Journal of Social Philosophy最新文献_第3页

Lottocracy and class‐specific political institutions: A plebeian constitutionalist defense 贵族政治和特定阶级的政治体制：平民立宪主义者的辩护

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-05-03 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12564

Vincent Harting

引用次数: 0

Issue Information - NASSP page 发行信息 - NASSP 页面

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-03-17 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12527

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CONTRIBUTORS 贡献者

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-03-17 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12525

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The harms of the internalized oppression worry 内化压迫的危害令人担忧

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-03-13 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12562

Nicole Dular, Madeline Ward

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Reparations: Special issue 赔偿：特刊

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-26 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12561

Christina Nick, Susan Stark

{"title":"Reparations: Special issue","authors":"Christina Nick, Susan Stark","doi":"10.1111/josp.12561","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12561","url":null,"abstract":"Recent and renewed concern for racial injustice has revived interest in the importance of making reparations for oppressed peoples (Coates, 2014). Philosophers and socio-political theorists have responded by reinvigorating longstanding debates about the requirement for reparations for colonialism, genocide, institutionalized slavery and racial subjugation (Lyons, 2017; Thompson, 2018), as well as exploring the role of reparations in transitional justice (Murphy, 2017; Pityana, 2018). These debates have also been advanced by social movements such as Black Lives Matter and Rhodes Must Fall, which have highlighted the need to reckon with historical injustices and their continued legacies of harm. These movements have brought into sharper relief the vast magnitude of systemic racism and of the ongoing harms that result from historical wrongs. Indeed, awareness is growing that these colonial and racist structures, as well as intergenerational harms, touch every aspect of contemporary social life. In recent years, the scholarly terrain surrounding reparations has expanded to include work addressing the prospect of reparations for women (Nuti, 2019), Latinx Americans (Corlett 2018), and climate refugees (Buxton, 2019). Scholars have also defended new moral bases for reparations in cases such as police shootings (Page, 2019), mass incarceration (King and Page 2018), and ecological degradation (Katz, 2018).This volume aims to center wronged individuals and groups in the sense that wronged peoples are the final arbiters of how the wrongs are to be understood, what are their precise contours, how, and to what extent repair can be made, and which particular actions will promote repair. This special issue explores a variety of issues related to reparation-making as a way to mitigate the ongoing effects of these historical wrongs. In particular, it considers a number of questions confronted by those who wish to make a compelling case for reparations.The first question addressed by this special issue is the problem of who ought to make reparations. At first, one might think simply that the perpetrators of injustice ought to pay reparations. The problem with this view, of course, is that many of these large-scale, historical injustices were committed such a long time ago that the perpetrators are now long deceased. Given this, we might instead argue that those who benefitted from these injustices (Butt, 2014) or the institutions of which the perpetrators were a part (Thompson, 2018) ought to pay reparations.Second, and related, is the matter of to whom reparations are owed. As is the case with the perpetrators, the injustices in question were committed long in the past, so that none of their victims are alive today. As a result, some argue that we owe reparations to the de","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 4","pages":"585-589"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12561","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140025977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Accountability in criminal justice 刑事司法问责制

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-23 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12560

Erin I. Kelly

引用次数: 0

Should nonideal theory rely on ideal theory? Lessons from the Frankfurt School 非理想理论应该依赖理想理论吗？法兰克福学派的启示

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-15 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12556

Kristina Lepold

{"title":"Should nonideal theory rely on ideal theory? Lessons from the Frankfurt School","authors":"Kristina Lepold","doi":"10.1111/josp.12556","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12556","url":null,"abstract":"While ideal theory tells us “what a perfectly just society would be like” (Rawls, 1971, p. 8), our current social world is far from perfectly just, and we clearly want to know how to orient ourselves and act in these less than perfectly just, or unjust, circumstances. This is why many political philosophers1 today agree that what is needed is nonideal theory. There is, however, disagreement on one key issue. While some—most notably Charles W. Mills and Amartya Sen—have argued that nonideal theory does not need to build on ideal theory and should do without it, others have pointed out ways in which ideal theory may still be necessary for doing nonideal theory, and that ideal theory should not be dismissed so easily for the project of nonideal theory. The central question, then, is whether nonideal theory should rely on ideal theory.In what follows, I would like to take up this question and propose an answer to it. I will do so by considering a more specific question. Taking the Frankfurt School as my point of departure, I would like to examine whether nonideal theory, when guided by ideal theory, can help members of the social world to understand injustices and thus contribute to their self-reflection. Advocates of nonideal theory should be concerned about the ability of nonideal theory to contribute to self-reflection, because whether it can successfully inform collective action to overcome injustice depends on its ability to contribute to self-reflection. In other words, what is at stake is nothing less than the practical relevance of political philosophy. As I will argue, however, reliance on ideal theory renders the ability of nonideal theory to contribute to self-reflection uncertain and therefore a matter of sheer luck. As a result, the ability of nonideal theory to successfully guide action is in constant doubt. I will therefore conclude by suggesting that if political philosophy wants to be practically relevant, nonideal theory should not rely on ideal theory.My argument will involve four steps. First, I will explain my understanding of ideal and nonideal theory (Section 1), before addressing the debate about the role of ideal theory for nonideal theory (Section 2). I will then turn to the Frankfurt School and outline its basic approach to injustice and social problems in general (Section 3). Finally, I will examine what lessons advocates of nonideal theory can learn from the Frankfurt School, which is where the main action of this paper takes place (Section 4). I will conclude with a summary of the argument.How best to define “ideal theory” and “nonideal theory” has been the subject of some debate (see, e.g., Mills, 2005; Robeyns, 2008; Stemplowska, 2008; Simmons, 2010; Valentini, 2012). As I understand it, ideal theory is concerned with finding out when the social world, or parts of the social world, are organized in such a wa","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 1","pages":"7-23"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12556","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139922438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Dakota land recovery in Minnesota: An experiment in reparative justice 明尼苏达州达科塔土地的恢复：补偿性司法实验

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-14 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12550

Waziyatawin

引用次数: 0

Knowing your past: Trauma, stress, and mnemonic epistemic injustice 了解你的过去：创伤、压力和记忆性认识论的不公正

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12557

Katherine Puddifoot, Clara Sandelind

{"title":"Knowing your past: Trauma, stress, and mnemonic epistemic injustice","authors":"Katherine Puddifoot, Clara Sandelind","doi":"10.1111/josp.12557","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12557","url":null,"abstract":"There is strong psychological evidence suggesting that sometimes social and institutional structures cause people to experience, or exacerbate existing, trauma and severe stress. Evidence further suggests that trauma and stress can lead autobiographical memories to become disorganized and distorted. In this way, social and institutional structures can cause significant harm by denying some individuals access to a specific kind of knowledge; knowledge about their personal past. When people are being denied access to this kind of knowledge, their objective, basic interests in good epistemic agency, capacity for autonomy, and general well-being, are curtailed. In this paper, we argue that these memory distortions therefore constitute a distinctive form of mnemonic epistemic injustice: some people are unjustly disadvantaged as epistemic agents by being avoidably and foreseeably denied access to epistemic goods required to support their objective interests, due to social and institutional structures that cause some of their memories to become distorted or disorganized.1 They are denied something that they are entitled to, that is, freedom from the imposition of stress and trauma that brings epistemic costs and other damage to their objective needs.Moreover, this injustice can be further compounded in cases where trauma and stress make it harder for an individual to be believed because their testimony contains untruths due to memory errors. Memories that are distorted and disorganized often exist alongside core memories about important events that are accurate. When it is assumed that certain core aspects of a person's account of their own experiences are false there can be an additional epistemic injustice that compounds the initial injustice of having one's memories distorted. The compound epistemic injustice that we describe can be experienced by people who are speaking untruths (due to memory errors), as a response to the untruths that they are speaking. It can even happen in cases where the hearer responds reasonably to the untruths of the speaker when denying their account credibility. These compound epistemic injustices therefore differ significantly from standard cases of testimonial injustice where a person has their testimony dismissed as lacking credibility when there is little or no good reason to believe that they are speaking untruths (Fricker, 2007). The compound injustices that we describe are interesting because they can be jointly caused by two or more different unjust features of social and institutional structures, that is, those features that cause the memory distortions and those that lead the memory errors to be misinterpreted. They show how different features of social and institutional structures can conspire to make it especially difficult for marginalized individuals to be believed.We illustrate these points via the case study of asylum seekers in the United Kingdo","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 2","pages":"261-281"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12557","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140482592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Care and exploitation in precarious employment in academic philosophy 学术哲学不稳定就业中的关爱与剥削

IF 1.1 3区哲学

Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-01-29 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12558

Christine Wieseler

引用次数: 0