Journal of Social Philosophy最新文献

{"title":"Dilemmas of dating: The case of aprioristic sexual lookism","authors":"Rossella De Bernardi","doi":"10.1111/josp.12585","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12585","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Over the last decade, “sexual racism”—that is, discrimination in dating based on racialized group membership—has increasingly attracted scholarly and public attention (Bedi, <span>2020</span>; Clarke, <span>2011</span>; Liu, <span>2015</span>; O'Shea, <span>2020</span>; Sonu, <span>2015</span>; Zheng, <span>2016</span>). Taking a cue from such a debate, some commentators have recently turned to discrimination based on physical appearance in dating—hereafter, sexual lookism—with some claiming it is morally problematic as well (D'Alessandro, <span>2022</span>) and, in fact, unjust on multiple counts (Midtgaard, <span>2022</span>).</p><p>The paper investigates such arguments' prescriptive implications regarding <i>individual dating conduct</i>. Namely, assuming such arguments are correct, should individuals try and date others, refraining from immediately ruling them out based on their physical appearance only? In a nutshell, the paper shows that even though there are pro tanto deontic reasons not to engage in ASL, their action-guiding force is, all things considered, limited at the level of individual dating conduct. By drawing on sociological research about dating as a Western social practice, the paper shows that trying to date others when deontic reasons have major weight in practical deliberation is disrespectful toward would-be dates in its own right. If so, opposing reasons need to be balanced against each other; it emerges that lookist daters are best seen as facing prohibition dilemmas since they are neither morally allowed to engage in ASL nor to try and date others primarily “out of duty.”</p><p>Reaching such a conclusion—and doing so via the paper's central strategy—contributes in multiple ways to the egalitarian literature on dating discrimination. First, the paper vindicates an important intuition—that is, that, when dating, being motivated by deontic reasons is morally problematic <i>from the very perspective of selected would-be dates</i>.<sup>2</sup> Despite being touched upon in the literature, this intuition has yet to receive a proper (successful) philosophical defense.<sup>3</sup></p><p>Crucially, without such a defense, the tendency of mainstream literature to sideline the realm of individual dating conduct as a potentially fruitful site to counter dating discrimination should make us pause. Consider, indeed, how the dominant—and, until very recently, only—focus has been on structural remedies—for example, the regulation of dating environments (e.g., Bedi, <span>2020</span>; O'Shea, <span>2020</span>)—or long-term cultural change—for example, via deliberative duties to reflect on, and possibly revise, biased sexual preferences (e.g., Cahill, <span>2016</span>). These are extremely important proposals. Still, altering dating conduct may be more feasible for individuals than effectively supporting structural transformations. It could also potentially make a shorter-term difference compared to (likely) long-term and complex pro","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 2","pages":"128-145"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12585","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141773246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Issue Information - NASSP Page","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.70045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70045","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.70045","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148300145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Issue Information - NASSP Page","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.70043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70043","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.70043","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147568121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Creative Resolve and the Threshold for a Minimally Good Life: A Reply to Critics","authors":"Nicole Hassoun","doi":"10.1111/josp.70037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70037","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 1","pages":"115-121"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147566533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reparations after species extinctions: An account of reparative interspecies justice","authors":"Anna Wienhues, Alfonso Donoso","doi":"10.1111/josp.12584","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12584","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The “standard” story of reparative justice goes something like this: an individual or a group of individuals (an agent, a community, etc.) has been the subject of injustices. These can be understood as human rights abuses, persecution, misrecognition, discrimination, distributive injustices embodied in the theft of cultural goods or natural resources, and so on. These injustices can then in turn be addressed by mechanisms that may include reparatory, restitutive, or restorative justice. Particularly historic injustices targeting communities are commonly described as appropriate objects of state reparations, such as widely discussed in the context of colonialism and slavery. Against the background of currently high levels of human-induced biodiversity loss, the question that now poses itself is whether a similar (albeit in many respects quite different) story can be told about anthropogenic species extinctions. In light of human-caused extinctions, can (some) humans or human institutions like the state be approached with reparative claims to respond to those losses?</p><p>One place to start this inquiry would be to take inspiration from the environmental ethics literature, which already offers different accounts of moral repair (Almassi, <span>2017</span>) or restitution (Basl, <span>2010</span>) and links these to practices of ecological restoration as moral restitution and/or reparation.<sup>1</sup> Such arguments could plausibly be extended to the subject matter of species extinctions. Yet, in this paper, we aim to show that species extinctions can also be integrated within a non-anthropocentric account of reparative justice that is significantly similar to how reparation is understood within the political theory literature and, thus, linking concerns of environmental ethics to political philosophy. That is, in how far are species extinctions a matter of <i>reparative interspecies justice</i> that is owed to individual nonhuman beings? And consequently, which entities are owed reparation and what would this reparative duty entail?</p><p>That is a novel area of inquiry. Yet, we do not have to fully start from scratch, because several political, environmental, and animal philosophers have already articulated different non-anthropocentric theories of (distributive, capabilities, recognition, etc.) interspecies justice on which such an account of reparative justice can be built (e.g., for book-length renditions, see Baxter, <span>2005</span>; Cochrane, <span>2018</span>; Donaldson & Kymlicka, <span>2011</span>; Garner, <span>2013</span>; Low & Gleeson, <span>1998</span>; Nussbaum, <span>2023</span>; Schlosberg, <span>2007</span>; Wienhues, <span>2020</span>. More on this literature and our understanding of interspecies justice in Section 2.1). Against this background, reparative justice within the context of interspecies justice has not received much philosophical attention to date (apart from Welchman, <span>2021</span>),<sup>2</sup> an","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 1","pages":"81-101"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12584","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141949489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What we owe to impaired agents","authors":"Giacomo Floris","doi":"10.1111/josp.12581","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12581","url":null,"abstract":"<p>According to relational egalitarians, a just society is one where the state considers and treats persons as equals, and persons stand in relations of equality with one another (Anderson, <span>1999</span>; Lippert-Rasmussen, <span>2018</span>; O'Neill, <span>2008</span>; Scheffler, <span>2003</span>; Schemmel, <span>2021</span>; Wolff, <span>1998</span>). Relational egalitarians, however, have so far been mainly concerned with how fully competent adults must be considered and treated as equals, whereas they have said much less about what a relational egalitarian society owes to those individuals whose agential capacities are impaired due to mental health issues, such as depression or drug and alcohol addiction.<sup>1</sup> The aim of this article is to address this lacuna in the relational egalitarian literature.</p><p>Exploring this issue is important for at least two reasons. First, impaired agents represent some of the most vulnerable members of society: they are often looked down upon by others and are deprived of the conditions necessary to exercise their political rights, take part in social cooperation, and establish meaningful social relationships. Therefore, it is crucial to develop an account of what is owed to impaired agents to enrich our understanding of what is required to achieve an inclusive society of equals. Second, this exploration will enable us to address a neglected tension between the demands of relational equality, and shed light on the role of its most fundamental background commitment: the principle of basic moral equality.</p><p>This article is divided into two parts. In the first part, I propose a novel theory of respect for persons' agential capacities that defines what a relational egalitarian society owes to impaired agents as a matter of respect for their equal standing. In Section 2, I illustrate how the social condition of impaired agents generates a tension between two core demands of relational equality. On the one hand, relational egalitarians argue that the state should express appropriate respect for persons' equal standing by refraining from making demeaning judgments about their variable agential capacities, which would allow ranking them on a scale of moral personality. On the other hand, they maintain that the state should enable everyone to <i>function</i> as equal citizens. However, I argue that a duty to refrain from assessing individuals' agential endowments is sometimes incompatible with a duty to ensure that impaired agents have access to the assistance necessary to be able to function as equal citizens.</p><p>To overcome this tension, in Section 3, I develop a <i>dualist</i> account of respect for persons' agential capacities. According to this account, respect does not only entail abstaining from assessing individuals' agential capacities, but it also requires a positive duty to offer help and support to address mental health issues that diminish moral personality. Call this kind of respect, <","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 1","pages":"27-43"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12581","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141569789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Understanding the Conditions for Human Flourishing: Comments on Nicole Hassoun's A Minimally Good Life","authors":"Carol C. Gould","doi":"10.1111/josp.70033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70033","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 1","pages":"102-105"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147564295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reparative justice, historical injustice, and the nonidentity problem","authors":"Felix Lambrecht","doi":"10.1111/josp.12583","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12583","url":null,"abstract":"<p>History is riddled with injustice. Nazi Germany murdered and stole from millions during the Holocaust. Imperial powers expropriated land, relocated populations, and violently maintain(ed) oppressive colonial systems. The slave trade created unimaginable suffering and oppression. These are examples of <i>historical injustice</i>.</p><p>Historical injustices are unjust actions occurring in the past in which the original individual perpetrators and victims are no longer alive. There is widespread intuition that historical injustices require reparative justice. Yet despite this reparative intuition, reparative justice for historical injustices encounters significant philosophical problems. In this paper, I consider one popular philosophical objection: The Nonidentity Objection.<sup>1</sup> The Nonidentity Objection says that contemporary individuals are not owed reparative duties for historical injustices because, without the historical injustice they would not have come to exist.<sup>2</sup> I show that the objection does not succeed. I accept the claim that particular individuals would not have come to exist without the injustice but deny that it vitiates their claim to reparative justice. I argue that the Objection only challenges reparations if we assume a model of reparative justice on which claims to reparations are generated by the harms that result from an injustice. If we use a different model of reparative justice, the Nonidentity Objection does not succeed and we can vindicate reparations.</p><p>I begin (Section 2) by presenting a general understanding of reparative justice, including three questions any model of reparative justice must answer. I sketch a popular model of reparative justice (the <i>Harm Model</i>) that is often used in the context of historical injustice to answer these questions. Next (Section 3), I present the Nonidentity Objection that challenges the possibility of reparative justice for historical injustice. I argue (Section 4) that the Objection only applies to arguments that assume the Harm Model. I offer an alternative model of reparative justice (the <i>Wrongful Interaction Model</i>) on which reparations address the wrongful actions of the injustice. I develop this model by drawing on accounts of relational (second-personal) morality,<sup>3</sup> and demonstrate how the model overcomes the Objection.<sup>4</sup> I conclude (Section 5) by introducing three new problems that my model faces. I argue that we should prefer my model over the Harm Model because these challenges pose a less intractable threat than the nonidentity problem.</p><p>Reparative justice starts from the intuition that injustices require repair. Reparative justice is distinct from distributive justice. Distributive justice concerns an allocation of resources, burdens or benefits, or a fair state of affairs. In contrast, reparative justice concerns what is owed to victims of a discrete unjust action. Where distributive justice determines allocat","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 1","pages":"61-80"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12583","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141745446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"On Virtues and Duties in A Minimally Good Life","authors":"Liam Murphy","doi":"10.1111/josp.70038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70038","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 1","pages":"109-111"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147564296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Hassoun on Sufficiency and Contentment","authors":"George Sher","doi":"10.1111/josp.70039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70039","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"57 1","pages":"106-108"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147565730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}