CEO tenure and labor investment efficiency

IF 2.9 3区管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-15 DOI:10.1016/j.jcae.2025.100475

Hui Liang James , Pornsit Jiraporn , Hongxia Wang

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We examine the impact of CEO tenure on corporate labor investment efficiency. While some studies show that CEO entrenchment increases in tenure (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998), others argue that managerial expertise builds over time in the office (e.g., Graf-Vlachy et al., 2020). Using a large sample of U.S. firms from 1992 to 2018, we find that longer-tenured CEOs are associated with more efficient labor investment. This finding is robust to alternative measures of labor investment inefficiency, subsample analyses, and various model specifications. Further analysis shows that longer-tenured CEOs mitigate both under- and over-investment in labor problems characterized by under-hiring and under-firing, respectively. The positive effect of CEO tenure on labor investment efficiency is stronger in human capital-intensive firms and those with greater operational uncertainty. We conclude that advanced managerial expertise enables longer-tenured CEOs to invest in labor more accurately.

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CEO任期与劳动投资效率

我们考察了CEO任期对企业劳动投资效率的影响。虽然一些研究表明，CEO的任期会增加（例如，Hermalin和Weisbach， 1998），但其他人认为，管理专业知识是随着办公室时间的推移而积累的（例如，grafy - vlachy等人，2020）。利用1992年至2018年美国公司的大样本，我们发现任期较长的首席执行官与更有效的劳动力投资相关。这一发现对于劳动力投资效率低下、子样本分析和各种模型规格的替代措施是稳健的。进一步的分析表明，任期较长的首席执行官分别缓解了以雇佣不足和解雇不足为特征的劳动力问题上的投资不足和投资过度。CEO任期对劳动投资效率的正向影响在人力资本密集型企业和经营不确定性较大的企业中更为显著。我们的结论是，先进的管理专业知识使任期较长的首席执行官能够更准确地投资于劳动力。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

6.00

自引率

3.00%

发文量