Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics最新文献_第3页

A robust model to estimate a firm’s average economic return 估算企业平均经济回报的稳健模型

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100400

Morris G. Danielson

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引用次数: 0

Acquirers’ political connections and bargaining outcomes in corporate takeover negotiations: Evidence from antitrust reviews 收购方的政治关系与企业收购谈判中的讨价还价结果：来自反垄断审查的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100399

Simon Yu Kit Fung, Lawrence (Hong) Huang

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引用次数: 0

Does opinion shopping impair auditor independence? Evidence from tax avoidance 征求意见是否会损害审计师的独立性？来自避税的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100398

Heesun Chung , Eugenia Y. Lee

引用次数: 0

Institutional investor horizons, information environment, and firm financing decisions 机构投资者视野、信息环境与企业融资决策

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100397

Xin Chang , Yangyang Chen , Kangkang Fu , Endong Yang

引用次数: 0

The impact of top management team incentive dispersion on Non-GAAP reporting 高层管理团队激励分散对非美国通用会计准则报告的影响

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100396

Hannah E. Richards , Yuan Shi , Hongkang Xu

{"title":"The impact of top management team incentive dispersion on Non-GAAP reporting","authors":"Hannah E. Richards , Yuan Shi , Hongkang Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100396","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100396","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine whether the dispersion of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) amongst the top management team (TMT) impacts the likelihood of firms disclosing non-GAAP earnings and the quality of non-GAAP earnings. Management compensation contracts are designed to incentivize executive team members individually and in the aggregate. By structuring these contracts to have similar PPS, those charged with governance can increase collaboration amongst the TMT. However, this collaboration can turn into the TMT colluding to make firm decisions that result in the highest compensation for the TMT. Thus, a greater dispersion of PPS can lead to less collusion. We find that the likelihood of firms reporting non-GAAP earnings decreases and the quality of non-GAAP earnings disclosures increases when there is a higher dispersion of PPS. These findings are consistent with executives that are less incentivized by temporary stock price increases suppressing other executives from eliciting firm scrutiny by disclosing non-GAAP earnings and releasing low-quality non-GAAP earnings. Additionally, we find these effects on non-GAAP earnings are more likely to occur in firms with weaker governance and when the management team has a shorter tenure of working together. Overall, our research provides evidence of the association between the dispersion of TMT PPS and non-GAAP earnings decisions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"20 1","pages":"Article 100396"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138679928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Textual disclosure complexity and analysts’ weighting of information 文本披露复杂性与分析师的信息权重

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100395

Xiaoxiao Yu , Lei Zhao

引用次数: 0

Proving their mettle: Managerial ability and firm performance in trying times 证明自己的能力艰难时期的管理能力与公司业绩

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100393

Barry Hettler , James Cordeiro , Arno Forst

引用次数: 0

U.S. airline responses to mandated disclosure of non-financial performance 美国航空公司对强制披露非财务业绩的回应

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100394

Xiaozhe Gu , Nandu J. Nagarajan , Akin Sayrak , Dhinu Srinivasan

引用次数: 0

Carbon emission trading scheme and firm debt financing 碳排放交易计划与企业债务融资

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100384

Nan Huang , Rong He , Le Luo , Hongtao Shen

引用次数: 0

Historical institution and corporate Innovation: Evidence from China’s Civil-service Examination 历史制度与企业创新：中国公务员考试的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100385

Ruilin Liu , Zheyuan Zhang , Dan Li

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引用次数: 0