Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics最新文献_第4页

Lending corruption and bank loan contracting: Cross-Country evidence 贷款腐败与银行贷款签约：跨国证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100415

Liangliang Jiang, Chong Wang

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Managerial ability and supply chain power 管理能力和供应链力量

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100414

G M Wali Ullah , Jane Luo , Alfred Yawson

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Predicting financial distress using machine learning approaches: Evidence China 利用机器学习方法预测金融困境：中国证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100403

Md Jahidur Rahman , Hongtao Zhu

{"title":"Predicting financial distress using machine learning approaches: Evidence China","authors":"Md Jahidur Rahman , Hongtao Zhu","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100403","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>This study uses machine learning techniques to construct financial distress prediction (FDP) models for Chinese A-listed construction companies and compares their classification performance with conventional Z-Score models. Three machine learning algorithms (Classification and Regression Tree, AdaBoost, and CUSBoost) are used to generate machine-learning-based classifiers, and four Z-Score models (Altman Z-Score, Sorins/Voronova Z-Score, Springate, and Z-Score of Ng et al.) are selected for comparison. The sample comprises 1782 firm-year observations from Chinese A-listed construction companies on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges from 2012 to 2021. The out-of-sample predicting performance of the classifiers are measured using the areas under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC) and under the precision-recall curve (AUPR). In additional tests, Pearson's correlation coefficients and the variance </span>inflation<span> factor are utilized to identify correlations among the raw financial predictors, while principal component analysis<span> is used to address high-correlation issues among the features. Results confirm that machine learning classifiers can effectively predict financial distress for Chinese A-listed construction companies and are more accurate than Z-Score models. Furthermore, the CUSBoost classifier is identified as the most precise model based on the AUC and AUPR metrics in both primary and additional tests. This study addresses the gap concerning the application of machine learning in FDP for Chinese-listed construction companies. Additionally, the CUSBoost Algorithm is introduced into the field of FDP research for the first time. Through the comparison of machine learning and Z-Score models, this study also contributes to the literature related to the contrast between machine learning and statistical modeling techniques.</span></span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"20 1","pages":"Article 100403"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139682476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Chaebol-affiliated analysts and biases in interpreting accruals 隶属于财阀的分析师和解读应计项目的偏差

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100402

Seunghee Yang , Lee-Seok Hwang , Yewon Kim

{"title":"Chaebol-affiliated analysts and biases in interpreting accruals","authors":"Seunghee Yang , Lee-Seok Hwang , Yewon Kim","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100402","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100402","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study investigates whether analysts exhibit accrual-related biases in forecasting earnings in the presence of conflicts of interest arising from business group affiliation. Our findings reveal that chaebol-affiliated analysts are more likely to overreact to accruals than do independent analysts by overestimating the persistence of accruals. Notably, affiliated analysts’ accrual-related biases are not reduced with analysts’ experience but intensify when analysts have stronger incentives to provide favorable forecasts for member firms. This suggests a possibility that in the presence of conflicts of interest analysts do not fully incorporate the implications of accruals into their forecasts, potentially with an intention to benefit group interests. In additional analyses, we find that the presence of affiliated analysts does not exacerbate accrual mispricing, which suggests that investors do not take affiliated analysts’ biased forecasts at face value. We also provide evidence that despite issuing less accurate forecasts than unaffiliated analysts, affiliated analysts do not necessarily encounter more career disadvantages.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"20 1","pages":"Article 100402"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139577865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Do managers respond to tax avoidance incentives by investing in the tax function? Evidence from tax departments 管理者是否会通过投资税务职能来应对避税动机？来自税务部门的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100401

John Li

{"title":"Do managers respond to tax avoidance incentives by investing in the tax function? Evidence from tax departments","authors":"John Li","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100401","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100401","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>While prior literature examines the role of certain incentives in motivating top managers (CEOs and CFOs) to engage in corporate tax avoidance, there is little evidence on the specific actions that managers take in response to these incentives. Motivated by the premise that a manager can influence a firm’s tax activities by directing resources towards the tax function, I investigate whether four specific tax avoidance incentives studied in prior literature (financial constraints, equity risk incentives, hedge fund interventions, and analyst cash flow forecasts) induce managers to make investments in hiring personnel within the firm’s tax department. Using a dataset of tax department employees collected from the professional networking website <em>LinkedIn</em>, I find evidence that each incentive is significantly associated with an increase in the number of individuals employed within the tax department. This association is generally stronger among higher ranked employees and employees with prior tax department experience. Overall, my findings are consistent with the premise that managers invest resources in the tax function when they are incentivized to avoid taxes. My study also provides some assurance that the association between tax avoidance incentives and effective tax rates documented in prior studies is reflective of intentional tax avoidance behavior.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"20 1","pages":"Article 100401"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1815566924000018/pdfft?md5=17cec1eabe35ee5fe82b5d420de25964&pid=1-s2.0-S1815566924000018-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139515121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A robust model to estimate a firm’s average economic return 估算企业平均经济回报的稳健模型

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100400

Morris G. Danielson

{"title":"A robust model to estimate a firm’s average economic return","authors":"Morris G. Danielson","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100400","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100400","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>Theoretical studies question the ability of financial statement information to provide evidence about a firm’s economic performance, as the mathematical relation between a firm’s accounting and economic returns becomes intractable when economic depreciation is defined endogenously—as a function of the firm’s cash flow stream—and when its internal rate of return (IRR) and investment growth rate have not been constant. This paper derives a new equation, called the average internal rate of return (</span><em>AIRR</em>) estimation model, in which a firm’s <em>AIRR</em> is estimated as a function of its current-year accounting return, its current-year asset growth rate, a measure of accounting conservatism, and a term that identifies the firm’s historical investment growth rate <em>trend</em>. Because the model allows economic depreciation to be defined exogenously, non-constant returns and growth rates can be aggregated across investment cohorts, allowing a firm’s accounting return to be reconciled to its <em>average</em> economic return. One such exogenous schedule—called competitive market depreciation—is used to illustrate the model’s implications. The <em>AIRR</em><span> estimation model empowers analysts to identify the direction and magnitude of the potential difference between a firm’s accounting and economic return created by fixed asset depreciation, accounting accruals<span>, and the immediate expensing of intangible assets.</span></span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"20 1","pages":"Article 100400"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139375430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Acquirers’ political connections and bargaining outcomes in corporate takeover negotiations: Evidence from antitrust reviews 收购方的政治关系与企业收购谈判中的讨价还价结果：来自反垄断审查的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100399

Simon Yu Kit Fung, Lawrence (Hong) Huang

{"title":"Acquirers’ political connections and bargaining outcomes in corporate takeover negotiations: Evidence from antitrust reviews","authors":"Simon Yu Kit Fung, Lawrence (Hong) Huang","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100399","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100399","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine how acquirers’ political connections affect takeover bargaining that involves significant regulatory uncertainties, when the target’s options of putting itself to another bidder are restricted. Opposite to prior takeover theories, we show that a politically connected acquirer pays a lower (rather than higher) takeover premium to and shares a smaller portion of the takeover gains with the target in the context of antitrust reviews, consistent with a bargaining benefit for the connected acquirer. Corroborating this bargaining argument, we find that the results are more pronounced in situations where: (1) the antitrust concerns are more severe; (2) the targets have fewer outside options other than the connected acquirers; and (3) the acquirers’ political connections are more valuable. Our results highlight the value of political connections to shareholders in takeovers, affecting not only the likelihood of completion but also the bargaining outcomes of the deal under the shadow of costly regulation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"20 1","pages":"Article 100399"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1815566923000498/pdfft?md5=ed30292d501f88a02c27224062e42327&pid=1-s2.0-S1815566923000498-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139079019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Does opinion shopping impair auditor independence? Evidence from tax avoidance 征求意见是否会损害审计师的独立性？来自避税的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100398

Heesun Chung , Eugenia Y. Lee

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Institutional investor horizons, information environment, and firm financing decisions 机构投资者视野、信息环境与企业融资决策

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100397

Xin Chang , Yangyang Chen , Kangkang Fu , Endong Yang

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The impact of top management team incentive dispersion on Non-GAAP reporting 高层管理团队激励分散对非美国通用会计准则报告的影响

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100396

Hannah E. Richards , Yuan Shi , Hongkang Xu

{"title":"The impact of top management team incentive dispersion on Non-GAAP reporting","authors":"Hannah E. Richards , Yuan Shi , Hongkang Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100396","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100396","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine whether the dispersion of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) amongst the top management team (TMT) impacts the likelihood of firms disclosing non-GAAP earnings and the quality of non-GAAP earnings. Management compensation contracts are designed to incentivize executive team members individually and in the aggregate. By structuring these contracts to have similar PPS, those charged with governance can increase collaboration amongst the TMT. However, this collaboration can turn into the TMT colluding to make firm decisions that result in the highest compensation for the TMT. Thus, a greater dispersion of PPS can lead to less collusion. We find that the likelihood of firms reporting non-GAAP earnings decreases and the quality of non-GAAP earnings disclosures increases when there is a higher dispersion of PPS. These findings are consistent with executives that are less incentivized by temporary stock price increases suppressing other executives from eliciting firm scrutiny by disclosing non-GAAP earnings and releasing low-quality non-GAAP earnings. Additionally, we find these effects on non-GAAP earnings are more likely to occur in firms with weaker governance and when the management team has a shorter tenure of working together. Overall, our research provides evidence of the association between the dispersion of TMT PPS and non-GAAP earnings decisions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"20 1","pages":"Article 100396"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138679928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0