Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics最新文献_第4页

Does opinion shopping impair auditor independence? Evidence from tax avoidance 征求意见是否会损害审计师的独立性？来自避税的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100398

Heesun Chung , Eugenia Y. Lee

引用次数: 0

Institutional investor horizons, information environment, and firm financing decisions 机构投资者视野、信息环境与企业融资决策

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100397

Xin Chang , Yangyang Chen , Kangkang Fu , Endong Yang

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The impact of top management team incentive dispersion on Non-GAAP reporting 高层管理团队激励分散对非美国通用会计准则报告的影响

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100396

Hannah E. Richards , Yuan Shi , Hongkang Xu

{"title":"The impact of top management team incentive dispersion on Non-GAAP reporting","authors":"Hannah E. Richards , Yuan Shi , Hongkang Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100396","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100396","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine whether the dispersion of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) amongst the top management team (TMT) impacts the likelihood of firms disclosing non-GAAP earnings and the quality of non-GAAP earnings. Management compensation contracts are designed to incentivize executive team members individually and in the aggregate. By structuring these contracts to have similar PPS, those charged with governance can increase collaboration amongst the TMT. However, this collaboration can turn into the TMT colluding to make firm decisions that result in the highest compensation for the TMT. Thus, a greater dispersion of PPS can lead to less collusion. We find that the likelihood of firms reporting non-GAAP earnings decreases and the quality of non-GAAP earnings disclosures increases when there is a higher dispersion of PPS. These findings are consistent with executives that are less incentivized by temporary stock price increases suppressing other executives from eliciting firm scrutiny by disclosing non-GAAP earnings and releasing low-quality non-GAAP earnings. Additionally, we find these effects on non-GAAP earnings are more likely to occur in firms with weaker governance and when the management team has a shorter tenure of working together. Overall, our research provides evidence of the association between the dispersion of TMT PPS and non-GAAP earnings decisions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"20 1","pages":"Article 100396"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138679928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Textual disclosure complexity and analysts’ weighting of information 文本披露复杂性与分析师的信息权重

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100395

Xiaoxiao Yu , Lei Zhao

引用次数: 0

Proving their mettle: Managerial ability and firm performance in trying times 证明自己的能力艰难时期的管理能力与公司业绩

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100393

Barry Hettler , James Cordeiro , Arno Forst

引用次数: 0

U.S. airline responses to mandated disclosure of non-financial performance 美国航空公司对强制披露非财务业绩的回应

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100394

Xiaozhe Gu , Nandu J. Nagarajan , Akin Sayrak , Dhinu Srinivasan

引用次数: 0

Carbon emission trading scheme and firm debt financing 碳排放交易计划与企业债务融资

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100384

Nan Huang , Rong He , Le Luo , Hongtao Shen

引用次数: 0

Historical institution and corporate Innovation: Evidence from China’s Civil-service Examination 历史制度与企业创新：中国公务员考试的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100385

Ruilin Liu , Zheyuan Zhang , Dan Li

{"title":"Historical institution and corporate Innovation: Evidence from China’s Civil-service Examination","authors":"Ruilin Liu , Zheyuan Zhang , Dan Li","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100385","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100385","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>Previous research indicates that historical institutions are crucial to the functioning and development of an economy. However, little is known about whether and how a historical institution affects current entrepreneurial activities. In ancient China, the Civil-service Examination (CSE), also known as </span><em>keju</em>, was the most important institution for selecting scholar-officials and had long-lasting effects. Using the variation in the historical success in <em>keju</em> across prefectures, this paper empirically examines the impact of the CSE on local corporate innovation. We find that the density of <em>jinshi</em>, which is the highest achievement in <em>keju</em><span>, is positively correlated with the innovation productivity of local firms as measured by patent applications and citations. To determine causality, we employ an instrumental variable<span> and a quasi-experiment in early Qing period. Further tests suggest that the CSE promotes corporate innovation by fostering a forward-looking stance in firms, enhancing firms’ human capital level, and increasing local social capital. Overall, our results indicate that the CSE has a real and long-lasting impact on today’s firm innovation.</span></span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"20 1","pages":"Article 100385"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135510630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Key audit matters and insider trading profitability: Evidence from China 关键审计事项与内幕交易盈利能力:来自中国的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100383

Hui Liu , Yufan Chang , Man Zuo

{"title":"Key audit matters and insider trading profitability: Evidence from China","authors":"Hui Liu , Yufan Chang , Man Zuo","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100383","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100383","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The debate as to whether or not an expanded audit report is informative to the market persists, either from experimental and empirical study perspectives. With the utilization of 4,336 firm-year Chinese observations from 2016 to 2017, this study investigates whether the mandatory disclosure of key audit matters (KAMs) restricts insider trading profitability in China. The main test and robustness tests confirm the significant and negative relationship between KAM disclosure and insider trading profitability in the Chinese capital market. The study further explores the impact of KAMs’ textual characteristics using the KAM data from 2017 to 2020. The results suggest that firm-specific KAMs, longer KAMs, more readable KAMs, and more accurate KAMs reduce the insider trading profitability. Supplementary analysis shows that this effect only exists for opportunistic insider trading. In addition, the effect of KAM disclosure on insider trading profitability is further amplified by high institutional ownership, auditor industry specialization, and KAM with goodwill impairment matter. Overall, the study presents some evidence of the communicative value of KAM disclosure and provides a practical means to restrict insiders’ opportunistic behavior, highlighting the decision-making usefulness of KAMs for external investors.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"19 3","pages":"Article 100383"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135371617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Covenant violation concern and investors’ pricing of Level 3 fair value adjustments 契约违约担忧与投资者对三级公允价值调整的定价

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100382

Laura Mehnaz , Asheq Rahman , Humayun Kabir

{"title":"Covenant violation concern and investors’ pricing of Level 3 fair value adjustments","authors":"Laura Mehnaz , Asheq Rahman , Humayun Kabir","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100382","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100382","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine the influence of concerns relating to violation of the borrowing covenant on the investors’ valuation of Level 3 fair value adjustments. We reason that managerial bias in Level 3 fair value estimation is greater for firms approaching violation of the borrowing covenant. Based on a sample of Australian real estate firms, we find that managers report upward adjustments to Level 3 investment property values when they approach the threshold where the borrowing covenant is violated; and further find that this deliberate use of discretion is significant for firms closer to the interest coverage thresholds, but not for those approaching the gearing thresholds. We then find that, while fair value adjustments are priced positively, investors apply incremental discounts for firms closer to the violation threshold, or firms which are in technical default of borrowing covenants relative to those that are far from violation. Additionally, we show that the pricing discount on fair value adjustments attributable to the concern over covenant violation is significant only for the weaker governance sub-sample, indicating that effective monitoring mitigates faithful representation concerns about Level 3 fair value estimations.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"19 3","pages":"Article 100382"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1815566923000322/pdfft?md5=27bb5cdc9551cc5868adce563af5539e&pid=1-s2.0-S1815566923000322-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135761073","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0