{"title":"Corporate corruption and future audit fees: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment","authors":"Juncheng Hu , Xiaorong Li , Zhong Wan","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100367","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100367","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>Using a difference-in-differences estimation that relies on China’s anti-corruption campaign as a regulatory shock, we report that an exogenous reduction in firm-level corruption leads to lower future </span>audit fees. Further triple difference analyses reveal that the decrease in future audit fees is more significant for firms operating in regions with weak legal environments, strong government control, and weak property rights protection. Government subsidies and related party transactions are channels through which the anti-corruption campaign affects future audit fees. Compared to previous literature, we conclude the effect of corruption on future audit fees is causal.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"19 3","pages":"Article 100367"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131093218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mandatory R&D disclosure and analyst forecast Accuracy: Evidence from an emerging market","authors":"Baohua Liu , Dan Huang , Tao Chen , Kam C. Chan","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100366","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100366","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>Exploiting the mandatory R&D disclosure policy in China, we capitalize on a difference-in-differences framework to examine whether mandatory R&D disclosure matters to analyst forecast accuracy in a sample of technology intensive firms. We find that, after mandatory R&D disclosure, forecast errors decrease significantly more for treatment firms (i.e., firms that chose not to disclose R&D investments before the mandate policy) relative to control firms (i.e., firms that did voluntary disclosure of R&D investments before the mandate policy). Further, we show that the impact of mandatory R&D disclosure is more pronounced when there is high information asymmetry within the firm or an </span>industry as well as when analysts are working under unfavorable conditions. Overall, our findings demonstrate the positive effect of mandatory R&D disclosure on reducing information asymmetry and shed light on the importance of R&D disclosure reform in developing markets.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"19 3","pages":"Article 100366"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135165873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Corporate governance, compensation mechanisms, and voluntary disclosure of carbon emissions: Evidence from Korea","authors":"Jiyoung Park , Jiyoon Lee , Jewon Shin","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100361","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100361","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>We investigate the effects of incentive-alignment mechanisms on voluntary disclosure of carbon emissions<span> in Korea, a latecomer in incorporating environmental practices into business operations. We consider in particular the effects of corporate governance and compensation mechanisms. We find that international aspects of governance mechanisms, measured by foreign ownership and foreign subsidiaries, are positively associated with the likelihood that a firm discloses carbon emissions voluntarily as well as with the extent of the details included in such disclosures. Similarly, strong internal governance, measured by board independence and </span></span>gender diversity<span>, makes voluntary, detailed carbon emissions disclosures more likely. Moreover, firms that employ compensation schemes that explicitly align corporate social responsibility (CSR) with CEO pay and those that set carbon emissions targets, which may be used to define thresholds for CEO bonuses, are more likely to voluntarily disclose carbon emissions information and to do so more extensively. As such, both international influence and internal factors that affect corporate governance and compensation structures, all of which are well-known incentive-alignment mechanisms, play important roles in voluntary carbon emissions disclosure decisions in emerging markets.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"19 3","pages":"Article 100361"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121789828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do insiders trade on innovation?","authors":"Ibrahim Bostan, G. Mujtaba Mian","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100350","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100350","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We find that pure insider share purchases—which we define as insider purchases over two successive years without any corresponding sales—are a strong predictor of a firm’s patent applications. The predictability increases with the quality of the patent: Applications for the highest-quality, breakthrough patents increase by 21% in the year following pure insider purchases in our sample. These purchases are associated with large abnormal stock returns of 1.1% per month (14% annualized) over the subsequent three-year period. We also document that stock price responds less to the subsequent announcement of the grant of patent if the application for the patent has been preceded by pure insider purchases, consistent with the idea that insider purchases reveal information about future firm innovation. Our evidence has implications for understanding insider trading within technology companies that have become a dominant feature of US stock markets in recent decades.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"19 1","pages":"Article 100350"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49875402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mostafa Monzur Hasan , Ashrafee Hossain , Takdir Hossain
{"title":"CEO inside debt holdings and credit ratings","authors":"Mostafa Monzur Hasan , Ashrafee Hossain , Takdir Hossain","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100337","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper we investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and long-term credit ratings. We provide evidence that firms with a higher level of inside debt holdings enjoy better credit ratings. Our results are robust to the use of alternative regression estimation and alternative measures of key variables. We employ instrumental variable–based two-stage least squares regression and instrumental variable regression estimation using heteroskedasticity-based instruments to mitigate the endogeneity concern. In addition, we employ propensity-matched sample and entropy balancing estimates to alleviate endogeneity concerns. Our cross-sectional analyses reveal that the relationship between CEO inside debt holdings and credit ratings is more pronounced in firms with a poor information environment, a weak monitoring mechanism, and powerful CEOs. Overall, findings from our study suggest that credit rating agencies evaluate CEO insider debt holdings positively in assessing the creditworthiness of a firm.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"19 1","pages":"Article 100337"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49875401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The value of the PCAOB’s international audit oversight on U.S. listed foreign companies: Evidence from an initial enforcement breakdown","authors":"Tracy Gu , Yiqi Jiang , Dan Simunic","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100349","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100349","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Using, as a natural experiment, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s May 18, 2010, release stating that its oversight of certain foreign auditors had been denied, we examine investors’ early valuation of the PCAOB’s international audit oversight on U.S.-listed foreign companies. Comparing reactions for the release-exposed U.S.-listed foreign companies to reactions for other U.S.-listed foreign companies, we find a significant decline in the share values of the release-exposed companies. The decline is driven by companies with auditors from China; the on-list companies from the 19 on-list European jurisdictions do not experience significantly negative stock market reactions. Using difference-in-differences analyses of earnings response coefficients, abnormal stock returns and trading volumes surrounding earnings announcements, and analyst forecast dispersions, we find a decline in perceived financial reporting quality for the release-exposed foreign listings from China but not for the release-exposed companies from the 19 European jurisdictions—a finding in line with the results of the stock market reaction analyses. These results are consistent with the view that the PCAOB’s international inspection would create a net value for U.S.-listed companies from China.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"19 1","pages":"Article 100349"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49875398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Disclosure strategies for management earnings forecasts: The role of managerial compensation structures, overoptimism, and effort","authors":"Hao-Chang Sung , Shirley J. Ho","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100351","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100351","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Management earnings forecasts have received significant attention as an important source for setting firm expectations. Our paper argues that how these forecasts are presented to the public is important for managing these expectations. We present both analytical and empirical analyses demonstrating that managers’ disclosure framing choices will depend on the information type, managerial overoptimism, and managerial compensation structures. We also provide evidence showing that disclosure framing choices can dampen stock return volatility. Finally, we indicate that disclosure strategies alter the misreporting results found in Guttman et al. (2006).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"19 1","pages":"Article 100351"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49875400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Predictors of revenue shifting and expense shifting: Evidence from an emerging economy","authors":"Manish Bansal , Ashish Kumar , Asit Bhattacharyya , Hajam Abid Bashir","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100339","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Prior literature established that managers engage in Revenue Shifting (RS) and Expense Shifting (ES) with an intent to report favourable operating performance; our paper extends such research in a new direction by investigating both forms based on the need, ease, and advantage of each form of shifting strategy. The study identifies firm-specific factors that incentivize firms to prefer RS over ES and vice-versa. We undertake a longitudinal study (2001–2019) using a sample size of 39,634 firm-years, enlisted in the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). Our results show that peer-performance, size, financial leverage, growth opportunities, accounting flexibility, and age of the firm are important determinants of RS and ES. Specifically, our results exhibit that large, levered, old, and high-growth firms are engaged in RS, whereas small, young, firms with lesser accounting flexibility, and firms operating below peer-performance are involved in ES. These results are robust to controlling for accruals earnings management, real earnings management, endogeneity, self-selection bias, and alternative measures of RS and ES. Our findings are helpful to auditors and investors in improving awareness of forms of classification shifting.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"19 1","pages":"Article 100339"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49875405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Steven Yik-Pui Low , Yee-Boon Foo , Ferdinand A Gul
{"title":"Corporate lobbying: Resource-seeking or rent-seeking? Evidence from audit fees","authors":"Steven Yik-Pui Low , Yee-Boon Foo , Ferdinand A Gul","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100341","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Theory and prior research suggest that corporate lobbying is a primary means that corporations use to influence government policies either for improving firm performance (i.e., strategic decisions) or for rent-seeking activities (i.e., agency costs) but the evidence between lobbying activities and auditor assessments of audit risk remains unclear. Our results show that lobbying firms are associated with higher audit risks and fees, consistent with the idea that lobbying is related to rent-seeking and higher agency costs. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the positive association between lobbying and audit fees<span> is weaker for firms with strong corporate governance. Further analysis shows that firm financial returns or low earnings quality mediate the relationship between lobbying and audit fees. The results suggest that practitioners, users of financial statements and regulators could benefit by recognizing that lobbying activities could signal managerial opportunistic behavior.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"19 1","pages":"Article 100341"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49875397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The unintended consequence of collateral-based financing: Evidence from corporate cost behavior","authors":"Tongxia Li , Chun Lu , Zhihua Chen","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100338","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines how real estate appreciation correspondingly changes collateral value, which affects debt structure choices and consequent operating decisions. Specifically, we explore whether collateral-based financing provides a link between real estate values and corporate cost behavior. Our baseline results show that an appreciation of a firm’s real estate assets alleviates its cost stickiness. A further analysis shows that this influence is stronger for firms with less prior bank debt, less dependence on external financing, and a lower leverage ratio. We also observe that the impact of collateral shocks on cost stickiness is more pronounced when selling, general and administrative (SG&A) costs create less future value for mature firms and for firms with weaker external governance. Collectively, our results support the argument that an increase in bank debt arising from collateral value appreciation mitigates agency problems and thus lessens cost stickiness.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"19 1","pages":"Article 100338"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49875404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}