DIALECTICA最新文献_第6页

Challenging Liberal Representationalism: A Reply to Artiga 挑战自由代表主义:对阿蒂加的回应

DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-11-14 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12275

Peter Schulte

引用次数: 4

DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-11-14 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12278

Sungho Choi

{"title":"Reverse-Cycle Intrinsic Finks","authors":"Sungho Choi","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12278","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12278","url":null,"abstract":"There is an ongoing debate among metaphysicians of dispositions about whether intrinsic interferers are possible for dispositions. What is interesting about this debate is that, whilst it is widely noted that dispositional interferers can work on a ‘reverse’ cycle, the possibility of reverse-cycle intrinsic interferers has been put on the sidelines with all the attention being paid to the possibility of their ‘normal’ cousins. Presumably this is due to the perception that a discussion of reverse-cycle interferers will be a trivial repetition of a discussion of normal ones. But I will argue that this perception is wrong. Whilst I acknowledge that there is a significant symmetry between the possibility of normal interferers and that of reverse-cycle ones, it is not a trivial task to give an account of intrinsic interferers in a way that accommodates this symmetry. In fact, when we examine the justifications the participants in this debate have offered for their positions, it will emerge that they are all under pressure to reject the possibility of reverse-cycle intrinsic interferers. What is intriguing about this result is that what advocates of the possibility of normal intrinsic interferers have said in support of that possibility, rather unexpectedly, puts pressure on them to reject the possibility of reverse-cycle intrinsic interferers. Combined with the symmetry between the possibility of normal interferers and that of reverse-cycle ones, this will pose a serious challenge to them.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"73 3","pages":"429-455"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12278","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42494931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Brentanian Inner Consciousness and the Infinite Regress Problem 布伦的内在意识与无限遗憾问题

DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-07-21 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12261

Andrea Marchesi

引用次数: 6

On the Conceivability of a Cognitive Phenomenology Zombie 论认知现象学僵尸的可想象性

DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-07-21 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12260

Martina Fürst

{"title":"On the Conceivability of a Cognitive Phenomenology Zombie","authors":"Martina Fürst","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12260","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12260","url":null,"abstract":"The cognitive phenomenology thesis has it that conscious cognitive states essentially exhibit a phenomenal character. Defenders of ‘conservatism’ about cognitive phenomenology think that the phenomenology of thought is reducible to sensory phenomenology. In contrast, proponents of ‘liberalism’ hold that there is a proprietary, sui generis cognitive phenomenology. Horgan develops a morph-sequence argument to argue for liberalism. The argument is based on the conceivability of a cognitive phenomenology zombie, i.e. a man who does not understand Chinese but shares the behavior and sensory phenomenology with his twin who does understand Chinese. I argue that the conceivability of a cognitive phenomenology-zombie fails to settle the debate between conservatives and liberals. The roots of the ineffectiveness of the argument lie in the diverse readings of sensory phenomenology which flesh out the relation between sensory phenomenology and concepts differently but explain the conceivability of the scenario equally well. The lesson to learn is that to adjudicate the debate about cognitive phenomenology, we first have to clarify the notion of sensory phenomenology.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"73 1-2","pages":"105-127"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12260","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41384769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Self-Knowledge as Knowledge of the Good: Hugh of St. Victor on Self-Knowledge 作为善的知识的自我认识:圣维克多的休论自我认识

DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-07-21 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12268

Boris Hennig

引用次数: 0

Robert Lockie, Free Will and Epistemology: A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018, 320 pp., £91 (hardbound), ISBN 9781350029040. RobertLockie，《自由意志与认识论：为自由的超越论辩护》，伦敦：布鲁姆斯伯里学院出版社，2018年，320页，91英镑（精装），ISBN 978135029040。

DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-07-21 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12257

Luca Zanetti

引用次数: 0

Concepts and the Epistemology of Essence 概念与本质认识论

DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-07-21 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12266

Sonia Roca-Royes