Non-ideal theory and critical theory and their relationship to standpoint theory

Abstract

This paper brings together two distinct areas of philosophy that have so far not received much attention together: Critical Theory and non-ideal theory. Its main argument is that these two yet distinct areas of philosophy share a methodological stance when it comes to analyzing social reality, namely standpoint theory. While there is a well-acknowledged relation between Critical Theory and standpoint theory, the claim that non-ideal theory is committed to standpoint theory as a methodology deserves further explanation. In a co-authored paper, Johanna Müller and I (2022) argue for a descriptive claim, they urge non-ideal theorists to engage in an act of self-clarification about the way in which they are doing non-ideal theory and argue that the commitment to start from real world injustices always already entails a commitment to standpoint theory. According to this claim, any theorist is embedded in a given ideology and, thus, needs methodological tools to overcome the ideological arrogance that might prevent them from analyzing particular instances of injustice.¹

Here, I want to make an explicitly normative claim, namely that taking seriously the pervasiveness of ideology and the resulting challenge of false consciousness, means that any endeavor in non-ideal theory that is not committed to standpoint theory is fruitless. This claim is not just about self-clarification. Instead, it proposes a way in which non-ideal theory should proceed.² To do so, I am guided by three claims: First, if non-ideal theory is theory that is non-idealizing (as Hänel & Müller, 2022; Khader, forthcoming; and Mills, 2005 show), then ideology is a barrier to such theorizing. Second, critical standpoints (as advanced by versions of standpoint theory) can function as a tool to overcome such barriers, yet, critical standpoints have to be achieved or struggled for and are not necessarily given due to a person's social group memberships or social identities. And, third, being subject to (intersecting) oppressions can be an epistemic advantage insofar as it provides the moral ruptures or internal contradictions needed to achieve a critical standpoint. It should be noted that the paper's aim is rather modest insofar as none of its claims are original in themselves, rather I am relying on the toolbox of Critical Theorists, standpoint theorists, and non-ideal theorists. What is new is (a) the way in which I let these traditions talk to each other and (b) my focus on the “trap of ideology”; neither do non-ideal theorists concern themselves with this particular dimension of ideology as an obstacle for theorizing, nor do contemporary standpoint epistemologists pay much attention to this problem.

In recent years, feminist philosophers and other moral and political philosophers have been increasingly disappointed with the dominant Rawlsian paradigm of doing normative theory in which the main question is what a perfectly ideal and just society would look like. They argue that this paradigm is of little help when it comes to practical matters; instead, normative theory should be influenced by real-world injustices. However, as many have pointed out, this methodological turn comes with diverse strategies and no unified view on how to theorize adequately (cf. Brennan, 1999, 860; Friedman, 2000, 211; Jaggar, 2000, 452–3; and in later years Jubb, 2012; Robeyns, 2008; Stemplowska, 2008; Swift, 2008). Although it is far from obvious what precisely non-ideal theory amounts to, it has been associated with one or all of the following but rather heterogenous features: partial compliance, realistic, transitional, and/or non-idealizing.³ Here, I focus on just one of these descriptions, namely non-ideal theory as non-idealizing (Mills, 2005).

While many feminist philosophers describe non-idealizing theory merely as a turn towards injustices in the real world—instead of generalized principles in a perfectly ideal world—, it can be argued that they are influenced by a specific methodological turn that takes into account the perspective of those oppressed or marginalized and thus suffering from said injustices (cf. Hänel & Müller, 2022). Here, I focus on this methodological turn. To be more precise, I want to argue that both non-ideal theory (as non-idealizing theory) and Critical Theory rely on important assumptions about the way in which we, as knowers, relate to knowledge and other knowers; that is, about what we can know and how we know what we know. In fact, both non-ideal theory (as non-idealizing theory) as well as Critical Theory are aware of the social relations and limits of knowers; yet, this feature has been neglected in analyses of what non-ideal theory amounts to—with the notable exception of Mills (2005), Khader (forthcoming), and Hänel and Müller (2022).

I argue that both non-ideal theory (as non-idealizing theory) and Critical Theory rely on some form of standpoint theory, i.e., the view that social position is relevant to knowledge acquisition. In fact, as I argue together with Johanna Müller (2022), non-ideal theory that is non-idealizing and concerned with real-world injustices necessarily includes the idea that theory should start from the perspective of the oppressed and the injustices they suffer from. Interestingly, the very same idea can be found in early Marxists as well as some scholars of the Frankfurt School; in short, the working class has to form a critical epistemic standpoint of class consciousness in order to emancipate itself, a point that was developed in different ways by Marxist feminist standpoint theory with regard to marginalized standpoints of women.⁴ In the following, I want to shed light on how non-ideal theory (as non-idealizing theory) and Critical Theory share this methodological stance. To do so, I show that the phenomenon of false consciousness—widely discussed in Critical Theory—forces the non-idealizing theorist to subscribe to standpoint theory. However, this methodological stance is not without problems as the critical epistemic standpoint is not a given; that is, although social position is relevant to knowledge acquisition, there is no direct relation between social position and a critical epistemic standpoint (or epistemic privilege). I argue that non-ideal theory (as non-idealizing theory) and Marxist or Frankfurt School Critical Theory not only share similar assumptions about standpoint theory, but that it can also be helpful to look at the ways in which Critical Theory has responded to the above mentioned problems. Doing so, allows us to conclude that non-ideal theory (as non-idealizing theory) should in fact proceed in line with standpoint theory.

The argument proceeds as follows. First, I give a brief overview of non-ideal theory as non-idealizing theory and show that non-idealizing theory that is not committed to standpoint theory is fruitless. Second, I show that pervasive ideology poses a threat to analyzing instances of injustice adequately by drawing on Simone de Beauvoir's example of women being complicit in their own oppression. Yet, if this is true then ideology seems to also pose a threat to standpoint theory—and, since standpoint theory is, according to my argument, one of the main methodological tools of both non-ideal theory and Critical Theory, ideology poses a threat to both of them. I proceed to give an overview of standpoint theory, both from a Marxist and feminist viewpoint, including the insight that a critical standpoint is, if at all, only a potential standpoint and not necessarily given due to a person's membership in a specific social class. Fourth, I argue that this problem is developed in detail by standpoint theorists. I then develop a way in which to understand critical standpoints in light of these problems drawing heavily from Marxism. I conclude that non-ideal theory as non-idealizing theory and Critical Theory not only share a methodological stance, but that Critical Theory also provides solution to the ideology trap that non-ideal theory faces.