收购经验重于业绩:并购后的董事声望

IF 2.9 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Martin Bugeja, Samir Ghannam, Davina Jeganathan, Yaowen Shan
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引用次数: 0

摘要

公司治理研究表明,在董事劳动力市场上,外部董事不会因参与破坏价值的并购(M&A)而受到惩罚,因为无论并购业绩如何,他们都能获得额外的董事职位。这一结果令人费解,因为它表明董事劳动力市场没有为外部董事提供足够的事后安置激励,以减轻并购背景下的代理担忧。我们通过研究独立董事在参与并购后获得的董事职位的声望来进一步研究这个问题。利用美国的数据,我们发现无论并购导致的是价值破坏还是价值创造,并购公司的董事都会获得更有声望的董事职位。总体而言,我们的研究结果强化了这样一种观点,即在董事劳动力市场上,收购经验比收购能力更有价值。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Acquisition experience over performance: Directorship prestige following M&As

Corporate governance research documents that outside directors are not penalised in the director labour market for engaging in value-destroying acquisitions (M&A) as they obtain additional directorships regardless of M&A performance. This result is puzzling as it suggests that the director labour market does not provide sufficient ex post settling-up incentives for outside directors to mitigate agency concerns in the M&A context. We further investigate this issue by examining the prestige of directorships received by independent directors after engaging in an M&A. Using US data, we find that acquiring firm directors are awarded more prestigious directorships, regardless of whether the acquisition resulted in value destruction or value creation. Overall, our findings reinforce the notion that, in the director labour market, acquisition experience holds more value than acquisition ability.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
3.00%
发文量
24
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