隶属于财阀的分析师和解读应计项目的偏差

IF 2.9 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Seunghee Yang , Lee-Seok Hwang , Yewon Kim
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了分析师在预测收益时是否会因企业集团关联带来的利益冲突而表现出与应计制相关的偏差。我们的研究结果表明,与独立分析师相比,与财团有关联的分析师更容易对应计项目做出过度反应,高估应计项目的持续性。值得注意的是,关联分析师与应计项目相关的偏差并不会随着分析师经验的增加而减少,反而会在分析师有更强的动机为成员公司提供有利预测时加剧。这表明,在存在利益冲突的情况下,分析师可能并没有将应计项目的影响完全纳入其预测中,其目的可能是为了集团利益。在其他分析中,我们发现关联分析师的存在并没有加剧应计项目的错误定价,这表明投资者并没有从表面价值上看待关联分析师有偏差的预测。我们还提供证据表明,尽管关联分析师发布的预测准确性低于非关联分析师,但关联分析师并不一定会遇到更多的职业不利因素。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Chaebol-affiliated analysts and biases in interpreting accruals

This study investigates whether analysts exhibit accrual-related biases in forecasting earnings in the presence of conflicts of interest arising from business group affiliation. Our findings reveal that chaebol-affiliated analysts are more likely to overreact to accruals than do independent analysts by overestimating the persistence of accruals. Notably, affiliated analysts’ accrual-related biases are not reduced with analysts’ experience but intensify when analysts have stronger incentives to provide favorable forecasts for member firms. This suggests a possibility that in the presence of conflicts of interest analysts do not fully incorporate the implications of accruals into their forecasts, potentially with an intention to benefit group interests. In additional analyses, we find that the presence of affiliated analysts does not exacerbate accrual mispricing, which suggests that investors do not take affiliated analysts’ biased forecasts at face value. We also provide evidence that despite issuing less accurate forecasts than unaffiliated analysts, affiliated analysts do not necessarily encounter more career disadvantages.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
3.00%
发文量
24
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