun to receive more attention in the philosophical literature.\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 They are usually explored with a focus on manipulative and corrupting speech—how certain phrases or words can be used to consciously or unconsciously influence audiences or audience-subsets. As such, dogwhistles can have significant impact not only on political discourse, but on society more broadly. They can function in manipulative and corruptive ways, shaping both conscious and unconscious attitudes and senses of in-group membership.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;As Drainville and Saul (&lt;span&gt;2024&lt;/span&gt;) note, in philosophy, explorations into dogwhistles have primarily focused on the linguistic side of things, owing to the fact that they have mostly been undertaken by philosophers of language. As a result, insufficient attention has been paid to &lt;i&gt;other&lt;/i&gt; ways in which dogwhistles can occur and influence people. Saul and Drainville's study aims to fill part of this gap in the literature by focusing on &lt;i&gt;visual&lt;/i&gt; dogwhistles.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;My argument in this paper is offered in a similar spirit: I want to draw attention to a &lt;i&gt;part&lt;/i&gt; of our linguistic practices that so far have not been explored in detail as a potential dogwhistle—&lt;i&gt;acts of remaining silent&lt;/i&gt;. I argue that such silences can function in similar ways to the “spoken”; dogwhistles that have so far been the main focus of philosophical discussions. More specifically, I will show that acts of remaining silent can be &lt;i&gt;overt code&lt;/i&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 dogwhistles. My discussion aims to shed light on silence as a dimension of (manipulative) communicative acts and, at the same time, will highlight the communicative and political potential of silence.\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;A question that might arise at this point is why the statement that dogwhistles can be silent is interesting at all. Obviously dogwhistles involve silence in &lt;i&gt;some&lt;/i&gt; way. For one, literal dogwhistles, the ones we borrowed the metaphor from, work on the very premise that only some (dogs) can hear them, while they are “silent” for others (humans). Likewise, the kind of dogwhistles that the literature has come to understand as akin to &lt;i&gt;code-words&lt;/i&gt; are supposed to communicate a message that can only be “heard” by a certain subsets of audiences. Put differently, a particular “dogwhistled” message might be “silent” for some, but “loud and clear” for others. When I talk about &lt;i&gt;acts of remaining silent&lt;/i&gt;; however, I have something much more specific in mind. I am thinking of somebody &lt;i&gt;literally&lt;/i&gt; remaining silent, either in a direct exchange, or when the broader context would &lt;i&gt;require&lt;/i&gt; them to comment. My discussion is about silence &lt;i&gt;as a communicative act in and of itself&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;All this will require further elaboration. Here is my plan for the paper: I'll first identify the definition of dogwhistles t","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 2","pages":"261-271"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12597","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148300031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Stepparenting and Moral Parenthood","authors":"Luara Ferracioli","doi":"10.1111/josp.12593","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12593","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;What is the value of the stepparent–stepchild relationship? In the social imaginary, such relationships are the unfortunate consequence of the breakdown of marriages involving children. At best, stepparents are seen as second-best solutions to marriage breakdowns where both biological parents are incapable of meeting all the financial and emotional needs of the child now that their romantic relationship has come to an end. At worse, stepparents are seen as the likely culprits when children are murdered or go missing.\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 Still, even though ordinary citizens can come to agree that in some cases children are better off with a stepparent than without one, many people think that children in stepparent families are “more unstable, more dissatisfied, and more insecure than children in intact two-parent families, as well as being more neglected and less loved” (Saint-Jacques et al. &lt;span&gt;2020&lt;/span&gt;, 2140).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;One widespread belief about stepfamilies is that the stepparent–stepchild relationship is parasitic on the romantic relationship between the child's biological parent and her stepparent. While they are romantically involved, the stepparent must then treat the child in an affectionate and caring way, but if the romantic relationship comes to an end, it is acceptable (if not desirable) for the stepparent to completely remove herself from the child's life. One expert summarizes societal attitudes in the wake of a relationship breakdown as “Well you're done with that relationship, walk away” (Selinger-Morris &lt;span&gt;2022&lt;/span&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In this essay, I hope to lay out the philosophical basis for legal changes that do justice to stepparent–stepchild relationships. I hope to show that such relationships can be morally on a par with the relationships children enjoy with their biological parents, and that when this is the case, the stepparent is morally entitled to shared custody, irrespective of whether the biological parents consent to such an arrangement, and irrespective of the level of parental competency on the part of the biological parents.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The discussion is structured as follows. In Part I, I defend the claim that stepparent–stepchild relationships can be just as meaningful and just as important as the relationship children enjoy with their biological (and adoptive) parents. In Part II, I argue that current legal arrangements relating to stepfamilies are deficient and that, in fact, philosophers working on the ethics of parenting have not yet developed monist accounts of moral parenthood which could help challenge such arrangements. In Part III, I defend my own monist account of moral parenthood, and show that it does justice to all parents, whether they are biological, adoptive, or part of step/blended families. In Part IV, I discuss the practical and legal implication of my account. In Part V, I deal with four objections and conclude.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Let us start by getting clear on the group we are refer","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 2","pages":"230-239"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12593","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148300127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Consequentialism and the ideal theory debate in political philosophy","authors":"Andreas T. Schmidt","doi":"10.1111/josp.12586","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12586","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;What methods should political philosophers use? One debate—henceforth just &lt;i&gt;the debate&lt;/i&gt;—is about ideal versus non-ideal theory and asks questions such as how far should political philosophy make idealizing assumptions about reality? And how much utopian thinking is necessary or even desirable in political philosophy? One way to further advance the debate is to produce more abstract methodological arguments. But I think we should also probe how far different first-order theories in political philosophy are actually exposed to the challenges identified in the debate or how they might be adjusted to avoid them.&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt; My contribution here is of the latter type. Specifically, I argue that &lt;i&gt;consequentialist&lt;/i&gt; political philosophy is a powerful position because it avoids various standard objections that have been raised to both ideal and non-ideal theory.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;To make this case, I proceed as follows.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In Section 2, I outline a generic version of consequentialist political philosophy. According to this version, consequentialism in political philosophy is about social practices, has a comparative structure, and focuses on expected consequences.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In Section 3, I introduce the debate. I first tease out different dimensions along which a theory can be ideal or non-ideal. In Section 3.1, I discuss arguments that have been raised against ideal theory. For example, Amartya Sen and others argue that utopian thinking is unnecessary, often unhelpful, and sometimes counterproductive when we compare real-world options (Sen, &lt;span&gt;2006&lt;/span&gt;, &lt;span&gt;2009&lt;/span&gt;, chap. 4). Others argue that idealized models often exclude important real-world concerns and contain blind spots. I show how consequentialism avoids those charges by focusing on expected goodness and comparative judgments and by eschewing what I will call a “privileged model” (Section 3.2). I also discuss how consequentialism encounters its own epistemic problems and offer several responses.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In Section 4, I discuss charges raised against non-ideal theory. For example, Cohen (&lt;span&gt;1997&lt;/span&gt;, &lt;span&gt;2008&lt;/span&gt;) argues that the real-world constraints built into non-ideal theories compromise their normative principles and bias them toward the status quo. I show that consequentialism circumvents these challenges. While consequentialism is uncompromising in its axiology, its comparative structures allow us to adjust how ideal or non-ideal we want our theories to be. This flexible yet unified structure, I argue, has independent advantages too.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I conclude in Section 5.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Note that my arguments also apply to theories that, while not fully consequentialist, assign significant weight to &lt;i&gt;instrumental&lt;/i&gt; modes of institutional justification. Also, I use “political philosophy” throughout but mean for this to be interchangeable with “normative political theory.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Consequentialism has a long and eminent tradition. The most prominent consequentialist political philosoph","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 2","pages":"146-168"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12586","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141949490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Making Sense of Erotically Oppressive Lifeworlds: Dynamics of Testimonial Smothering and Testimonial Quieting","authors":"Paul Giladi","doi":"10.1111/josp.12599","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12599","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, I focus on applying Kristie Dotson's (<span>2011</span>) critical social epistemological framework to the topic of women's sexual arousal. My paper is divided into three parts. In Section 1, I provide a brief history of the DSM sexological discourse about sexual arousal, and conclude by proposing that there is a mutually sustaining relationship between mainstream media, androcentric pornography, and the DSM-IV vocabulary, insofar as each of these feeds myths about arousal to each other. The mutually sustaining relationship between mainstream media, androcentric pornography, and the DSM-IV vocabulary (re)produces longstanding oppressive social norms and concomitant cultures of erotic expectation in western heteropatriarchal contexts. In Section 2, I contend that the epistemic harms of these erotically oppressive lifeworlds involve testimonial smothering as well as testimonial quieting. In Section 3, I conclude the paper with two critical responses to Richard Balon and Anita Clayton's objection to DSM-5's radical changes to conceptualizing issues with women's sexual arousal. [Correction added on 20 December 2024, after first online publication: In the preceding sentence, \"Section 5\" has been corrected to \"Section 3\".]</p><p>The author declares no conflicts of interest.</p>","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 2","pages":"240-249"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12599","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148300101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Rights, respect, and the duty to obey the law","authors":"Shruta Swarup","doi":"10.1111/josp.12589","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12589","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;I aim in this paper to give a new account of “political obligation,” the moral duty to obey the law. What the law requires of us often coincides with the content of widely accepted moral duties. In such cases, it may seem obvious that there is a duty to obey. If we accept a moral duty not to assault others, for example, it may seem obvious that there is a moral duty to obey a law that prohibits assault. But while there may be, in such cases, a duty to act as the law happens to command, it does not follow that there is a duty to &lt;i&gt;obey&lt;/i&gt; the law—to do as the law commands for the reason that the law commands it.&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt; The question I am concerned with is not: “Do we have a moral duty to do what the law tells us to do?”, but rather: “Does the fact that the law tells us to do something generate a moral duty to do it?” I will argue that it does—in certain kinds of states. I'll defend the claim that citizens of democratic states have a &lt;i&gt;pro tanto&lt;/i&gt; moral duty to obey their laws, except for those laws which violate people's basic rights.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I am going to offer a natural duty account which does not invoke the standard argument. Views that rely on that argument are subject to a serious objection I'll call the &lt;i&gt;objection from the sufficiency of partial or selective compliance&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;sup&gt;6&lt;/sup&gt; A satisfactory account of political obligation must establish a general &lt;i&gt;moral presumption&lt;/i&gt; in favor of obedience.&lt;sup&gt;7&lt;/sup&gt; The problem for the standard argument is that not many laws play a role in enabling states to perform morally essential tasks. Consider laws which regulate fishing, require people to report found treasure, or establish protections for historical monuments—a state's ability to rescue people from the state of nature or maintain justice would not be undermined if these laws were generally disobeyed (i.e., not complied with). That is, premise (2) of the standard argument is false: Maintaining the state's stability and ability to perform morally essential functions does not require widespread compliance with very many of its laws; widespread compliance with a small subset of its laws would suffice. As such, the conclusion of the standard argument doesn't follow. At best, the standard argument establishes only a duty to comply with a small subset of laws, namely those laws general compliance with which is necessary for the state's ability to administer justice or rescue people from the state of nature; we are off the moral hook for compliance with the vast majority of laws. That is to say, according to the standard argument, the laws with respect to which there is a &lt;i&gt;pro tanto&lt;/i&gt; duty to obey are exceptions; the argument fails to establish anything like a moral presumption in favor of obedience.&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt; The distinctive natural duty account I offer overcomes this limitation by invoking the moral significance of the fact that a state is democratic. My account has a further important virtue: It is immune to the so-called","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 2","pages":"188-207"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12589","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148300041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Role of Trust in LGBTQ+ Refugee Status Determination (RSD) System","authors":"Annamari Vitikainen,&nbsp;Patti Tamara Lenard","doi":"10.1111/josp.12596","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12596","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;The refugee status determination (RSD) system struggles to treat LGBTQ+/queer\u0000 &lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;\u0000 asylum seekers fairly. The many humiliations to which they are subject over the course of the determination process are well-documented (O'Leary &lt;span&gt;2008&lt;/span&gt;; Jensen and Spijkerboer &lt;span&gt;2011&lt;/span&gt;; Lewis &lt;span&gt;2014&lt;/span&gt;; Danisi et al. &lt;span&gt;2021&lt;/span&gt;). The dangers they face before they seek status and after they are granted this status are widely recognized (Grungras, Levitan, and Slotek &lt;span&gt;2009&lt;/span&gt;; UNHCR &lt;span&gt;2021&lt;/span&gt;, &lt;span&gt;2022a&lt;/span&gt;; &lt;span&gt;2022b&lt;/span&gt;; Human Rights Watch &lt;span&gt;2020&lt;/span&gt;; Rainbow Railroad &lt;span&gt;2022&lt;/span&gt;; NGLHRC [National Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission] and Amnesty International &lt;span&gt;2023&lt;/span&gt;). Many LGBTQ+ claimants are being denied status because their way of expressing their sexuality or gender identity does not conform to the existing stereotypes of being queer (Morgan &lt;span&gt;2006&lt;/span&gt;; Tschalaer &lt;span&gt;2020&lt;/span&gt;; Wolff and Cochrane &lt;span&gt;2023&lt;/span&gt;). During grueling and often humiliating interviews, their stories are discredited by homo- or transphobic interviewers, and their discomfort with being open about their sexuality or gender identity along with their occasional refusal to disclose highly private, intimate details about their behavior, is often judged in ways that are detrimental to their case (Murray &lt;span&gt;2014&lt;/span&gt;; Akin &lt;span&gt;2017&lt;/span&gt;; Dhoest &lt;span&gt;2019&lt;/span&gt;; Dustin and Ferreira &lt;span&gt;2021&lt;/span&gt;; Ferreira &lt;span&gt;2023&lt;/span&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In this article, we look at one specific, underlying feature of the RSD system—that of mistrust—and the ways in which the unique experiences of LGBTQ+ persons and the social attitudes directed at them challenge the appropriate functioning of trust within the system. We bring together several strands of philosophical analysis—specifically insights from queer theory, democratic theory, and political theory of refugees—to demonstrate the difficulties that LGBTQ+ persons face in gaining access to protection, and to shape several recommendations for undermining these difficulties.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;We start from the assumption that certain relations of trust and institutional mistrust ought to operate at the center of a fair RSD system, one that aims to identify those (and only those) individuals who are eligible for international protection. The appropriate relations of trust and mistrust within the system—and between individual RSD officers and asylum claimants—are, however, distorted in many ways. One major distortion, which is endemic to the system and which applies to all asylum seekers, stems from the structural disadvantages that asylum seekers face vis-à-vis the asylum system in general. That is to say, asylum seekers are always at the mercy of the officers that determine their fates. We will consider the way that these structures shape trust, mistrust, and distrust below, among all asylum seekers, but our main analysi","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 2","pages":"250-260"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12596","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148300044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Categories of Criminal Law: Cognitive Injustice and Non-Sovereign Agency in the Civil Law Tradition","authors":"Adriana Alfaro Altamirano,&nbsp;Adriana Ortega Ortiz","doi":"10.1111/josp.12591","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12591","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 2","pages":"208-218"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148300048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}