Lending corruption and bank loan contracting: Cross-Country evidence

IF 2.9 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Liangliang Jiang, Chong Wang
{"title":"Lending corruption and bank loan contracting: Cross-Country evidence","authors":"Liangliang Jiang,&nbsp;Chong Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100415","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Using World Bank survey data, we document that banks extend more favorable loan terms to borrowers in countries with more lending corruption. This relation is stronger when borrowers have financing constraints but weaker in countries with stronger monitoring of foreign bank ownership or with stronger religiosity. We also find that banks in countries with high lending corruption have poor loan quality and earnings performance and are more susceptible to trouble during a financial crisis. Overall, our findings suggest that corruption “greases the wheels” for borrowers but is detrimental to bank shareholders.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1815566924000158","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Using World Bank survey data, we document that banks extend more favorable loan terms to borrowers in countries with more lending corruption. This relation is stronger when borrowers have financing constraints but weaker in countries with stronger monitoring of foreign bank ownership or with stronger religiosity. We also find that banks in countries with high lending corruption have poor loan quality and earnings performance and are more susceptible to trouble during a financial crisis. Overall, our findings suggest that corruption “greases the wheels” for borrowers but is detrimental to bank shareholders.

贷款腐败与银行贷款签约:跨国证据
利用世界银行的调查数据,我们发现在贷款腐败较严重的国家,银行会向借款人提供更优惠的贷款条件。当借款人有融资限制时,这种关系会更强,但在对外国银行所有权有更严格监管或宗教信仰更浓厚的国家,这种关系会更弱。我们还发现,在贷款腐败严重的国家,银行的贷款质量和盈利表现较差,在金融危机中更容易陷入困境。总之,我们的研究结果表明,腐败为借款人 "铺平道路",但对银行股东不利。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
3.00%
发文量
24
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信