{"title":"Accountability in criminal justice","authors":"Erin I. Kelly","doi":"10.1111/josp.12560","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12560","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 2","pages":"317-335"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139950881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Should nonideal theory rely on ideal theory? Lessons from the Frankfurt School","authors":"Kristina Lepold","doi":"10.1111/josp.12556","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12556","url":null,"abstract":"<p>While ideal theory tells us “what a perfectly just society would be like” (Rawls, <span>1971</span>, p. 8), our current social world is far from perfectly just, and we clearly want to know how to orient ourselves and act in these less than perfectly just, or unjust, circumstances. This is why many political philosophers<sup>1</sup> today agree that what is needed is nonideal theory. There is, however, disagreement on one key issue. While some—most notably Charles W. Mills and Amartya Sen—have argued that nonideal theory does not need to build on ideal theory and should do without it, others have pointed out ways in which ideal theory may still be necessary for doing nonideal theory, and that ideal theory should not be dismissed so easily for the project of nonideal theory. The central question, then, is whether nonideal theory should rely on ideal theory.</p>\u0000<p>In what follows, I would like to take up this question and propose an answer to it. I will do so by considering a more specific question. Taking the Frankfurt School as my point of departure, I would like to examine whether nonideal theory, when guided by ideal theory, can help members of the social world to understand injustices and thus contribute to their self-reflection. Advocates of nonideal theory should be concerned about the ability of nonideal theory to contribute to self-reflection, because whether it can successfully inform collective action to overcome injustice depends on its ability to contribute to self-reflection. In other words, what is at stake is nothing less than the practical relevance of political philosophy. As I will argue, however, reliance on ideal theory renders the ability of nonideal theory to contribute to self-reflection uncertain and therefore a matter of sheer luck. As a result, the ability of nonideal theory to successfully guide action is in constant doubt. I will therefore conclude by suggesting that if political philosophy wants to be practically relevant, nonideal theory should not rely on ideal theory.</p>\u0000<p>My argument will involve four steps. First, I will explain my understanding of ideal and nonideal theory (Section 1), before addressing the debate about the role of ideal theory for nonideal theory (Section 2). I will then turn to the Frankfurt School and outline its basic approach to injustice and social problems in general (Section 3). Finally, I will examine what lessons advocates of nonideal theory can learn from the Frankfurt School, which is where the main action of this paper takes place (Section 4). I will conclude with a summary of the argument.</p>","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"167 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139922438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Care and exploitation in precarious employment in academic philosophy","authors":"Christine Wieseler","doi":"10.1111/josp.12558","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12558","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 3","pages":"433-451"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140487455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The libertarian argument for reparations","authors":"Mark R. Reiff","doi":"10.1111/josp.12555","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12555","url":null,"abstract":"<h2>1 INTRODUCTION</h2>\u0000<p>The case for reparations for grievous acts of historical injustice has been getting a lot of attention lately, both within and outside academia (e.g., California Reparations Report <span>2023</span>; Coates, <span>2014</span>; Martin & Yaquinto, <span>2007</span>). Those who advance it claim that the injuries inflicted by these acts are ongoing and severe, and the only way that members of the groups that were the focus of these acts can begin to regain the place they would have held within society had these injustices not occurred, or at least be able and willing to move on from them into the future, is to provide current members of these victimized groups reparations for the wrongs committed against their forebearers. In New World societies, talk of reparations has typically focused on two of these historic wrongs. First, the continuing injury inflicted by slavery and the discrimination against Black people that continued in its aftermath. Second, the injury inflicted through the widespread murder and seizure of land by government and government-sanctioned forces from indigenous peoples. In both the New and Old World, however, other groups—for example, religious or ethnic minorities who have been subjected to centuries of persecution—are also sometimes discussed as being entitled to reparations. Whenever reparations are discussed, however, the claim has generally been that these are required for violations of the principle of equality, a principle to which liberal societies have long paid lip service, but which is now (in some quarters, at least) beginning to be taken more seriously.</p>\u0000<p>But I am going to talk about reparations in a different way. Not because I think that any of the current arguments for reparations for Black and indigenous people or anyone else for that matter do not lead to the conclusions that their proponents say they do. On the contrary, with perhaps a few exceptions, I find these arguments not only valid but also convincing. Accordingly, nothing I will say in this paper should be taken as an argument against any of these existing claims for reparations. But I do want to broaden the current discussion in two ways.</p>\u0000<p>First, in part I, I am going to set forth what I call a general theory of reparations. In it, I am not only going to talk about reparations as a means of remedying the injuries inflicted by slavery and by the genocide of indigenous peoples, the theft of their land, and the ongoing ripple effects of these historic wrongs. And I am not merely going to add to this a call for reparations for injuries caused by the long-time persecution of the usual religious, ethnic, and other minority populations. I am going to talk about reparations for an even wider variety of historical injustices, including, most importantly, the long-term economic oppression of women, and the historical exploitation of labor.</p>\u0000<p>Second, in part II, I am going to set forth my argument for reparations, ","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139376627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gordon Arlen, Antoinette Scherz, Martin Vestergren
{"title":"New perspectives on the legitimacy of international institutions and power","authors":"Gordon Arlen, Antoinette Scherz, Martin Vestergren","doi":"10.1111/josp.12554","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12554","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In democracies around the world, political forces calling for a rollback of globalization are on the ascendancy. Longstanding consensus about the benefits of free trade and human rights and around the legitimacy of the international institutions enabling these goods has been questioned by successful populist politicians on both sides of the ideological spectrum. Some even claim that the entire liberal international order has become contested, perhaps as never before (Lake et al., <span>2021</span>). An emerging critique of multilateralism argues that states and peoples should not be shackled by international legal arrangements and international law, but rather, that states should “do it alone.” The picture painted is one where state sovereignty is constrained and undermined by international institutions. This view implies that there is necessarily a tradeoff between multilateralism and state autonomy.</p>\u0000<p>Yet, in our globalized world, the relationship between state autonomy and international legal institutions is more complex than both critics and some defenders of the international order acknowledge. Though states frequently find themselves under pressure to join international legal institutions, this is often because there are good reasons to do so. In a globalized world, membership in these institutions is often crucial for states to function properly, serving their citizens domestically, while also cultivating productive relationships with other states. Therefore, international institutions may contribute to the construction of domestic legitimacy (Buchanan, <span>2011</span>). By imposing reciprocal limitations on states, international institutions may increase, rather than diminish, a state's room to maneuver. Furthermore, the very act of joining and submitting to international authority may be seen as an expression of state autonomy rather than a surrender of it. Without dismissing the growing opposition to international institutions as uninformed, misguided, or insincere, this special symposium seeks to deepen our theoretical understanding of the complex authority and power relations between international legal arrangements and states and between particular international institutions and the broader institutional structure in which they are embedded.</p>\u0000<p>More specifically, the special symposium explores power relations and legitimacy issues in the context of international legal institutions in two dimensions. It assesses, first, what we call vertical power, that is, power and authority exercised by international bodies over states and societies. The special symposium explores claims made about power abuse and illegitimacy by investigating how this kind of power operates, what sort of legitimacy problems it gives rise to, and the normative conditions and criteria of legitimacy that are relevant. Second, the special symposium addresses questions about the international horizontal allocation of power, that is, the division of functi","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"9 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138511968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What is a black radical Kantianism without Du Bois? On method, principle, and abolition democracy","authors":"Elvira Basevich","doi":"10.1111/josp.12552","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12552","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 1","pages":"6-24"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139244563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Alienated dependence: The unfreedom of our social relations","authors":"Tatiana Llaguno","doi":"10.1111/josp.12551","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12551","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"23 19","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139271079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rawls and American political traditions","authors":"David A. Reidy","doi":"10.1111/josp.12549","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12549","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 2","pages":"178-208"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135974425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Contributors","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12479","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 3","pages":"290-291"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50125481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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