Pretending to be sustainable: Is ESG disparity a symptom?

IF 2.9 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Gabriel de la Fuente, Pilar Velasco
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This study investigates a novel dimension of ESG (environmental, social, and governance), namely the degree of inequality in the distribution of a firm’s overall ESG performance across the three pillars. By grounding our arguments on the agency theory, we argue that such a dimension can discern the degree of authenticity of managers’ ESG awareness. A more unequal distribution might be due to a discretionary and self-interested adoption of ESG principles in order to win the favour of key stakeholders. Using a sample of U.S. listed companies, we provide empirical evidence that disparity in ESG scores between pillars detracts value from ESG engagement. Moreover, such a negative moderating effect worsens in companies that are more prone to agency problems (e.g. higher cash holdings), lack ESG-based compensation, have lower leverage, and are more exposed to the investor spotlight (e.g. higher analyst coverage). Overall, our findings suggest the importance of accounting for managerial motivations to engage in ESG and support the idea that a lower perceived authenticity of these programmes results in lower value outcomes.

假装可持续:ESG 差异是一种症状吗?
本研究调查了 ESG(环境、社会和治理)的一个新维度,即企业的整体 ESG 表现在三大支柱之间的分布不平等程度。通过以代理理论为基础进行论证,我们认为这一维度可以看出管理者对环境、社会和治理认识的真实程度。分配不均的原因可能是企业为了赢得主要利益相关者的青睐而随意采用环境、社会和公司治理原则。利用美国上市公司样本,我们提供了实证证据,证明不同支柱之间的 ESG 分数差距会降低 ESG 参与的价值。此外,对于那些更容易出现代理问题(如持有较多现金)、缺乏基于环境、社会和公司治理的薪酬、杠杆率较低、更受投资者关注(如分析师覆盖率较高)的公司,这种负面调节作用会更加严重。总之,我们的研究结果表明,考虑管理者参与环境、社会和公司治理的动机非常重要,并支持这样一种观点,即这些计划的感知真实性越低,价值结果就越低。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
3.00%
发文量
24
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