{"title":"交错董事会的光明面：劳动力投资效率的证据","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100439","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Using U.S. data from 1983 to 2015, we document that firms with staggered boards exhibit greater labor investment efficiency, measured as less abnormal net hiring, including over-investment (over-hiring and under-firing) and under-investment (under-hiring). A path analysis shows that 8.3% of the total effect of staggered boards on labor investment efficiency is explained by the positive effect of staggered boards on institutional ownership. Overall, our results support the view that staggered boards strengthen managers’ commitment to long-term shareholders’ interests, thereby encouraging managerial efforts to boost labor investment efficiency.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The bright side of staggered boards: Evidence from labor investment efficiency\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100439\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Using U.S. data from 1983 to 2015, we document that firms with staggered boards exhibit greater labor investment efficiency, measured as less abnormal net hiring, including over-investment (over-hiring and under-firing) and under-investment (under-hiring). A path analysis shows that 8.3% of the total effect of staggered boards on labor investment efficiency is explained by the positive effect of staggered boards on institutional ownership. Overall, our results support the view that staggered boards strengthen managers’ commitment to long-term shareholders’ interests, thereby encouraging managerial efforts to boost labor investment efficiency.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":46693,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1815566924000390\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1815566924000390","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
The bright side of staggered boards: Evidence from labor investment efficiency
Using U.S. data from 1983 to 2015, we document that firms with staggered boards exhibit greater labor investment efficiency, measured as less abnormal net hiring, including over-investment (over-hiring and under-firing) and under-investment (under-hiring). A path analysis shows that 8.3% of the total effect of staggered boards on labor investment efficiency is explained by the positive effect of staggered boards on institutional ownership. Overall, our results support the view that staggered boards strengthen managers’ commitment to long-term shareholders’ interests, thereby encouraging managerial efforts to boost labor investment efficiency.
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