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A Teleological Answer to the Special Composition Question 对特殊作文问题的目的论回答
DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-07-21 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12270
Jason Bowers
{"title":"A Teleological Answer to the Special Composition Question","authors":"Jason Bowers","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12270","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12270","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Every contemporary answer to van Inwagen's Special Composition Question faces counterexamples. I defend a teleological answer that avoids these counterexamples. The Teleological Answer claims that a collection of materials composes something exactly when those materials are arranged in order to perform some proper function. After demonstrating this account's immunity to its competitors' counterexamples, I respond to objections.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"73 1-2","pages":"231-246"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12270","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45845492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Naturalness and Convex Class Nominalism 自然主义与凸类名义主义
DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-07-21 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12263
Ben Blumson
{"title":"Naturalness and Convex Class Nominalism","authors":"Ben Blumson","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12263","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12263","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper I argue that the analysis of natural properties as convex subsets of a metric space in which the distances are degrees of dissimilarity is incompatible with both the definition of degree of dissimilarity as number of natural properties not in common and the definition of degree of dissimilarity as proportion of natural properties not in common, since in combination with either of these definitions it entails that every property is a natural property, which is absurd. I suggest it follows that we should think of the convex class analysis of natural properties as a variety of resemblance nominalism.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"73 1-2","pages":"65-81"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12263","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45684810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
McDowell and the Contents of Intuition 麦克道尔与直觉的内容
DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-07-21 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12252
Jacob Browning
{"title":"McDowell and the Contents of Intuition","authors":"Jacob Browning","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12252","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12252","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In <i>Mind and World</i>, John McDowell provided an influential account of how perceptual experience makes knowledge of the world possible. He recommended a view he called “conceptualism”, according to which concepts are intimately involved in perception and there is no non-conceptual content. In response to criticisms of this view (especially those from Charles Travis), McDowell has more recently proposed a revised account that distinguishes between two kinds of representation: the passive non-propositional contents of perceptual experience – what he now calls “intuitional content” – and the propositional contents of judgment – what he now calls “discursive content.” In this paper, I criticize McDowell's account of intuitional content. I argue that he equivocates between two different notions of intuitional content. These views propose different, and incompatible, ways of understanding how a perceiver makes a judgment based on perceptual experience. This is because these two views result from an underlying indeterminacy as to what, if anything, McDowell now means by “conceptual” when he makes claims that intuitional content is conceptual.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"73 1-2","pages":"83-104"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12252","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46082646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The Standing To Blame, or Why Moral Disapproval Is What It Is 指责的立场，或者为什么道德上不赞成
DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-07-21 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12262
Stefan Riedener
{"title":"The Standing To Blame, or Why Moral Disapproval Is What It Is","authors":"Stefan Riedener","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12262","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12262","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Intuitively, we lack the standing to blame others in light of moral norms that we ourselves don't take seriously: if Adam is unrepentantly aggressive, say, he lacks the standing to blame Celia for her aggressiveness. But why does blame have this feature? Existing proposals try to explain this by reference to specific principles of normative ethics – e.g. to rule-consequentialist considerations, to the wrongness of hypocritical blame, or principles of rights-forfeiture based on this wrongness. In this paper, I suggest a fundamentally different approach. Employing Timothy Williamson's idea of ‘constitutive rules’ of speech acts, I argue that this feature of blame is simply constitutive of any essentially moral form of disapproval. So if Adam had the standing to disapprove of Celia's aggressiveness in some form, necessarily, this disapproval couldn't be blame. If I'm right, this proposal thus not only answers our main question, but also sheds an interesting novel light on the very nature of blame. If we didn't have a form of disapproval with that feature, we wouldn't have our practice of holding each other to moral norms.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"73 1-2","pages":"183-210"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12262","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49227229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Presentism and the Specious Present: From Temporal Experience to Meta-Metaphysics 在场主义与特定的在场：从时间经验到元形而上学
DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-07-21 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12271
Olla Solomyak
{"title":"Presentism and the Specious Present: From Temporal Experience to Meta-Metaphysics","authors":"Olla Solomyak","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12271","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12271","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the debate between presentism and eternalism, presentism is often assumed to be the position that is in line with ordinary intuitions and experience, with eternalism being the counter-intuitive position that must explain these intuitions and appearances away. I argue that this assumption is problematic, in that presentism's supposed agreement with our experience is conditional on the assumption that presentism is correct. In particular, attention to specious present models of temporal experience reveals the possibility of a deep disconnect between presentism and experience—on which presentism fails in accommodating the very intuitions that are supposed to motivate the view. I argue that this complexity in the dialectic suggests that we should see the debate between presentism and eternalism in a new light.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"73 1-2","pages":"247-266"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12271","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46647683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
An Argument for Minimal Logic 极小逻辑的一个论证
DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-07-21 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12267
Nils Kürbis
{"title":"An Argument for Minimal Logic","authors":"Nils Kürbis","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12267","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12267","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The problem of negative truth is the problem of how, if everything in the world is positive, we can speak truly about the world using negative propositions. A prominent solution is to explain negation in terms of a primitive notion of metaphysical incompatibility. I argue that if this account is correct, then minimal logic is the correct logic. The negation of a proposition <i>A</i> is characterised as the minimal incompatible of <i>A</i> composed of it and the logical constant ¬. A rule-based account of the meanings of logical constants that appeals to the notion of incompatibility in the introduction rule for negation ensures the existence and uniqueness of the negation of every proposition. But it endows the negation operator with no more formal properties than those it has in minimal logic.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"73 1-2","pages":"31-63"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12267","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48540683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
What is the Relation between a Philosophical Stance and Its Associated Beliefs? 一种哲学立场与其相关信仰之间的关系是什么?
DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12251
Sandy C. Boucher
{"title":"What is the Relation between a Philosophical Stance and Its Associated Beliefs?","authors":"Sandy C. Boucher","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12251","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12251","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Van Fraassen's view that many philosophical positions should be understood as stances rather than factual beliefs, has become increasingly popular. But the precise relation between a philosophical stance, and the factual beliefs that typically accompany it, is an unresolved issue. It is widely accepted that no factual belief is sufficient for holding a particular stance, but some have argued that holding certain factual beliefs is nonetheless necessary for adopting a given stance. I argue against this claim, along with the weaker claim that while there are no beliefs that are necessary for adopting a particular stance, those who share a stance must share some characteristic belief(s) in common. I outline and defend an alternative ‘cluster’ account, according to which, in order to accept a stance, one must hold some minimal subset of the set of theoretical beliefs characteristic of the stance in question. This view can accommodate the intuitions motivating those who defend the stronger necessity claims, while crucially allowing for the flexibility of a stance vis-à-vis the relevant factual beliefs, and its relative independence from those beliefs, which is central to van Fraassen's main examples of stances and their nature.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 4","pages":"509-524"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12251","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48905145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Thought Sharing, Communication, and Perspectives about the Self 思想分享，交流，以及对自我的看法
DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12250
Víctor M. Verdejo
{"title":"Thought Sharing, Communication, and Perspectives about the Self","authors":"Víctor M. Verdejo","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12250","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12250","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many scholars are ready to accept that first person thought involves a special way <i>w</i> such that, for any thinker <i>x</i>, only <i>x</i> can access the first person way <i>w</i> of thinking about <i>x</i>. Standard articulations of this Frege-inspired view involve a rejection of the strict shareability of first person thought. I argue that this rejection eventually forces us to renounce an intuitively plausible characterisation of communication, and specifically, disagreement. This result invites us to explore alternative articulations which, still within an overall Fregean framework, may better explain how first person thoughts reach out into a public, shareable dimension. Here I shape this possibility in terms of perspectives, i.e. ways of thinking that do not individuate concepts or thoughts. Perspectives, I submit, can serve to unproblematically accommodate basic disagreement in indexical cases and to outline the dynamic character of first person thought.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 4","pages":"487-507"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12250","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45906013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Linda T. Zagzebski, Exemplarist Moral Theory, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, 274 pp., £48.49 (hardback), ISBN 9780190655846. 琳达·t·扎格布斯基，《模范道德理论》，纽约:牛津大学出版社，2017年，274页，48.49英镑(精装本)，ISBN 9780190655846。
DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12248
Maria Silvia Vaccarezza
{"title":"Linda T. Zagzebski, Exemplarist Moral Theory, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, 274 pp., £48.49 (hardback), ISBN 9780190655846.","authors":"Maria Silvia Vaccarezza","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12248","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12248","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 4","pages":"633-640"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12248","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41670229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Armchair Access and Imagination 扶手椅与想象力
DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12249
Giada Fratantonio
{"title":"Armchair Access and Imagination","authors":"Giada Fratantonio","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12249","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12249","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, I focus on the Armchair Access Problem for E=K as presented by Nicholas Silins, and I argue, <i>contra</i> Silins, that it does not represent a real threat to E=K. More precisely, I put forward two lines of response, both of which put pressure on the main assumption of the argument, namely, the Armchair Access thesis. The first line of response focuses on its scope, while the second line of response focuses on its nature. The second line of response is the most interesting one, for it represents the framework within which I develop a novel account of second-order knowledge, one that involves evaluation of counterfactual conditionals and the employment of our imaginative capacities, i.e., an imagination-based account of second-order knowledge. The two lines of response are shown to be jointly compatible and mutually supportive. I then conclude that the Armchair Access Problem is not a challenge for E=K, yet it relies on the ambiguity of the notion of armchair knowledge underpinning the Armchair Access thesis.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 4","pages":"525-547"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12249","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45727042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
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