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Expanded auditor’s reports and voluntary disclosure 扩大审计报告和自愿披露范围
IF 2.9 3区 管理学
Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100443
{"title":"Expanded auditor’s reports and voluntary disclosure","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100443","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100443","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Employing a panel sample of 5,090 firm-years from 981 UK firms during the period from 2010 to 2016, we investigate the impact of the implementation of expanded auditor’s reports (EARs) on corporate voluntary disclosure. We find that the likelihood and frequency of voluntary disclosure significantly decrease after the implementation of EARs. In addition, the <em>total</em> number of risks of material misstatement (RMMs) has no impact on voluntary disclosure after the implementation of EARs, while certain RMMs categories (i.e., entity rather than account risks, and firm-specific rather than industry-level risks) display a more pronounced impact on corporate voluntary disclosure. In further analysis, we find that the mandatory adoption of EARs increases the proportion of long-term forecasts, riches the content of voluntary disclosure, and elicits a more positive market response to the announcement of voluntary disclosure. Cross-sectional analyses show that the impact of the implementation of EARs on voluntary disclosure can be magnified by a higher level of media coverage, especially breaking news coverage. Our results remain valid after considering various robustness tests and selection bias concerns.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142533490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Long-term tax strategy and corporate acquisition payment structure: An analysis based on the book-tax tradeoff theory 长期税收战略与企业收购支付结构：基于账面税收权衡理论的分析
IF 2.9 3区 管理学
Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100442
{"title":"Long-term tax strategy and corporate acquisition payment structure: An analysis based on the book-tax tradeoff theory","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100442","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100442","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the relationship between corporate acquirers’ long-term tax strategy (i.e., past behavior) and their subsequent choice of an acquisition payment method (i.e., future behavior) based on a book-tax tradeoff analysis. We find that acquirers with a high (low) level of long-term tax avoidance are more likely to have cash (stock)-financed acquisitions. Political influence attenuates the significance of the above relationship. Among the acquirers who use cash-financed payment method, those who are less tax aggressive tend to include debt to finance their acquisitions, suggesting that debt and non-debt tax shields are substitutes for each other in acquisitions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142357106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dividend signalling and investor protection: An international comparison 股利信号与投资者保护：国际比较
IF 2.9 3区 管理学
Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100441
{"title":"Dividend signalling and investor protection: An international comparison","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100441","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100441","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study examines whether dividend changes signal future earnings growth in non-US markets following the Ham et al. (2020) methodology and whether the strength of the earnings signal varies with the level of investor protection. Based on the notion that weak investor protection reduces the cost of cutting dividends and as such increases managers’ discretion to change dividends, we expect that the strength of the earnings signal in dividend increases becomes weaker as investor protection decreases. In a sample drawn from 38 different markets, our results indicate while dividends can signal future earnings in non-US markets, the strength of the signal is weaker than that in the US. In line with our predictions, we find that for firms in a strong investor protection environment, dividend changes are correlated more strongly with subsequent earning changes than is the case for firms in weak investor protection environments.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1815566924000419/pdfft?md5=e829392218254f8682343d76aabe8643&pid=1-s2.0-S1815566924000419-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142164236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
MD&A tone and stock returns MD&A 基调与股票回报
IF 2.9 3区 管理学
Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100440
{"title":"MD&A tone and stock returns","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100440","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100440","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines the impact of the MD&amp;A (Management’s Discussion and Analysis) tone on cross-sectional stock returns in the unique context of Chinese A-share companies. We find a significant and positive relationship between the MD&amp;A tone and Chinese stock returns after controlling for quantitative financial metrics. Our results suggest that the MD&amp;A tone provides additional value that further enhances the information quality in MD&amp;A disclosures and market responses. Furthermore, we observe that the textual tone effect is more pronounced for firms with lower institutional ownership, lower financial transparency, in less competitive market environments, and both the information factor and the sentiment factor of MD&amp;A tone positively affect stock returns. Thus, we provide convincing evidence that MD&amp;A narratives can serve as an effective communication tool to facilitate disclosure and mitigate information asymmetry between corporations and investors.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142098373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The bright side of staggered boards: Evidence from labor investment efficiency 交错董事会的光明面：劳动力投资效率的证据
IF 2.9 3区 管理学
Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100439
{"title":"The bright side of staggered boards: Evidence from labor investment efficiency","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100439","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100439","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Using U.S. data from 1983 to 2015, we document that firms with staggered boards exhibit greater labor investment efficiency, measured as less abnormal net hiring, including over-investment (over-hiring and under-firing) and under-investment (under-hiring). A path analysis shows that 8.3% of the total effect of staggered boards on labor investment efficiency is explained by the positive effect of staggered boards on institutional ownership. Overall, our results support the view that staggered boards strengthen managers’ commitment to long-term shareholders’ interests, thereby encouraging managerial efforts to boost labor investment efficiency.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141998293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Acquisition experience over performance: Directorship prestige following M&As 收购经验重于业绩：并购后的董事声望
IF 2.9 3区 管理学
Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100438
{"title":"Acquisition experience over performance: Directorship prestige following M&As","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100438","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100438","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Corporate governance research documents that outside directors are not penalised in the director labour market for engaging in value-destroying acquisitions (M&amp;A) as they obtain additional directorships regardless of M&amp;A performance. This result is puzzling as it suggests that the director labour market does not provide sufficient ex post settling-up incentives for outside directors to mitigate agency concerns in the M&amp;A context. We further investigate this issue by examining the prestige of directorships received by independent directors after engaging in an M&amp;A. Using US data, we find that acquiring firm directors are awarded more prestigious directorships, regardless of whether the acquisition resulted in value destruction or value creation. Overall, our findings reinforce the notion that, in the director labour market, acquisition experience holds more value than acquisition ability.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1815566924000389/pdfft?md5=f60f1846acea6c276b078f3b9aac3319&pid=1-s2.0-S1815566924000389-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141944929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Corporate reporting by cooperatives: Mapping the landscape and identifying determinants 合作社的企业报告：绘制前景图并确定决定因素
IF 2.9 3区 管理学
Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100436
{"title":"Corporate reporting by cooperatives: Mapping the landscape and identifying determinants","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100436","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100436","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Cooperatives conform to a model that is different to what is normally understood to be an enterprise, with distinctive interpretations of property rights, governance, and values. A unique characteristic of cooperatives’ corporate reporting is it essentially addresses member-owners, and not shareholders. Despite this, most research has been performed from the perspective of investor-owned firms. The aim of this study is to obtain an understanding of the nature and extent of the adoption of corporate reporting conventions, and to identify the determinants of such adoptions by cooperatives, by means of ordinal regression and binary logistic models on a sample drawn from the Global Top 300 cooperatives. Despite the expectations implicit in the differences in the users of financial reports (cooperative members), there was a lack of cooperative-specific reporting in that the most common categories of published corporate reports are still annual reports and annual financial statements. Approximately half of the cooperatives publish environmental and social reports, governance reports and/or management reports, while only a miniscule number publish integrated reports. Results also suggest the stakeholder, legitimacy, institutional, transaction cost and agency theories help to explain the determinants for the of adoption of corporate reporting. We have identified common determinants (market, country and institutional factors) for the adoption of cooperative reporting, as well as idiosyncratic determinants that are unique to cooperative entities. We found that cooperatives with external shareholders are more likely to adopt environmental and social, management and governance reporting. Idiosyncratic determinants indicated that cooperatives who more assertively draw their attention to their identity are more likely to adopt annual reporting. Cooperatives who limit the distribution of profits to members only are also more likely to adopt management reporting.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141852435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Human capital quality and cash holdings 人力资本质量和现金持有量
IF 2.9 3区 管理学
Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100437
{"title":"Human capital quality and cash holdings","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100437","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100437","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, we examine whether human capital quality affects firms’ cash holdings. Using a sample of U.S. firms from 1980 to 2022, we find that a one standard deviation increase in human capital quality is associated with an increase of 0.053 in the cash-to-total assets ratio. We also explore two channels—skilled labour risk and agency costs—through which human capital quality affects cash holdings. Further, using the hiring of a chief diversity officer as a proxy for a diverse and inclusive workforce, we find that firms that hire chief diversity officers have higher cash holdings.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141849311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Environmental and social disclosure, managerial entrenchment, and investment efficiency 环境和社会信息披露、管理控制和投资效率
IF 2.9 3区 管理学
Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100435
{"title":"Environmental and social disclosure, managerial entrenchment, and investment efficiency","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100435","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100435","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study investigates the effect of environmental and social (E&amp;S) disclosure and managerial entrenchment on investment efficiency. E&amp;S disclosure increases not only capital accessibility but also external monitoring of entrenched managers’ actions. We develop a theoretical model that demonstrates how these benefits and costs of firms’ voluntary E&amp;S disclosure affect investment efficiency. Using a large sample of U.S.-listed firms over the period 2016–2022, we test the model’s predictions and provide empirical evidence suggesting that E&amp;S disclosure is positively associated with investment efficiency and that this effect is stronger for firms with lower managerial entrenchment or those disclosing more financially material E&amp;S information. Our study contributes to the investment efficiency literature by demonstrating the relevance of an incentive-compatible mechanism reflecting managers’ choice of E&amp;S voluntary disclosure to the efficient capital allocation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141630572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Can the registration system reform improve the disclosure quality?——Evidence from the ChiNext board 注册制改革能否提高信息披露质量？
IF 3.3 3区 管理学
Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100426
Xihao Wu, Yuezhe Shen, Yani Sun
{"title":"Can the registration system reform improve the disclosure quality?——Evidence from the ChiNext board","authors":"Xihao Wu,&nbsp;Yuezhe Shen,&nbsp;Yani Sun","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100426","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100426","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>As an important institutional reform in the Chinese capital market, the registration system reform aims to improve the disclosure quality of public companies. Using the exogenous shock from the registration system reform as a quasi-natural experiment, we probe the effect of the registration system on disclosure in two stages: IPO admission and post-IPO supervision. We find that the registration system reform significantly reduces the performance deterioration of “incremental” companies in the IPO admission stage and improves the disclosure quality of “existing” companies in the post-IPO supervision stage. In addition, curbing earnings manipulation is a possible channel the registration system reform affects disclosure. Furthermore, these effects are more pronounced in firms with lower internal governance levels and less external media attention. Collectively, these findings respond to the theoretical controversy over whether the registration system will improve or worsen disclosure quality and confirm the reform has positive effects.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141241796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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